

P R E F A C E

In the present thesis an attempt has been made to discuss some fundamental doctrines of the sublime philosophy of Advaita as propounded by Śaṅkara. The non-dual Brahman-Ātman as the Ultimate Reality, the concept of Māyā, the concept of Māyā-avidyā, the falsity of the world of plurality, the absolute non-difference between jīva and Brahman and the Advaita concept of Mokṣa and the means therefor are the important doctrines that have been discussed in the following pages.

The main purpose of this thesis, however, is to present the views of three illustrious post-Śaṅkara Advaita preceptors, namely, Sureśvara, Vācaspatimiśra and Prakāśānanda, over some fundamental problems pertaining to various aspects of Advaita philosophy. These preceptors, though unanimously upholding the central thesis of Advaita that Brahman is real, the world of plurality is illusory and the so-called jīva is non-different from Brahman, the Absolute, differ among themselves in matter of details, methods of reasoning and techniques. A critical and comparative study of some of the views maintained by these preceptors enlighten us over the main features of the development of Advaitic thought after Śaṅkara.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Al. Ā.	Āitareya Āraṇyaka
Alt. Up.	Āitareya Upaniṣad
AS	Advaita-siddhi
Bh. G. Bh (BGB)	Bhagavad-gītā-bhāṣya
BG	Bhagavad-gītā
Bhā	Bhāmati
BP	Vivaraṇa-bhāva-prakāśikā
Bṛh. Up.	Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad
Br. Sū.	Brahma-sūtra
Brahmobindu.,	Brahmobindu Upaniṣad
BSD	Brahma-sūtra-Śaṅkara-bhāṣya
BS	Brahma-siddhi
BUB	Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad-bhāṣya
BUBV	Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad-bhāṣya-vārttika
Chā. Up.	Chāndogya Upaniṣad
CK	Coḍapāda-kārikā
HIF	History of Indian Philosophy
IS	Iṣṭa-siddhi
Īśa. Up. (Ī. Up.)	Īśāvāsyā Upaniṣad
Kaṭha. Up.	Kaṭha Upaniṣad
Kena. Up.	Kena Upaniṣad
Mahānār.,	Mahānārāyaṇa Upaniṣad

Mā.	Mānasollāsa
Māṇḍ. Up.	Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad
Mund. Up.	Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad
MS	Maṇḍamya-siddhi
Pā. Sū.	Pāṇini-sūtra
PD	Pañdadasi
PP	Pañcapādikā
PPV	Pañcapādikā-vivaraṇa
PV	Pañcīkaraṇa-vārttika
RV	R̥gveda
SB	Siddhānta-bindu
SB	Śaṅkara-bhāṣya
SLS	Siddhānta-loka-saṅgraha
SS	Saṅkṣepa-śārīraka
Śve. Up. (Śvet. Up.)	Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad
SV	Saṁbandha-vārttika
Tai. Brā.	Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa
Tai. Saṁ.	Taittirīya saṁhitā
Tait. Up.	Taittirīya Upaniṣad
TD (VTD)	Vivaraṇa-tātparya-dīpikā
TP	Tattva-pradīpikā
TUSV	Taittirīyopaniṣad-bhāṣya-vārttika
US	Upadeśa-sāhasī
Vi. Pu.	Viṣṇu Purāṇa

VK	Vedānta-kalpataru
VKP	Vedānta-kalpataru-parimala
VP	Vedānta-paribhāṣā
VPS	Vivaraṇa-pramāṇa-saṅgraha
VSSM	Vedānta-siddhānta-sūkti-mañjarī

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INTRODUCTION

(a) Place of Vedānta in Indian Philosophy

India, the native land of philosophy, has produced various philosophical systems, both orthodox (āstika) as well as heterodox (nāstika). These systems are technically termed as darśanas. Among these, Sāṅkhya, Yoga, Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Pūrva-mīmāṃsā and Uttara-mīmāṃsā or Vedānta are regarded to be the six principle Darśanas or systems of orthodox Hindu Philosophy (āstika-ṣaḍ-darśanāni). Vedānta, among them, is the last and at the same time the most sublime philosophy. In fact, it enjoys the supreme position, as a philosophy, both in the east as well as in the west, because this particular system of thought is perfect and complete in all respects. As Dr. R. D. Ranade (Gurudeva) observes: "A Philosophy, if it is to be followed, must be flawless in all its aspects."¹ In other words, a philosophical system, if it is to be accepted universally by all, must be perfect and complete in all its aspects, metaphysical, epistemological, cosmological, axiological, etc. All other systems, except Vedānta fail to fulfil this condition in one way or the other.² It is only in the Vedānta that we can find a proper solution to all the philosophical problems. It discusses all the fundamental problems of life and answers them satisfactorily.³ Except

Vedānta, no other philosophical system in the world is capable of answering the questions in such a satisfying manner. This will be evident if we compare Vedānta with other systems of thought.

According to the Sāṅkhya school, the insentient, inert, Prakṛti itself is the root cause of the world. It creates this variegated world quite independently of any sentient being. But, how can such a wonderful creation be caused by an inert entity, without the assistance of any sentient being? Verily, a stone by itself cannot create anything. Moreover, the Puruṣa (self), according to Sāṅkhyas, is accepted to be passive, and hence does not enter into any activities. Sāṅkhyas have no satisfactory answers to such questions.

The defects pointed out in the Sāṅkhya-school, apply to the Yoga-school also, for it also like the former accepts the insentient Prakṛti to be the independent creator of the world.

Unlike Sāṅkhyas, the Nyāya-school believes in the existence of God (Īśvara).⁴ But the Naiyāyika conception of God is defective, for, according to them, Īśvara is only the efficient cause of the world and not the material

cause too. If He has to depend upon the material cause other than Himself in creating the world, He loses His independence and omnipotence. And Īvara, who is not independent and omnipotent, is no more Īvara. Moreover, according to the Naiyāyikas, the state of liberation is a complete cessation of all sorrows. It is not positively a state of experiencing the supreme happiness, for, according to their view, happiness (sukha) etc., which are the adventitious attributes of the self, are also absent in that state. Thus, the state of release, according to them, can be compared to that of a stone. And no one would endeavour to attain such a stone-like liberation, in which there is not even a bit of happiness (sukha-lāṇa). Śrīhara, in his Naiṣeṭha-carita, aptly ridicules such a type of liberation.⁵

The Vaiśeṣika concept of mokṣa is also the same as that of Naiyāyikas. The Vaiśeṣika-theory that the indivisible atoms are the material cause of the world is also untenable, for, the atoms, which are inert, cannot combine themselves, without the help of someone who can produce activity in them, at the time of creation. Thus, in this theory, the creation (gr̥h̥ti) as well as dissolution (pralaya) become impossible.⁶

The Mīmāṃsā-school also does not represent a complete philosophy, for, though it utterly follows Vedas in all religious matters, it puts aside the necessity of God and thus its metaphysical view is not much different from that of the Nāstika-schools in this regard.⁷ Further, it emphasises only the importance of Karma-kāṇḍa and holds that the performance of karmas ordained therein, alone leads to the attainment of the supreme human goal. And it completely ignores the jñāna-kāṇḍa i.e. the Upaniṣadic portion, which is also a part of the Veda. In this way, all these schools are weak in one aspect or the other. And the untenability of the theories maintained by heterodox schools and the philosophical systems of the west is obvious, for these systems are purely based on the human authority and mere reasoning.

But when we approach Vedānta, we find that it overcomes all such difficulties and inconsistencies. Taking its stand on the Upaniṣads, first it accepts Brahman, which is infinite, non-relational, omnipresent, omnipotent and which is of the nature of existence, knowledge and bliss, to be the ultimate reality. Further, it regards a sentient Īśvara, who is none other than a form of Brahman, as the cause of the origination, sustenance and dissolution of the world. Thus, in Vedānta, Īśvara is

perfect, being both the material and the efficient cause of the world and the inner ruler of all. The liberation, according to Vedānta, is not merely a cessation of sorrow, but the attainment of the supreme bliss. One more distinguishing feature of Vedānta is that it raises the individual soul to the universal status, by regarding it in its essential nature to be identical with Brahman, the all-pervasive reality. According to all other schools, the individual soul is always different from the God and thus never attains the universal nature in any state.

In this way, we arrive at the conclusion that, no other philosophical system is as complete in all respects as Vedānta. Therefore, it is pre-eminent among the philosophies, both eastern and western. Vedānta is hence honoured to be the basis of all knowledge (sarva-vidya-pratiṣṭha).⁸

As we know, Vedas consist of four parts viz., Sāhitās, Brāhmanas, Āraṇyakas and Upaniṣads. These again are divided as karva-kāṇḍa, upāsana-kāṇḍa and jñāna-kāṇḍa. The jñāna-kāṇḍa or Brahma-kāṇḍa, which occurs in the Upaniṣads, is called Vedānta. The Vedānta literally means "the end of the Veda." According to the context, we may take it either in the sense of 'the final portion of the

Veda' or in the sense of 'the ultimate aim of the Veda'. Śaṅkara uses it also in the sense of an Upaniṣadic text as in the compound word 'Vyati-vedāntam'.⁹ If we take the word Veda in its widest sense to mean 'knowledge', then, Vedānta means 'the end of knowledge'. It is here that the knowledge reaches its end. It is here that the knowledge attains its supremacy. There is no knowledge, which can be equalled with the knowledge given by Vedānta, because it gives the knowledge of that entity, by knowing which everything else becomes known,¹⁰ and since through it alone is known all that all kinds of knowledge aim at. After attaining that knowledge, there remains nothing which is unknown and there remains nothing which is undone. This is the ultimate aim of the Vedas. In this way, Vedānta holds a unique position in Indian philosophy. In fact, Vedānta is the native philosophy of India.

(b) Vedānta is Advaita

There have been various schools of Vedānta by name, Advaita, Dvaita, Viśiṣṭādvaita, Śuddhādvaita, Dvaitādvaita etc. All these schools differ from each other on many fundamental problems like the real nature of the individual soul (jīva), God (Īśvara), and the world (jagat). Now, a question naturally arises as to what is the real Vedānta among them? The answer to this question is very simple

and straight-forward. The real Vedānta is Advaita, because the Upaniṣads, which are considered to be the Vedānta, have their purport in teaching only the non-dualism i.e. Advaita, and not the dualism (dvaita) nor the qualified monism i.e. Viśiṣṭādvaita nor any other isms. The valid import of the Upaniṣads can be determined by the help of six traditional modes of interpretation, viz. (1) The unity of thought in the beginning as well as in the end (Upakramopasaṁhāra), (2) Repetition (abhyāsa), (3) Novelty of the thought (apūrvatā), (4) Fruit (phala), (5) Eulogical expressions (arthavāda), (6) Reason (upapatti).¹¹ When we examine the Upaniṣadic texts with the help of these modes, we get only the non-dualistic import. For instance, we may take the Chāndogya Upaniṣad. In this, "In the beginning, O child, this was a mere state of being (sat), one only without a second" (VI.ii.1) is the commencement (upakrama). And, "All this universe is of the nature of that Supreme Being. That is truth. O Śvetaketu, thou art That." (VI.viii.7) is the conclusion (upasaṁhāra). Here, there is complete unity of thought in the beginning as well as in the end, in as much as both the precepts declare the non-duality of the Supreme Being. And the precept, "That thou art", declaring the identity of the individual soul and that Supreme Being, which occurs nine times in the same chapter of that Upaniṣad, is repetition (abhyāsa). Since this

knowledge of the nature of the highest reality is not acquired by any other sources, novelty (apūrvata) also is there. The knowledge of that entity, by knowing which everything else becomes known, is the fruit (phala). The descriptions of creation, maintenance, dissolution etc. from that Supreme Being, which declare its universal character, are the ontological expressions (arthavāda). The illustrations of clay etc., which aim at establishing the sole reality of the cause and falsity of the effect, are reasons (upapatti). And this examination results in the establishment of Brahman as the sole reality, the non-reality of the world and the identity of the individual soul with Brahman, which are the basic tenets of Advaita. This is the internal evidence.

We have also the external evidences. It is the custom of Indian philosophers belonging to the various schools of thought that in order to establish the theories of their own system, they refute the theories of other systems. And while doing so, the Sāṃkhyaas, the Vaiśeṣikaas and Naiyāyikaas, the Yogins, the Mīmāṃsakaas, all of them have refuted the Advaita-school as the Vedānta-school of thought and not any other rival schools. Viśvanātha Pañcānana for instance, in his Nyāya-Siddhānta-Muktāvalī, while controverting the other theories, regarding the nature of

the self, attacks the Advaita concept of self as Vedāntic.^{11a} Even the western scholars, whenever they criticise or appreciate the Vedānta philosophy, they take Advaita-school alone and not any other school. George Thibaut observes, "It has been said before that the task of reducing the whole of the Upaniṣads to a system consistent and free from all contradictions is an intrinsically impossible one. But the task once being given, we are quite ready to admit that Śaṅkara's system is most probably the best which can be devised."^{11b} Max Müller also more or less gives the same opinion.¹² This further strengthens the idea that the real purport of Vedānta is Advaita. Otherwise there is no reason why these scholars should refer to Advaita in the name of Vedānta.

The other schools of Vedānta, viz., Viśiṣṭādvaita of Rāmānuja, Dvaitādvaita of Nimbārka, Śivaviśiṣṭādvaita of Śrīkaṭṭha, Śaktiviśiṣṭādvaita of Śrīpati, Buddhādvaita of Vallabha, Bhedābheda of Bhāskara, Acintya-bhedābheda of Baladeva have added the term 'Advaita' or 'Abheda' to designate their systems. And the Vedānta school propounded by Madhva, which is so emphatic in refuting Advaita, is known as Dvaita. But to our surprise, some modern scholars have suggested, "Svatantrādvitīya-Brahmavēda" or "Svatantrādvaita" as an alternative designation for Madhva's

system.¹³ One point is very clear from this that any school, if it is to be regarded as Vedānta, should accept 'Advaita' in one way or the other. 'Advaita darśana' alone, therefore, is real Vedānta-darśana. The terms Vedānta and Advaita are synonymous. Any attempt to designate it as Advaita-Vedānta is a mere repetition.

But it should be noted that even though the final import of the Upaniṣads is the Nirguṇa-Brahman as the non-dual reality, yet in the Upaniṣads we come across, in many places, the description of the 'Saguṇa Brahman' and the meditation (upāsana) thereupon. Though the Upaniṣads declare knowledge alone to be the sole means of liberation, yet they enjoin karma, upāsana, or bhakti as the subsidiary aids to attain that highest knowledge. Taking this advantage, the other preceptors like Rāmānuja, Madhva, Vallabha, etc., propagated their own traditions by regarding 'Saguṇa-Brahman', which they call as Viṣṇu or Śiva alone as the Supreme, and karma, bhakti or upāsana alone as the sole means for the attainment of liberation. In fact, these schools do not conflict with Advaita; but on the contrary are helpful to it. Because Advaitic-sādhana is possible only in case of the highly qualified persons. All are not qualified to meditate upon Nirguṇa-Brahman.^{13a} To others, thus unqualified, It (Brahman) appears to be

non-existent (asat).¹⁴ Hence, for the convenience of such aspirants, who cannot follow Nirgunopāśanā, other preceptors have propounded the Saṁupāśanā. And since these schools are based on the authority of Upaniṣads and Brahma-sūtras, these are also called 'Vedānta'. But Advaita reconciles all such contradictions as Saṁupa-Nirguna, Karma-Bhakti, Jñāna-yoga etc. and stands as perfect Vedānta philosophy.

(c) Pre-Śaṅkara Advaitic Thought

In the history of philosophy, the tradition of Advaita is the oldest. The roots of Advaita can be traced back to the early Vedic period. Some of the hymns of Ṛgveda, the first literature in the history of the world, abound in Advaitic thought. It is true that Veda is mainly concerned with the praises of and the prayers to various deities like Agni, Indra, Varuṇa, Dyauspati, Aśvins, Mitra, Viṣṇu, Rudra etc., yet we come across the idea that God is one though the wise seers describe Him differently.¹⁵ In the Hiranyagarbha hymn, there is a reference to the one God, who is the giver of life as well as strength; and whose commands all creatures and even Gods obey. Further, in the same hymn, God is described as the one soul of all the gods and as the 'God of Gods'.¹⁶ In the Vācāmbrhaṇi hymn, it is said that the Supreme Power which supports all the gods, Rudra, Āditya, Mitra etc. is one.¹⁷ Elsewhere we

come across the one God who gives names to all the gods, and seeking whom the other beings proceed.¹⁸ The primordial person (Purusa) is declared in the Purusa-sūkta to be all that exists, that was and that will be.¹⁹ The identity of the universe with Purusa declared in this hymn, clearly shows that the universe has no separate existence apart from Purusa. And this is one of the basic concepts of Advaita.

And this idea of personal God was further developed into the concept of one fundamental reality. Thus, a seer clearly says that the Reality is one (ekam sat), though seers speak of it differently, as Agni, Yama, Mātariśvan, etc.²⁰ The Reality that underlies all the gods is here declared to be one. The Uṣasīya-sūkta, 'the flower of Indian Philosophy', referring to the stage prior to the creation, says that there was neither existent (sat) nor non-existent (asat) and comes to the conclusion that there was only that One (sat ekam), which breathed forth at will even in the absence of air; there was nothing beyond it... When there was void surrounding everywhere that One was born by the power of its potency.²¹

In Taittirīya-brāhmaṇa, we come across the idea that Brahman was the word, out of which the heaven and the earth



were carved out; and that Brahman stood supporting the worlds.²² And this clearly conveys the idea that Brahman is both the material as well as the efficient cause of the world (abhinna-nimittopādāna-kāraṇa).

In the Yajurveda, it is said that Agni, Vāyu, Tditya, Jala, Prajāpati and Brahman are one.²³

In the Skambha-sūktas of Atharva-veda, skambha is spoken of as the support of the whole universe. Skambha is the only reality and Skambha is self; whatever breathes in this creation is skambha, the self. This clearly points to the identity of the individual soul and God, the Supreme Reality.²⁴

The Advaitic thoughts reflected here and there in the portions of the Vedas, obtain a more definite shape in the Upaniṣads, 'the everlasting monument of Indian thought and the fountain-head of all subsequent springs of philosophy.' The highest principle, which was referred to in the Vedas as 'Ekam sat' and 'Tad ekam', is declared to be non-dual in the Upaniṣads. The Chāndogya Upaniṣad, for instance, states that Reality, one only without a second, was there in the beginning. And this non-dual reality is also termed as Brahman or Ātman.²⁵ It also

states that by knowing this everything else becomes known, because that alone is the reality, just as by knowing a lump of clay everything made of clay becomes known, the clay being the only reality underlying all the names and forms like pitchers and jars.²⁶

The fundamental concepts of Advaita, such as the non-duality of Brahman and its identity with the individual soul (jīva) are revealed in the Upanisadic texts like "All this is indeed Brahman", (Chā.Up.III.xiv.1); "One only without a second," (Chā.Up.VI.II.1); "This self is Brahman", (Bṛh.Up.II.v.19); "All this is but Brahman" (Bṛh.Up.II.iv.6); "That thou art" (Chā.Up.VI.viii.7); "I am Brahman" (Bṛh.Up.I.iv.10) etc.²⁷

This conception of Brahman as "all this" i.e., the equation of 'Brahman = All this (i.e. the universe)', in the Upanisads subsequently led to the negation of the manifold world. Thus in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad, it is stated that so long as there is duality 'as it were' so long one perceives the other... but when everything becomes his own self, such acts of perception etc. of other things become impossible. It also clearly states that everything other than Ātman is false. Finally the Upaniṣad concludes that "there is no diversity here about anything."²⁸

The current of Advaitic thought continues in the later works like Smṛtis, Dharma-sūtras, epics, Purāṇas etc. The Manu-smṛti, the most ancient in the Smṛti literature, states that 'Ātman is all deities; everything rests in Ātman... some call him Agni, others call him Maruts or Prajāpati, some call him Indra, others call him Prāṇa, while still others call him the eternal Brahman.²⁹ Further, Manu eulogizes the vision of the oneness of the self. He says that 'that sacrificer to the self, who sees self equally in all beings and all beings in his own self, attains spiritual sovereignty!³⁰

The oneness of self is declared in the Mahābhārata also. By way of refuting Sāṅkhya and Yoga, which speak of many souls, it is stated, "He is my indwelling self as well as yours; He is the witness of all others, who are spoken of as associated with bodies; but He is not perceived by anybody anywhere... He is one, but moves through all beings at his will. He is blissful and free from sorrow.³¹ But the main contribution of the Mahābhārata to Advaita is the Bhagavad-gītā, which summarises all the Vedāntic doctrines contained in the Upaniṣads. The Viṣṇupurāṇa also abounds in Advaitic thought.³² In this way, all the ancient scriptures like Vedas, Upaniṣads, Smṛtis etc, declare the Advaitic truth.

It should here be noted that, even though the conclusion arrived at in the Upaniṣads is final and valid, yet at first, Upaniṣads seem to be full of contradictions and hence they do not seem to be representing a consistent system of thought. It is, therefore, not an easy task to deduce them to a consistent philosophical system. But unmistakable credit certainly goes to Bādarāyaṇa, who successfully systematised the philosophy of the Upaniṣads in his Brahma-sūtras. He reconciled all the apparently conflicting statements of the Upaniṣads. Therefore, Śaṅkara states that the aphorisms are meant for stringing together the flowers in the form of the sentences of the Upaniṣads; for it is precisely the sentences of the Upaniṣads, that are referred to and discussed in these aphorisms.³³

The real merit of Bādarāyaṇa lies in the fact that the Brahma-sūtras are the best means of thoroughly discussing the contents of the Upaniṣads with arguments. Doubts may naturally arise in those, who have studied mere Upaniṣads. These Brahma-sūtras remove all such doubts by adducing several logical arguments in support of that Upaniṣadic import. They give the logical justification of the Upaniṣadic import. Therefore, Brahma-sūtra is called the Nyāya-prasthāna or the logical source of the Vedānta.

Brahma-sūtra, which constitutes the Nyāya-prasthāna, is one of the three authoritative works, the so called 'Prasthāna-trayī', on which the Vedānta philosophy is based; the other two being the Upaniṣads i.e., Śruti-prasthāna and the Bhagavad-gītā i.e., the Smṛti-prasthāna. The term 'prasthāna', here means 'a way' or 'a method'. These three viz., the Upaniṣads, Bhagavad-gītā and Brahma-sūtra convey one and the same Vedic import in different ways.

But Bādarāyaṇa was not the only interpreter of the Upaniṣads nor the first author of the Brahma-sūtras. It is known through the references that even before Bādarāyaṇa there were many preceptors, who wrote Brahma-sūtras. Bādarāyaṇa himself, in his Brahma-sūtra, refers to the views of various Ācāryas like Ātreya, Āmarathya, Auḍulomi, Bādari, Jaimini, Kāṇvājani, Kāśakṛtana and Kāśyapa. These Ācāryas, were probably well-versed in Mīmāṃsā as well as in Vedānta, since some of them are referred to in the Mīmāṃsā-sūtra of Jaimini as well. But unfortunately their works have been lost forever. The views of some of these Ācāryas regarding the relation between the individual soul and Brahman will be discussed later on in this thesis. Śaṅkara, in his commentary on the Bṛ. Sū. I. iv. 22, says that, according to Kāśakṛtana, the non-modified Supreme Lord himself

is the individual soul, and not anything else.³⁴ From this it is clear that Kāśakṛtana was the upholder of the Advaita doctrine, which is identical with Śaṅkara's own views.

Before Śaṅkara, there were many old preceptors, who expounded the Vedānta doctrine, namely, Bhartṛhari, Bhartṛprapañca, Brahma-datta, Bhartṛmitra, Brahmanandin, Upavarṇa etc. A brief consideration of the type of Vedānta philosophy held by some of these preceptors and a comparison thereof with Śaṅkara's own teachings will reveal the distinctive contribution of Śaṅkara.

Bhartṛhari was one of the great pre-Śaṅkara Advaitins. His Vākyaśedīya, even though a treatise on grammar, abounds in Advaitic thought. Bhartṛhari's Advaita is technically known as 'Śabdādvaita-vāda'. In the very opening verse itself, he declares that Brahman is without beginning or end, the eternal essence or root principle of speech (śabdatattvam); and the world of phenomena is a transfiguration thereof.³⁵ Thus, he identifies Brahman, the Supreme Reality, with speech, and subscribes to the central doctrine of Advaita by regarding the phenomenal world to be the transfiguration of Brahman. Like Śaṅkara, he also regards the duality to be illusory and holds that this

duality is a product of the power known as Kālaśakti.³⁶ It should be noted here that, even though Bhartṛhari upholds the central doctrine of Advaita, still there are several points of difference between him and Śaṅkara. While according to Śaṅkara the ultimate reality is Nirguṇa-Brahman, for Bhartṛhari it is Śabda-Brahman. According to Bhartṛhari, further, Kālaśakti is held to be responsible for illusion, but for Śaṅkara it is Māyā-śakti which causes duality. While the former accepts Sphoṭa-vāda, the latter rejects it as untenable.^{36a} Śaṅkara recognises the śeṣa aspect of Brahman as Īvara, but Bhartṛhari does not accept Īvara apart from Śabda.

Another notable Vedāntin in the pre-Śaṅkara period was Bhartṛpreśa. Śaṅkara himself has referred to his views in his commentary on the Bṛhadāraṇyakaopaniṣad and Brahma-sūtra.³⁷ The metaphysical doctrine of Bhartṛpreśa is called Bhedābheda or Dvaitādvaita, according to which Brahman is, at once, one and many. Therefore, both duality and non-duality are equally real. Unlike Śaṅkara, he does not accept duality to be an appearance (yivarta) of Brahman, but on the contrary, he regards it to be the transformation (pariṇāma) of Brahman. Thus, Brahman has two aspects viz., duality and non-duality, the former being called the lower Brahman (avara-Brahman) and the latter as higher Brahman

(para-Brahman). Higher-Brahman is the cause of lower Brahman. The relation between the two is also real.

On the practical side, Bhartr-prasaṅga recommends the combination of knowledge and action (jñāna-karma-samuccaya-vāda) as the best means of liberation. But for Śaṅkara karma is only a remote auxiliary, the sole means of liberation being the unaided knowledge. From the above it is evident that Bhartr-prasaṅga was not purely an Advaitin, as he differs from Śaṅkara in many respects.

Another Vedāntin, worth consideration, before Śaṅkara is Brahmadatta.³⁸ But his line of thinking is different from that of Śaṅkara. He upheld that the individual soul (jīva), being born like unconscious things, is non-eternal. Like universe, it also originates from Brahman and again will be dissolved in Brahman itself. But no extant school of Vedānta welcomes such a view. Further, according to him, the purport of the Upaniṣads lies not in the Mahāvākyas like "Tattvamasī" etc., but in such injunctive texts as "ātmaṃ yā ora draṣṭavyaḥ", a view rejected by Śaṅkara in his commentary on the Samanvayādhikaraṇa (I.1.4).

Brahmadatta is an advocate of 'Prasaṅghyāna-vāda', according to which the knowledge arising from the Upaniṣads

is only mediate, and one has to deeply meditate upon it, in order to transmute it into immediate, which alone is capable of dispelling ignorance. Hence, according to this view, it is the constant meditation (prasaṅkhyāna) on the verbal knowledge of Brahman that is the ultimate means of liberation. Suresvara has severely criticised this view.³⁹

Further, Brahmadaṭṭa was a follower of jñāna-karma-samuccaya-vāda, and emphasised the lifelong performance of karma. Unlike Śaṅkara, he does not believe in the embodied-release (jīvan-mukti), but upholds the doctrine of 'videha-mukti', according to which one has to wait till the decease of the body for the attainment of the release. Thus for Brahmadaṭṭa, release is an unseen fruit (adr̥ṣṭa-phala) and not seen fruit (dr̥ṣṭa-phala) as for Śaṅkara.

Śaṅkara, at the close of his commentary on Samanvaya-dhikaraṇa (I.1.4), quotes three verses, the author of which has been identified as Sundara-pādya by later Advaitins.^{39a} These verses reveal that he subscribed to the type of Advaitic thought, which Śaṅkara himself has accepted. According to Sundarapādya, when the Brahman-realisation dawns, any action whatsoever prompted by injunction and prohibition cannot be possible, the body etc. being sublated, and the self in that state becomes free from

all defects. The third verse states that just as the idea that the body is the self is assumed to be valid for all empirical dealings, similarly this empirical knowledge of the world is valid till the direct knowledge of the self dawns.⁴⁰

Gauḍapāda is the most prominent among the pre-Śaṅkara Advaitins. Fortunately, his work i.e. Māṇḍūkya-kārikā, which is the earliest systematic exposition of the Advaita philosophy, has come down to us. Tradition regards Gauḍapāda as the teacher of Śaṅkara's teacher (guru-guru), and Śaṅkara himself commented upon his Māṇḍūkya-kārikā. Śaṅkara refers to Gauḍapāda respectfully as the knower of tradition (saṃpradāyavid). According to Gauḍapāda, the ultimate reality i.e. Brahman is non-dual and the manifold world of phenomena is merely an appearance thereof. He accepts jñāna alone to be the sole means of release. In this way, there is no doctrinal difference between him and Śaṅkara. Only one verse from the Māṇḍūkya-kārikā is sufficient to show that he was a great Advaitin - "In reality, there is no dissolution, no creation; there is no one bound, no one longing for release, and none liberated. This is the supreme truth."⁴¹ In his kārikās, Gauḍapāda has neatly set forth all the cardinal doctrines of Advaita, such as the orders of reality, the identity of Brahman

and Ātman, Māyā, the inapplicability of causation to ultimate reality and jñāna as the sole means of liberation. Only a true Advaitin can advocate such views. And Gauḍapāda's work must have deeply influenced Śaṅkara in expounding his system of thought.

Maṇḍana Miśra, one of the elder contemporaries of Śaṅkara, wrote an Advaitic treatise, by name Brahma-siddhi, following the Upaniṣadic tradition. But his approach to Advaita slightly differs from that of Śaṅkara. Vācaspati was deeply influenced by Brahma-siddhi, on which he wrote an elaborate commentary, by name 'Brahma-tattva-saṅkṣepa.' And Vācaspati has tried to incorporate some of the views of Maṇḍana in his Dharmatī a commentary on Śaṅkara's Śārīraka-bhāṣya.

(d) Śaṅkara's Contribution

Śaṅkara, the greatest of Advaitins, is one of the most remarkable personalities, ever produced on this soil. In fact, in the history of Indian philosophy, he occupies a very high position. In India, he is held to be almost a divine personality, an incarnation of Śiva. A true Hindu, who knows his life and works, never fails to express this. Living a life of only thirty two years, he acquired wide knowledge, renounced the worldly life, travelled all

over India, winning over the followers of rival schools of thought, created a vast literature, converted the followers of diverse faiths to their purer forms by suggesting something more reasonable and more spiritual, and established mutts in different parts of India for the preservation and propagation of the Hindu faith. We cannot even imagine that one could achieve so many things in such a short span of life of 32 years.

In Śaṅkara, we find an illustrious saint-philosopher, a great dialectician, a good poet, a sincere devotee, a great yogin and also a devoted social worker. Though Śaṅkara was the upholder of the doctrine of the Nirguṇa-Brahman, yet there is no one whom we may compare with Śaṅkara in depicting the saguna-bhakti in such a beautiful style as Śaṅkara did in his stotras. In the situation, when there were no vehicles, he travelled all over India, successfully revivifying the true Hindu religion (janātana-dharma). Though Śaṅkara preached the falsity or the illusoriness (mithyātva) of the world, he dedicated his whole life for the welfare of this world. It is no exaggeration to say that if Śaṅkara would not have incarnated, the true Hindu religion would have vanished once for all.

To Śaṅkara, philosophy is not merely an intellectual gymnastic, a mere game of logic, but it is a real way of life. According to him, philosophy should enable one to seek the truth, to live according to it and finally to attain spiritual release. Śaṅkara's life itself is the best illustration to this ideal. He preached what he lived and what he experienced in the highest intuition of Brahman. The influence of Śaṅkara's philosophy is so deep that, in popular mind Vedānta is almost equated with Śaṅkara and "whenever we speak of Vedānta philosophy, we mean the philosophy that was expounded by Śaṅkara."^{41a}

It should be noted here that Śaṅkara did not invent an entirely new system of thought, but faithfully interpreted the three basic canons of Vedānta (prasthāna-trayī) i.e. the principal Upaniṣads, the Bhagavad-gītā and the Brahma-sūtra and showed that the ultimate import conveyed by them is 'Advaita' (non-dualism). An impartial critic, on going through the commentaries of Śaṅkara on these three, feels that Śaṅkara correctly represents their teachings. Possessed of great dialectical skill, a deep insight into all the philosophical problems, and a thorough acquaintance with all the other schools of thought, orthodox as well as heterodox, Śaṅkara systematised the Upaniṣadic philosophy and established it on the firm and secure

foundation. In doing so, Śaṅkara adopted a two-fold method. On the one hand he refuted all the rival schools of thought, orthodox as well as heterodox, as baseless, and on the other he defended his own philosophy by showing it to be in complete harmony with śruti (scripture), yukti (reason) and anubhava (experience). And here lies the main contribution of Śaṅkara to Advaita philosophy. Śaṅkara sincerely claims his philosophy to be based on the Upaniṣads and calls it as 'Upaniṣaden darśanam'.⁴² His bhāṣyas are celebrated for their lucidity of language and depth of thought (bhāṣyaṁ prasannagambhīram).⁴³ After Śaṅkara, many preceptors wrote their own commentaries on the 'Prasthāna-trayī', but none of them could stand against the glare of Śaṅkara.

The quintessence of Śaṅkara's philosophy is beautifully summarised in a single line as follows: "Brahman is real, the world is phenomenal, and the individual soul is none other than Brahman."⁴⁴

According to Śaṅkara, the ultimate reality is non-dual (Advaita) Brahman, which is attributeless and of the nature of reality, knowledge and bliss (sacchidananda-avarūpaṁ). The world of phenomena is merely an appearance of Brahman, a product of the 'Māyā-śakti' of Brahman. Just as a

rope appears as a snake, so the Absolute Brahman appears as the world. Brahman in its saguna-aspect is viewed as Ivara, who looks after the creation etc. of the world. Though the world is phenomenal from the absolute stand-point, yet it is practically real and serves all our practical needs. This, Śaṅkara establishes by recognising different levels of reality. And it is this introduction of different levels of reality, that enabled Śaṅkara to remove all the apparent inconsistencies and contradictions in the Upaniṣads and to deduce them to a consistent system of thought. The individual soul in its essence is none other than Brahman. But identifying itself with the body, mind and senses it thinks itself to be finite, a doer, an enjoyer and a sufferer. When the limiting adjuncts like body caused by Māyā are removed at the dawn of Brahman-realization, jīva attains Brahmanhood, which is liberation; and this can be possible even when living in this body. And jñāna, arising from the mahākāvyas like 'Tattvamaṣi', alone is the sole means of liberation, and karma, bhakti, upāsana etc. are only remote auxiliaries in attaining that knowledge.

(c) The rise of three sub-schools in Advaita Philosophy

The Advaitic stream of thought, which originated in the early Vedic period and grew at the hands of Śaṅkara

did not stop there only; but it proceeded through out the successive centuries undergoing still subtler elaboration and fuller clarity provided by Śaṅkara's followers. After Śaṅkara, the Advaitic thought developed in two phases, viz., the irenical phase and the polemical phase. H.N. Ananta Krishna Shastri has called them as 'Adhikaraṇa-praethāna' and 'Vāda-praethāna' respectively.⁴⁵ The former, viz., the irenical phase, which covers the period from 9th century to 13th century, is mainly characterised by the commentaries upon Śaṅkara's commentaries upon Brahma-sūtra and the Upaniṣads. During this period, Śaṅkara's followers including some of his direct disciples further elaborated and neatly clarified the teachings of their Master.

This work continued even in the later stage i.e., the polemical period. But this phase is mainly concerned with defending the central teachings of Advaita, put forth by their predecessors from the attacks of the hostile Vedāntic systems and controverting the theories of those rival schools like those of Rāmānuja, Madhva, etc. In this way, the post-Śaṅkara Advaitic period witnesses two sorts of activities. The following pages are mainly concerned with the development of Advaitic thought during the first phase viz., the irenical phase.

Śaṅkara's works exercised a moulding influence over his disciples who followed him. Being inspired by their Master's unmatched genius, they undertook the task of interpreting Śaṅkara's works, in order to neatly clarify some fundamental problems concerning epistemology, ontology and cosmology etc., which Śaṅkara had slightly touched. Śaṅkara, being mainly concerned with the establishment of the identity of the self and the Brahman, as the ultimate import of all the scriptures, some times does not attach much importance to the explanation of empirical details. Even though 'superimposition' (adhyāsa), for instance, is one of the fundamental concepts of Śaṅkara's teachings, he, in his 'Adhyāsa-bhāṣya', gives only its important features and states some of the rival theories of 'adhyāsa' without indulging in unnecessary details. But his commentators like Padmapāda, Vācaspati etc. explain and establish the Advaita concept of Adhyāsa in all its aspects, by refuting the other theories. Śaṅkara treats the concept of Māyā as almost central to his teachings. But even then there is no specific defence of the concept of Avidyā or Māyā in his works. His followers took up this task of defending this basic concept and in the Pañcapādika-vivaraṇa of Prakāśātman we find a detailed account of the Avidyā concept. Śaṅkara's successors have answered all possible objections that can be raised against the concept of Avidyā.

Apart from this, these disciples continued the work of criticising the jñāna-karma-samyacaya-vāda, bhedāinoda-vāda and other loose metaphysical positions held by the rival schools of thought, more elaborately and more severely than Śaṅkara.

Another distinguishing feature of the immediate post-Śaṅkara period is that, his disciples tried to solve some of the basic problems on the empirical plane from their own fundamental outlook and as a result of this, many differing interpretations began to germinate gradually. The main reason for the rise of these differing interpretations is "... the fluid condition of some of the fundamental concepts in the scheme of metaphysics as conceived of by Śaṅkara."⁴⁶ These differing interpretations, even though not so emphatic and dissimilar to each other in the beginning, later on grew into crystallised forms and thus led to the formation of separate sub-schools in Advaita. Even though all these schools subscribe to the central theme of Advaita i.e., non-dual Brahman as the ultimate reality, yet they differ from each other over some fundamental problems and each one of these divergent views finds its source in the teachings of Śaṅkara.

Thus, the two direct disciples of Śaṅkara viz.,

Padmapāda and Sureśvara began to elaborate and clarify the original teachings of their Master by writing commentaries upon his works. Padmapāda commented upon Śaṅkara's Brahma-sūtra-bhāṣya, in his Pañcapādikā, the original work of the Vivaraṇa school, which represents one of the dominant currents of thought in the post-Śaṅkara Advaita. In fact, the distinctive features of the Vivaraṇa-school are found in Prakāśātman's Pañcapādikā-vivaraṇa, the famous commentary on the Pañcapādikā.

Sureśvara, who wrote elaborate versified commentaries (vārttika) on Śaṅkara's Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad-bhāṣya and the Taittirīyopaniṣad-bhāṣya, is the founder of the Vārttika-school. Besides this, Sureśvara also wrote an independent treatise on Advaita by name Naṣṭakarmyasiddhi, wherein he treats all the important tenets of the system.⁴⁷

Shortly after these two disciples, there flourished another illustrious philosopher, by name Vācaspati Miśra, who wrote a comprehensive commentary on Brahma-sūtra-bhāṣya of Śaṅkara called Bhāmatī. This famous commentary is characterised by the combination of the philosophical elements of not only Gauḍapāda and Śaṅkara but also of Maṇḍana Miśra. Bhāmatī represents another main stream in the development of Advaitic thought after Śaṅkara.

Without the help of these commentaries it is very difficult to comprehend the subtlety of Śaṅkara's thoughts. No doubt it is the duty of a commentator to faithfully interpret the original works. But, in doing so, one may take liberty to expound the minor details, and sometimes one's own opinions may possibly creep in. Thus, the above commentators, though faithful to the original works of Śaṅkara, adopt different modes of setting forth some fundamental doctrines of their system. These commentaries, therefore, exhibit a rich variety and considerable originality in tackling various problems. A critical and a comparative study of some of the views maintained by the preceptors of these three sub-schools viz., the Vivaraṇa-school, the Vārttika-school, and the Bhāmatī-school, gives us a fair idea about the development of the Advaitic thought in the first phase of the post-Śaṅkara Advaita. Later on, various Advaita preceptors wrote several commentaries and independent works on these sub-schools to establish and endorse the cardinal doctrines of the respective sub-schools.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. R. D. Renada, Vedānta - The Culmination of Indian Thought, p. 1.
2. "There may be one which has reached the giddy heights of speculation in metaphysics, but lacks the moral fervour or the psychological insight or the spiritual enlightenment. Another may be very strong in putting forth the moral standard of conduct, but non-logical in character. The epistemology of one may be in direct conflict with its metaphysics. The Vedānta philosophy which we are trying to present in the following pages will be, so to say, a joint communiqué of the philosopher and the mystic. With God-realisation as the be-all and the end-all of the human endeavour, and as the central theme of Vedānta, we shall find in the sequel that all the problems of philosophy fall in their proper order".

Ibid.

3. अ०. विद्वत्स्यं ब्रह्म ह्यतः स्म ज्ञातः
जीवाय केन क्व च तैत्तिरिहः ।
अधिष्ठिताः केन तुल्यैरेषु
वर्तमाने ब्रह्मविदो व्यवस्थाग् ।

Śvet. Up. I. 1. 1.

4. Udayanācārya in his Nyāya-kusumanjālī has adduced several reasons in order to establish the existence of Īśvara.

कार्यायोजनभूत्यादेः यदास्त्ययतः ज्ञेयः ।
वाक्यात्तस्या विज्ञेयस्य सौख्यं विनिविद्यते ॥
Nyāya-kusumanjālī Ch. V. V. 1.

5. मुक्तये यः शिवायैव सात्त्विके लोकात्मा ।
गौतमे तस्यैव यथा विद्यते तथैव सः ॥
Naiṣadha-Sūtra, XVII-75.
6. BSE, II, 11 .12-17, pp.808-822.
7. "Together with Vaiśeṣika, Mīmāṃsā can be said to be heterodox, in fact the Sāṅkhya, the Vaiśeṣika and the Mīmāṃsā should be excluded from the orthodox systems, Sāṅkhya because it is Mirāvara, Vaiśeṣika because it recognises no anta-vākya and Mīmāṃsā because it finds no necessity of God...

If we were to enquire into the metaphysical problems of Mīmāṃsā we find that this system does away with the problem of God and what is left is a heterodox metaphysics".

R.D.Ranade, OR.Sit., p.26.
8. स ब्रह्मविता सर्वविधाप्रतिष्ठाता
अथर्ववेदोक्तप्रकारेण गृह्यते ॥
Mund. II, 1.1.
9. BSE, III, 111.1. p.736.
10. येनाहुर्न ह्येतं मन्त्रमन्त्रं सात्त्विकं विद्वान् स्यात् ।
Chā. II, VI.1.3.

11. उपपत्तिस्तथावस्थासौपूर्वता एवम् ।
 अर्थादोपपत्तिरिति न तद्विपर्ययः ।
 This verse is quoted from the Ārṇabha-sūtrāṭīkā in
 Śāyana-mādhava's Sarva-darśana-saṅgraha, p. 70.
 (Ānandaśārama Sanskrit Series No. 51, Poona, 1966).
- 11 a. Viśvanātha-pañcānana's Nirṇaya-siddhānta-muktāvalī
 Pratyakṣa-khaṇḍa, pp. 221-226.
 (Nirṇaya-sagara Press, Bombay, 1916).
- 11 b. George Thibaut, Introduction to Vedānta-sūtras
 with the commentary by Śaṅkarācārya. p. cxvii.
 (SBE Series Vol. xxiv).
12. Max Müller, The Six Systems of Indian Philosophy, p. 191
 (The Chowkhamba Sanskrit Studies. Vol. XVI).
13. "I would venture to suggest "Syātāntarādvaitīya-
 brahma-vāda" as an alternative designation for
 Medhva's system, capable of conveying directly
 rather than by implication or definition the
 highest reach of its thought and its metaphysical
 ideology so often stressed by Medhva and so well
 expounded by Jayatīrtha.
 ... The name I suggested twenty years ago (in
 the AUI and subsequently in my book: "Syātāntarādvaita"
 Madras, 1942) has had the high pontifical approval
 of the late Swāmi Satyaśrīmatīrtha of the

- ... Uttarādi mutt. Its adoption might help substantially in focussing attention on the highest metaphysical standpoint of the system to a greater extent and much more directly than the current designation."

B. N. K. Sharma, A History of the Nyāya-school of Vedānta. Introduction, pp. 6-7.

- 13a. मध्यविकारे अनन्ते प्रथमणि त्रीः पुंभिः
शक्या बुद्धिः स्थापयितुं, मन्दमध्यमोत्तमबुद्धिरवात् पुंसां ।
Bṛh. III. 11. 33. p. 726.
14. दिग्देशगुणप्रतिफलमसूत्रं हि परमार्थसत् ३८४
प्रथम मन्दबुद्धीनां अतदिव प्रतिभाति ।
Śū. ca Śū. Op. VIII. 1. 1.
15. रूपं विष्णुः रूपो ब्रह्मणि
सकं तन्तं बहुधा कल्पयन्ति ॥
RV. X. 114. 5.
16. a) य आत्मदा ब्रह्मा यस्य विश्वे
उपासीते प्रणिषी यस्या देवाः ।
b) ततो देवानां सम्यक्तातुरेकः ।
c) यो देवैर्विष देव एक आसीत् ।
RV. X. 121 2, 7, 8.
17. अहं स्त्रेभिर्मनुभिश्चराभि
अहमादित्यैस्तविश्वदेवैः ।
अहं विश्वावल्गोमा हिमभि
अहमिन्द्राग्नी अहमश्विनोमा ।
RV. X. 125. 1.



18. यो देवानां नामधा स एव
तं तंभ्रमे भुवना पान्तयन्त्या ॥
RV. X. 62. 3.
19. पुण्य स्वेदं तर्हि यदभूतं यच्च मध्यम् ।
RV. X. 90. 2.
20. हन्तुं मित्रं वसन्मग्निमाहु-
रथो दिव्यः स सुवर्णो मरुमान् ।
सं तत् विष्टा बहुधा वयन्ति
अग्निं यमं मातासिवातमाहुः ॥
RV. X. 264. 46.
21. आनीदवार्तं स्वध्या तदेकं
तस्मादान्यन्न परः किञ्चनात ।
तुष्टेनाम्बुषिहितं यदातीत्
तपसास्तन्यहिना वायुकिम् ॥
RV. X. 121. 32, 3.
महद् देवानामसुरस्वमेकम् । RV. III. 55. 1-22.
तदेकं देवानां त्रेहोवपुष्मण्यम् । RV. V. 62. 1.
सं वा ह्यं विष्टमू विष्टम् । RV. VIII. 58. 2.
22. ब्रह्म वर्त ब्रह्म स बृध आतीत्
यतो यावापृथिवी निष्टतधुः ।
मनीषिणी मनसा विष्टवीमि वः
ब्रह्मापृथितिह्य भुवनानि पारयत् ॥
RV. X. 121. 32, 3.
23. तदेवाग्निस्तदापित्यस्तदवायुस्तद् वन्द्रमाः ।
तदेव शुक्रस्तद् ब्रह्म तदापस्तत्प्रजापतिः ॥
Sukla-Yajurveda, 35. 3. 1.

24. त्वम् हृदं विश्वं भुवनादिवेश ।
Atharvashukla. 10.7.35.
 and
 त्वमेमे विष्टम्भे धीरव भूमिव तिष्ठतः ।
 त्वम् हृदं त्वमात्मन्वद् यत् प्राणन्निमिष्य यत् ॥
Atharva. 10.8.2.
25. a) त्वेव सोम्य हृदम् आसीदिकमेवाद्वितीयम् ।
Chā. Up. VI.11.1.
 b) आत्मा वा हृदमेव स्यात् आसीत् ।
AI. A. 2.4.1.1.
 c) ब्रह्म वा हृदम् आसीत् ।
Bṛh. Up. 1. iv. 10.
26. यथा सोमैकेन मूर्तिपण्डेन त्वं भुवमयं
 विधातं स्याद् वायारम्भं विधारी मामयं
 मूर्तिरुत्तरेव सत्यम् ।
Chā. Up. VI.1.4.
27. त्वं उत्पद्यं ब्रह्म - Chā. Up. III. xiv. 1.
 एकमेवाद्वितीयम् - Chā. Up. VI.11.1.
 ज्यमात्मा ब्रह्म - Bṛh. Up. II. v. 19.
 हृदं त्वं यदयमात्मा - Bṛh. Up. II. iv. 6.
 तत्त्वमसि - Chā. Up. VI. viii. 7.
 त्वं ब्रह्मास्मि - Bṛh. Up. I. iv. 10.
 त्वं ह्येतद् ब्रह्म - Mānd. Up. 2.

28. यत्र हि द्वैतमिव भवति तदितर इतरं विप्रति तदितर इतरं पश्यति....
यत्र त्वस्य सर्वमात्मैवामृतं तत् केन कं विप्रैश्च तत् केन कं पश्येत्
Bṛh. Up. II. iv. 14.
एष त आत्मा सर्वान्तरः अतोऽन्यदार्तम् ।
Bṛh. Up. III. iv. 2.
नेह नानास्ति किं घन -
Bṛh. Up. IV. iv. 19.
29. आत्मैव देवताः सर्वाः सर्वमात्मन्यवस्थिताम् ।
आत्मा हि जन्यदेवता कर्मयोगं शरीरिणाम् ॥
Mahābhārata, XII. 119.
रन्मोक्षे तदन्त्यग्निं मस्तोऽन्ये प्रजापतिम् ।
पन्मोक्षे परे प्राणस्य परे ब्रह्म शाश्वतम् ॥
Mahābhārata, XIII. 123.
30. सर्वभूतेषु यात्मानं सर्वभूतानिवात्मनि
संपश्यन्नात्मवाजी वै स्वाराज्यमधिप्यति ॥
Mahābhārata, XII. 91.
31. ममात्तरात्मा तव घ ये पान्ये देवसंस्थिताः ।
सर्वेषां साधिभूतोऽमी न ग्राह्यः केनचित् क्वचित् ॥
विश्वमूर्धा विश्वमुजो विश्वपादाक्षिणस्त्रिः ।
स्फुरयति भूतेषु स्वैरवारी यथातुल्यम् ॥
- Quoted from Vāntīgarva of Mahābhārata,
Mokṣadharmā in Bṛh. II. 1. 1.
32. एकः समस्तं यदिदृष्टिं किञ्चिद्
तदप्युतो नास्ति परं ततोऽन्यत् ।
तोऽहं तव सर्वं तव त्वमित् ।
आत्मत्वस्यैव तव मोहभ्रमम् ॥
Vi. Bṛ. II. 16. 23.

33. वेदान्तवाक्यकुसुमगुणार्थत्वात्
तूनायाम्, वेदान्तवाक्यानि हि त्वेस्तादृश्य
विधार्यन्ते ।
BSE. I. 1. 2. p. 00.
34. 'काश्चिदस्त्वस्यावार्थस्याविकृतः परमेवरो
जीवो नाम्य इति मतम् ।
PA. 222. I. 17. 22. p. 417.
35. अनादिनिधनं ब्रह्म शब्दतत्त्वं यद्वदम् ।
विवर्तितसंभावेन प्रकृया जगती यतः ॥
Vedānta-sūtra I. 1.
36. एकमेव यदात्मनो भिन्नं शक्तिरूपमात्रम् ।
अप्यस्तदेषां शक्तित्वम्; पृथक्त्वेनैव वर्तते ॥
PA. 222. I. 2.
36. Cf. BSP. I. 111. 20, pp. 321-330.
37. SB on Brh. Up. V. 1. See also Sureśvara's Vārttika
and Ānandagiri's gloss on it, Cf. BSP. II. i. 14.
pp. 456-458.
38. Cf. M. Hiriyanna, 'Brahmadatta: An Old Vedāntin'
Journal of Oriental Research, Madras, Vol. IX. pp. 1-9.
39. MS. I. 67, III. 88-93, and III 123-126. SV. 810-849.
DUBV. IV. 14. 796-961.
- 39 a. Āmasvarūpa's Prebodbhāṣāśāhī on Saṁkṣepa-sāhī,
p. 373.

40. गौणिक्रियात्मनोऽतस्यै पुनर्देहादिबाधनात् ।
तदुद्भवात्माहमित्येवं बोधे कार्यं कथं श्येत् ॥

अन्येऽहम्यात्मविज्ञानात्प्राविश्यात्तत्त्वमात्मनः ।
अन्विष्टः स्यात्प्रमासि पाप्मदोषादिगर्हितः ॥

देहात्मप्रत्ययो यद्वत् प्रमाणत्वेन कल्पितः ।
नौ किञ्च तद्वेदेऽपि प्रमाणं स्यात्समाप्तिपयात् ॥
DSB. L.I.4. pp.154-155.

41. न निरोधो न चोत्पत्तिः न यदो न य तावकः ।
न बुभुक्षुर्न वै मुक्त इत्येषा परमार्थता ॥
Gr. II.32.

- 41 a. Cf. S.N.Dasgupta, History of Indian Philosophy.
Vol. I, p.429.

42. तस्याहम्यन्वयमिदमीपनिषद् दर्शयत् ।
DSB. II.1.9. p.447.

43. नत्वा विष्णुविज्ञानं शीघ्रं हस्याहम् ।
"भाष्यं प्रसन्नगम्भीरं तत्प्रणीतं विष्णुवते ॥
Prāṇatī, Invocatory verse 6. and
पदादिवृत्ताभारेण परिगणं विभर्ति यत् ।
"भाष्यं प्रसन्नगम्भीरं" तद्व्याख्यां ह्याहम् ॥
Pañcanadīka, invocatory verse 5.

44. The oft-quoted dictum which sums up Śaṅkara's
teachings is as follows -

असौलार्थेन प्रवक्ष्यामि गुरुवत् प्रत्यक्षोक्तिभिः ।
ब्रह्म सत्यं आन्विष्या जीवो ब्रह्मेव नापरः ॥

45. Cf. Ananta Kṛpā Śāstri, Advaita-siddhi, intro., p. 36.
(Mehasechand Lachhmandas, New Delhi, 1984)

46. Cf. S. S. Hasurkar, Vācārātmikā on Advaita
vedānta, p. 99.

Cf. also HIF Vol. II, p. 44.

47. श्रीशेखरान्तसारसंग्रहणसारम् ।
NS X, Sambandhokti to V.1.

CHAPTER II
THE CONCEPT OF SUPERIMPOSITION (ADHYĀSA)

a) Introductory Remarks

That the non-dual Brahman-Ātman alone is the ultimate reality and everything other than Brahman-Ātman, i.e. the universe consisting of body, mind, senses etc. is illusorily superimposed on It due to ignorance, has been established in the previous chapter. Now we are confronted with the questions- What is the nature of superimposition? Can the mutual superimposition of the Self and the not-Self be possible? If it is possible, what is the evidence? These questions Śaṅkara has answered in his brief exposition of Adhyāsa. The concept of Adhyāsa, in fact, is one of the most fundamental concepts of Advaita philosophy. And it is a very difficult problem too. Śaṅkara, therefore, tackles this problem at the very beginning of his commentary on the Brahma-sūtras. He, therein points out only the relevant features of Adhyāsa without indulging into unnecessary details. But his followers, however, have established this basic concept in all its details by elaborating and clarifying many thoughts on Adhyāsa which were but slightly hinted at by their Master.

Śaṅkara, in his Adhyāsa-bhāṣya, declares that our entire business of life involving the differentiation such

as "I do this action", "This is the fruit of my action", "I am stout or lean or fair", "I am standing or going", "I am dumb or blind", "I desire or resolve or doubt" etc. is based on the superimposition of the nature and attributes of the Self on the not-Self and vice-versa. Really, without this mutual superimposition of the Self and the not-Self, it is not possible for us to carry on our day-to-day affairs of life. It is only on relating the Self with the not-Self both in respect of their natures and attributes that all our empirical usages of day-to-day experience proceed. And all worldly conduct and Vedic actions related to the valid means of knowledge and the valid knowledge, and even all the scriptural teachings relating to injunctions, prohibitions and release are promoted, by adopting this mutual superimposition of the Self and the not-Self. (a) This is the revolutionary statement made by Śaṅkara. And such a superimposition is designated as Nescience (Avidyā), as it is the root cause of all evil (garva-anartha-betu). It is the root cause of all evil, because it brings about suffering to the non-suffering inner-Self, by imposing the adverse internal organ, body, senses etc. associated with pleasure and pain, death, old age etc. on the inner Self, which is free from all such distinctions. (b) Further, this mutual superimposition of the Self and the not-Self, which consists in wrong attribution of doership (kartṛtva), enjoyership

(bhoktṛya) etc. to the Self, is beginningless (anādi), as it is a continuous stream. Though it is anādi it has an end, because it disappears when the right knowledge of the Self dawns.

At first it appears to be unbelievable that the Self and the not-Self could be mutually superimposed on each other; in so far as they are opposed to each other in respect of their natures like darkness and light. For, the Self (Ātman) is of the nature of eternal, pure consciousness and infinitude, whereas the not-Self i.e. body, senses, mind etc. is of the nature of non-eternal, insentient and finite. The Self is of the sphere of the notion 'I' (āsmat-pratyaya-geṇa) while the not-Self is of the sphere of the notion 'Thou' (yuṣmat-pratyaya-geṇa). The Self is the subject (viśayin) and the not-Self is the object (viśaya). It is, therefore, evident that the Self and the not-Self, which, in this way, are as opposed to each other in character as the light and darkness, cannot be mutually superimposed. When their mutual superimposition is proved to be impossible, much less can there be the mutual superimposition of their respective attributes on each other, ^(c) for it is a well-known fact that the attributes having dissociated themselves from their substrates cannot exist elsewhere. ^(d)

But Śaṅkara asserts that in spite of all this, it is a natural process on the part of every one, resulting from the false ignorance (mithyābhāṣa), to superimpose the nature and the attributes of the Self on the not-Self and vice-versa, through the lack of discrimination of each other, even though they are absolutely distinct from each other. Thus by coupling the real (satya) i.e. the Self of the nature of pure consciousness and the unreal (asatya) i.e. the not-Self consisting of body, senses, mind etc. which are insentient, we make use of such expressions as "I am this" and "This is mine".¹

Śaṅkara, in this way, states the nature (avarūpa), the cause (nimitta) and result (phala) of the superimposition. Its nature consists in superimposing mutually the nature and attributes of the one thing (Self) on the other(not-Self). It, in other words, is the coupling the real and the unreal (satyanṛta-mithunīkaraṇa). The cause of superimposition is the failure to discriminate or distinguish either of them from each other even though they are absolutely distinct. This non-discrimination again in its turn is rooted in the ignorance of the true nature of the Self. And the result of superimposition is our day-to-day affairs or actions of life (vyavahāra), which consist in making use of such expressions as "I am this (body)" and "This (old age, death, son, cow, ownership etc.) is mine."²

Our day-to-day affairs of life are generally based on two kinds of superimposition or erroneous notion, namely, ahamabhimāna i.e. in the form of 'I' and mamābhimāna i.e. in the form of 'mine'. In the former i.e. ahamabhimāna, we wrongly identify the self with the intellect, or the mind, or the organs of sense and action or the body which are not-self, and make use of such usages as "I know", "I think", "I am happy", "I see this", "I am blind", "I am going", "I am fair" etc. And in the latter i.e. the mamābhimāna, we wrongly identify the ownership of the external things like cow, son, wife, property etc. with the Self and say "This is my cow", "This is my son", "This property belongs to me", etc. Due to deep attachment, there is the superimposition of the oneness in respect of the son, wife etc.^{2a} And thus when a child is adorned with clothes, ornaments etc., the father considers himself to be adorned. And when one's wife is ill, the husband, due to intense love, thinks himself to be so. When this is the case in respect of the external things like son etc. which are relatively remote to the Self, then what need be said about the internal organ etc. which are very close to the Self? But really speaking the Atman i.e. Self is asaṅga i.e. non-attached or non-relational and hence it cannot be identified either with external or the internal things. In other words, the Self is free from all sorts of relations, subjective as well as

objective.

Now to bring out further the process of the mutual superimposition of the Self and ^{the} not-Self: The Self (Ātman) alone is the sentient being. And the not-Self consisting of the internal organ, senses and body, which are the limiting adjuncts of the inner self, is insentient (jada). But we make use of such expressions as 'the man is a sentient being'. Here we superimpose sentience (caitanya), which constitutes the essential nature of the Self, on the body. And when we say "I am a man", we superimpose the characteristic of being a man (manuṣyatva), which belongs to the body, on the Self. Similarly by identifying the Self with the senses or internal organ and vice-versa, we imagine that 'the senses are sentient' or 'the internal organ is sentient'; and say "I am blind", "I am happy" etc. In this way, we superimpose the sentience on the internal organ, senses and the body and in turn the characteristics thereof on the sentient Self. Owing to this wrong identification of the Self and the not-Self, the assemblage of the internal organ, senses and body appears to be sentient. It is, as it has already been pointed out, due to the lack of discrimination of the Self and the not-Self. But on the discrimination of the Self from the not-self we come to know that the internal organ, the senses and body are insentient like a stone.

Because all of them depend upon the sentient Self for their functions. The internal organ, being inert, cannot do any function by itself without the co-operation of the Self. For even in the ordinary world it is a well-known fact that no non-sentient being can function independently without the assistance of some sentient entity. Thus, the internal organ could function only when it carries the reflection of the pure consciousness i.e. the Self. Similarly when the internal organ does not function, the senses cannot carry on their functions and hence become insentient. When the senses cease to function the physical body becomes inert like a stone. It is, therefore, well said that all our dealings of day-to-day life are caused by the mutual superimposition of the Self and the not-Self.

By superimposing the stoutness (athaulya), which is the characteristic of body, on the Self we say "I am stout" (aham athūlah). Here, by the term 'I' (aham-ego) is denoted the pure Self. Even though the ego is a not-Self being itself a modification of the internal organ, yet it represents the pure Self in the realm of the phenomenal experience, since it is the nearest to the Self in comparison with all other empirical categories and since it is filled with consciousness.³ Hence the concept of ego (aham) can be characterised as the complex of the cit and acit —

sentience and the insentience (idamanidish rūpa).⁴ It should be noted here that the ego-superimposition (ahankāra-adyāsa) is the initiative adyāsa.⁵ because it is the starting point of all subsequent adyāsas. That is, the ego (ahankāra) being the primary adjunct (mukhyopādhi) of the Self is the first to be superimposed on the Self and the other adjuncts starting from the mind are superimposed on the Self-ego complex i.e. on the ego-concept, which embraces both the sentient and the non-sentient elements.

Because of the mutual superimposition of the pure Self and the ego, each of them is overpowered by the nature of the other. The Self being superimposed on the ego, overpowers its (i.e. of the ego) characteristic of being a not-Self (anātmatva). Similarly the ego being superimposed on the Self overpowers its Self-luminosity (avaprakāśatva) and the characteristic of being a Self (ātmatva). In this way, both the Self and the ego are filled with the nature of each other. Therefore, our claim that "I know" is based on the mutual superimposition of the Self and the ego. Because the ego being insentient cannot know by itself. It is only due to the reflection of pure consciousness in it that the ego attains the status of a knower (jñātā). Similarly the Self being attributeless cannot possess such features as knowership etc. But it is only due to its association as it were with the ego that it is looked upon as the knower.

Thus only as conditioned by the ego, the Self assumes the status of knower etc. Further by adding in sequence the mind, senses and body as the limiting adjuncts to the Self-ego complex we make use of the expressions respectively "I am happy", "I am blind", "I am a man" etc. In this way, the ahaṅkāra-ādhyāsa is the first superimposition, which all other superimpositions follow. The ego, therefore, plays an important role in the mechanism of superimposition. It can, therefore, be characterised as a knot (granthī) which unites as it were the Self and the not-Self. The ego being the first conditioning factor of the Self serves as the meeting place of the inner-Self and the outer world.

(b) Definition of Adhyāsa

Śaṅkara defines superimposition as: "The appearance elsewhere, with a nature like that of recollection, of what was seen before" (anṛti-rūpaḥ paratra pūrvadr̥ṣṭāvabhāsaḥ).^{5a} Vācaspati Miśra, in his Bhāṣatī, explains each term of this definition- The word 'avabhāsa' in the above definition means an appearance which is terminated or deprecated. Termination or deprecation is sublation by another cognition. The term 'avabhāsa', in this way, indicates an illusory cognition⁶ for what is illusory alone can be sublated by another cognition. The phrase 'pūrvadr̥ṣṭāvabhāsaḥ' means the ('appearance of what was seen before'. As a matter of fact,

in the absence of the coupling of the object superimposed and that on which it is superimposed, the superimposition will not arise. The phrase 'pūrvā-dr̥ṣṭa' (what was seen before), therefore, indicates what is untrue (anṛta) and superimposed.⁷ Further the word dr̥ṣṭa (seen) indicates that for the superimposition to take place, the mere cognition alone of the superimposed entity is useful, but not its reality too.⁸ Even thus what is now seen is not capable of being superimposed, hence the use of the word pūrvā (before).⁹ It means that the object superimposed must have been cognised at different time. Even though the object seen before is real in its own nature, yet in the superimposed form it is indeterminable and hence false (mithyā),¹⁰ because it gets sublated by the subsequent right cognition. In this way the phrase 'pūrvā-dr̥ṣṭāva-
bhāṣaḥ' indicates that in the superimposition there is the appearance of what is indeterminable, false. The term elsewhere (paratra) states that the substratum of the superimposition is real. In this way, adhyāsa means the coupling of the real with the false.¹¹

If we define superimposition merely as "the appearance elsewhere of what was seen before", it will lead to the fallacy of overpervasion (ativyāpti-dōṣa) in the recognition (pratyākhyāṇa), because in the recognition also there is

the appearance of the previously cognised object in some other place, e.g., the genus (jāti) cowness (gotva), which was seen before in the cow, namely 'Svastimatī', is now apprehended elsewhere in the cow, namely 'Kālākṣī'. Similarly Devadatta, who was seen before in Pāṭalīputra, is now apprehended elsewhere in Māhīmatī. Both these appearances are valid cognitions and not superimpositions. And it is well-known that the term appearance (avabhāsa) is used sometimes with reference to the valid cognitions too, e.g., "the appearance of blue, the appearance of yellow" etc.¹² In this way, the definition of adhyāsa [merely as "paratra pūrvadr̥ṣṭāvabhāsaḥ" extends to the sphere of pratyābhīñā which is a case of valid cognition, but whereas superimposition is an invalid cognition. So in order to avoid this fallacy the phrase 'smṛtirūpaḥ' is included in the definition. 'Smṛtirūpaḥ' means "the appearance of the nature like to that of recollection." That is, the nature of superimposition is similar to that of recollection (smṛti). Now the definition cannot be applied to recognition, for in case of the recognition, the object recognised is really present before us, but in case of superimposition the object, which is similar to what is recollected, is not really present before us.¹³

The nature of superimposition only resembles the nature

of recollection and it is not recollection itself. It resembles recollection, because like recollection it is also caused by the residual impressions (saṃskāras) of the object seen before, for one who has not seen silver before cannot indeed superimpose it elsewhere in the shell. But superimposition differs from recollection in so far as the latter is originated only from the residual impressions caused by the previous experience, whereas in the superimposition, along with the residual impressions, other factors such as sense-object contact, the defect in the senses etc. also are required. In recollection, it is the very object of the past experience that is manifested, whereas in the superimposition, it is not the very object of the past experience that manifests itself, but one similar to it. Since in recollection one cognises the object as belonging to some other place and different time, in the form 'That silver' (ad-rajataḥ), it does not presuppose a substratum in front of us. But the superimposition necessarily presupposes a substratum, for in the absence of such a substratum in front of us, say the shell, the superimposition of the silver will not take place. Superimposition is also different from recognition (pratyakṣa), for in the latter the object recognised is really present before us, but in the former the imposed object does not really exist in the locus where it is superimposed. If the imposed object is really present before us, it is not

superimposition. Though the object of superimposition does not really exist in the locus where it is superimposed, it does have a phenomenal existence.

Śaṅkara after having given his own definition of adhyāsa, refers to some other definitions given by the adherents of different schools of Indian philosophy such as Viśiṣṭānavādins, Mīmāṃsākas and Naiyāyikas.¹⁴ At the end he remarks that all these definitions agree in so far as they accept superimposition as the apparent presentation of the attributes of one thing in another.¹⁵ And, as already noted, this assumption of the attributes of one thing in case of another is false, indeterminate. It follows from this that all the systems should accept the doctrine of the indeterminability (anirvacanīyatā).¹⁶ And this false assumption of the attributes of one thing in another is well known to the world. Thus in our day-to-day experience we come across such instances as the shell appearing as silver, the moon though one appearing as if having a second.¹⁷ It is, therefore, a universal fact. Not only the philosophical enquirers know of this, but it is the experience of even a layman. For even a man in the street, after the sublation of his delusion recognises that the object which is present before him is shell and not silver.

(c) Possibility of the mutual superimposition of the Self and the not-Self

Now we may consider some objections that can be raised against the possibility of the mutual superimposition of the Self and the not-Self.

Superimposition of the Self and the not-Self is objected on the ground that the Self (Ātman) is a non-object (avijaya). The Self cannot be an object of cognition, since it does not depend upon any other factors for its manifestation and since it is devoid of parts.¹⁸ That is, an entity which is dependent for its manifestation and which possesses parts, can appear as something else. This appearance of an entity other than what it is can take place when a person due to the defects in the sense-organ apprehends only the general nature of that entity without apprehending its specific nature.¹⁹ The shell, for instance, appears as silver as it fulfils this condition. But the inner Self, being self-luminous does not depend upon any other sense-organ for its manifestation, in which case it would itself become defective by the defects in those organs.²⁰ Further the Self is featureless (nirvikāra) and partless (niravayava) and therefore its apprehension in some part and non-apprehension in some other part cannot be possible.²¹ Thus, on the view that the Self is self-luminous, there can be no superimposition of

the not-Self on the Self.²² And if on the other hand we accept complete non-manifestation of the Self, then also there can be no superimposition, since such an entity is not in the range of our immediate experience.²³ We cannot, verily, superimpose the silver on the shell, when the latter is not present before us.²⁴ The superimposition, therefore, cannot be possible both when there is complete apprehension and complete non-apprehension.²⁵ For if the shell is apprehended as shell, no question of its appearing as silver arises, or when it is totally non-manifest like a sky-flower, then also its appearing as something else is impossible. And the partial apprehension and partial non-apprehension in case of the partless inner Self (pratyakṣātman), as noted already, is impossible. In this way, the inner Self being the non-object (avigraha) of cognition, the superimposition of the not-Self thereon is impossible.

And if on the other hand we regard the inner Self to be the object say of the notion of 'I', then the subject (viśayin) would be something other than that, for the subject is always different from object. And in this way, that which is the subject is itself the inner Self. And the object, however, should be admitted to be other than that, and in the sphere of the "thou-notion" (yugmatopratyaya-gocara).²⁶ If the inner Self be in the sphere of the 'thou-notion', it

also becomes not-Self like a pot. And further if we assume the objectness of the Self, we have to accept the subject to be something different from that. And this subject alone is the inner Self. For the superimposition thereon, we have to again assume its objectness and the subject must be something different from that and so on. Thus we have to face the infinite regress (anavasthā). In order to remedy these defects we have to accept the non-objectness of the Self. And as noted already, the superimposition on what is non-object cannot be possible.²⁷

To this, Advaitins reply by saying that the inner Self is not absolutely a non-object, as it is the object of the concept 'I'.²⁸ That is, even though the inner Self being self-luminous is non-object and is partless, yet having attained to the state of 'jīva', due to the limiting adjuncts such as the organs, subtle and gross bodies, mind and the intellect imagined by the beginningless and indeterminate nescience, though not really defined, appears as if defined, though not different, appears as if different, and though not an object of cognition, appears as if the object of the concept 'I'.²⁹ In this way, the inner Self being self-luminous is essentially not object, yet in its conditioned form is an object.³⁰ In other words, Ātman though not the object in a primary sense is so in a secondary sense (gauna

or supercārīka). It may, therefore, become the substrate of superimposition.

The opponent contended that if the Self is an object, it also becomes not-Self like a pot. But this contention is false, because the characteristic of being the object (viśayatva) of the Self is only imagined (kalpita) due to the limiting adjuncts like mind etc. and it is not the real nature of the Self. Verily, the imagined characteristic cannot bring about any change in the essential nature of an entity. If one assumes blueness in the sky, it does not really become blue. Similarly, the imagined objectness of the Self can never bring about any change in its self-luminous nature. Nor does the fallacy of the infinite regress arise, because one and the same inner self, becomes the object of the I-notion, as conditioned by the limiting adjuncts. Being free from all conditioning factors, it is the subject (viśayīn).

Now one may object that the superimposition of the not-Self on the Self will involve the fallacy of the mutual dependence (anyonyāsāraya) because the inner self (pratyak-ātmān) becomes an object of the cognition 'I', only if there is the superimposition of the not-Self like intellect etc., and there can be superimposition thereof only when the Self becomes an object.

But Advaitins say that the mutual dependence in case of the beginningless entities is not a defect at all. The Self and the process of superimposition, like the seed and sprout, are beginningless.³¹ And hence their dependence on each other is also beginningless. Therefore there is no inconsistency whatsoever in holding that the inner Self who is the object of each earlier superimposition and the residual impressions thereof will become the object of every subsequent superimposition.³² This is a continuous stream wherein the objectness of the Self and the superimposition come one after the other. So the defect of mutual dependence should not be pointed out.

Further, there is neither the complete apprehension nor the total non-manifestation of the Self, in which case the superimposition of the not-Self on the inner Self would not have been possible. The Self is not completely apprehended (atyanta-grhita). To explain it: No doubt the inner Self is the one impartite essence (akhandāikarasa) and essentially of the nature of pure consciousness. And therefore on the apprehension of the consciousness element of the Self, there will not remain anything unapprehended, because the other elements like bliss, eternity, pervasiveness etc. are really non-different from the nature of consciousness. Yet due to the difference imagined by

Avidyā, they appear as if not discriminated and hence not apprehended.³³ That is, the Self is not completely apprehended as long as the avidyā persists. Nor is the Self totally non-manifest (atyantagrhiṭa), for if the Self itself does not manifest, everything other than it which is insentient and inert would be non-manifest, and then the whole world would be enveloped in complete darkness (lagadāndhya-prasāng). The śruti also declares "That shining alone all else shines after it; by its light all this shines." Therefore, the intelligent Self should necessarily be admitted to be immediately perceived.³⁴ It is evident, therefore, that the partial apprehension and partial non-apprehension even in respect of the partless inner Self can be possible in the realm of avidyā.

Even if the Self is assumed to be mediate, there is no unintelligibility whatsoever of the superimposition of the not-Self on the Self. Because there is no any such rule that an object can be superimposed only on what is directly perceived. Those, who lack discriminative knowledge, superimpose surface (śāla), impurity (malinatā) etc. upon the ether, even though it is not within the range of our perception.³⁵ Ether, though a substance is yet devoid of form and touch, hence its cognition through the external senses is not possible.

Nor can it be cognised by the mind, for the mind without the media of the external senses cannot act in respect of the external things. Therefore the ether is not perceptible. But by imposing sometimes the blueness which is the colour of earth, sometimes the whiteness which is the property of fire on the ether, we imagine it to be blue like the petals of the nilotpala (blue lily) or white like a row of rājahatā (swans). Similarly there is no contradiction in the superimposition of the not-Self even on the inner Self.³⁶

Now the opponent may raise another objection: For the superimposition to take place, one must have a prior cognition of the superimposed object which really exists somewhere. In case of the superimposition of the silver on the shell, for instance, the superimposition of the silver is possible because it has a real existence in the market. But according to Advaita, the not-Self i.e. mind, egoity etc. are not real. They have no existence of their own apart from the Self. Hence, how can there be the superimposition of them?

Advaitins rejoin to this by saying that for the superimposition to take place, the prior cognition of the imposed object alone is sufficient, and it need not have a real existence elsewhere.³⁷ For superimposition it is enough if one has a prior cognition of the imposed object and even that

prior cognition itself refers to an illusory object. Because what is required for superimposition is the residual impression of the prior cognition of the imposed object. And there is no rule that the residual impression generated by the valid cognition alone³⁸ is the cause of superimposition. Even the residual impression generated by the delusive cognition can as well serve as the cause of superimposition. There is no restriction that one must see real silver before superimposing it on the shell. The superimposition can be possible even if one has seen illusory silver created by magic. Therefore, the mere cognition of the imposed object and not its reality too is the cause of superimposition. In the present case also, since the process of superimposition is beginningless, the residual impressions of the body, mind etc. presented in each earlier superimposition are the cause of each subsequent superimposition.

Now the mutual superimposition of the Self and the not-Self is again objected on the ground that there is no causal aggregate for it. In the ordinary illusions like "This is silver, "This is a snake" etc. the causal aggregate (kāraṇa-sāmagrī) for superimposition is the similarity (sādṛśya) based on the attributes or parts of the substrate of superimposition as well as of that which is superimposed. In case of the shell-silver superimposition, for instance, the



brightness is the similarity between the shell and the silver. But in case of the Self and the not-Self this similarity does not exist, because the Self is without attributes and is without parts.

Advaitins answer this objection by saying that the similarity between the substrate of superimposition and that which is superimposed is not the invariable causal aggregate in all cases of superimposition. Because the superimposition is seen to take place in "the conch is yellow", without any similarity between the conch and yellowness.³⁹ In this case i.e. "The conch is yellow" (pīṭhaḥ śaṅkhaḥ) there is of course the causal aggregate like excess of bile etc. in the perceiver. But similarly, in the Self also there certainly exists the causal aggregate, namely, the ignorance (avidyā), which is the root cause of all superimposition.⁴⁰

The most serious objection raised against the possibility of the mutual superimposition of the Self and the not-Self, which has already been referred to, is that since the Self and the not-Self are opposed in character to each other as darkness and light, the superimposition thereof on each other cannot stand to reason. One of the two entities, having mutually contradictory natures can never be of the nature of the other. Then how can the mutual superimposition of the Self and the not-Self be possible?

Advaitins rejoin to such a question by saying that the superimposition cannot be denied, on the ground that it is in conflict with reason (yukti). To Advaitins who uphold the doctrine of indeterminability, non-reality and conflict with reason are acceptable in the case of superimposition. It is only because of its conflict with all reasoning that the mutual superimposition of the Self and the not-Self is admitted to be indeterminable.⁴¹ The conflict with reasoning, therefore, is an ornament and not a defect in case of the superimposition. Further, superimposition is a perceptually experienced fact. Hence Śaṅkara declares that Adhyāsa is sarvaloka-pratyakṣa.^{41a} So it cannot be denied merely on the ground that it is in conflict with reason. For reason or logic has its own limits and hence it cannot abolish what is perceptually experienced.⁴²

(d) The evidence for superimposition

Advaitins adduce perception (pratyakṣa), inference (anumāna), presumption (arthāpatti) and scripture (śāstra) as the evidence to establish the mutual superimposition of the Self and the not-Self.

As it has already been stated, Adhyāsa is a perceptually experienced fact. For it is only after superimposing the Self of the nature of pure-consciousness on the assemblage

of body, senses etc., qualified by class etc. that the empirical usage of the form of knower, known and the instrument of knowledge, or of enjoyer, that which is enjoyed, and the act of enjoying etc. is accomplished in the world. Such empirical usage as "I am a man", "I am a God", "I am a beast" etc. is caused by the false identification of the characteristics of the not-Self on the Self.⁴³ This is the perception.⁴⁴

Similarly we have also the inference:⁴⁵ In the state of deep sleep (gusupti) the empirical usage of the knowership (prematrya) etc. is not present, because there is no superimposition in that state. But there is the empirical usage of knowership etc., in the form of "I am a man" as precoded by the superimpositions in the states of waking and dream, because they are periods other than the period of deep sleep. And in the state where there is no such empirical usage, it is not certainly the state other than that of deep sleep.

There is presumption too.⁴⁶ The empirical usage of knowership etc. is not intelligible in the absence of the superimposition of the identity of the Self with body etc. Thus the superimposition is the cause of the empirical usage (vyavahāra) and hence without Ahnyāsa, vyavahāra cannot be possible. Because in the states of deep sleep, swoon etc.

when there is no superimposition the said empirical usage is not cognised. For in the state of deep sleep no one cognises that he is a man. But in the states of waking and dream the said empirical usage is cognised, as the superimposition persists in those periods.

And the texts like "Brāhmaṇa is to sacrifice" etc. are the scriptural evidences for superimposition.⁴⁷ For these texts function only as based on the superimposition of the differentiations like caste (varṇa), orders of life (āśrama), age (vayas) etc. on the inner Self, who is free from all such distinctions.⁴⁸

(c) Divisions of Adhyāsa

Commenting upon the Adhyāsa-bhāṣya, Padmapāda interprets the definition of Adhyāsa given by Śaṅkara as applicable to both īdāṇādhyāsa and arthādhyāsa.⁴⁹ The point is that in the case of superimposition of the silver on the shell, not only the object silver is illusory, but also the knowledge thereof, for the knowledge which refers to an illusory object cannot be real. Hence we have both arthādhyāsa or viśayā-dhyāsa and īdāṇādhyāsa.

1. Arthādhyāsa: This is defined as that thing which is similar to what is recollected and appears as of the nature

of a different thing.⁵⁰ The superimposition of the false entity i.e. silver on the shell or egoity etc. on the Self is an illustration of this kind of Adhyāsa.

2. Jñānādhyaśa: It is defined as the cognition similar to recollection, which is the presentation of one thing as of the nature of another.⁵¹ This is illustrated by the cognition of the serpent on the rope, the cognition of the non-Ātman entities like egoity etc. on the Ātman etc.

3. Nirupādhika-ādhyāśa: The superimposition of the silver on the shell, snake on the rope etc. are the illustrations of this. This disappears when the right knowledge of the substratum arises. The superimposition of the egoity (ahamkāra) on the pure consciousness is an instance of nirupādhikādhyaśa.

4. Sopādhika-ādhyāśa: The moon though one appears as if having a second. This is an illustration of this kind of Adhyāśa. This arises owing to some adventitious cause (upādhi) like finger, the defect in the eyes etc. This disappears only when the upādhi i.e. the finger etc. is removed. Unless the upādhi is removed, the mere knowledge of substratum (adhisthāna) that the moon is one does not take away the appearance of moon as if having a second.

or take for instance the white crystal appearing as reddish. When the china rose (jagā-kusuma) is placed near a white crystal piece, it (the crystal) continues to appear reddish even when a trustworthy person instructs that the crystal is white. Only when the china rose is removed from that place, the crystal as it is is perceived. The superimposition of duality on the non-dual Self is an instance of sopādhikōdhyāsa. That is, though the Supreme Self is one, it appears as different individual souls as associated with different limiting adjuncts like internal organ etc.

5. Prātibhāsika or Prātibhāsika: Illusions like rope-snake, shell-silver etc., which we come across in our day-to-day experience, are prātibhāsika-ādhyāsa. These are brought by the defects associated with the pramātr, pramāṇa and prameya i.e. the knower, the means of knowledge and the object of knowledge. These superimpositions disappear on the removal of these defects even before the attainment of the Brahman-realisation.

6. Vyāvahārika: This is the superimposition of the whole universe consisting of the egoity, mind, senses, body, etc., on the Ātman. This can be removed only when the realisation of Ātman is secured.

(f) Adhyēsa is beginningless (anādi)

Even though the mutual superimposition of the Self and the not-Self in its individual character (vyakti-rūpa) has a beginning in so far as each act of superimposition presupposes a previous one as its cause, yet it is beginningless judged from its character as a continuous stream (pravāha-rūpa).

Superimposition is the false attribution to the Self of the characteristic of being a doer of action (kartṛtva), of being an experiencer of pleasure and pain (bhokṛtva) and of having attachment (rāga) and aversion (dveṣa). Prakāśānanda explains how this superimposition is a beginningless chain:⁵² The attribution of the characteristic of being an enjoyer or sufferer presupposes an attribution of being a doer of action, for one who has not done any action cannot enjoy or suffer. This attribution of doership of action to the Self again depends upon the attribution of having attachment and aversion to the Self, because one who is devoid of attachment and aversion cannot indulge in any action. Having attachment and aversion in its turn depends upon the characteristic of being an enjoyer or the sufferer, for one who has not experienced pleasure and pain cannot have attachment or aversion. In this way, the superimposition of the doership etc. is a beginningless series

like the beginningless series of seed and sprout.

As it has already been pointed out, the mutual superimposition of the Self and the not-Self in its individual character has a beginning, as each act of superimposition is caused by the previous one. Interpreting the phrase 'mithyābhāsa-nimittaḥ',⁵³ Vācaspatimītra says that Mithyābhāsa is Adhyāsa and that the prior superimpositions are the causes of the subsequent ones.⁵⁴ But Padmapāda splits this phrase as 'mithyā as śaśa śānta śa' and declares that the indeterminable avidyā-śakti is the material cause (upādāna-kāraṇa) of Adhyāsa.⁵⁵ It should be noted in this regard that the term 'nimitta' denotes a cause in general as well as an efficient cause (nimitta-kāraṇa). Vācaspatimītra takes it in the latter sense. But it does not mean that Vācaspati does not accept avidyā as the material cause of Adhyāsa. His commentator Anandānanda in this context defends Vācaspati's stand and says that 'the material cause of the illusion will be stated in the Devatādhikaraṇa'.⁵⁶ But Padmapāda takes the word 'nimitta' in the sense of the material cause (upādāna-kāraṇa). As Adhyāsa is an existent effect (bhāva-kārya), it must have a material cause as well as an efficient cause. All post-Śaṅkara Advaitins following their Master, accept avidyā as the material cause of Adhyāsa and the previous superimpositions and the residual impressions thereof as the efficient cause.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

- (a) तमेतमविषयं आत्मानात्मनोरितरेतराध्यातं
पुरस्कृत्य त्वं प्रमाणप्रमेयव्यवहाराः तीक्ष्ण
वैदिकार्य प्रवृत्ताः स्वानि च शास्त्राणि विधि—
प्रतिषेधमोक्षराणि ।
BSB 1.1.1. p.40.
- (b) यस्मात्प्रत्यगात्मन्यवनायादिरहिते अनायाद्व्येतान्ताः—
करणाधितारोपेण प्रत्यगात्मानं अदुःखं दुःखाकरोति
तस्मादवन्धितः ।
Bhā. 1.1.1. p.40.
- (c) युष्मदस्मत्प्रत्यगोचरयोः विषयविषयिणोः समः प्रकाशमद
विरुद्धत्वमापयोः इतरेतरमावानुपपत्तौ मिथ्यायां
तद्वर्माणामपि सुतरागितरेतरमावानुपपत्तौ इत्यतः
अस्मत्प्रत्यगोचरे विषयिणि विदात्मके युष्मत्प्रत्यग
गोचरस्य विषयस्य तद्वर्णां वाध्यासः, तद्विषयिण
विषयिणस्तद्वर्णां च विषयेऽध्यासो मिथ्येति मयितुं युक्तम् ।
BSB. 1.1.1. pp.6-15.
- (d) एवं स्थिते स्वाश्रयमतिरिच्य धारणां अन्यत्र
मावानुपपत्तिः सुनिश्चिता इति दर्शयति ।
PP. Var.I. p.21.

Attributes are never independent of a substrate.
Even in the crystal, redness is cognised only as
located in the reflected red japa flower, in case
of the experience "The crystal is red". Therefore
the superimposition of the attributes alone, as
apart from their substrates is not possible.
Cf. YPS. Var.I. p.14.

1. तथाप्यन्योन्यास्मिन्नन्योन्यात्मकतामन्योन्यधर्माच्च
अप्यस्य हृदितरापिकेन अत्यन्तविपक्षयोः धर्मधर्मिणोः
मिथ्याज्ञाननिमित्तः सत्यान्ते मिथुनीकृत्य "अहमिदं"
ममेदमिति नैवर्मिकोऽयं लोकव्यवहारः ।
SSB. I.1.1., pp.15-17.
2. "स्वस्य" अन्योन्यात्मकतान्योन्यधर्माध्यासौ ।
"निमित्तं" द्वारेतरापिकेः । "फलं" व्यवहारः ।
VK. p.15.
- 2 a. पुत्रमायादिषु विकलेषु सकलेषु वा अहमेव
विकलः सज्जो वेति बाह्यधर्मानात्मन्यध्यस्यति ।
SSB. I.1.1. p.44.
3. गिन्निस्त्रयमहंभुक्तिः प्रतीचीवात्मनोऽन्यतः ।
पूर्वोदयेभ्यश्च हेतुम्यस्तस्माद्वारमान्योच्यते ॥
MS. XII.100.
4. अत्यप्रत्ययत्वाभिमतो हंकारः । स वेदमहिद्वेषस्तुगर्भः
सर्वलोकसाक्षिः ।
FP. Var.I. pp.85-86.
See also the commentary thereon-
अहंकारेऽध्यस्तेन तस्यागात्मत्वं तिरस्कुर्वता धैतन्येन
अहंकारो गर्भितः । धैतन्यमपि स्वस्मिन्नध्यस्तेन स्वस्य
आत्मत्वं स्वप्रकाशत्वं तिरस्कुर्वता अहंकारेण गर्भितमित्यर्थः ।
Ātma-svarūpa's Prabodha-parīśodhinī, p.86.
5. अहमिति तावत्प्रथमोऽध्यासः ।
FP. Var.I. p.31.
In this context *Drakṣāśāstrman* points out that even
though the superimposition of the primal nescience
(*aīñēśādhyaśa*) the root cause of all superimpositions,
is ready even before the *śhañkāra-ādhyaśa*, yet from
the point of view of the effect series (*kāryādhyaśas*),
the ego-superimposition (*śhañkāra-ādhyaśa*) is the
initiative, because it is at this point that the
ākṣya-ādhyaśas begin. Cf. FPV. Var.I. p.112.

5 a. BSB. 1.1.1. pp.17-18.

6. अवमन्नोऽवमतो वा मातः अवमातः । प्रथमान्तर-
चाप्स्य अवमातोऽवमानो वा । स्तावता विषयाहानमित्युक्तं
भवति ।

Ibid. 1.1.1. p.18.

7. मिथ्याप्रत्ययस्य आरोपविषयारोपणीयस्य विधुनमन्तरेण
न भवतीति पूर्वदृष्टग्रहणेन अनुत्तनारोपणीयं उपस्थापयति ।
Ibid.

8. तस्य च दृष्टत्वमात्रमुपयुज्यते न वस्तुतत्वेति
दृष्टग्रहणम् ।

Ibid.

9. तथापि वर्तमानं दृष्टं दर्शनं नारोपयोगीति
पूर्वैर्युक्तम् ।

Ibid.

10. तत्र "पूर्वदृष्टं" स्वस्येण तदप्यारोपणीयतया
अनिर्वाच्यमित्युक्तम् ।

Ibid.

11. आरोपविषयं तत्पमाह परत्रेति । परत्र गुणितकादौ
परमार्थमिति, तदनेन सायानुत्तमिधुनीकरणश्रुतम् ।

Ibid.

12. परत्र पूर्वदृष्टावमान इत्यलक्षणम्, अतिव्यापकत्वात् ।
अस्ति हि स्वस्तिमर्यां गति पूर्वदृष्टस्य गोत्वस्य परत्र
कालाहवामवमातः, अस्ति च पाटलिपुत्रे पूर्वदृष्टस्य देवदत्तस्य परत्र
माहिष्यार्यामवमातः समीचीनः । अवमातपदं च तन्नीचीनेऽपि प्रत्यये
प्रसिद्धम्, यथा नीलस्यावमातः पीतस्यावमातः ...

Op.cit. pp.18-19.

13. स्मृतौः स्वमित्त्व स्वमस्येति स्मृतिरस्यः । अस्मिन्निहितविषयत्वं
च स्मृतिरस्यत्वं तस्मिन्निहितविषयं च प्रत्यभिज्ञानं समीचीनमिति
नतिव्याप्तिः ।
Op. cit. pp. 19-20, C2. also VK2. p. 19.
14. तं केचिदन्यत्र अन्यधर्माध्यात - इति वदन्ति ।
केचित्तु यत्र यदध्यातः तद्विवेकाग्रहनिबन्धनो भ्रम इति ।
अन्ये तु - यत्र यदध्यातस्तत्तस्यैव विपरीतधर्मस्य कल्पनाभावोक्तो ।
BC2. pp. 18-27.
15. त्वध्यापि तु अन्यस्य अन्यधर्माविभाक्ततां न
व्यभिचरति ।
B55. p. 32.
16. अन्यस्य अन्यधर्मकल्पना अनुतता, सा च अस्मिन्निवनीयतेत्यधस्तात्
उपपादितम् । तेन त्वेवाध्यात परीक्षाणां भवेदन्यत्पान्यधर्मकल्पनाऽ-
निवनीयता अवश्यमाविनीत्यनिवनीयता त्वतन्त्राविस्मृत्यर्थ
इत्यर्थः ।
Abh. I. 1. 1 pp. 32-34.
17. तथा च तौरेऽनुमयः - गुणित्वा हि स्वतत्त्वधर्मात्तो,
स्वतत्त्वधर्मः सद्वितीयवदिति ।
B55. I. 1. 1. pp. 32-34.
18. स च अपराधीनप्रकाशत्वात्, अन्तःस्थाच्च
अविषयः ।
B55. I. 1. 1. p. 37.
19. अपराधीनप्रकाशं अन्तःस्थं तत्त्वमात्राङ्गप्रकाशे
कारणदोषशङ्काच्च विषेवाङ्गप्रकाशे अन्यथा प्रकाशते ।
Abh.
20. प्रत्यमात्मातत्त्वपराधीनप्रकाशतया न स्वभावे
कारणान्यपेक्षो येन तदास्मदोर्ध्वप्रेत ।
Abh.

21. न चागवान्, येन कश्चिददत्वांशो गृह्येत
कश्चिन्न गृह्येत ।
Ibid.
22. न हि तद्वै तदानीमेव तेनैव गृहीतमगृहीतं च
कम्पतीति न त्वयंप्रजापतये उच्यते ।
Ibid.
23. तदातनेऽप्यप्रकाशे पुरोऽवस्थितत्वरप अरोऽवस्थ
अगावान्नापगतः ।
Ibid.
24. न हि गुप्तावपुरःस्थितायां रक्षावध्यस्यतीये
क्षितिति ।
Ibid.
25. तस्मादत्यन्तगृहेऽत्यन्तागृहे च नाध्यातः
वति निद्रम् ।
Ibid.
26. विष्यत्ये हि विदात्मनोऽन्यो विषयी भवेत् ।
तथा च नो विषयी न स्य विदात्मा ।
विषयस्तु ततोऽन्यो पुष्पप्रत्ययगोररो ऋगुपेयः ।
Op. cit. pp. 37-38.
27. तस्मादनात्मत्वप्रतीगादन्तस्थापरिहाराय युष्मत् -
प्रत्ययापेतत्वम् अत एव अविष्यत्त्वमात्मनो
पक्षतद्वयम्, तथा च नाध्यात इत्यर्थः ।
Ibid.
28. उच्यते - न तावदप्येकान्तोनाविषयः अत्मतु-
प्रत्ययविषयत्वात् ।
ibid. 1.1.1. p. 38.

29. सत्यं प्रत्यगात्मा स्वयंप्रकाशत्वादविषयः
अविषयः, तथाप्यविषयनीयानामधियापरिकल्पित-
बुद्धिजनः शुद्धमस्तु शरीरेन्द्रियावच्छेदेन अविच्छिन्नोऽपि
पशुतोऽपि चिन्न इव, अभिन्नोऽपि भिन्न इव,
अकर्तापि कर्ता, अमोहतापि मोहोद्य, अविषयोऽप्यस्य प्रत्ययविषय
इव जीवमावमापन्नोऽवभासते ।
ibid. I.1.1. p.38.
30. जीवो हि चिदात्मतया स्वयंप्रकाशतया अविषयोऽपि
अविषयत्वेन त्वेव विषय इति भावः ।
ibid. p.39.
31. न च - अद्यात्मे सति विषयत्वं विषयत्वे बाधनात्
इत्यन्योन्याश्रयत्वमिति ताप्रतम्, जीवास्तु रचनादिस्थात् ।
ibid. p.39. See also p.17.
32. पूर्वपूर्वध्यातृतादात्मताविषयीकृतस्य उत्तरोत्तराध्यातृविषयत्वाविरोधादि-
त्युक्तम् - नैतर्हि कोऽयं लोकोप्यहार इति मुन्येव ।
ibid. p.39 and p.17.
33. नहि विदेकरूपस्य आत्मनश्चिदमेव गृहीते अगृहीते चिन्विदस्ति ।
न अस्मानन्दनित्यत्वविमुत्पादयोऽस्य विदुषत्वादस्तुतो भिदन्ते
येन तदगृहे न गृह्येरन् । गृहीता स्व तु कल्पितेन भेदेन
अविवेचिता इत्यगृहीता इवाभासति ।
ibid. p.39.
34. अवरोधत्वाच्च प्रत्यगात्मप्रतीक्षेः ।
ibid. I.1.1. pp.38-39. Cf. ibid. chapter -
प्रतीक्षः आत्मनः प्रतीक्षः प्रथा तस्या अवरोधत्वात् ...
अतस्य विदात्मा अवरोधोऽन्युपेतव्यः, तदप्रथायां सर्वस्याप्रयत्नेन
जगदान्धमूर्खतायां हत्युक्तम् । सुतिष्ठान् भवति - "तस्य
मान्तमनुमाति स्वं तत्त्व भाता सर्वमिदं विभाति" इति ।
p.39.

35. न वायमस्ति नियमः - पुरोवस्थिता एव विवर्ते
विषयान्तरमध्यतितत्त्वविति, अप्रत्यये विद्वद्वाक्ये
मालास्तलमतिन्ताद्यत्यन्ति ।
BSS. I.1.1. p.39. Cf. Bhāṣatī thereon, p.39.
36. स्वमयिस्त्वः प्रत्यगात्मन्यनात्माध्यातः ।
BSS. I.1.1. p.39.
37. अप्रतीतस्य आरोपायोगादारोप्यस्य प्रतीतिस्यगुण्यते
न वस्तुतत्तेति ।
Bhāṣ. I.1.1. p.17. Cf. p.18.
Cf. also VPS. Var.1 -
न च देहादेखस्तुत्वादनारोप इति पाठ्यम् ,
प्रतीतिमात्रेण आरोप्यत्वसिद्धौ वस्तुतत्ताया
अप्रयोजकत्वात् । p.16.
38. न हि प्रमाणस्यः संस्कार उपाधिः न भ्रान्तितन्त्रः
इति नियमोऽस्ति ।
VPS. Var.1. p.15.
39. सादृश्यमन्तरेण "पीतः" इति निर्याधिक्रमदर्शनात् ।
QR. 915. p.15.
40. अत्रत्येव तद्वर्णायविधाभ्या मामग्री ।
QR. 915. p.15.
41. अनिर्वचनीयवादिनामस्मात् उच्यतास्य अस्तुत्वयुगितविरोधमोरिच्छतात् ।
नित्यते हि आत्मानात्माध्यातो युगितमिः इत्येव अनिर्वच्यत्वमस्तीति पते ।
अन्यथा तस्य वस्तुत्वमेव अङ्गुपेयं स्यात् ।
Ibid.
- 41 a. BSS. I.1.1. p.45.

42. Cf. T. M. P. Mahadevan. The Philosophy of Advaita. p. 248.
43. तस्यै लोकः "मनुष्योऽहं देवोऽहं पशुरहम्"
इति वातिविशिष्टशरीरेन्द्रियादितयाते
चिद्रूपस्य स्वस्य तादात्म्यमध्यस्थैव व्यवहारं
प्रमाणमयेवादित्यं कृत्वा इति प्रत्यक्षमेतत् ।
VPS. Var. I. p. 106. Cf. also PPV. Var. I. p. 347.
44. It should be noted that the perception in the present case is not through the sense-organs, but it is the eternal witness-perception (sākṣīpratyakṣa). Because, since the sense organs are also included among the objects of knowledge, they cannot serve as the causal aggregate of perception. Vidyāranya points out that according to Vedānta where there is seen immediacy even in the absence of causal aggregate like mind, senses etc., witness-perception is to be accepted.
Cf. VPS. Var. I. p. 106.
45. विमती देवदत्तस्य जाग्रदवस्थायां तस्यैव "अहं मनुष्यः"
इत्यादिवाक्यान्तराः तत्प्रभातत्वादिव्यवहारवन्ती, तस्यैव
सुषुप्त्यादिकालादन्यकालत्वात्, यन्नेह तन्नेह यथा तस्यैव
सुषुप्त्यादिकालः ।
VPS. Var. I. pp. 106-107. Cf. also PPV. Var. I. pp. 348-349.
46. अर्थापत्तिरपि - प्रजातृत्वादिव्यवहारो देहादि-
तादात्म्यादयानं विना नोपपद्यते, सुषुप्तावावधनाभावात्
व्यवहारानुपपत्त्या - इति ।
VPS. Var. I. p. 107.
Cf. also PPV. Var. I. p. 349.

47. आगमस्तु "ब्राह्मणो यजेत" इत्यादिरवगन्तायः ।
VPV. Var. I. p. 107. Cf. also PPV. Var. I. p. 382.
48. तथाहि - ब्राह्मणो यजेत इत्यादीनि शास्त्राण्यात्मनि
 वर्णविक्रययो वस्थादिविशेषाद्यात्मनाश्रित्य प्रवर्तन्ते ।
BSB. I. 1. 1. p. 44.
49. PP. Var. I. pp. 39-42.
50. यदा हानविशिष्टोऽर्थ एवाध्यातः तदा "स्मरमाणमृगः
 अन्यस्यान्वात्मनावमानोऽन्वोऽर्थोऽध्यातः"
 इत्येवमक्षररतया वाक्यं योजितम् ।
PPV. Var. I. p. 327.
51. यदा पुनः अर्थविशिष्टं हानमेवाध्यातः तदा
 "स्मृतितमानः अन्यस्यान्वात्मनावमानोऽध्यातः";
 इत्येवमक्षररतयापि तदेव वाक्यं योजयितुं शक्यते ।
Id. id.
52. तत्र भोक्तृत्वाध्यातः कर्तृत्वाध्यातमपेक्षते ।
 अर्तुर्भोगायोगात् । कर्तृत्वं च रागद्वेषायोगाध्यातमपेक्षते
 तद्रहितस्य उर्तृत्वामायात् । दोषसंयोगश्च भोक्तृत्वमपेक्षते ।
 अनुभूयते अतज्जातीये वा रागाः कृत्यपत्तेः । एवं
 भोगाः कृत्यवत् हेतुपरंपरया अनादिस्थात् अध्यातस्य
 नैमर्गिकत्वम् ।
PPV. Var. I. p. 62.
53. BSB. I. 1. 1. p. 26.
54. मिथ्याज्ञानं - अध्यातः, तन्निमित्तः ।
Bhā. I. 1. 1. p. 16.
55. मिथ्याज्ञाननिमित्तः ज्ञाते । मिथ्या च तद्वृत्तानं च मिथ्याज्ञानं ।
 मिथ्येति अनिर्वचनीयता उच्यते । अज्ञानमिति च जडात्त्विका
 अविकाराशक्तिः हानमर्थदातेन उच्यते । तन्निमित्तः - सवृत्तादानः उत्तरार्थः ।
PP. Var. I. p. 26.
56. प्रमोषादानं तु वदयति देवताधिकारम् ।
VX. p. 17.

CHAPTER III
NESCIENCE (MĀYĀ - AVIDYĀ)

(a) Introduction

At the close of the previous chapter it has been pointed out that avidyā is the material cause of all superimposition. Now, in this section, the riddle of avidyā (nescience) as handled by Śaṅkarites, is dealt with.

Avidyā or māyā is one of the basic concepts of Advaita philosophy propounded by Śaṅkara. It is almost central to the Advaitic teachings. It is by using this unique principle of avidyā or māyā that Śaṅkara explains the very difficult metaphysical problem of the relation of the one and the many i.e. the non-dual Brahman and the diversified world of phenomena. It is a key-concept on which the Advaita metaphysics, epistemology, and ethical discipline are ultimately based. In fact, without presupposing this principle Advaitins cannot satisfactorily solve the problems metaphysical, epistemological and axiological, from the Advaita stand-point.

Taking their stand on the authority of śrutis, Advaitins say that the ultimate reality i.e. Brahman is one only without a second (ekamevadvitīya) and attributeless (nirguna). And at the same time they declare that Brahman in its saguna form

as qualified by omniscience (sarvajñatva) and omnipotence (sarvabhaktimattva), is the cause of creation, maintenance, and dissolution of this universe. But if Brahman is 'eka-nayādvaitīya', how to account for this distinction between Brahman as sacchidānanda and nirguṇa? Advaitins have to explain how one and the same reality can take different forms.

Further, Śruti proclaims that the individual soul (jīva) in its essential nature is identical with Brahman. But in our experience we see contrary to that, for to us the jīvas appear to be finite and as experiencing pleasure and pain. The question is, how the non-dual Brahman of the nature of infinitude appears to be the finite individual souls. There must be some external principle that brings about the apparent distinction between Brahman and the individual soul. As already seen, according to Advaita, the world of plurality is merely an appearance of the one ultimate reality which is non-dual. But it is not enough if it is said this much. We have to account for how the 'One' appears as the 'many'. How the immutably eternal Brahman appears as the non-eternal world? Unless some extraneous principle or power is pre-supposed, such important issues involved in the Advaita metaphysics cannot be intelligibly explained. Advaitins declare that it is vyāpāra or māyā that is responsible for all sorts of differences.

Further, the subject-object epistemology, which involves the distinction of the knower, known, and the resulting knowledge, and the anirvacanīya-khyāti in terms of which Advaita explains the problem of error, the central problem of epistemology, presuppose the concept of avidyā. The ethical discipline involving the distinctions such as the meditator, meditation, and the object meditated; or the release, the seeker thereof, and the means therefor can be meaningful only in the realm of avidyā. Finally, Advaitin's stress on the knowledge alone as the direct means of liberation (mokṣa) is owing to the fact that avidyā, which is the root cause of the bondage (bandha) of the individual soul, can be removed only by the right knowledge.

In this way, for the justification of many important issues in the Advaitic scheme of metaphysics, epistemology and the ethical discipline, the concept of avidyā is necessary. The post-Sankara Advaitins, to whom Advaita owes its rise as a coherent system of metaphysics, discuss at length the riddle of avidyā, which is integral to the metaphysical structure of Advaita.

(b) Māyā-avidyā in scriptures

The principle of māyā or avidyā was not newly introduced by the Advaitins. But we come across many texts in the

ancient scriptures that lend support to the Advaita view of māyā or avidyā. Śruti, Smṛti, Itihāsa, and Purāṇa, in different contexts, describe this principle variously as nāma-rūpa, avyākṛta, avidyā, māyā, prakṛti, śarabha, avyakta, temas, kāraṇa, laya, śakti, mohāsupti, nidrā, akṣara, and ākāśa.¹

In some of the Ṛgvedic mantras the term māyā occurs in the sense of "mysterious wonder-working power", which brings about results that are not within the reach of human capacities. It enables its possessor to do marvellous deeds. Thus Indra is capable of attaining various forms through māyā.² A woman is capable of killing others with her mysterious power (māyā).³ And the very 'fightes' (yuddhāni) of Indra are spoken of as the manifestations of māyā.⁴ But the real philosophical significance of this principle can be found in the Nāśadiya-sūkta of Ṛgveda. It states: "Then there was neither ast nor ast... there was darkness covered by darkness."⁵ The term 'darkness' here refers to the indeterminable avidyā only.

The Upaniṣads are more explicit in conveying this principle. Thus the Chāndogya text states: "Just as those, who do not know the spot, might go over a hidden treasure again and again but do not find it; even so all creatures

here go day by day to the world of Brahman (in deep sleep), but do not find it, for truly they are concealed by the untrue (anṛta).⁶ Here the word 'anṛta' refers to avidyā. In Mundakopaniṣad, avidyā is spoken of as a knot (granthi).⁷ Again the Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad refers to avidyā as 'darkness' (tamas) in "From darkness lead me to light."⁸ And in the Śvetāśvataropaniṣad it is said: "The sages absorbed in meditation discovered the 'creative power' which is present in Brahman and which consists of the three guṇas namely sattva, rajas and tamas."⁹ Here the expression 'creative power' (devatmaśakti) stands for māyā. In the same Upaniṣad, in another place, māyā is declared as the primal cause of the universe the weilder of which is the great lord (Mahāśvara).¹⁰

Similarly in the Bhagavadgītā it is stated that 'knowledge is enveloped by ignorance, thereby mortals are deluded'.¹¹ Elsewhere in the Gītā, we are told, "Iśvara abides in the hearts of all beings causing them to revolve by his power (māyā) as though mounted on the wheel."¹²

Śaṅkara's predecessor, Gauḍapāda, in his Māṇḍūkya-kārikā declares that the world of plurality is merely an illusion (māyā), the non-duality alone being ultimately real.¹³ Elsewhere he compares māyā to deep slumber.¹⁴ We may think that we are in the waking state, but really

we are in great sleep, the sleep in the form of ignorance of the real nature of the Self. We may be awake physically but are not so spiritually. Spiritual enlightenment alone is the real waking state. And it is the beginningless māyā that conceals this enlightenment from us.

In this way, from the above references it is evident that the doctrine of māyā or avidyā was developed even before Śaṅkara. But it is Śaṅkara who gave this doctrine a classical currency, in systematising the Upaniṣadic philosophy.

(c) Identity of Māyā and Avidyā

A good majority of Advaitins, including Śaṅkara, Maṇḍana Miśra, Sureśvara, Padmapāda, Prakāśātman, and Vācaspati Miśra treat the terms māyā and avidyā as synonymous. Śaṅkara recognises no difference between māyā and avidyā. He uses the two terms synonymously. Thus in his commentary on the Ānugāhikādhikaraṇa, he says: "The primal cause of the universe is of the nature of avidyā; it is indicated by the term 'avyakta'; it has Parameśvara as its basis; it is of the nature of māyā; it is the great sleep in which the jīvas unaware of their real nature rest."¹⁵ And again in Daharādhi-
kāraṇa-bhāṣya he states: "Parameśvara, of the nature of pure consciousness under the influence of avidyā i.e. māyā appears

in different ways."¹⁶ From these passages it is clear that Śaṅkara uses the terms māyā and avidyā with reference to the same entity. Similarly Sureśvara also treats them to be identical. He, in his Vārttikas, says that avidyā i.e. māyā itself manifests in the form of the name and form (nāma-rūpa)¹⁷. He uses the phrases avātmaavidyā¹⁸ and avātma-māyā¹⁹ frequently in his works to indicate that Brahman-Ātman can be the cause of the world only as associated with māyā or avidyā. In the same way Vācaspati Miśra also accepts the identity of māyā and avidyā. According to him, both are simply two terms of the same meaning viz., illogicalness. He says: "This power of Brahman i.e. avidyā, which is also designated by the terms māyā etc., cannot be determined either as real or as unreal."²⁰

Padmapāda also admits the identity of māyā and avidyā. He says that this principle is variously described in the scriptures as nāma-rūpa, avyākṛta, māyā, avidyā etc.²¹ Following the foot-steps of Padmapāda, his commentator Prakāśātman, in his Pañcapādikā-vivaraṇa, upholds the theory of the equation of māyā and avidyā. He states: "Hence Brahman alone through its own avidyā i.e. māyā transfigures (in the form of the world.)"²²

Prakāśātman does not simply escape by treating the two

terms synonymously, but he proves the equation of māyā and avidyā by adducing reasoning and quoting references from scriptures and other authoritative works in support of it.²³ He argues that the distinction between māyā and avidyā cannot be maintained because the nature of indeterminability and the characteristic of being the cause of the obstruction of the manifestation of the real and of the presentation of the erroneous are common to both māyā and avidyā.²⁴

Moreover, añāna, which alone can be removed by right knowledge, is denoted by the word 'māyā' in the Śvetāśvatara-opaniṣad text: "Again at the end there is the removal of all māyā."²⁵ If māyā were not of the nature of añāna, its removal by the right knowledge would not have been possible. But in the empirical usage, however, māyā wherein the power of projection (vikṣepa-śakti) is predominant is differentiated from avidyā or añāna wherein the power of concealment (āvaropa-śakti) is predominant. Or māyā is that which depends upon the will of the agent; and añāna is that which is independent of the agent's will. This difference is possible even in respect of one and the same entity, due to different adjuncts.²⁶ Hence, the theory of māyā-avidyā equation is intelligible. In this way, the early post-Śaṅkara Advaitins, following their Master, use the terms māyā and avidyā synonymously.

But the later post-Śaṅkara Advaitins felt the need of drawing some distinction between māyā and avidyā for the purposes of investigation. Dealing with different theories regarding the nature of jīva and Īvara, Appayya Dikṣita, in his Siddhānta-leśa-saṅgraha, records some of the views according to which māyā and avidyā are considered to be different. According to the author of Prakāśārtha-Vivaraṇa, the primal cause of the world (bhūta-prakṛti), which is beginningless and indeterminable, is called māyā; and the numerous small portions of that māyā, which are possessed of two powers of concealment and projection, are known as avidyā.²⁷ In this view, māyā and avidyā are related with each other as the whole and its parts.

Even though Vidyāranya, in his Vivaraṇa-ratna-saṅgraha, following the tradition of Vivaraṇa, does not make any distinction between māyā and avidyā, still in Pañcadaśī, however, he treats them as two different forms of the primal cause (mūla-prakṛti), which consists of three guṇas viz., sattva, rajas, and tamas, on the strength of the Upaniṣadic text "That primal cause divides itself into two forms named māyā and avidyā."²⁸ That form of the mūla-prakṛti in which pure sattva is predominant i.e. when sattva is not overpowered by rajas and tamas, is called māyā, whereas that form in which impure sattva is predominant i.e. when sattva is subordinated to rajas and tamas, is called avidyā.²⁹

It should be noted in this context that in the above views both jīva and Īvara are considered to be the reflections of the pure consciousness i.e. Brahman-Ātman. And the different reflections presuppose different limiting adjuncts, for in the absence of different reflecting media the different reflections of the same entity cannot be possible. Verily, a single mirror can never be the locus of two reflected images of the same face. According to these theories, māyā forms the adjunct of Īvara and avidyā forms the adjunct of jīva.

Appayya Dīkṣita records one more view according to which māyā in which the power of projection is predominant is distinguished from avidyā where in the power of concealment is predominant. In other words, the same mūla-prakṛti is called māyā when the vikāpa-śakti predominates and forms the adjunct of Īvara and is called avidyā when the āvarana-śakti predominates and forms the adjunct of jīva. This is the reason why there is the experience "I am ignorant" to jīva alone and not to Īvara.³⁰

But we should remember that even according to the Advaitins, who do not equate māyā and avidyā, these two are not distinct entities, but in one way or the other they are the two forms of the same principle i.e. the primal cause

(mūla-prakṛti), when viewed from different angles. "When we look at the problem from the objective side, we speak of māyā, and when from the subjective side, we speak of avidyā.³¹

(d) Important Characteristics of Māyā-Avidyā

According to Advaita, māyā otherwise called avidyā or ajñāna (nescience) is of the nature of an existent (bhāvarūpa) i.e. avidyā is something positive and not a mere negation or non-existence of knowledge. Since avidyā cannot be described either as real or as unreal or as both, it is indeterminable (anirvacanīya). It has two powers viz. the power of concealment (āvarana-śakti) and the power of projection (vikṣepa-śakti). By the former it conceals the true nature of the reality and by the latter it creates the false. Moreover, avidyā is beginningless (anādi), because though it is the root cause of everything, it itself is not caused by anything else. Though it is beginningless, it has an end because it can be removed by the right knowledge (jñāna-nivartya).

(e) Avidyā is Bhāvarūpa

As it has been already stated, in the view of Advaita, avidyā is something positive in nature (bhāvarūpa) and not mere absence of knowledge, as it would literally mean. Since avidyā is responsible for the appearance of the world-spectacle, it should be regarded as a positive entity.

In the Śrutis, māyā, which is identical with avidyā, is declared to be the material cause (prakṛti) of the universe. Avidyā, therefore, does not imply a mere non-existence of knowledge, because the non-existence of knowledge can never be the material cause of anything. Moreover, according to Advaita, the delusive cognition (bhṛāṇa) is rooted in avidyā. Since the delusive cognition, which consists in superimposing the nature and attributes of the one thing on the other, is directly experienced to be positive, its root cause i.e. avidyā also must be positive. In this way, avidyā is something existent in nature but not of the nature of non-existence.

Commenting upon the Devatādhikaraṇa-bhāṣya (Br. Sū. I.1.30), Vācaspati Miśra, in his Bhāmātī, says that though all the products of avidyā, such as the internal organ (antah-karana) etc. cease to function at the time of the great dissolution (mahā-pralaya), yet owing to that they are not destroyed. But these products are merged in their root cause i.e. the indescribable avidyā and exist there in the form of the potential capacities (śūkṣmā śakti-rūpa) along with the residual impressions of all delusions.³² Again at the end of the mahā-pralaya, i.e. at the time of new creation, these products of avidyā, which were till then in the form of the potential capacities, being influenced by the will of

Parameśvara come out like the limbs of a tortoise or like the rejuvenation during rains of the bodies of the frogs which till then remained inert and lifeless. That is, the potentialities hidden in their root-cause avidyā at the time of mahāpralaya, assume their particular names and forms in accordance with their respective residual impressions.³³ In other words, the unmanifested names and forms become manifested at the time of new creation.

The above passage clearly indicates that Vācaspati does believe in avidyā of the nature of indescribable and existent (bhāvarūpa). Though Vācaspati does not mention here avidyā as bhāvarūpa, the indescribable avidyā, into which the products of the world are merged during the mahāpralaya and out of which they come out in the end, referred to here by Vācaspati, must be admitted to be bhāvarūpa i.e. something existent. For if avidyā were of the nature of mere non-existence, it would not have been the abode of the world-products in their subtle form in the mahāpralaya. And since all the delusions in that state cease to function and the residual impressions thereof also require a locus other than themselves, avidyā, in the view of Vācaspati, must be something other than delusions and their residual impressions. Amalananda, his commentator, therefore, rightly points out that from the illustrations such as the emergence of the limbs

of tortoise and the rejuvenation of the bodies of the frogs, Vācaspati clearly admits here avidyā to be of positive nature (bhāvarūpa) as distinct from the delusions and their residual impressions.³⁴

According to Sureśvara also, avidyā must be something positive in nature and not mere non-existence of knowledge. He says that Ātman i.e. Brahman cannot really be the material cause of the world-products i.e. the not-Self (anātmān), because there exists absolutely no identity between the two i.e. the Self and the not-Self in respect of their nature. Verily, the threads can never generate the pot.³⁵ Hence, avidyā, which corresponds to the nature of not-Self, alone can be the material cause of the not-Self consisting of mind, senses, etc.³⁶ It, therefore, clearly indicates that, according to Sureśvara also, avidyā is something existent, for if it were of the nature of mere negation or non-existence, the material causality of the world-products in case of avidyā cannot be possible. It has been already noted that mere non-existence can never be the material cause of anything. Therefore, Sureśvara asserts that it is contrary to all evidences to hold that something positive comes out of what is negative or non-existent.³⁷

Moreover, Sureśvara says that avidyā is an obscuring

agent of the Self.³⁸ In fact, the very nature of avidyā consists in obscuring or concealing the real nature of the Self.³⁹ It is well-known that mere non-existence cannot obscure anything. As Sarvajñātman remarks, even the logicians, who are adepts in determining the nature of non-existence (abhāva-bodhīn), do not assert that what is non-existent or negative veils an object.⁴⁰ Therefore, the mere absence or non-existence of knowledge cannot do the work of concealing or veiling the Self. Since avidyā does this work, it should be viewed as something positive. The term avidyā, therefore, does not denote mere non-existence of knowledge. That is why Sūrāvara says that the term avidyā must be explained the way in which the word 'amitra' is explained.⁴¹ The negative particle na in 'amitra' conveys the sense that the person denoted by the word is either other than or opposed to a friend. Similarly, the word avidyā must be explained as something other than or opposed to knowledge (vidyā). Therefore, the term avidyā does not convey the sense of mere non-existence of knowledge.⁴²

According to Sūrāvara, further, avidyā (nescience) is something distinct from the delusive cognition (mithyā-jñāna). The delusive cognition takes place only when there is the beginningless nescience and it does not take place in the absence of the latter. Thus, there is established between

the two i.e. aīhāna and mithyāīhāna the co-presence and co-absence (anvaya-vyatireka). Hence Sureśvara says that these two are invariably related with each other as cause and effect.⁴³ Since, according to Advaita, cause and effect are not different (ananya), the effect i.e. delusive cognition also can be called aīhāna (nescience). But on this strength the existence of beginningless avidyā or aīhāna apart from the delusive cognition should not be denied. Sureśvara refutes the theory of those according to whom the delusive cognition alone is nescience and apart from the former there is no aīhāna or avidyā as such. In the case of rope-snake illusion, for instance, even though the erroneous cognition of the snake is removed by the instruction of a trustworthy person that "It is not a snake" (nāyaṁ śarpakā), still, prior to the right knowledge of the substratum i.e. rope, one desires to know the real nature of the object in front in the form "What is this?" This desire to know (bhūtsā) of a person cannot be intelligibly explained if there is no avidyā as such that veils the true nature of the object in front of us, because the erroneous cognition has already been sublated.⁴⁴ Similarly in the case of the shell-silver illusion, for instance, there is seen the removal of the nescience by the instruction of the trust-worthy person (āpta) that the object before is really a shell (This is shell i.e. śukṭikīyaṁ), even without the sublation of the erroneous

perception of the silver.⁴⁵ From these instances it is clear that there does exist avidyā or aīhāna as apart from the delusive cognitions (mithyāīhāna).

Nor avidyā can be equated with the residual impressions. For, since everything other than Brahman is caused by avidyā, the latter is the cause of the residual impressions (sāṃskāras) also. Moreover, as already noted, the residual impressions require a substratum. The Self, which is essentially pure, cannot be the locus of sāṃskāras. Since in the state of deep sleep even the mind, etc. cease to function, the nescience alone should be accepted as the substratum of sāṃskāras. Therefore, Sureśvara declares that avidyā alone is related with all kinds of residual impressions.⁴⁶

In this way according to Sureśvara also avidyā is something positive in nature and it is something distinct from the delusive cognitions and their residual impressions. This avidyā alone is called mūlāvidyā or mūlāīhāna, the primal nescience.

As it has been noted already, Paṇḍapāda commenting upon adhyāsa-bhāṣya resolves the compound mithyāīhāna-nimittah as mithyā or taḍ aīhānaṭca and says that the indescribable potency (śakti) of nescience (avidyā), which is of the nature

of insentience (jadātmikā) and which is exclusive to knowledge, is the material cause of superimposition.⁴⁷ He further declares that this potency of avidyā which is located in the Self and pervades the things external as well as internal should be admitted. Otherwise i.e. if nescience is not admitted, the appearance of illusory objects cannot be intelligibly explained.⁴⁸ From these statements it is evident that Padmapāda admits a positive nescience which is indeterminate and removable by right knowledge.

But Prakāśātman, in his Pañcapādika-vivaraṇa, proceeds to prove avidyā to be of the nature of existent by adducing pramāṇas like pratyakṣa, anumāna etc. Avidyā, of the existent nature is perceptually experienced in statements like "I am ignorant", "I know neither myself nor another."⁴⁹ This experience does not relate to the non-existence of knowledge (jñānābhāva), because it is experienced immediately in the same way as the experience "I am happy." If it were mere non-existence of knowledge, it would not have been experienced directly, because the non-existence is to be cognised only through non-cognition (apartha-pramāṇa).⁵⁰ the pramāṇa which relates only to what is mediate (parokṣa). Thus non-existence is imperceptible whereas avidyā is perceptually experienced.

Even according to those who hold the view that the non-

existence is perceptible, the perception of the non-existence of knowledge in the Self is not possible. For in the case of the knowledge, "There is no knowledge in me", if the substrate (dharmi) i.e. the Self and the counter-correlate i.e. the knowledge are cognised, the perception of the non-existence of knowledge cannot be possible.⁵¹ Just as the perception of the non-existence of pot (ghatābhāva) in "There is no pot on the floor" does not arise if the floor and pot are already cognised. If, on the other hand, these two i.e. the substrate and the counter-correlate are not cognised, then also the perception of the non-existence of knowledge cannot arise.⁵² because the cognition of non-existence presupposes the prior knowledge of 'dharmi' and 'pratiyogi'. Verily, one could not know "There is no pot on the floor", if one had no prior knowledge of both the floor and the pot. The same defect will arise on the view that the non-existence of knowledge is to be known either through inference (anumāna) or through non-cognition (anupalabdhi).⁵³

Now, the opponent may raise an objection: According to Advaita also, the nascent (avidyā) of the nature of existent is admitted to be removable by knowledge (jñāna-nivartya). Then how can the perception of nascent in the form "I am ignorant", which involves the cognition of the substrate (i.e. the Self) and the counter correlate (i.e. knowledge),

be possible?

To this, Prakāśātman replies by saying that if in the view of Advaita nescience were mere non-existence of knowledge, then its removal by the knowledge of the substrate and the counter-correlate would have been possible. Just as the existence and the non-existence of the same pot in the same place and at the same time cannot be possible even so both the knowledge and its non-existence cannot co-exist. But according to Advaita, as it has been already noted, avidyā is not mere non-existence of knowledge but something existent in nature. Hence, the two existent entities viz., the knowledge (of the locus and the counter-correlate) and the nescience existing in one and the same substrate do not contradict each other, just as two existing entities, the pot and cloth do not contradict each other.⁵⁴

But strictly speaking the knowledge of locus (āśraya) and the counter-correlate (prativoti) is nothing but the witness-consciousness itself. And the witness-consciousness does not remove the nescience, for it is this very witness-consciousness (sākṣi-caitanya) that establishes the existence of nescience.⁵⁵ And it is a well-known fact that the knowledge, which establishes a particular object, does not, verily, remove that object.⁵⁶ For otherwise the object, say pot, would have

been removed by the knowledge thereof (i.e. of pot).⁵⁷ But this is not the fact. Similarly, the witness-consciousness which manifests nescience does not remove it. The removing factor of nescience, however, is the mental mode carrying the reflection of consciousness in it. But that is absent in the present case.⁵⁸ In this way, the perception "I am ignorant" is the evidence for the nescience to be of the nature of an existent.

Similarly the following inference also establishes the existence of the nescience to be of the nature of an existent. Any valid cognition must be preceded by something else, which is other than its own antecedent non-existence (ava-prāga-bhāva), which veils its own content, which is removable by itself and which is present in the locus of that cognition; because it manifests something which is not yet manifested, like the light of a lamp arising for the first time in darkness. Just as the light of a lamp is preceded by darkness, which according to Advaita is an existent entity, so the valid cognition is preceded by the nescience which is of the nature of an existent.⁵⁹ Now to explain this inference more clearly: When the valid knowledge of a pot arises, it gives rise to such empirical usages as "The pot exists," "The pot is manifest", etc; just as the light of a lamp, which arises for the first time in the darkness, gives rise to such usages

with reference to the things that already exist there. It can be inferred from this that prior to the rise of the valid knowledge of that object, there existed some factor in that object which gave rise to such empirical usages as "The object does not exist and is not manifest", etc; and which is removed by the valid knowledge. And that factor must be something different from the prior non-existence of valid knowledge (jñāna-prāgabhāva), for, removal of the prior non-existence of knowledge by knowledge is not appropriate, because knowledge should exist prior to its prior non-existence in order to remove the latter. But knowledge could arise only after the annihilation of its prior non-existence.^{59a} Thus, when there is knowledge, there is no prior non-existence of knowledge, and when there is prior non-existence of knowledge, there is no knowledge. The two, therefore, cannot be related as the remover and the removed. In so far as the valid knowledge removes the factor, which veils the true nature of the objects, the latter should be viewed as something positive in nature, and not negatively as prior non-existence of knowledge. And that factor is avidyā.

Prakāśātman adduces presumption (arthāpatti) as well as to prove the existence of the negligence of the nature of an existent: As it has been already noted, the two-fold


superimposition, in the form of cognitions and of things (i.e. both arthādhyaṣa and īśānādhyaṣa), being an existent effect (bhāva-kārya) must have a material cause.⁶⁰ Now, the superimposition of ego (ahaṁkāra) on the pure consciousness i.e. Brahman-Ātman or of silver on the shell, which is indeterminable (mithyā), necessitates the postulation of some material cause therefor, which must also be indeterminable. If that material cause were real, its effect i.e. the superimposition would also be real, since the nature of cause necessarily inheres in to its effect. If superimposition were also real, its removal by subsequent right knowledge would not be possible. But it is not the fact, since sublation of superimposition of silver in the shell etc. is directly experienced.⁶¹

Further, if that material cause, which is false (mithyā), had beginning, we have to assume another material cause for that, for the second, one more material cause and so on, and thus we have to go on assuming a series of material causes without an end, which will definitely lead to the contingency of infinite regress (anavasthā). In order to avoid this defect we have to accept that material cause of adhyāsa is beginningless.⁶² And that material cause, which is beginningless and indeterminable and which relates to the Self, is nescience (ajñāna). In this way, the false

superimposition itself, which does not arise in the absence of such a material cause, postulates that i.e. aihāna.⁶³

Prakāśātman then proceeds to refute the theory of Bhāskara. According to Bhāskara, the non-existence of knowledge, the delusive cognition and the residual impressions thereof alone are the denotation of 'aihāna' or 'avidyā'. And these alone would obstruct the manifestation of the essential nature of the individual soul i.e. the Self-luminous Brahman. Hence there is no need of assuming the nescience of the nature of existent, apart from these. This is Bhāskara's contention.

But Prakāśātman says that this contention is false. He establishes avidyā of the nature of existent from the analysis of the experience of deep sleep. In that state the true nature of the self-luminous Brahman is not manifested to the individual soul. This non-manifestation cannot be due to the difference of the true nature of Brahman from the cognising jīva i.e. the individual Self (drasṭṛ), because the Upaniṣadic texts like "That thou art" (Chā. Up. VI.viii.7) etc. declare that the individual self and Brahman are essentially one.⁶⁴ Nor can the delusive cognition (mithyā-
iḥāna) obstruct the manifestation of the real nature of Brahman in the deep sleep, for the delusive cognition is

absent in that state.⁶⁵ Nor even the residual impressions of delusive cognitions could cause this obstruction. Because the residual impressions are not indeed capable of obstructing the manifestation of the true nature of reality. The real nature of  the shell is being seen manifested, even when the residual impressions of the delusive silver still persist.⁶⁶

The non-existence of knowledge also cannot be the obstructing factor of the real nature of Brahman. Since the knowledge, which is the essential nature of the Self, is eternal, its non-existence can never be possible.⁶⁷ And the non-existence of the other cognitions (i.e. the cognitions which objectify the self-luminous consciousness) is not capable of obstructing the manifestation of the true nature of the self-luminous Brahman.⁶⁸ For otherwise, there would be the non-manifestation of self-luminous Brahman even in the state of release, since during that state such cognitions do not exist. Nor even the karmas are the cause of non-manifestation, for the karmas are of the form of residual impressions like the residual impressions of the delusive silver, which, as it has been already noticed, are incapable of obstructing the true nature of reality.⁶⁹ Prakāśātman, therefore, concludes that the obstruction to the manifestation of the real nature of Brahman in deep sleep must be

caused by something, which is different from the non-existence of knowledge, delusive cognitions, the residual impressions thereof, and the karmas. And that obstructing factor should be the nescience, which is of the nature of an existent.⁷⁰

Prakāśātman also adduces śruti and presumption from what is heard in śruti in support of avidyā of the nature of an existent.⁷¹ Referring to the state of deep sleep the Chāndogyaopaniṣad declares "...All these people go to the world of Brahman day after day, and yet do not find it, for they are covered by the non-real (nescience)."⁷² It means that the true nature of Brahman is concealed from the individual souls by avidyā (anṛta). As it has been already pointed out, avidyā, which veils the true nature of Brahman, must be something existent and not mere non-existence of knowledge, for mere non-existence (abhāva) cannot veil an object. Similarly the śruti texts such as "without cognising his identity with Īvara, he sorrows, lost in delusion,"⁷³ "The true nature of Brahman is veiled from the individual souls by an entity similar to mist"⁷⁴ etc. also support this view.

In the same way, we have the presumption from what is heard in śruti (śrutārthāpatti). In all the śrutis it is the knowledge of Brahman that is set forth as the means of

liberation i.e. the removal of the bondage of the individual soul. If the bondage be not of the nature of avidyā, its removal by the knowledge cannot be intelligible, because avidyā alone can be removed by knowledge. From this it is clear that there is in respect of Brahman, the earlier non-knowledge (i.e. avidyā), which causes the bondage of superimposition to the individual soul.⁷⁵ In this way, Prakāśātman establishes nescience (avidyā) to be indeterminable, beginningless and of the nature of an existent, by adducing perception, inference, presumption, śruti, and presumption from what is heard in śruti in support of it.

Thus we see that the three sub-schools of Advaita, i.e. the Śāmatī-school, Vārttika-school and Vivarapa-school admit primal nescience (mūlāvidyā), which is of the nature of an existent.

(f) Critical remarks

Before going into the critical remarks, let us first examine as to what is the exact position of Śaṅkara regarding the concept of phāvarūpāvidyā. Śaṅkara, in his commentary on the Br. Sū. I. iv. 3, while distinguishing his position from that of Sāṅkhya's pradhāna-vāda, declares that the primal state (prāgavasthā), which, according to the Sāṅkhyas, creates this universe independently, is admitted

by Vedāntins to be dependent upon the Supreme Lord. That state must necessarily be admitted, because it has a purpose to serve. In the absence of that latent state, the creatorship in case of Brahman, which is essentially immutable (kūṭastha), cannot be possible, because without such an inherent power, Brahman cannot proceed to create. And without that latent state the absence of re-birth in case of the released souls cannot be reasonably explained, because one attains release only when this potential power is burnt away by knowledge. Thus that state should be accepted in order to hold reasonably the distinction between the released and the bound souls. This potential power, which is the primal cause of this universe, is of the nature of avidyā, it is indicated by the term avyakta; it has Paramēśvara as its basis; it is of the nature of māyā; it is the great sleep, in which the jīvas unaware of their real nature rest.⁷⁶

From the above oft-quoted passage it is clear that the primal state, which Śaṅkara calls, avidyā or māyā or avyakta, which is the power of the Supreme Lord and which causes obstruction for the jīva in knowing its real nature, must be something positive or existent in nature.

The primal state also called māyā or avidyā, which is

here referred to by Śaṅkara, can be differentiated from Sāṅkhya's doctrine of pradhāna in two respects: Pradhāna creates the world independently of any sentient being and is really different from Puruṣa. But in the view of Advaita, avidyā, which is the inherent power of Brahman, is solely dependent on the latter. And it cannot be determined either as different or as non-different from Brahman.⁷⁷ But the nature of possessing the three guṇas i.e. sattva, rajas and tamas, being the primal cause of the universe, being beginningless and the nature of being an existent are common to both Pradhāna and avidyā or māyā. It follows from this that Śaṅkara does accept a primal nescience (mūlāvidyā or mūlāśifāna) which is of the nature of an existent (bhāvarūpa).

Nevertheless it should be remembered that there is no specific defence of bhāvarūpa-avidyā concept either in Śaṅkara's works or in Bhāratī of Vācaspati Miśra. In their commentaries we find no separate section, which is specifically devoted to treat the concept of avidyā. They almost take this principle of avidyā for granted through out their works. They might have thought that the establishment of avidyā by any proof is useless, since avidyā is directly experienced by one and all in the form "I am ignorant". As it has been already noted, Śaṅkara, only while distinguishing his position from that of Sāṅkhya's pradhāna-vāda, stops a while

and briefly explains as to why avidyā should be admitted at all. Vācaspati Miśra also follows the footsteps of Śaṅkara in this regard and thus only in the Devatādhikaraṇa, he explains as to how the world-products are merged into the indeterminable avidyā at the time of great dissolution and how they come out again at the time of fresh creation. In this way, it is clear that Śaṅkara and Vācaspati do not explain avidyā in so many words. And also, they do not mention avidyā expressly, as bhāvarūpa, whenever they refer to it. But still on the close examination of their works we can arrive at a conclusion that both Śaṅkara and Vācaspati believed in primal nescience which is of a positive nature.

Padmapāda and Sureśvara, the direct disciples of Śaṅkara, explain the concept of avidyā or māyā much more elaborately referring to its diverse functions. Even though they do not mention avidyā as bhāvarūpa, yet they clearly admit avidyā to be the material cause of superimposition or erroneous cognition, the view which, as already noted, holds good only if avidyā is something existent or positive in nature.

It is Padmapāda, who for the first time, interpreted the phrase 'mithyābhāsa-nimittatā', to mean that the material cause of superimposition is avidyā which is of the nature of material power and which is removable by knowledge.⁷⁸ The

validity of this interpretation should not be questioned, because this is the interpretation of an Advaita proceptor who heard Bhāṣya on Brahma-Sūtras from Śaṅkara's own mouth. Śaṅkara, in his commentary on Bṛ. Sū. II.1.9, states that as in the state of deep sleep, or sauṣṭhi (absorption in divine consciousness), though there is the natural eradication of all sorts of differences, still owing to the persistence of the 'mithyājñāna', differences occur over again in the waking state; similarly in the dissolution a power of diversification associated with 'mithyājñāna' persists.⁷⁹ Here 'mithyājñāna', which Śaṅkara refers to as persisting in the deep sleep etc., cannot be interpreted as 'mithyā ca tad jñānaṁ ca' which means erroneous cognition, because there exists no erroneous cognition in that state. It holds good only if we interpret the term as 'mithyā ca tad ajñānaṁ ca' to mean indeterminable avidyā. Hence Padmapāda's interpretation does not conflict with Śaṅkara's commentary.

But soon after Śaṅkara, Bhāskara (C. 750-850 A.D.) wrote commentary on Brahma-Sūtras, and charged objections against Śaṅkara, by using very strong language against him. Bhāskara raised all sorts of objections against the conception of avidyā. In the 11th century, there was again a great protest against avidyā-concept in the Śrībhāṣya of Rāmānuja. Therefore, the later Advaitins had to defend their conception of avidyā.

against the attacks of the non-Advaitic schools of Vedānta. Thus it is Prakāśātman, who for the first time established avidyā in all its aspects. He, in his Pançopādikā-vivaraṇa, gives all sorts of proofs in support of avidyā, which is indeterminable, beginningless, and of the nature of an existent. Prakāśātman clearly mentions that avidyā is not mere non-existence or negation of knowledge but something positive or existent in nature (bhāva-rūpa).

As already noticed, Prakāśātman, in his Vivaraṇa, has adduced pramāṇas like perception, inference, etc. in order to prove the primalnescience, which is of the nature of an existent. But it should be remembered that these pramāṇas are adduced to prove not the very existence of avidyā, but the positive nature (bhāvarūpatva) of avidyā. It should be understood in this sense only, because avidyā cannot become the object of any proof or means of knowledge (pramāṇa). Now it is necessary at this stage to understand the position of Advaita as to why avidyā cannot become the object of any pramāṇa: A pramāṇa is that which conveys the knowledge of an object, unknown hitherto (anadhigata). Or in other words, a pramāṇa makes known an object that is characterised by avidyā. Now it is only by removing the unknownness (ajnātatā) or avidyā characterising an object that a pramāṇa could convey its knowledge. As Sureśvara remarks a pramāṇa is

pramāṇa only in so far as it removes the unknownness of an object.⁸⁰ Pratyekṣa, for instance, makes known an object, say pot, only after destroying the avidyā characterising that pot. Hence, the criterion for an object to be known by pramāṇa is that it should be characterised by avidyā or aīhāna. Now, if we admit that the existence of avidyā is made known by any pramāṇa it should be characterised by another avidyā. And to prove the existence of the second avidyā we have to assume a third avidyā and so on. Thus, we land ourselves in the fallacy of infinite regress (anavasthā). Thus inference etc. cannot be the proof in respect of avidyā as such.⁸¹

Moreover, a knowledge arising from a pramāṇa (i.e. vyākṣi-īhāna) is opposed to avidyā. Instead of establishing avidyā, the 'pramāṇa-īhāna' removes it. Therefore, avidyā cannot be known through the knowledge generated by a pramāṇa. As Sureśvara has aptly pointed out, any such attempt to know avidyā through the knowledge arising from a pramāṇa is as futile and absurd as the attempt to see the darkness of a mountain-cave by means of a lamp-light.⁸² Just as the light of a lamp dispels the darkness, instead of revealing it; in the same way the pramāṇa-īhāna, instead of establishing aīhāna, removes it. Hence avidyā cannot become an object of any pramāṇa. Advaitins, therefore, conclude that avidyā

is prasiṅgha but not pramāṇa-siṅgha.⁸³ It is prasiṅgha in so far as it is revealed by the self-luminous witness-consciousness (sākṣi-caitanya) itself. But it is not pramāṇa-siṅgha, since it is removable by the knowledge obtained through a pramāṇa. In fact, not standing the test of valid knowledge is the very nature of avidyā.⁸⁴

In this way, it should be remembered that whenever Advaitins adduce any pramāṇas to establish avidyā, it is not to prove the very existence of avidyā but to prove the positive nature of avidyā. Since avidyā is experienced directly by the witness-consciousness, the pramāṇas such as perception, inference etc. prove that avidyā is not something non-existent or negative.⁸⁵

Since avidyā is patent to one and all, being experienced directly by the witness in the form "I do not know", there is no doubt about its existence. Really speaking an entity, which is revealed immediately by the witness-consciousness like happiness etc., does not require any proof or pramāṇa for its existence. That avidyā is not something negative but something positive in nature, too is not established by the mere witness-consciousness, because there is difference of opinion among the philosophers in respect of its positive nature. So it is only in order to refute the position of

those who contend that there is nothing called nescience, which is indeterminable and of the nature of an existent, that the pramāṇas like anumāna etc. are mentioned. Therefore, although avidyā as such cannot become the object of any pramāṇa, such elements like indeterminability, the nature of being existent etc. can become the object of pramāṇa. But the existence of avidyā is established by the witness-consciousness only.⁸⁶

But it must also be noted that when Advaitins say that avidyā is bhāvarūpa, i.e. something positive, it is only from the empirical point of view. Only from the relative stand-point it is something positive. It is not as positive as Brahman is. Since it causes the world appearance, it cannot be negative, for an entity which is negative or non-existent cannot be the material cause of anything positive. Hence it is only to suggest that avidyā is something different from what is negative or non-existent that Advaitins characterise it as bhāvarūpa.⁸⁷ From the stand-point of Brahman, however, avidyā is not (tucchā). Still it appears to exist till Brahman realisation dawns. Now this positivity or existent nature of avidyā does not imply its reality. It only implies the presentability of avidyā. In other words, avidyā is positive or existent, as it is other than the unreal or non-existent, which is not presentable

at all. Strictly speaking avidyā is neither real nor unreal. It is indeterminable.

(g) Avidyā is indeterminable (anirvacanīya)

Avidyā, according to Advaita, is indeterminable (anirvacanīya). It is neither real nor unreal, nor both real and unreal; it is neither really different from Brahman nor non-different from it, nor both different and non-different from Brahman, and it is neither possessed of parts nor is it partless, nor can it be characterised both as possessing parts and without parts.⁸³

Avidyā is not real, for what is real, according to Advaita, is not contradicted in all the three divisions of time, past, present, and future. Since Avidyā is sublatable subsequent to the right knowledge of Brahman, it cannot be real. Nor is it unreal (asat), for what is unreal like a sky-flower is not in the range of any of our experience. In so far as avidyā is directly experienced by the witness-self in the form "I am ignorant", it cannot be unreal. Nor can it be both real and unreal, for one and the same entity cannot be the locus of two mutually contradicting characteristics.

Similarly, avidyā cannot be really different from

Brahman, for otherwise the spirit of non-dualism will be lost. Nor can it be non-different from Brahman, because no real identity between Brahman, which is of the nature of pure consciousness, and avidyā, which is insentient, can be possible. And because of contradiction it cannot be both different and non-different from Brahman. Avidyā does not have parts, because it is not caused by any parts. For what is possessed of parts like cloth etc., is seen to be caused by the parts like threads etc. Moreover, if it has parts, then it must have a beginning (sādi). And in that case, it would require another avidyā for its material cause and so on. This will definitely lead to infinite regress. Nor is it partless, for otherwise it would not have been the transformative material cause of this composite world. Nor can it be both with parts and partless, for that violates the law of contradiction. In this way, it is not possible to bring avidyā under any known categories. Advaitins, therefore, conclude that avidyā is indeterminable.⁸⁹ And since it is indeterminable, it is said to be illusory (mithyā).

It is noteworthy in this regard that even though all other post-Śaṅkara Advaitins characterise avidyā as 'anirvacanīya'.⁹⁰ Sureśvara does not use the neat expression 'anirvacanīya' anywhere in his writings. He frequently uses

the term 'avicārita-saṁśiddha', to bring out the nature of the primal nescience.⁹¹ Now the phrase 'avicārita-saṁśiddha' means "that which appears to be real and established fact until reality is not realized."⁹² From this it is clear that subsequent to the Brahman-realisation avidyā will be uprooted. Therefore, though avidyā appears to exist empirically, it is not real absolutely. It has the same kind of existence and reality as any other empirical object has. Just as in case of the shell-silver illusion the silver appears to be real, so long as the true nature of the substratum i.e. shell is not perceived; even so avidyā and its products appear to be real, so long as their substratum i.e. Brahman is not realised. Hence avidyā is not absolutely real, since it is sublated, nor absolutely unreal, for it is available in our experience, nor both, because of contradiction; just as in the shell-silver illusion, the silver cannot be determined either as real or as unreal or as both. In this way, the term 'avicārita-saṁśiddha' ultimately implies the indeterminability of avidyā. Sureśvara's traditional interpreter, Ānandagiri also, therefore, equates 'avicārita-saṁśiddha' with 'anirvacanīya'.⁹³ But Sureśvara characterises avidyā as 'avicārita-saṁśiddha' in order to show the positivity or existent nature of avidyā too in addition to its indeterminability. The term 'saṁśiddha' in the above phrase clearly indicates the positive nature of avidyā.

(h) The Locus and the Object of Avidyā

Now the question arises as to what is the locus (āśraya) as well as the object (viśaya) of avidyā. Like knowledge (vidyā), avidyā is bipolar. That is, just as the knowledge (vidyā) involves the knowing subject and the object known, so avidyā also should have some person on whom it rests and some object to which it refers. In other words, avidyā is in something and about some other thing.

The problem of the locus of avidyā is one of the most important issues in Advaita philosophy. Since, avidyā, as it has already been proved, is a positive entity, it must exist somewhere. But at the same time it should also be remembered that since avidyā is not absolutely real, the question of its real substratum does not arise. That which is merely an illusory appearance (mithyā-rūpa) like a shell-silver or rope-snake cannot really exist anywhere. The only question that Advaitins should answer is as to where avidyā can apparently rest?

Now, there has been a controversy among the post-Śaṅkara Advaitins regarding the locus of avidyā. According to the Bhāmatī-school, propounded by Vācaspati Miśra, the individual soul (jīva) is locus of avidyā, whereas according to the Vivarapa-school propounded by Prakāśātman, Brahman

of the nature of pure consciousness is the locus of avidyā.

Vācaspati Miśra, in his Bhōmatī, upholds 'jīvāśritā-
viśvā-vāda'. According to him, the individual soul is the
locus (āśraya) of avidyā, which obscures the real nature
of Brahman, and consequently it has the latter as its
object (viśaya). Thus, in the view of Vācaspati, the locus
and the object of avidyā are different.

In his commentary on the adhyāsa-bhāṣya, Vācaspati
says that the individual soul is the locus of two kinds
of avidyā, i.e. kārya-avidyā and kāraṇa-avidyā.⁹⁴ Again
in the Samanvayādhikaraṇa, he says that the indeterminable
avidyā is located not in Brahman, but in the individual
soul, and hence Brahman is eternally pure (nitya-śuddha).⁹⁵
He repeats the same idea in the Sarvatraśasiddhādhikaraṇa
also and says that the Supreme Self itself, having attained
to the state of the individual soul due to beginningless
avidyā appears as many. And avidyā belongs to those indivi-
dual souls and not to Brahman which transcends all limiting
adjuncts.⁹⁶ This clearly indicates that, according to
Vācaspati, Brahman, which is eternally pure and free from
the taints of all sorts of upādhis, cannot be ^{the} abode of
avidyā, but the jīva who is impure due to limiting adjuncts
such as mind, intellect, etc. can be its abode.

Vācaspati opposes the view of those who maintain Brahman as the locus of avidyā. His main argument against this view is that avidyā cannot be located in Brahman for the essential nature of Brahman is the pure consciousness (vidyā-avyabhāva). Upaniṣads declare Brahman as Self-luminous consciousness and free from all sorts of bondage.⁹⁷ The brahmācīṭāvidyā-vāda, hence, contradicts the Upaniṣadic statements. There cannot be a relation of the supporter and that which is supported between two entities which are opposed to each other like light and darkness. Therefore, Brahman of the nature of light, cannot support and sustain avidyā which is of the nature of darkness. Thus Vācaspati concludes that though avidyā is located in jīva, the individual soul, yet it is spoken of as having the Supreme Lord as its basis (Paramaśvaraśrayā) not in the sense of its locus but in the sense of its object; because it depends upon Him for its object. Thus, in the view of Vācaspati, Īśvara cannot be the very abode avidyā.⁹⁸ Amalananda, in his Vedānta-kalpataru, further endorses Vācaspati's view.⁹⁹ Apṛaṣṭa Dīkṣita, in his Kalpataru-parimela, says that our day-to-day empirical usages in the form "I am ignorant", "I am not the Lord", etc., and the Vedic statement "The two unborn, the knower and the ignorant" (Śve. Up. I. 9), which speaks of Īśvara and jīva as the knower and the ignorant respectively, clearly indicate that jīva alone is the locus of avidyā.¹⁰⁰

Brahmānanda, in his commentary on the Siddhānta-bindu, argues that in the view of Vācaspati, avidyā should belong to the one who feels that Brahman does not exist and Brahman is not manifest. Since it is the individual soul from whom the real nature of Brahman is concealed, it i.e. the individual soul feels that Brahman does not exist and Brahman is not manifest. Hence the individual soul alone should be regarded as the locus of avidyā.¹⁰¹ Further, the scriptural texts that instruct the individual soul to strive for the mokṣa, which consists of the removal of avidyā, also suggest that the individual soul alone is the locus of avidyā. The point to be noted is that it is the individual soul that acquires the right knowledge i.e. the final intuition of Brahman (Brahma-sākṣātkāra), which dispels avidyā. Now this right knowledge can destroy avidyā only if avidyā abides in jīva. For, there can be no relation of the destroyer and destroyed between the two that do not occupy the common substratum. Therefore, vidyā and avidyā must have the same locus i.e. jīva.

Now an objection can naturally be raised against 'jīvācāritāvidyā-vāda'. According to Advaita, the very conception of jīvahood is the result of avidyā. In other words, it is only due to avidyā that the one impertite Supreme Self appears as many individual souls. Thus, unless

we presuppose the prior existence of avidyā, we cannot think of the individual soul. Therefore, only when there exists avidyā, the division of the individual souls is possible, and only after the division of individual souls, avidyā becomes located in jīva. In this way, the view that the individual soul is ^{the} locus of avidyā involves the fallacy of mutual dependence (anvayābhāva).

This objection, Vācaspati easily refutes by saying that the fallacy of mutual dependence will not arise, since both avidyā and jīva are beginningless (anādi). If they had a beginning (śādi), the above fallacy could have been pointed out. But, Advaitins do not say that at any time avidyā was and the jīva was not or that the jīva was and avidyā was not.¹⁰² Like the seed-sprout series the interaction of avidyā and jīvahood has no beginning at all. Hence there is no inconsistency in admitting the beginningless jīva as the locus of avidyā, which is also beginningless.¹⁰³

Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, in his Advaita-siddhi, while defending Vācaspati's view says that the mutual dependence is of three kinds, i.e., mutual dependence in respect of origin (utpatti), in respect of knowledge (jñapti) and in respect of existence (sthiti). Madhusūdana argues that

none of them will apply in the case of jīva and avidyā. Since both avidyā and jīva are beginningless, there is no question of mutual dependence in respect of their origin. The fallacy of mutual dependence cannot be ascribed to jīva and avidyā even in respect of their knowledge, because though avidyā is manifested by the jīva-caitanya, the latter does not require avidyā for its manifestation, since it (jīva-caitanya) is self-luminous. Nor can there be the mutual dependence between them in respect of their existence, because though avidyā rests on jīva-caitanya and depends upon it for its own existence, yet jīva-caitanya does not rest on avidyā nor does it depend upon avidyā for its own existence.¹⁰⁴

One may still urge that the above explanation is not intelligible. Advaitins cannot escape so easily merely by saying that avidyā and jīva are beginningless. The question still raises its head as to how can avidyā, which depends upon jīva for its existence, be itself the cause of jīva?

Advaitins' answer to this question is that if avidyā were a real entity, the alleged defect would be effective. But avidyā is mere illusion (māyā). So there is no unintelligibility in case of it. To be unintelligible in the last resort is the very essence of māyā. It is, therefore, meaningless to expect intelligibility in the case of māyā. If it were intelligible in any

way, it would be real and in that case it ceases to be māyā. Māyā indeed is that which is adept in creating what we think to be impossible in our ordinary life. Hence, avidyā which depends upon jīva for its existence, can itself be the cause of jīva.^{104a}

The view that jīva is the locus of avidyā can be traced back to Maṇḍana's Brahma-siddhi.¹⁰⁵ It should be noted that Vācaspati, in his Bhāmati, has followed the same line of argument, which Maṇḍana has adopted in his Brahma-siddhi, in this regard.

In this way, according to the Bhāmati-school, jīva is the locus (āśraya) of avidyā and Brahman is its content (viśaya). Avidyā, abiding in the individual soul, veils the real nature of the absolute reality i.e. Brahman. Thus the Bhāmati-school differentiates between the locus and the object of avidyā.

On the contrary, the Vivarapa-school does not find any difference between (the locus and the object of avidyā). In the view of Vivarapa, Brahman of the nature of pure consciousness alone is both the locus and the object of avidyā. Prakāśātman, in his Vivarapa, refutes the view of those who contend that the locus and the object of avidyā



are different. He says that avidyā does not require the difference of locus from the object, since it is not of the nature of an act like the pot etc. But just as darkness obscures the place wherein it is located, even so avidyā veils the real nature of thing wherein it is present, since it is an obscuring agent. Certainly, darkness present in a room does not require the things outside for its function of concealment. The darkness, therefore, does not require the difference of locus from its object, but veils the objects in the place in which it is located. Similarly, avidyā accomplishes the two-fold relation in the form of 'sāraṇatva' and 'viśayatva' even in respect of one and the same thing i.e. the Self, without depending upon the two.¹⁰⁶

Now, it may be argued that the locus and the object of avidyā or aihāṇa, like that of vidyā or jñāna cannot be one and the same. We say "I do not know this", just as we say "I know this". This certainly implies that the locus and the content of avidyā must be different. That is, avidyā should abide in some person and should refer to something else.

Prakāśātman refutes this by saying that since avidyā denotes the exclusion of jñāna (knowledge), which depends upon the two i.e. the locus and the object, it (avidyā)

also appears to be requiring the difference of the locus from the difference of the locus from the object. It is just like this: The 'being at rest' (sthitiḥ) does not require an object. But if we put it in the form "non-moving" (acramanam), it appears to be dependent on an object in the form "whose non-moving" "towards what object". But really speaking, avidyā like darkness obscures its own abode.¹⁰⁷ It does not require the difference of the locus from its content. Hence the self-luminous pure consciousness alone is both the locus and the object of avidyā.

Now one may object that it is self-contradictory to admit the location of avidyā in the self-luminous pure consciousness, because the two are mutually opposed to each other like light and darkness. How can the self-luminous pure consciousness i.e. Brahman of the nature of light be the abode of avidyā of the nature of darkness? Certainly the darkness cannot abide in the effulgent sun.

Prakāśātman refuted this objection by saying that avidyā does not conflict with its abode i.e. pure consciousness. That is, avidyā is not opposed to the self-luminous self-consciousness which manifests avidyā. In other words, pure consciousness is not the contrary of avidyā, but it is its witness. According to Advaita, avidyā is manifested by this

witness-consciousness only. If the ātma-caitanya is opposed to avidyā, the very existence of avidyā would not have been established. But as it has ^{been} already noted the existence of avidyā is established only through the witness-consciousness (sākṣi-caitanya) and not through any source of knowledge (pramāṇa). And, that which establishes avidyā certainly cannot remove it. Hence there is no conflict. ¹⁰⁸

It should be noted in this context that advaitins usually draw a distinction between the avarūpa-jñāna and vytti-jñāna. The avarūpa-jñāna is the pure consciousness (śuddha-caitanya) that constitutes the essential nature of the Self (Ātman), the absolute reality. This consciousness does not remove avidyā. But, as it has been already noted, it illumines avidyā. The relation, therefore, between the avarūpa-caitanya and avidyā is not that of the remover and the removed (nivartya-nivartaka-bhāva) but that of revealer and that which is revealed (bhāva-bhāseka-bhāva). And the same consciousness, when reflected in a mental mode (antahkarana-vytti), is called vytti-jñāna. And it is this vytti-jñāna that is opposed to avidyā. In other words, the modification of the internal organ, carrying the reflection of the pure consciousness, alone is opposed to avidyā. In fact, this vytti-jñāna does not arise without removing avidyā. Thus, the removing factor of avidyā is not the pure

consciousness that constitutes the essential nature of the Self (Svarūpa-caitanya), but the consciousness that is reflected in the mental mode. Hence, in the absence of such mental mode (antahkarana-vṛtti), the pure consciousness does not remove avidyā. In this way, even though the pure consciousness is self-luminous in nature, yet in the absence of the mental mode, reveals avidyā instead of removing it. Therefore, there is no self-contradiction in admitting the location of avidyā in the self-luminous Self-consciousness. ¹⁰⁹

Now, one may argue against the 'Brahmāśritēvidyā-vāda' on the ground that if Brahman of the nature of pure consciousness be the abode of avidyā, how can there be omniscience etc. in case of it? Then Brahman also would become non-omniscient (asavyasīna) like the jīva. But this directly contradicts the scriptures.

Prakāśātman rejects this charge by saying that just as the black spots etc. present in the impure mirror, which are superimposed on the reflection, do not spoil the fairness of the original face; similarly the defects present in avidyā, which is the reflecting medium in the present case, do not affect the purity of the pure consciousness i.e. Brahman. Hence, the property of Brahman's being the locus

of avidyā does not conflict with its being omniscient.¹¹⁰

According to the Vivarapa-school, the individual soul (jīva) is the reflection of the pure consciousness in avidyā. So, just as a mirror etc., related to face in general, distinguishes between the prototype and the reflection, and produces something distinctive only on the side of the reflection, in the same way, though avidyā, while being related to the pure consciousness (Brahman) as a whole, distinguishes between jīva and Brahman, yet neglecting the nature of Brahman and leaning to the side of jīva alone, it produces its effects i.e. transmigration.¹¹¹ Therefore, there is non-omniscience (asavyajñatva) etc. only in the case of jīva and not in the case of Brahman. Hence, though the locus of avidyā is consciousness in general, yet it is said to be located in the jīva, because of its leaning to the side of the jīva.¹¹²

Now it may be argued on the strength of the experience "I am ignorant" (ahamajñah) that avidyā or ajñāna must be located in the consciousness as qualified by the internal organ and not in the pure consciousness as such.

But Prakāśātman says that the experience "I am ignorant" is not due to the relation of avidyā to the internal organ.

But since both the internal organ and avidyā are related to the single Self, there appears to be the opposition (sāmānādhikaranyā) between the two i.e. the internal organ and avidyā. This is just like the empirical usage 'Iron burns' (ayodehati). The property of burning really does not belong to the iron. But still it appears to be in relation with iron, because both iron and the property of burning are related to the single fire.¹¹³

Further, the experience of deep sleep also postulates that avidyā must be related to the pure consciousness (i.e. Ātman) alone and not to the qualified. For even in the absence of the internal organ, avidyā persists as related to the pure consciousness in that state.¹¹⁴

Strictly speaking, the location of avidyā in the Self of the nature of pure consciousness is only assumptive (kālpavāda) and hence it does not conflict with the real unattachedness (asaṃkṣipta) of the Self.¹¹⁵ In this way, according to the Vivarāṇa-school, Brahman-Ātman of the nature of pure consciousness alone is both the locus and the object of avidyā.

And this salient feature of the Vivarāṇa-school can be traced back to Sureśvara's works. Sureśvara, in his

Vārttikas and Naishkarmya-siddhi, maintains that Brahman or Ātman alone is both the locus and the object of avidyā.¹¹⁶ In his preface to the third chapter of the Naishkarmya-siddhi, he adduces arguments as to why the locus and the object of avidyā should be Brahman or Ātman alone. Suresvara argues that since avidyā is not an entity which can exist by itself, it should belong to some subject and should refer to some object. According to Advaita, there are only two categories viz., the Self and the not-Self. Of these two, the Self alone should be admitted to be the locus of avidyā and not the not-Self, for the very nature of the not-Self is avidyā or aihanā. Certainly, that which is of the nature of avidyā, cannot be related with avidyā as its locus. So it is absurd to say that avidyā is supported by that which is itself of the nature of avidyā. Further, the knowledge and ignorance (avidyā) must have the common substratum. That is, avidyā can belong to that which is capable of acquiring knowledge. Since the not-Self, being the product of avidyā is insentient, it can never acquire knowledge and hence avidyā cannot be located in the not-Self. Moreover, since the not-Self is the product of avidyā, the latter should exist prior to the origination of its effect. Really an entity which already exists does not depend upon its own product, which comes afterwards. Further, a locus must have an existence of its own independently of what is located in it. But the not-Self has no independent existence

of its own apart from avidyā. Hence it cannot be the locus of avidyā.

But if we admit the Self as the locus of avidyā, the above difficulties will not arise. Since the Self is of the nature of pure consciousness, it can never be of the nature of avidyā. Since the Self is the ultimate source of all knowledge, there is the possibility of attaining the knowledge in it. And since the Self is immutable (nītsētha), it exists independently of avidyā. Hence the Self can be held as the locus of avidyā. Further, according to Sureśvara as for all Advaitins, avidyā is the creative power of the Self, so it abides in the Self as always related to it.¹¹⁷ Sureśvara, in his works, very frequently uses the terms pratyak-moha, pratyak-dhvānta, pratyakāṁṣāna, pratyakavidyā, ātmavidyā etc. This shows that according to Sureśvara also the inner Self alone is the locus of avidyā.¹¹⁸ "The individual soul cannot be held to be the abode of avidyā (as accepted by Vācaspati Miśra), since the jīva, being wholly or partially an appearance, according to Sureśvara, presupposes it as the necessary condition."¹¹⁹ The experience of the deep sleep also proves that it is the pure consciousness alone and not the individual soul that can be the locus of avidyā. Subsequent to the deep sleep we recollect avidyā in the form "I did not know

anything when I was asleep." This recollection presupposes the prior experience of avidyā. For there can be no recollection with reference to anything which is not previously experienced. Therefore, it should be admitted that avidyā exists and is experienced in the state of deep sleep. Thus in that state avidyā exists and is experienced even in the absence of the notion of the individual soul. And this would not be possible if we admit the individual soul to be the locus of avidyā. For the manifestation of the notion of the individual soul, other factors like ego, mind, etc. are required. But those factors are provisionally merged in avidyā, in the state of deep sleep. In that state there exist only avidyā and pure consciousness. And in the absence of a substratum, avidyā cannot exist, nor can it be experienced immediately. Hence, pure consciousness alone must be the locus of avidyā in that state. Therefore, Suresvara, in his Bṛhadāraṇyakaopaniṣad-bhāṣya-vārttika, points out that before the manifestation of the notion of the individual soul (prematr), avidyā, which is directly experienced, could not have any relation with anything else except pure consciousness.¹²⁰

(1) Critical Remarks

In this way, we come across two prominent views regarding the locus of avidyā in post-Śaṅkara Advaita. According

to the Bhāmatī-school, the locus of avidyā is the individual soul, whereas according to the Vivarapa-school, the locus of avidyā is pure consciousness (śuddha-caitanya) i.e. Brahman. The former view i.e. jīvāśritāvidyā-vāda, as already seen, can be traced back to Maṇḍana's Brahma-siddhi, while the latter view i.e. Brahmāśritāvidyā-vāda has its roots in Sureśvara's works. It is noteworthy that both these views find source in Śaṅkara. The latter in his commentaries on Br. Sū. I.iv.3 and the Śvetāśvataraopaniṣad maintains that Paraśeśvara i.e. Brahman is the locus of avidyā.¹²¹ But in his commentaries on Br. Sū. IV.1.1, Bṛhadāraṇyakaopaniṣad, and the Phalgunīya-śāstra, Śaṅkara, however, holds that jīva is the locus of avidyā.¹²² In one place Sureśvara also holds this view.^{122a}

Nevertheless it should be noted that we do not find anywhere in Śaṅkara's works a specific discussion on the locus of avidyā. In fact, from the above mentioned references, it is somewhat difficult to say anything confidently as to exactly which view is favourable to Śaṅkara. That is, these references are too inadequate to form a correct idea of Śaṅkara's position regarding this problem. Of course, the main task before Śaṅkara was to establish the identity of the Self and Brahman i.e. the unity of the Self (ātmaikatya) to be the ultimate import of all the

Upaṇiṣads.¹²³ And it thus seems that he is least bothered about such minor details. In other words, Śaṅkara, in his writings, concedes primacy to absolutistic ontology, subordinating relativistic epistemology to it. But Śaṅkara's pupils, apart from establishing the central theme of Advaita i.e. the non-duality of Brahman, also gave much more attention than the Master to explain and clarify the order of the phenomenal appearances. The reason, as it has been already mentioned, for this is to defend Advaita philosophy as expounded by Śaṅkara, from the attacks of the non-Advaitic preceptors of Vedānta, who severely criticised the Advaita concept of avidyā. The latter Advaitins met all those objections coming from the other sides. They took liberty to explain the details of avidyā and adopted different modes of interpretation. And as a result, there appeared two divergent views regarding the problem of the locus of avidyā. Both these views are valid in a particular context in the structure of Advaita. These are necessary for the clarification of that context. This is evident from the fact that Madhusūdana-sarasvatī, in his Advaita-siddhi, defends both these views and shows that both of them are intelligible and free from defects.¹²⁴

But it is necessary at this stage to examine critically the two views and see whether these have any advantage over

each other. Vācaspati seems to be correct while he maintains that avidyā cannot be located in Brahman in as much as the latter transcends all sorts of Upādhis and is thus eternally pure, perfect and free from all defects. Hence avidyā which is itself the greatest defect, being the root cause of all defects, can never be located in Brahman. Further, there must be a common substratum for both vidyā (knowledge) and avidyā (ignorance). Since it is the individual soul that acquires the right knowledge, which annihilates avidyā, the latter should belong to the individual soul alone. Vācaspati's view that avidyā rests on the jīva and not on Brahman aptly fulfils this condition. The charge that the jīvāśritāvidyā-vāda involves the fallacy of the mutual dependence (anyonyāśraya) can be easily overcome by resorting to the maxim of seed and the sprout (plāṅkuraṇvāya). But Vācaspati's argument against the Brahmāśritāvidyā-vāda that the location of avidyā in what is essentially of the nature of pure consciousness (vidyā-svabhāva) i.e. Brahman cannot be possible, is, however, not sound. For the relation between Brahman as pure consciousness and avidyā, as it has already been pointed out, is not that of the remover and the removed, but that of the revealer and the revealed. Verily, that which is revealed by an entity has really no conflict with what reveals it. Further, even in the absence of the notion of the individual soul in the state of

deep sleep, avidyā exists and is directly experienced by the pure consciousness. This would not be possible if the individual soul be held as the locus of avidyā. The Dhāsatī-school, which maintains jīvāśritāvidyā-vāda, utterly fails to conceive this point. Hence pure consciousness alone should be admitted to be the locus of avidyā. Moreover, the purity of Brahman is not destroyed by the location of avidyā in it. As already stated, the reflection of the pure consciousness (Brahman) in avidyā is the individual soul. It is the nature of the limiting adjuncts like mirror etc. to affect the reflected image (pratibimba). Therefore, avidyā, which is the reflecting medium in the present case, brings about changes only in the reflected image i.e. jīva and not in the original i.e. pure consciousness, even though avidyā in general is related with the latter. Therefore, the location of avidyā does not affect the omniscience, omnipotence etc. of Brahman. In this way, even though avidyā is located in Brahman in general, still owing to its nature of leaning to the side of jīva, there is bondage only in the case of the latter i.e. the jīva. Therefore, the individual soul alone is instructed in the scriptures to strive for the attainment of right knowledge to remove bondage in so far as avidyā, in its aspect of being removable by right knowledge, always appears in the individual soul in the form "I am ignorant." Thus the Brahmāśritāvidyā-vāda also fulfils the condition that there

must be a common substratum for both vidyā and avidyā. The supporters of the Bhāmatī view may adduce the Śvetāśvatara-panisad text, "the two unborn the knower and the ignorant,"¹²⁵ which speaks of Īvara and jīva as the knower and the ignorant respectively, in support of their view that avidyā should belong to the jīva alone. But even though we do not admit the individual soul as the locus of avidyā, the ajñatya (ignorance) of the jīva can be reasonably explained on the ground that it is related with the diverse functions of avidyā. That is, the ajñatya of the individual soul is not due to the location of avidyā in it, but it is because of the concealing power of avidyā that veils the real nature of Brahman from the individual soul.¹²⁶ The Upaniṣadic text 'māyīnaḥ tu Maheshvaran' directly proves that avidyā belongs to the Supreme Lord i.e. Brahman only.¹²⁷ The problem of facing the fallacies like mutual dependence and self dependence will not arise on the Vivarapa view. In this way, on comparing the two views, the Vivarapa view that Brahman as pure consciousness is the locus of avidyā seems to be more correct and more reasonable than the view of the Bhāmatī-school. The arguments adduced by the advocates of the jīvaśritavidyā-vāda, seem to be somewhat weak when compared with those adduced by the Vivarapa-school. That is why a good majority of Advaitins including Sarvajñ-ātman,¹²⁸ Vimuktātman,¹²⁹ and Citukhēcārya,¹³⁰ subscribe

to the view that Brahman as pure consciousness alone is the locus of avidyā. But Anandānanda and Appayya Dīkṣita have, however, followed the Bhāmatī tradition.

It has already been concluded that the Vivarapa view that Brahman is the locus of avidyā is more correct and more reasonable than the view that jīva is the locus of avidyā. But still a doubt arises in our mind as to why Śaṅkara also in some places mentions avidyā as belonging to the individual soul. It has been noted that both these views regarding the locus of avidyā find source in Śaṅkara. But this mere statement does not reconcile the two divergent views. We have to show as to how both the views are reasonable. It is Sarvajñātman who in his Śaṅkara-Śārīroka, has resolved these apparently contradictory statements of Śaṅkara regarding the locus of avidyā. Sarvajñātman says that avidyā though present in the pure consciousness, is not clearly perceptible in the state of deep sleep; but it becomes clearly manifest in the waking state, because of its relation to the reflection of the pure consciousness in the intellect (i.e. the individual soul). Avidyā, when present in the pure consciousness, is not so clearly perceptible, as it is when the pure consciousness is reflected in the intellect. It, therefore, means that it is only by the intellect (antahkaraṇa) which is the limiting adjunct

of the individual soul, that avidyā, though present in the pure consciousness, is revealed in the form "I am ignorant." Because in the state of deep sleep when the intellect is absent, avidyā, though present in the pure consciousness, is not determinately perceived in the form "I am ignorant". But in the waking state when the intellect is present, there is a clear manifestation of avidyā in the form "I am ignorant." Thus the intellect does reveal avidyā. Now it is the nature of the revealing medium to reveal the things as though located in the medium itself. For instance, the mirror which reflects the face, reveals the latter as if located in itself. So, in this way, the revealing media reveal the things to be revealed as though present in themselves. Similarly, in the present case also, the intellect which reveals avidyā reveals it as if located in itself and consequently in the consciousness delimited by it i.e. the individual soul, in the form "I am ignorant". Therefore, Śaṅkara's statements in some places that avidyā belongs to the individual soul are also reasonable.¹³¹

In this way, Sarvajñātman resolves the apparently contradictory statements of Śaṅkara regarding the locus of avidyā. But Sarvajñātman is not, however, ready to extend this line of explanation to Maṇḍana's view that the individual soul is the locus of avidyā, because, as Sarvajñātman himself points out, Maṇḍana represents a standpoint in Advaita

different from that of Śaṅkara.¹³² If Vācaspatimiśra truly follows the tradition of Advaita represented by Śaṅkara, particularly regarding the locus of avidyā, his view that the individual soul is the locus of avidyā also can be interpreted in the aforesaid manner. But since it is well known in the Advaita tradition that Vācaspati owes the major part of what is distinctive in his teachings to Maṇḍana's Brahmasiddhi,^{132a} it is difficult to say whether he speaks of the individual soul as the locus of avidyā only in the sense in which it is interpreted by Sarvajñātman.

After all has been said, it should be pointed out that though the two views regarding the locus of avidyā find source in Śaṅkara, yet much of what has been discussed by both Bhāmatī and the Vivarapa schools in this regard does not have its roots in Śaṅkara. He must have probably thought that the questions such as 'What is the locus of avidyā? What is its object? How does it conceal the Absolute Brahman?' are meaningless in the scheme of Absolutism, because they relate to the categories known to us (conceivable) at the empirical level. Such questions worry the minds of those who have not yet realised the absolute reality i.e. Brahman, being clouded by avidyā. It is such unrealised souls who fail to rise from the empirical level to the transcendental reality, that engage in such useless

arguments and counter-arguments regarding the pseudo problems such as the locus of avidyā etc. But in case of a highly enlightened soul like Śaṅkara, such questions have hardly any place. That is why as ^{regards} question 'to whom does avidyā belong?' Śaṅkara twists the questioner by replying sharply that it belongs to the questioner and none else,¹³³ for the question itself is an expression of avidyā. Thus Śaṅkara wisely avoids the discussion of the details of avidyā and the problems that arise in the minds of unenlightened souls, and rightly grants primacy to the final Upaniṣadic import. This is so because these problems are merely intellectual exercises, least conducive to the liberation, which is the supreme human goal.¹³⁴ But even then the dialecticians of the post-Śaṅkara Advaita had to attempt these problems in order to defend the Advaita concept of avidyā from the onslaughts of the non-Advaitic preceptors of Vedānta.

(j) The Object of Avidyā

As regards the object of avidyā, there is no controversy among the Advaitins. All Advaitins admit Brahman alone to be the object of avidyā. As it has already been noted, avidyā, like vidyā, can never be possible without the subject to whom it belongs, and an object to which it refers. The not-Self, which is the product of avidyā, cannot be its object. If the not-Self is admitted to be

the object of avidyā, it will definitely involve the fallacy of mutual dependence. For, without avidyā, the not-Self cannot be superimposed, and in the absence of the not-Self, avidyā, which depends upon the latter for its object, cannot be established. Therefore, an entity, which exists quite independently of avidyā, alone should be held to be the object of avidyā and that entity is Brahman-Ātman of the nature of pure consciousness alone and none else. Since Brahman does not owe its existence to avidyā and exists independently, the said fallacy does not arise in its case. And it is only by the witness-consciousness, which is itself covered by avidyā, that the latter is manifested. If the not-Self which is insentient be the object of avidyā, then the very existence of avidyā would not be established. As already seen, avidyā cannot be established by any premises. Therefore, it should be admitted that avidyā is manifested by the consciousness which is itself covered by that avidyā. Moreover, Brahman as pure consciousness, being self-luminous, is always manifest in its own nature. Avidyā, by its power of concealment could obstruct the manifestation of such an entity. But it is futile to speak of concealment in case of what is non-manifest and insentient. If the self-luminous Brahman is not concealed by avidyā, then it should be manifested in its real nature to all the individual souls. In that case, the scriptures that declare the identity of

the individual soul and Brahman would be meaningless. But it is not the case. Therefore, it should be admitted that avidyā conceals Brahman's real nature from the individual soul. And this can be possible only when the self-luminous Brahman as pure consciousness is held to be the object of avidyā. Finally, avidyā is removable by the right knowledge (samyak-jñāna). The right knowledge is that which refers to what is real. Since Brahman alone is the ultimate reality, its knowledge alone is the right knowledge. Now this right knowledge, which refers to Brahman, can remove avidyā only if the latter also refers to Brahman. Because there can be no opposition between avidyā and right knowledge if they refer to different entities. The knowledge about one thing, say pot, vizily, does not remove the ignorance about some other thing, say cloth. Therefore, the relation of the remover and the removed between the right knowledge and avidyā can be possible only if they refer to the same object. Since avidyā is removable by right knowledge, which refers to Brahman, the object of avidyā also must be Brahman, the pure consciousness.¹³⁵

(k) Relation of Avidyā to Brahman

In Advaita, the question as to how avidyā is related to Brahman is a very difficult problem to solve. In fact, it is impossible for us to explain in any intelligible

manner the exact relation of avidyā to Brahman. For, how can there be a real relation of anything to Brahman which is essentially supra-relational? But even then, in the context of avidyā, an attempt can be made to solve this problem. The post-Śaṅkara Advaitins, therefore, have tried to explain the relation between avidyā and Brahman from different angles of vision according to the various sub-traditions of Advaita interpretation.

In the Bhāṣatī-school led by Vācaspati-miśra, avidyā depends upon Brahman only for its object and not for its locus. Hence, according to this school, the relation between Brahman and avidyā is that of the object and the predicate (viśaya-viśayi-bhāva) and not that of the locus-contained (śaravāśrayi-bhāva), for this tradition does not admit the location of avidyā in Brahman. But since according to the Vivarapa school, Brahman itself is both the locus and the object of avidyā, the two-fold relation i.e. the relation of the object and the predicate as well as the relation of the locus and the contained can be maintained between Brahman and avidyā. This view is acceptable to Sureśvara, the Vārttika-kāra, also. But Sureśvara exhibits originality by introducing a peculiar relation between Brahman and avidyā. According to him, avidyā is the primal appearance of the Supreme Self i.e. Brahman.¹³⁶ Hence it

exists in Brahman as attached to it naturally and intrinsically and is also manifested by the Brahman-consciousness alone. Thus avidyā owes its very life to Brahman. In other words, Brahman forms the very essence, the very soul or reality (ātman) of avidyā. Therefore, the relation between Brahman and avidyā must be that of 'the soul (ātma) and the souled (ātmavān)' or 'Reality and the one (i.e. avidyā)' having it to be so, that is, founded upon Brahman as reality.¹³⁷ Sureśvara characterises this relation as 'ātmātmavattva,'¹³⁸ to convey the above sense. The phrase ātmātmavattva, in other words, clearly indicates the false identity (adhyasta-tādātmya), between Brahman and avidyā.¹³⁹

But Sureśvara, as a true Advaitin, does not forget to mention that any such relation of avidyā to Brahman is merely assumed in the latter due to avidyā itself and there can be no real relation of anything with reference to Brahman or Ātman¹⁴⁰ which, as it has been already noted, is supra-relational. Because from the standpoint of Brahman, says Sureśvara, there is no avidyā at all.¹⁴¹ In this way, the relations of avidyā are meaningful only from the empirical view-point. But the moment the Brahman-realisation dawns, avidyā disappears without a trace. In that state, neither avidyā nor its relations can be possible. Therefore, it should be remembered that the empirically viewed relations

do not conflict with the transcendental unattachedness (pāramārthika-asāṅgata) of Brahman.

(1) Avidyā - One or Many?

The problem whether this primal nescience (avidyā) is one or many may now be considered. Even though there is no difference of opinion among the Advaitins regarding the positivity, indeterminability, and beginninglessness of avidyā, yet the various sub-schools of the post-Śaṅkara Advaita maintain different views regarding the issue whether avidyā is single or plural.

Vācaspatiśiṣya, in his Bhāṣatī, advocates the theory of the plurality of avidyās. According to him, the primal nescience (avidyā) is not one but many. And it should be noted that this theory of Vācaspati is very closely connected with his 'Jīvāśritāvidyā-vāda'. If avidyā is located not in the transcendental Brahman, but in innumerable individual souls as Vācaspati contends, a question naturally arises - whether avidyā differs from one individual soul to another or is it common to all? Though Maṇḍana is the first exponent to propound the 'Jīvāśritāvidyā-vāda', yet his opinion on the above problem is not clear. But, Vācaspati, on the other hand, is very explicit on this issue. And in his commentary on the 'Ānumānikādhikaraṇa-bhāṣya,' he

emphatically maintains that avidyā is not one and common to all individual souls, but differs in respect of each and every individual soul.¹⁴² And since the individual souls are many, avidyā belonging to those also must be many. Really, it is the difference of avidyās, that accounts for the apparent distinction between the innumerable individual souls. In this way, according to Vācaspati, there are as many avidyās as there are individual souls; one avidyā for each individual soul.

Vācaspati is opposed to the view that avidyā, abiding in the innumerable individual souls is one. He, under the guise of criticising the Sāṅkhya-doctrine of Brahāna, points out the defects inherent in such conception. He argues that if avidyā is one only, common to all the individual souls, then, by the Brahman-realisation on the part of one individual soul, there must be a complete cessation of avidyā as a whole and consequently there would be the simultaneous liberation for all. That is, had avidyā been one, common to all, when one particular individual soul is liberated, by attaining the right knowledge of Brahman, all other jīvas also would be automatically liberated. If, in order to avoid this difficulty, we admit the non-removal of avidyā, that would result in an unending transmigration to all (ananta-kāla-prasaṅga).¹⁴³ But this is not the fact.

For any such assumption would violate the order of the released and the bound souls (bodha-mukta-vyavasthā). Certainly, if Devadatta is liberated by removing his avidyā on the attainment of the right knowledge, another individual soul, say, Yajñadatta is not liberated. On the contrary, the latter continues to be bound in the transmigratory existence. It is so because there must be a common substratum for both vidyā and avidyā. Verily, the right knowledge attained by one individual soul does not contradict the avidyā of the other.¹⁴⁴ In other words, there cannot be the relation of the remover and the removed between vidyā and avidyā which occupy different locus. Therefore, it should be admitted that avidyā belonging to innumerable individual souls is not common but different. On this view, however, the distinction between the released and the bound souls can be reasonably maintained. For, according to this view, avidyā belonging to that individual soul which attains right knowledge alone is removed and not that belonging to other.¹⁴⁵ In this way, according to Vācaspati-miśra, avidyā resting on innumerable individual souls is many, and each individual soul has got its own particular avidyā.

Now, an objection can be raised against the above view: If it is the plurality of avidyās that accounts for the

distinction of the innumerable individual souls, then it will definitely lead to the fallacy of mutual dependence (anyonyāśraya). For unless we establish the plurality of avidyās, the distinction of innumerable individual souls cannot be explained; in the same way, in the absence of the distinction of the individual souls, the plurality of avidyās cannot be established. Thus the plurality of avidyās depends upon the plurality of jīvas and vice-versa.

Vācaspati replies to this objection again by adducing his favourite maxim of the seed and the sprout (bīśākura-nyāya).¹⁴⁶ He asserts that the distinction of both the jīvas as well as avidyās is beginningless (anādi).^{146a} Both of them exist from a beginningless time. The above said fallacy would occur, if they had a beginning. But that is not the case. Hence the plurality of avidyās as well as the distinction of the jīvas can be reasonably held.

Yet another difficulty arises on the aneka-avidyā-view: If avidyā, as Vācaspati contends, is plural, then the statements of Śruti as well as of Śaṅkara, wherein the term avidyā is used in a singular form as 'avyaktam', 'avyakṛtam' etc., implying only one avidyā would be contradicted.

Vācaspati refutes this charge by stating that, the treatment of avidyā as one by the earlier authorities, is not because avidyā as an entity itself is one common to all, but because the generality of avidyā is one common to all those avidyās abiding in innumerable jīvas. Thus Vācaspati concludes that the citation of avidyā in singular form as 'avyaktam' etc. in the earlier authorities is only figurative.¹⁴⁷ In this way according to the Bhāmatī-school, the primal nescience (mūlāvidyā) is not one, but many.

But according to the Vivarapa-school, avidyā is not many. Prakāśātman does not admit different avidyās in respect of each and every individual soul. Since according to this school, the non-dual Brahman alone is both the locus and the object of avidyā, there is no need of postulating the plurality of avidyās. And in the first Varṇaka, Prakāśātman clearly says that avidyā, the locus and the content of which is the pure Self, does not exist in respect of each and every object (i.e. the not-Self).¹⁴⁸

Now an objection can be raised against this view of single avidyā: If the primal nescience is one, then by the right knowledge of the shell etc., (in case of the illusions like shell-silver etc.), there should be the complete removal of avidyā as a whole. And in that case, one would

have attained liberation by the mere knowledge of the shell etc. But it contradicts our experience. Therefore, it should be admitted that avidyā differs with each and every object.

Prakāśānanda meets this objection in two ways: Firstly, he says that when the right knowledge of the shell etc. arises, the superimpositions of silver etc. are simply resolved in their material cause, namely, avidyā, just as the pot, when destroyed, is merged in its material cause i.e. the clay.¹⁴⁹ Hence the mere knowledge of shell etc. does not bring about the total annihilation of avidyā, in which case one would have attained the final liberation, by the mere knowledge of shell.

He replies the above objection in another way also: He says that though the primal nescience is one, yet it has various modes (avasthābhēda). And these modes of primal nescience, which are present in the consciousness delimited by shell etc. are the material causes of the illusory appearance of the silver etc. And, they are removed along with the superimposition of silver etc. by the knowledge of their substratum i.e. shell.¹⁵⁰

Akhaṇḍānanda, in his Tattvavārtikā, a commentary on

the Pañcapādikā-vivaraṇa, in this context, asserts that on the authority of such śruti texts as 'māyāṁ tu prakṛtiṁ' etc., the primal ignorance should be regarded to be one only. For it is prolix to assume many avidyās. But still for the sake of practical purposes we can admit innumerable modes of the same avidyā.¹⁵¹

It follows from the above that the Vivaraṇa-school does not admit the plurality of primal ignorance (mūlāvidyā). But even on the view of single avidyā the distinction of the released and the bound can be reasonably explained. Because, though avidyā is a single entity, yet, due to the differences of the individual souls, it has diverse capacities (śaktis), which conceal the true nature of Brahman from those individual souls. In other words, avidyā, though entitatively one, its capacities that veil the true nature of Brahman differ with each and every individual soul. In this way, avidyā has different capacities (viśiṣṭa-śaktis) to bind every individual soul. When a particular individual soul attains Brahman realisation, there is the removal of avidyā as qualified by that capacity which veils the nature of Brahman in respect of that particular individual soul alone. And it does not involve the removal of avidyā as a whole. Therefore, there is liberation only to that individual soul which attains Brahman realisation; while the

others in case of which avidyā still persists, continue to be bound in this transmigration. In this way, even in the view of single avidyā, it is possible to overcome the absurd position of the simultaneous liberation for all when one is liberated (eka-muktau sarvamukti-prasaṅga).¹⁵²

Sureśvara also subscribes to the view of single avidyā. Since, according to him, the non-dual Self alone is both the locus and the object of avidyā, it is not necessary to admit many avidyās. Sureśvara, in his Vārttikas, refutes the theory of those who hold the view of two-fold avidyā (avidyā-dvayavidhyā). Maṇḍana, for instance, in his Brahma-siddhi recognises two kinds of avidyā, namely, non-apprehension (agrahāṇa) and mis-apprehension (mithyā-grahāṇa).^{152a} But Sureśvara argues that since the Self, to which avidyā is solely related is one and undifferentiated, it is reasonable to accept that there exists only one avidyā. For there is no other factor in the Self, which is featureless (nirviśeṣa), that can differentiate avidyā. Moreover, since avidyā itself is the root cause of all sorts of differences, there can be no other cause that could bring about differentiation in avidyā. Therefore, concludes Sureśvara, the view of two-fold avidyā in the form of mis-apprehension and non-apprehension is not tenable.¹⁵³ Ānandagiri, in his commentary on the Vārttikas, remarks

that when we admit avidyā appearing in the form of mis-apprehension, non-apprehension etc. to be located in the Self, then, since the Self is non-dual and featureless, there can be no differences in avidyā.¹⁵⁴

Even though Sureśvara treats avidyā to be a single entity, he speaks of avidyā stressing its functional diversity. We usually find in the Vārttika literature of Sureśvara, the three terms, namely, aīñāna (non-apprehension), mithyā-īñāna (mis-apprehension) and saṁśaya-īñāna (doubtful cognition), that are used to convey the diverse functions of avidyā. Of these three, the first one i.e. aīñāna denotes the very nature of avidyā, while the remaining two i.e. mithyā-īñāna and saṁśaya-īñāna express the various results of its functioning. That is, aīñāna is the cause and the other two are its outcome.¹⁵⁵

In order to create the false appearance either in the form of mis-apprehension or in the form of doubtful cognition, avidyā should first envelop the true nature of the given object. This represents the obscuring nature of avidyā, which Sureśvara calls aīñāna i.e. non-apprehension. Both mis-apprehension and the doubtful cognition thus presuppose the non-apprehension of the given object. For the mis-apprehension in the form 'This is silver' (in the

case of shell-silver illusion) cannot be possible if the object in front i.e. the shell as it is, is directly perceived. Nor can there be the doubt in the form 'whether it is a lamp-post or a man', if the lamp-post before us is cognised as it is. The non-apprehension, therefore, of the true nature of reality is the root cause of all further appearances.^{155a} Even though mis-apprehension and the dubitative cognition are the effects of non-apprehension, they are not essentially different from the latter, for in Advaita the effect is really non-different from the cause. In this way, though non-apprehension, mis-apprehension and dubitative cognition represent the various functions of avidyā, their true nature is essentially avidyā itself.¹⁵⁶ Sureśvara, therefore, states that these are the different forms of one and the same principle i.e. avidyā.¹⁵⁷ In other words, non-apprehension etc. are only the further developments of avidyā. To sum up, in the view of Vārttika-school of Sureśvara, avidyā as an entity is single, though it appears to be many through its diverse functions. Or in other words, avidyā is entitatively one but functionally many. But the functional diversity of avidyā does not militate against its essential unity.¹⁵⁸

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. PP. Var. I., pp. 98-99.
2. इन्द्रो मायाभिः पुस्त्य ईयते ।
RV. VI. 47. 18.
3. इन्द्र जहि पुमानं यातुधान -
मृत स्त्रियं जायता शारदानाम् ॥
RV. VII. 104. 24.
4. मायेत्तमाते यानि घृष्टान्याहुः ।
RV. X. 55. 2.
5. नाय्दासीन्नो स्वासीत्तदानीं ।
RV. X. 129. 1. and
तम आसीत्तमसा गुह्यग्रेऽप्रदेसं ।
RV. X. 129. 3.
Cf. Śāyana's Commentary thereon -
"आत्मतत्त्वस्य आचरत्वात् मायापरम्
मायस्यानानं अत्र तम इत्युच्यते ।"
6. तव्यामि हिरण्यनिधिं निहितमधेक्षा उपर्युपरि
स्वरन्तो न विन्देपुरेतमेवेनाः सर्वाः प्रजाः
उदरहर्षन्त्य एतं ब्रह्मलोकं न विन्दन्त्यन्तेन हि प्रपृष्टाः ।
Chā. Up. VIII. 111. 2.
7. एतयो वेद निहितं गुहायां सोऽपिदाग्न्यं विकिरतीह सोम्य ।
Mund. Up. II. 1. 10.
8. तमसो ना ज्योतिर्नस्य ।
Bṛh. Up. I. 111. 25.

Cf. "सर्वं ब्रह्मलोकं आचरणात्कृत्वास्तमः ।"
Śaṅkara's Commentary thereon.

9. ते ध्यानयोगानुरता प्रभवन्
देवात्मसाधितं त्वगुणैर्निगुदाम् ।
Sya. Up. 1. 3.
10. मायां तु प्रकृतिं विजा-
न्मायिनं तु महेश्वरम् ।
Sya. Up. IV. 10.
11. अज्ञानेनावृत्तं ज्ञानं तेन मुह्यन्ति जन्तवः ।
BG. V. 18.
12. ईश्वरः सर्वभूतानां हृद्देशेऽर्जुन तिष्ठति ।
शामयन् सर्वभूतानि यन्त्रास्तानि मायया ॥
BG. XVIII. 61.
13. मायामात्रमिदं देतमद्वैतं परमार्थतः ।
SK. 2. 17.
14. अनादिमायया सुप्तो यदा जीवः प्रबुध्यते ।
अवमनिद्रमस्यप्नमदोऽं सुष्यते तदा ॥
CP. Cit. 2. 16.
15. अविद्यात्मिका हि बीजावृत्तिः अव्यक्तादिशब्द-
निर्देशा परमेश्वराश्रया मायामयी महासृष्टिः,
यस्यां त्वरूपप्रतिबोधरहिताः शैरते गंतारिणो जीवाः ।
BSP. I. 1v. 3. p. 397.
16. एत एव परमेश्वरः कृतस्वमित्यो विज्ञानधातुरविद्या
मायया मायाविषयनेत्रया विभाव्यते ।
CP. Cit. I. 111. 10. p. 397.
Again commenting upon BG. V. 14, Śaṅkara states—
“समावः अविद्यात्मिका प्रकृतिः माया प्रवर्तते”

17. नामख्यादिना येषमविद्या प्रकीर्तनी ।
माया तस्याः परं सौदम्यं मृत्युनैवेति श्रूयते ॥
MSV. I. 44. 139.
18. सर्वं सैतत्तत्तावत्परं ब्रह्म परावणम् ।
जगत्प्रवाप्नुवादानं "स्वात्मविद्या" तन्मन्त्रयात् ॥
MS. 111. 12. 130.
19. पञ्चतात्त्रिजह वैमान्ताः प्रसिद्धाश्चै तथोत्तरम् ।
इत्येवमततामेव जगदात्मा स्वात्ममायया ॥
MS. 111. 12. 130.
20. ब्रह्मणस्तत्त्वमसिद्धागच्छतः मायादिगन्धवाय्वा प
रायया तत्तत्तैवान्मन्त्रेण वा निर्वपयितुम् ।
Shā. I. 1v. 3. p. 377.
21. येषं धृतिरमृतीतिहासपुराणेषु नामभ्यं उच्यते
अविद्या माया प्रकृतिः इति च तत्र तत्र
बहुधागीयते ।
PP. Var. I. p. 98.
22. तस्मात् ब्रह्मेव स्वमायया अविद्या विवर्तते इति ।
PPV. Var. VII. p. 693.
23. PLV. Var. I. pp. 169-173.
24. अनिर्वचनीयतया तत्तत्तावमात्मप्रतिबन्धविपर्ययावभासादविद्याविशेषात् ।
PP. 111. pp. 169-170.
Cf. also VPS. Var. I. p. 44.

25. "तस्याभिव्यानाद्योजनास्तत्त्वमायात् भूषणान्ते
विश्वमायाविस्तृतः" [मधे.उ. 1.10] इत्यादिभूतो
सम्यग्ज्ञाननिवर्त्यविद्यार्थं मायाशब्दप्रयोगात् ।
pp. 94t. pp. 172-173.
26. "तत्मात् तद्योवयात् बुधव्यवहारे च स्वत्वावगमात्
स्वस्मिन्नपि वस्तुनि विदेमप्राधान्येन माया आच्छादन-
प्राधान्येन अविद्येति व्यवहारमैदः इत्याधीनत्वतदैवरीत्येन
वा व्यवहारमैदः इति युक्तं मायामयमिति ।
pp. 94t. p. 173.
27. अत्रोक्तं प्रकटार्थविवरणे अनादिरनिर्वार्या मूलप्रकृति-
विचित्रावर्तवन्धिनी माया । तस्या स्व परिच्छिन्नान-
न्तप्रदेशेषु आवरणविदेमवित्तवद्विद्याभिव्यानेषु विरप्रतिविम्बो
जीव इति ।
SLG. I. pp. 68-69.
अनादिपिश्वप्रकृतिर्माया विचित्रावर्तव्या ।
तदेवदेशोऽविद्या तु विदेमावरणान्विताः ॥
VSSM. I. 29.
28. जीवेनावामातेन करोति माया च अविद्या च
स्वयमेव भवति ।
Krishnabharatānandopaniṣad, Chapter, 9.
29. तत्त्वविदेके तु त्रिगुणात्मिकाया मूलप्रकृतेर्जीवेनावामातेन
करोति इति भूतिमिदं वा व्यभेदी रजस्तमोऽनभिभूतगु-
तत्त्वप्रधाना माया तदभिभूतमतिनतत्त्वाविदेति भाषाविजार्थं
परिकल्प्य
SLG. I. p. 69.
उक्ता तत्त्वविदेके तु गुःतत्त्वमयी स्फुटा ।
माया रजस्तमोऽवस्ताऽविद्या रैर्वा तु पूर्ववत् ॥
VSSM. I. 30.
तत्त्वगुणपिशुडिभ्यां भाषाविद्या च ते गते ।
PO. 2. 16.

30. स्वेद मूलप्रकृतिः विवेकप्राधान्येन मायाशक्तित्वात् ईश्वरोपाधिः
आवरणप्राधान्येन अज्ञानशक्तित्वात् जीवोपाधिः । अतः स्व तस्या
जीवेश्वरताधारणविन्मात्रमेकान्यत्वेऽपि जीवस्यैव स्वीकृत्योक्तिः
अज्ञानसंबन्धानुसारी भवत्येति ।

SLG. I. 14. 69-70.

विवेकप्राधान्यान्मायेकोपाधिरूप्यते ।

अविद्यावरणोत्कर्षज्जीवस्यैवैतदपि केचन ॥

VSM. I. 31.

31. Dr. S. Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, p. 387.

32. यद्यपि महाप्रलये नान्तःकरणादयः स्रष्टावरणवृत्तयः गच्छन्ति,
तथापि स्वकारणेऽन्विष्यार्थां अविद्यार्थां लीनाः तद्वशेन
गणितरूपेण कर्मविवेकादिवाक्यतन्माभिः स्रष्टावृत्तयस्तन्ते स्म ।
BHO. I. 111. 30. p. 333.

33. ते चाप्यर्थे प्राप्य परोक्षवैच्छाद्रेरिता यथा कर्मदेहे
नितीनात्पद्मानि ततो निःसरन्ति यथा तां पर्याप्याये
प्राप्तमृदभावादि गण्डूकशरीराणि तदासनावाहिततया
यनागनागाराद्येकतुलितानि पुनर्गण्डूकदेहभाजमुन्मथन्ति
तथा पूर्वपूर्ववागमावशात् पूर्वजमाननामत्पाण्युत्पद्यन्ते ।
QD-Q1E. pp. 333-334.

34. स्मार्तसंस्कारप्रधाना गण्डूकमुत्पदाहृतेः ।
भावस्था गतापि वा स्फुटं वाप्येतेरिदं ॥
VX. p. 332.

35. नात्मानात्मोपकारस्य त्यागप्रादान्कारणम् ।
अतादात्म्यान्न हि एषं जन्वन्तीति नन्तवः ।
BUSV. 111. 11. 88. Cf. also—
कारणार्थं न कौटल्यात्तन्मोहविरहाद् भवेत् ।
जादृष्टान्वयाच्च बुद्ध्यादेर्युक्ता तत्कारणतानुमा ॥
QD-Q1E. 111. 14. 87.

36. उपादानं हि बुद्ध्यादेरात्म्याविधेति कथ्यते ।
Op. Cit. IV. 111. 33B.
 Cf. Anandagiri's Commentary thereon-
 "बुद्ध्यादेरपि ध्यायाम् जहत्वेन तत्तुल्यादुचितमुपादानोपादेय-
 त्वमिति सूचनार्थो हिताब्दः ।"
37. सर्वप्रमाणहोषः स्यादभावाद् भावसंभवे ।
TSBV. I. 22.
38. परिच्छेदी न धाविवा ततोऽस्या हि ता यतः ।
 आच्छादिकास्तः ता युक्ता तमस्तव्यस्तस्मिन् ॥
BUSV. XII. 11, 34.
39. आत्मागृहातिरेकेन तस्या स्य न विद्यते ।
TSBV. II. 179.
 Cf. Anandagiri's Commentary thereon-
 "हेचितु आन्त्रायमावमविद्यामायते । ताम् प्रत्याह आत्मेति ।
 आत्मनः अग्रतो नाम आवरणमाच्छादयन् । न तदतिरेकेण
 अधिवाया स्वगति । न सन् आत्मस्य आच्छादकत्वं संभवति ।
 अतो वस्तुमाच्छादकत्वं अधिवायाः स्वस्वमित्यर्थः ।"
40. नाभावतास्य घटते वरणात्मकत्वा-
 न्नाभावमावरणमाहुरमावरीकृताः ।
 अहान्मावरणमाह य वास्तुव-
 स्तद्भावस्यमिति तेन कर्म प्रतीयः ॥
Op. I. 320.
41. अमित्रवदिति तत्वेन घटते तदा ।
TSBV. II. 179.
42. Cf. "अविधेति ननः तर्हि कोऽर्थः स्यात् ? इत्याशङ्क्य यथा
 अमित्राणां तदन्यत्वं तद्विस्तृत्य वा ननः अर्थः तथा विद्यातोऽन्यत्वं
 विद्याविस्तृत्य वा ननोऽर्थः, न तदभावस्यमित्याह - अमित्रवदिति ।
 Anandagiri's commentary on TSBV. II. 179.

43. एदेव नित्यमज्ञानं मिथ्याज्ञानं तदेव तु ।
कारणकारत्येन तयोक्त्यभिप्रायतः ॥
BUBV. I. iv. 388.
44. किञ्चेतविति जिज्ञासोर्निषिद्धेऽप्यन्यथागृहे ।
तावतो व्यवधानत्वाद् बुभुक्ष्वा च न युज्यते ॥
Op. cit. I. iv. 466.
45. शुभितर्क्यमिति ह्युच्यते यथार्थं प्रतिपद्यते ।
रक्ताद्यन्यथाज्ञानप्रतिषेधायुतेऽपि हि ॥
Op. cit. I. iv. 467.
46. नानार्तत्कारतर्कं प्रत्यक्षज्ञानमेव तत् ।
बुभुक्षादित्युक्तित्वेन प्रकृतं कर्मणो वशात् ॥
Op. cit. IV. iii. 80. Cf. also I. ii. 131, and III. viii. 30-31.
47. PP. Var. I. p. 26.
48. अवयवं स्या उपनिषासहितः बाह्याध्यात्मिकेषु वस्तुषु
तत्त्वत्व्यतत्तामानानुबन्धिनी अनुपगन्ताव्या ।
अन्यथा मिथ्याव्यभिचारात्तनुपपत्तिः ।
Op. cit. Var. I. p. 27.
Prakāśān, in his commentary on this passage, says
that by the words 'avayava' and 'śāśā', inference and
perception are indicated as the pramāṇas for the
realisation to be of the nature of existent.
PPV. Var. I. p. 74.
49. प्रत्यक्षं तावत् " अहमः " "मानस्यं च न जानामि "
इत्यपरोधावमातत्त्वनात् ।
PPV. Var. I. p. 74.
50. ननु ज्ञानाभावविषयः उपपन्नमातः ? न - उपरोधावमातत्वात्
"अहं सुखी" इतिवत् । उभावस्य व्युत्पत्त्यापत्तौ परत्वात् ।
Ibid.

51. प्रत्यक्षाभाववादिनोऽपि न ज्ञात्मानि ज्ञानाभाववगमः
 लेभ्यति । "ययि ज्ञानं नास्ति" इति प्रतिपत्तौ ज्ञात्मानि
 धर्मिणि प्रतियोगिनि च कुर्ये क्वयते तत्र ज्ञानसद्भावात्
 ज्ञानाभावप्रतिपत्त्ययोगात् । अन्यतोऽपि धर्म्यादौ सुतरां
 उभावान्वगमात् ।
OP. cit. pp. 74-75.
52. GE. उभावपुष्टिं प्रति प्रतियोगिनौ ज्ञानस्य कारणत्वम् ।
53. षष्ठप्रमाणोपरे क्वलितज्ञाभावापुष्टौऽपि ज्ञानाभावे ज्ञात्मादौ
 क्वयते अन्यतोऽपि ज्ञात्मानि ज्ञानाभावात् प्रतिपत्त्ययोगात् ।
KPV. Var. I. p. 75.
54. भावस्याज्ञानप्रत्यक्षादेः तु तत्पि ज्ञानप्रतियोगिज्ञाने
 ज्ञानाभावस्यैव भावान्तरस्यापि न अनुपपत्तिः नियन्तुं शक्यते ।
Op. cit. p. 81.
Dr. Citakchha's translation-
 "यथा भावे सति उभावो निवर्तते तत्र विरोधिभावान्तरे
 सति भावान्तरे निवर्तते इति भावः ।"
10. Var. I. pp. 81-82.
55. नच ज्ञानप्रतियोगिज्ञानसूत्रमपि ताद्वैतान्तं
 भावान्तरस्य ज्ञानस्य निवर्तकम् । तस्य ज्ञानविषय-
 प्रतिभासत्वात् ।
KPV. Var. I. p. 82.
56. नहि स्वज्ञानेनैव स्वयं निवर्तते ।
Ibid.
57. यत् यत्तार्थं न तन्मात्रं तन्निवर्तकम्, यथा घटज्ञानम् न
 वाप्रयोजकत्वं तार्थक्यमात्रस्य निवर्तकस्यैव घटादेरपि स्वज्ञानाभिप्रेतप्रसङ्गात् ।
OP. Var. I. p. 82.

58. Cf. आश्वविषयाज्ञानानि त्रीण्यपि स्तैरेव तादृश्या
अभास्यन्ते । तथा च आश्वविषयी साध्यन्त्येव
ताधी तददेव उद्यानमपि साध्यत्येव, न तु निवर्तयति,
तन्निवर्तकं तु अन्तःकरणवृत्तिज्ञानमेव । तस्यात्र
नान्तरीति कथं व्याहतिः ।
VPS. Var. I, p. 20.
59. अनुमानमपि - विवादगोचरापन्नं प्रमाणज्ञानं स्वप्रागभाव-
व्यतिरिक्तस्वविषयावरणस्य निवर्त्यत्वदेशमात्रवन्तरपूर्वकं
मपितुमर्हति, अप्रकारितार्थक्याशङ्कयात्, अन्यकारे
प्रयोगोत्पन्नप्रदीपप्रभावत् ।
PPV. Var. I, p. 85.
- 59 a. Cf. ज्ञानस्य प्रागभावादपरममिहितं प्रत्यक्षज्ञानमेतत्
संसारव्याधिसिद्धे कश्चित्तन्मदशादेव बुध्यत्व बुद्ध्या ।
ज्ञानेनाज्ञाननाशं कथयति म्यासान्ध्र गीतागतः तन्
न ज्ञानात्प्रागभावश्च इति यद्वै तदर्थे तत्प्रसूतेः ॥
- 26. 111, 111.
60. सर्वं च कार्यं सोपादानम्, भावकार्यत्वात्,
घटादिवत्, इत्यनुमानात् ।
PPV. Var. I, pp. 88-89.
Cf. also VPS. Var. I, p. 18.
61. विमुक्तप्रहमात्मनि श्रुतिव्याप्यं च अहङ्काररजतादयामस्य
अर्थज्ञानारम्भस्य मिथ्यामूर्तेरिति किञ्चिदुपादानं ज्ञानेऽस्मीयम् ।
तत्सोपादानस्य कार्यस्य कारणत्वभावतया उद्यानस्यापि
तत्पत्त्यप्रतीक्षात् ।
PPV. Var. I, pp. 88-90.
62. तस्यापि मिथ्योपादानस्य तादित्वे तथाविधोपादानान्तर-
कल्पनाप्रसङ्गात् अनाद्ये तत् मिथ्योपादानं इति कल्पनीयम् ।
Q.B. 244. p. 90.

63. यच्च अनादि स्वयं मिथ्या प्रियोपादानं आत्मतैबन्धि य
तत् अज्ञानं, इति, मिथ्याध्यात स्व तथाविधाज्ञानीपादानं
कारणमन्तरेण अनुपपद्यमानः तत् कल्पजोत्पुवत्तम् ।
Op. cit. pp. 90-91.
64. न तावत् तुष्टतादी स्वयंप्रकाशप्रमावस्थतान्त्वमातः
पुष्टान्तरसिद्धयत् प्रष्टुर्भिन्नत्वादिति शय्यं वक्तुम् । स्वरसङ्गतेः ।
Op. cit. p. 106.
65. नापि मिथ्याज्ञानप्रतिबन्धात् । तत्र तस्य उभावात् ।
Ibid.
66. नापि तत्तैत्कारप्रतिबन्धात् । भ्रान्तिर्तैत्कारणां
तत्त्वायमात्प्रतिबन्धात्तामावात्, तत्त्वपि
रजतममर्तकारेषु गुणित्वावबोध्यात् ।
Ibid.
67. नापि अग्रतःप्रतिबन्धात् स्वस्यग्रहणस्य नित्यत्वात् ।
Ibid.
CE. न तावत्स्वस्यज्ञानस्य नित्यस्य उभावः शक्येति ।
VP. Var. I. p. 25.
68. स्वयंप्रकाशमाने त्वेदने तद्विषयकादायिरुग्रहणस्य
अप्रतिबन्धकत्वात् ।
PEV. Var. I. pp. 106-107.
CE. अन्यज्ञानाभावे तु न स्वयंप्रकाशप्रज्ञानतत्त्वाध्यायमात्प्रतिबन्धः,
अन्यथा मुक्तायामि प्रतिबन्धस्तथा ।
VP. Var. I. p. 25.
69. न च कर्माणि स्वाध्यायमात्प्रतिबन्धीनि इति प्रमाणमस्ति,
तैत्कारत्वाच्च कर्मां भ्रान्तिर्तैत्कारत्वात् अप्रतिबन्धकता ।
PEV. Var. 2. p. 107.

70. तस्मात् समुत्पादो स्वल्पान्ममातव्यवहारः अगुह्यमिध्यापान-
तत्तत्कारकमर्थः अन्यदेव विद्विषत् प्रतिमन्त्रं अज्ञानं कल्पयतीत्यर्थः ।
Op. cit. pp. 107-108.
71. Op. cit. pp. 207-209.
72. तद्यथापि विरुध्यनिर्धि निहितमयेन उपर्युपरि स्वरन्तो न
विन्देयुरेवमेवमाः सर्वाः प्रजाः अहरर्गच्छन्त्य स्तं प्रहृतोक्तं न
विन्दन्त्यन्तूनं हि प्रत्युष्टाः ।
Chā. Up. VIII, 111, 2.
73. अनीश्या शोयति मुख्यमानः ।
Mupā. Up. III, 1, 2.
74. न तं विद्वाय य इदं ज्ञानान्वद युष्माकमन्तरं भवति ।
"नीतारेण प्रागुता" ज्ञान्या पातुषः उक्त्यात्प्रचरन्ति ।
Tej. Sam. IV, vi, 2, 2.
75. अर्थापत्तिरपि- प्रमत्तानां अन्यत्पुत्तिः क्षुब्धानां प्रहृषाणि
प्रागन्मयोधोऽप्यातर्क्यैरुत्तीति कल्पयतीति फलस्यनुपपत्तिः ।
EDV. Var. 1. p. 208.
76. यदि सर्वं स्वतन्त्रां काञ्चित्प्रागवस्थां जगतः कारणत्वेन
अधुपगच्छेत्, तदा प्रधानकारणत्वादम् । परमेश्वराधीना
विषयमस्याभिः प्रागवस्था जगतोऽधुपगम्यते, न स्वतन्त्रा ।
ता पातयाम्यधुपगन्ताव्या । अर्थवती हि सा । नहि तथा
विना परमेश्वरस्य प्रवृत्तं स्थितिः, शक्तिरहितस्य तस्य
प्रवृत्त्यनुपपत्तेः । कुतः ? विद्यया तस्या जीवविवेदिता ।
अविषात्मिका हि जीवविवेदिताः अव्ययतादिगन्धिर्देवता
परमेश्वराप्रवा मायामयी महासृष्टिः यस्यां स्वल्पप्रतिबोधरहिताः
शरते तैत्तिरिणी जीवाः ।
Ed. 1. iv. 3. pp. 377-378.

77. प्रधानं हि साध्यानां सेवराणांमनीश्वराणां वा ईश्वरात्
क्षेत्रेभ्यो वा वस्तुतो भिन्ना शक्यं निर्वक्तुम् । प्रत्यक्षान्तिव्य-
मविधाशक्तिः मायादिशब्दवाच्या न शक्या तत्त्वैवान्परत्वेन
वा निर्वक्तुम् । ह्यमेवास्या अव्यवर्तत्वं यदभिप्रायित्वं भाम ।
तौज्यमव्याकृतत्वादस्य प्रधानत्वादाद भेदः ।
Bhā. I, iv, 2, p. 377.
78. EP. Var. I. p. 26.
79. यथा हि सुसुप्तिममाद्यादावपि सत्यां स्वाभापिवयामविभागप्राप्तौ
मिथ्याज्ञानस्यानयोदितत्प्रातर्पूर्ववत् घनः प्रतिबोध्य विभागो
भवत्येवमिहापि भविष्यति । स्वमपीतावपि मिथ्याज्ञान-
प्रतिबद्धेव विभागशक्तिरनुभात्यते ।
Bhā. II, 1, 9.
80. अज्ञातत्ववर्तिं दुर्धन्मानं मानात्ममनुजो ।
मानादज्ञातता चेत्स्यान्न सा तत्त्वज्ञायायिनी ॥
BY. 909.
Cf. also BY 900-901.
81. तस्मादज्ञातावेदभेदायैतत्ताप्रयोजकं प्रमाणम् ।
अज्ञातत्वं च मायस्याज्ञानविषयत्वं अन्यदा
इत्यज्ञानाणि अनुमानादि न प्रमाणमिति भावः ।
EP. Var. I. p. 209.
82. प्रमाणोत्पन्नया दुष्टया योऽविद्यां ब्रह्ममिच्छति ।
दीवेनासौ पूर्णं पश्येद् गुहाकृतिशतं तमः ॥
SVBV. II, 177.
83. Cf. न जानामीत्यविद्वेष्टाऽविद्या तत्कारणं मता ।
स्वप्रतिद्वेष सा त्विहा निगोलूकीय वासरे ॥
OP. 215, II, 176.

84. अविद्याया अविद्यात्वं तदमेव तु तदप्यम् ।
मानायातातद्विष्णुत्वमसाधारणमित्यते ॥
SV. 181.
85. अत्र च साधित्वस्य अज्ञानस्य प्रमाणरभावव्यावृत्तिः
प्रदर्शयता इति न तस्य प्रमाणोपपत्त्यप्रसङ्गः इति ।
PPV. Var. I. p. 209.
86. CE. अज्ञानं हि निरपेक्षताद्विरूपक्षेत्र " न जानामि " इति
प्रथममुक्तम् । तत एव तस्य प्रमाणाभावप्रयुक्ततासत्त्व-
पक्षान्वित्वः सिद्धेति साधित्वमज्ञानं भवति ।
तस्य अभावव्यावृत्तिस्तु साधित्वपक्षायान्न सिध्यति ।
तत्र वादिनां विप्रतिपत्तिदर्शनात् । अतस्तदनुमानप्रमाणा-
धीनमिति प्रमाणरहातस्य अभावव्यावृत्तिः प्रतिपाद्यत इत्यर्थः ।
PP. Var. I. p. 209.
- CE. "अविद्या नाम तावद्विनिर्गुणनीक्यावस्था वास्तीति वादिनः
पर्य निराकृत्य प्रमाणोपस्थाताम् । अविद्यात्वस्य तु
साधित्वस्यादेव सिध्यति ।
VP. Var. I. p. 55.
87. मावर्त्य चात्र अभाववितक्षणत्वमप्यं विवक्षितम् ।
AJ. I. p. 544.
88. CE. न तन्नातन्ना तदस्य गिन्यामिन् न वारयनः ।
न तमार्गं न निर्गमं न चाप्युपस्थितम् ॥
EV. 40-41.
89. युक्तिहोन्प्रकाशस्य तैसा मायेति कथ्यते ।
नाततो दुष्यमाना सा ताप्यमाना न वा ततो ॥
न प्रकाशादित्तिं भिन्ना तायेवार्थस्य सामागि ।
न चाभिन्ना जडत्वेन विरोधान्नोभयारिक्ता ॥
त्यहेत्यवस्थामाधान्नेर्षं ताप्यवोच्यते ।
न वायव्यवहीना सा कार्यव्यवस्थान्विता ॥
MS. VIII. vv. 13-15.
CE. also Rāṣṇānanda Tīrtha's Commentary on MS. I.
pp. 68-69.

90. Cf. also Bhā. Invocatory verses 1.
 "अग्निर्विद्याविद्यादित्यतपितस्य प्रसूतो"
 Cf. also Bhā. I. iii. 30 p. 333 and I. iv. 3. p. 377.
 Cf. PP. Var. I. p. 26.
 Cf. PPV. Var. I. pp. 169-170.
91. Cf. BUBV. I. iv. 332 and 442, II. iii. 192 and 224,
 III. viii. 31, III. v. 42, and IV. iv. 307.
92. V. P. Upadhyaya, Lights on Vedānta, p. 97.
 Cf. also—
 प्रत्यक्षिदामाविद्यातो ह्यविवक्षितसिद्धिः ।
 सिद्धायते प्रतीचीयं प्रादुर्भव्यमानमननः ॥
BUBV. IV. iii. 1111.
93. Commenting upon the Vārttika —
 अविद्यारितसिद्धिं त्वनिर्दिष्टकारणम् ।
 प्रत्यक्षमोक्षमाप्तिवारतमस्तत्प्रत्यगात्मनि ॥
BUBV. I. iv. 1341.
 Anandagiri clearly states —
 "तत्तमोऽन्विष्य प्रत्यगात्मनि इति संबन्धः, तदन्विष्यत्वसिद्धयर्थं
 त्रयं विशेषम् "
94. "कार्यकारणाविद्यादयाधारः शुद्धकारात्पदं सैतरी
 त्वनिर्दिष्टमात्रमावर्तनीयात्मा ।"
Bhā. I. i. 1 p. 45.
95. नाविद्या प्रहमाश्रया, किन्तु जीवे, ना
 त्वनिर्दिष्टनीयेत्युक्तं तेन नित्यशुद्धमेव ब्रह्म ।
OP. Sit. I. i. 6. p. 126.
 Cf. also "हायातपत्त्वमपि जीवस्य अविद्याश्रयतया
 प्रहमण्येव शुद्धप्रकाशत्वभावस्य तदनाश्रयतया मन्तव्यम् ।
OP. Sit. I. ii. 11. p. 244.

96. अनाद्यविद्यायच्छेदलक्ष्यजीवभावः पर एव आत्मा स्वतो

भेदेन अवभासते । तावुगानां च जीवानामविद्या,

न तु निरुपाधिनो ब्रह्मणः ।

Op. cit. I. 11.6-7, p. 235.

97. *निष्कलं निष्कृष्टं गान्तं ^{निरवधं} निरञ्जनम् ।*

Śve. Up. VI. 19.

98. जीवाधिकरणमप्यविद्या निमित्ततया विषयतया वा
ईश्वरमाश्रयत इतीश्वराश्रयेत्युच्यते, न स्वाधारतया,
विद्यास्वभावादे ब्रह्मणि तदनुपपत्तेः ।

Bhā. I. iv. 3. p. 378.

Cf. also Vācaspati's Commentary on the Vākyānvyādhikaraṇa.

*अविधोपादानं च यद्यपि विद्यास्वभावे परमात्मनि
न तायादस्ति, तथापि तत्प्रतिबिम्बस्वजीवदारेण
परस्मिन्नुच्यते ।

Bhā. I. iv. 22. p. 421.

Brahmānanda explains the term 'Vidyāśvabhāva' as -

*निरवधमिति ब्रुत्यवगतनिर्दोषानात्मत्वं
विद्यास्वभावत्वम् ।*

VK. p. 378.

99. Cf. *VK. pp. 235-236.*

100. स्वमिहापि *अहमहो न त्वीश्वरः,* *आहो हो दावजो

[श्वे. उ. 1. 9.] *इत्यादिमौलिकवैदिकव्यवहारदर्शकृत-

भेदोपहितजीव एव अहानं तत्तुल्यत इति युक्तम् ।

VKP. p. 379.

101. *ब्रह्म नास्ति* इत्यादिव्यवहारो यदाश्रितः अहानमपि तदाश्रितम्,

कार्यकारणयोः स्थापितत्वस्य युक्तत्वात्, न च जीवाश्रित इति

अहानमपि तदाश्रितम् ।

Brahmānanda's Uvāya-Ratnāvalī on SD p. 227.

102. Prof. S. S. Suryanarayana Shastri and C. Rukhan Raja.
Introduction to Bhā. Ca. Śū. p. xxiv. (Theosophical
Publishing House, Adyar, Madras, 1933).

103. न च अविद्यायां तस्यां जीवात्मविभागः, सति च
जीवात्मविभागे तदात्र्याविद्येऽन्योन्यावयवमिति सांप्रतम्,
अनादित्वेन जीवाविद्योरन्वयतुष्टोरयोगात् ।
Bhā. I. II. 6. p. 235.
cf. also* न एवमन्योन्यावयो जीवविभागावयवविधा
अविद्यावयव जीवात्मविभाग इति, बीजाङ्कुरवदनादित्वात् ।
OP. cit. I. IV. 22. p. 421.

104. किमन्योन्यावयव उत्पत्तौ उक्तौ स्थितौ वा नातः,
अनादित्वादुभयोः । न द्वितीयः, अज्ञानस्य विदमात्मत्वेऽपि
चितेः स्वप्रकाशात्वेन तदभात्यत्वात् । न तृतीयः, त किं
परस्परामित्येन परस्परसापेक्षस्थितिकात्वेन वा स्यात् । तन्न,
उभयस्याप्यस्तिः अज्ञानस्य विदावयवत्वे विदधीनस्थितिकात्वेऽपि
मिति अविद्यावयवत्वेऽधीनस्थितिकावयोरभावात् ।
AS. I. p. 585.

- 104a. Prof. S. S. Suryanarayana Shastri and C. Rukhan Raja.
Introduction to Bhā. Ca. Śū. p. xxiv.

*वस्तुत्त्वापेक्ष दोषः नास्ति वस्तु वस्त्वन्तरनिष्पत्तये समं,
न मायामात्रे, न हि मायायां काचिदनुपपत्तिः, अन्यदप्यनार्यं
हि माया, उपपद्यमानार्थत्वे यथार्थमायान्न माया स्यात् ।"
BS. I. p. 10.

*न हि मायायामसमायनीयं नाम् । अस्मादनौपायमासवतुरा
हि सा ।"
PP. Var. I. p. 109.



105. यस्तु कस्याप्येति, जीवानामिति सूयः ।

BS. I. p. 10

106. न तावदज्ञानमात्रविषयमेवापेक्षम् । किन्तु स्फुटिगन्नेव वस्तुनि आश्रयत्वं विषयत्वं चेति कृत्यद्वयं न्यादयति ।
स्याश्रयापत्तकप्रदेशे कृत्यद्वयत्वादितामोषत् अक्रियारम्भत्वात्
आवरणत्वाच्च, नहि ततो वस्तुद्वयापेक्षमभासते ।

BSV. Var. I. p. 210

107. अज्ञानमिति च दयापेक्षान्तर्युदात्तेन अभिधानात्
दयापेक्षदवभासते । यथा स्थितिरगमनाद्येन
अभिधीयमाना कस्य किंविषयमगमनमिति दर्शयतापेक्षद भाति ।

Op. Cit. p. 211.

108. नापि स्वाश्रयवित्प्रकाशेन विबुध्यते अज्ञानम् ।
स्वावभासकेन स्थितेन वित्प्रकाशेन अज्ञानस्य अविस्तृत्वात्
ताद्विषयस्य बाह्यायमानकत्वात् । अतो न तदाश्रयत्वविरोधः ।

Ibid.

109. Cf. यद्यपि अज्ञानस्य चैतन्यविरोधित्वमनुभूयते, तथापि
तत्तदाकारापरौघात्तस्यमिव्यवस्थेयं चैतन्यं चैतन्यात्मना
अज्ञानस्य निवर्तकम् ।

.....

तस्मात्स्वप्नावस्थापि चैतन्यस्य अपरोक्षवृत्तिविरहदशायां
अज्ञानतापकत्वात् तदविस्तृत्वाच्च तदाश्रयत्वमपि तदिति भावः ।

BP. Var. I. pp. 211-212

Cf. Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, in his Advaita-Siddhi, while defending the Viversion-view says that just as the sun-light, which manifests the objects like grass, paper, etc, burns away those objects when delimited by or passing through the sun-crystal (lense), similarly the consciousness (caitanya), though it illumines avidyā, can remove it (avidyā) when delimited by the modification of the internal organ.

...

...

*स्वतस्तुण्डतुलकादिमासकस्य सीरासीकस्य सूर्यकान्तावच्छेदेन
स्वमास्यगुणतुलकादिमासकत्ववत् स्वतोऽविद्यातत्कार्यमासकस्य
यैतन्यस्य पुत्स्यवच्छेदेन तद्वदादकत्वात् ।*

AS. I. p. 977.

110. सत्यप्येक्ये प्रतिबिम्बात्मन्यव्यक्तमयामस्यादेः
द्विष्ये अवर्जनात् । अवदाततायावच अविरोधदर्शनात् ।
एवं तर्हिस्वाविद्यात्रयस्योः सत्यप्येक्ये अविरोधात् ।
SPV. Var. I. p. 215.

111. यद्यप्यज्ञापविद्या चिन्मात्रसंविन्धिनी जीवब्रह्मणी विभजते,
तथापि ब्रह्मस्वल्पमुपैक्ष्य जीवभाग एव पञ्चातिनी संसारं
जनयेत्, यथा भुक्मात्रसंविन्धि दर्पणादिदं बिम्बप्रतिबिम्बो
विभज्य प्रतिबिम्बभाग एव अतिज्ञासमादधाति तद्वत् ।
VPS. Var. I. p. 58. also of. SPV. Var. I. p. 219.

112. अतिविघ्नमात्रावितमहार्ण जीवपक्षातित्वावजीवावित-
मित्युच्यते ।
VPS. Var. I. p. 39.

113. स्वमहानान्तःकरणयोरेकात्मत्वव्यात् "अहमहः" इत्यवभासः
नान्तःकरणस्याज्ञानसंविन्धादिति तुल्यम् ।
SPV. Var. I. p. 220.

114. प्रतीतेरन्ययासिद्धी परस्परसंविन्धकत्वनायोगात् आत्मनि
अतिप्राप्त्यन्धस्य लुप्तोऽपि संप्रतिपन्नत्वात् ।
Ibid.

115. CE. न च यैतन्यस्य तात्पर्यनिर्णय आक्षेपत्वेन वास्तव्यं
असंगतत्वं विहन्यते ।
VPS. Var. I. p. 59.

116. SV. 175-182; BUBV. I. iv. 1215-1227.
Cf. H3. See the Sambandhokti at the beginning of Chapter III.
117. आत्माविषय नः शक्तिः सर्वगतस्य सज्जने ।
 नातोऽन्यथा शक्तिवादः प्रमाणेनावसीयते ॥
BUBV. IV. 141. 1704-1705.
118. असाधारणज्ञानं प्रतीत्येवं यतः रिक्तम् ।
Op. cit. I. iv. 170.
 असाधारणज्ञानातिरेकेण नान्योऽर्थोऽज्ञानमिति हिम् ।
 अज्ञानादित्यं यस्मात्स्वतो दोषोऽसंख्यम् ।
Op. cit. IV. iv. 800.
119. Cf. V. P. Upadhyaya, Lights on Vedānta. pp. 101-102.
120. प्रमात्रादिष्विज्जातार्थानुसूयोऽतिरिक्ततः ।
 नापेक्षितमिति प्राह स्वानुसूयनुसारतः ॥
 प्रमात्राद्यतिरिक्तोऽर्थः पूर्वं विद्वन्प्राप्तमन्यथास्तमः ।
 विवेचना विवेका स्वानुसूयैव मम्यते ।
BUBV. I. iv. 289-290.
121. 1) अविघाटिमहा हि बीजावितः
 परमेश्वराख्या ।
BSB. I. iv. 3.
 11) चित्तदानन्दादिति विषयस्वस्योऽप्यात्मा
 स्वावयवास्वविषयया अविषया
Sankara's preface to the Śvetāśvataraopaniṣad.

122. 1) कस्य पुनरर्थं अप्रबोध इति चेत्,
यस्यैव पुच्छति तस्य ते प्रति वदामः ।
350. IV. 1.3.
- 11) अविद्याकामकर्मविशिष्टकार्यकरणोपाधिः
आत्मा तन्तरी जीव उच्यते ।
BUB. III. 911. 12.
- 111) अविद्या कस्य यस्य दूयते तस्यैव ।
BUB. XIII. 2.
122. ६ परावप्रवण्णा दुष्टया पीत्योऽन्नोऽन्नानमात्मनि ।
ज्योमन्त्राण्यदिवातन्ज्ये संभावयति न त्वतः ॥
BUOV. I. 1v. 396.
123. अस्मान्मृतोः प्रहाणाग, आत्मैऽत्यजिवाप्रतिपरतो
तर्के वेदान्ताः आरभ्यन्ते । यथा यायमर्थः तर्केषां
वेदान्तानां तथा वयमस्यां शारीरकनीमातायां प्रदर्शयिष्यामः ।
BUB. I. 1. 1. (Aśhvāśa-śāstra). p. 45.
124. AS. I. pp. 577-581 and p. 585.
125. "शास्त्री जी वाचवादीशानीश"
Śrī. Up. I. 9.
126. न च "शास्त्रीशानीश" इति जीवाज्ञानप्रतिपक्षकपुतिविरोधः,
तदा तत्पत्वाभावेऽपि तत्कार्ययोगितया आत्यन्तपक्षोपपत्तेः ।
AS. I. p. 578.
127. न च चिन्मात्रस्य अविद्याव्यत्ये प्रमाणाभावः
.... "माया" तु प्रकृतिं विद्यान्मादिने तु महेश्वरम्
इति ह्योरेव प्रमाणत्वात् ।
Ibid.

128. Cf. आद्यपरवविष्णुतन्त्रभागिनी
निर्विभागधितरेव कैवला ।
पूर्वसिद्धतमसो हि परिचर्यो
नामयो भवति नापि गोचरः ।
SS. I. 319.
129. Cf. IS. I. p. 207.
130. Cf. IS. IV. pp. 369-376.
131. उद्यानि प्रदम जीवो भवति भवति य त्वद्व्यमज्ञानमस्य
प्रागस्पष्टं तदन्तःकरणमितितज्ज्योतिरामास्योगात् ।
यैतन्नैकप्रतिष्ठं स्पृहति न हि तमस्तादृशं यादृशं
तद्व्यद्विष्यामादनिष्ठं स्पृहति तद्व्यपि जीवमौदयाभियानम् ।
SS. II. 164.
Cf. also SS. II. 165 and 174.
Cf. Dr. N. Veezhinathan's introduction to Saṅkṣepa-
Śarīraka. pp. 77-79.
132. नेतव्यं परिहृत्य मण्डनमवस्तद्व्यन्यथा प्रस्थिताम् ।
SS. II. 174.
- 132 a प्रकरणमिदं वाचस्पतिमिषीयत्वेन उक्तमपि वस्तुतः
मण्डनमिषीयमेव । "वाचस्पतिस्तु मण्डनमुच्यते" ति
प्रवादः सुप्रसिद्धः सः ।
Yogendranātha's Mālabodhinī on AS. I. p. 1354.
133. कस्य पुनरयं अप्रमोद्य इति चेत्, यस्तु
पृच्छति तस्य ते इति वदामः ।
SSB. IV. 1. 3. pp. 933-939.

134. Cf. K. Krishnamoorthy. 'The Idea of avidyā, A Historical Survey', Path Way to God, April 1980, pp. 11-12.
135. Cf. Yogendranātha's Bhāṣya on AS I. pp. 1359-1356.
136. प्रत्यङ्गावृत्तिं कृत्वा जाग्रदवस्थां प्रविशति ।
तदवस्थां तदागतां तन्मया प्रतिष्ठयति ॥
BUBV. II. 111. 191.
Cf. also BUBV. I. iv. 341 and 374; IV. 111. 1111 and 1377.
137. V. P. Upadhyaya, Lights on Vedānta, pp. 105-106.
138. आत्मातमवस्थां तन्मया आत्मातमवस्थायोक्तः ।
BUBV. I. iv. 381.
अविद्यातमवस्थायामात्मातमवस्थां तन्मया प्रतिष्ठयति ।
आत्मातमवस्थां तन्मया तन्मया तन्मया ॥
Op. cit. I. iv. 1370.
139. तस्मिन् शब्दे शब्दोक्तस्योक्तिरित्याद्यास्तिसृषु आत्मविवक्षा-
आत्मेति ।
Anandagiri's gloss on BUBV. I. iv. 381.
140. योऽप्यविद्यादिर्बन्धः सोऽप्यविद्याप्रकल्पितः ।
वास्तवस्तद्विमुक्तो नोपपत्त्यात्मनो यतः ॥
BUBV. IV. 111. 95.
141. प्रसङ्गोऽप्यविद्या तद्विषयं न कथञ्चन युज्यते ।
SV. 176.

142. न सर्वं प्रधानादविर्वा त्वजीवेऽवेकामायामहे,
येनैवमुपलभ्येमहि, किन्त्विष्यं प्रतिजीवं भिद्यते ।
Bhā. I. iv. 3. p. 377.
Vācaspati repeats this idea in the Vākyānuyāñhi-
karṣaṇa also, -
यथा हि विम्वस्य मण्डूपाणाहयो गुहा सर्व
प्रत्यगोऽपि प्रतिजीवं भिन्ना अविद्या गुहा किति ।
Op. cit. p. 421.
143. तदुक्तः सप्ततारोच्छेदप्रमाणः १ प्रधानादिनां त्वेव दोषः ।
प्रधानस्यैकत्वेन तदुच्छेदे सर्वोच्छेदः, अनुच्छेदे वा न
कस्यचिदित्यभिप्रायः ।
Op. cit. p. 378.
144. भिन्नाधिरण्योर्विवाविध्योरधिरोधात् ।
ibid.
145. तेन यस्यैव जीवस्य विधीत्यन्ना तस्यैव अविद्या
अपनीयो न जीवान्तरस्य ।
Bhā. I. iv. 3. pp. 377-378.
146. न च - अविद्योपाधिमेदाधीनो जीवमेदो जीवमेदाधीनश्च
अविद्योपाधिमेद इति परस्परान्नादुभयामिदिरिति साक्षात्
अनावित्त्वाद् जीवाङ्कुरपदुभयमिदं ।
Op. cit. p. 378.
- 146 a. न क्त्वादिमान् नंतरः, नाप्यादिमान्
अविद्याजीवविभागः, येनानुगुण्येतेति ।
Op. cit. p. 378.
147. अविद्यात्वमात्रेण चैतन्योपचारः अव्यवहृतमिति
वाप्यावृत्तमिति चेति ।
Op. cit. p. 378.

148. आरम्भाज्यं आत्मविषयं च अज्ञानं अन्तरेण
अनारम्भं प्रतिविषयं भावस्याज्ञानत्वात्
प्रमाणमावात् ।
PPV. I. pp. 97-98.
149. अस्मिन् पक्षे शुषित्वादिज्ञानेन रजताद्युपादानानां
स्वकारणे प्रविलयगर्भं क्रियते मुक्तप्रकारेण फलम् ।
Op. cit. pp. 98-99.
150. अथवा मूलाज्ञानस्यैव अवस्थामेष्टाः रजताद्युपादानानि
शुषित्वादिज्ञानैः स्थाप्यातेन निवर्तन्ते इति कल्प्यताम् ।
Op. cit. p. 99.
151. "मायां तु प्रकृतिं विद्यादित्यादिवाक्यात्
कल्पनालाघवानुगृहीतान्मूलाज्ञानमेकमेष्टव्यम्, तस्य च
अनन्ताः अवस्थाः कल्प्यन्ते व्यवहारनिर्वाहाय ।
Akhepandanda's Tattvadarśana on PPV. Var. I. p. 72
(Banaras, 1902).
152. एवैव अविद्या, तस्या एव अविद्याया जीवमेवेन
ब्रह्मत्वस्यावरणज्ञातयो नाना, तथा च यस्य ब्रह्मज्ञानं तस्य
ब्रह्मत्वस्यावरणज्ञातयिविशिष्टाविद्यानाशः, न त्वन्व्यं प्रति
ब्रह्मत्वस्यावरणज्ञातयिविशिष्टा विद्यानाशः, इत्यभ्युपगमान्नैकमुक्तौ
सर्वमुक्तिः ।
VF. IX. pp. 171-172.
CE. "अव्यक्ताव्याहृतज्ञातयास्तस्या मेष्टाभावादेकत्वेऽपि
स्वशक्त्या विधियकार्यकरत्वात् ।"
Ānandagiri's Nyāyārnava on DSS. I. iv. 3. p. 277.
- 152 a. तत्मादग्रहणविषयग्रहणे हि अविद्ये कार्यकारणभावेन
अवस्थितौ ।
DS. III. pp. 149-150.

153. देविर्द्यं चाप्यविद्याया न च युक्त्यावसीयते ।
स्कारम्यमाश्वत्थात्तादनिर्देयं पुण्यते ॥

प्रमेयमेदमिन्नत्वं ज्ञानानामिव मेदकम् ।
नविद्याया यतोऽस्तीह देविर्द्यं तेन दुष्टम् ॥

प्रत्ययज्ञानमेवेह तदन्यद्वस्तुकारणम् ।
तदन्यकारणान्तराद् देविर्द्यं तमसः कुतः ॥

BUBV. II. 1v. 199-201.

cf. "आख्यविष्णुमेदाभावाद् मेदाभावे तदेवमित्यर्थः ।
Ānandagiri on BUBV. II. 1v. 199.

154. अविद्या कथञ्चान्नस्यमिदयाज्ञानात्मिका प्रत्यक्षावस्था ततो
तदसाधारणा यदेष्टा तदा प्रतीयोऽव्यस्य विविक्षितत्वात् तत्र
तद्वेदायोगात् ज्ञानस्यादिनिदानमेवेवाविद्या न तद्वेदितामित्यर्थः ।
Ānandagiri on BUBV. IV. 1v. 892.

155. अज्ञानं स्याज्ज्ञानं मिथ्याज्ञानमिति त्रिषु ।
अज्ञानं कारणं तत्र कार्यत्वं परिशिष्योः ॥
BUBV. I. 1v. 1366.

- 155 a. It may be pointed out in this regard that the later
Advaitins use the terms āvarana and vikṣāṇa to
denote the diverse functions of avivāṇa.

156. अज्ञानं स्यात्तान्मो मिथ्याज्ञानात्तदेव च ।
तयोस्तत्त्वविवक्षायाज्ज्ञानं तत्त्वमुच्यते ॥
BUBV. I. 1v. 440.

157. यदसाधारणादिव्या प्रत्ययात्मैकगोचरा ।
ज्ञानावात्मिका हिता देविर्द्यं त्यास्तदा कुतः ॥
Op. cit. IV. 1v. 892.

158. V. P. Upadhyaya. Lights on Vedānta, p. 97.

CHAPTER IV

THE NATURE OF THE PHENOMENAL WORLD (JAGAT)

a) The Status of the World

If, according to Advaita, the non-dual Brahman-Ātman is the sole reality, what is the ontological status of the world of plurality we live in? This is a question of vital importance, which Advaitins have to answer satisfactorily. Advaitins declare that the world is 'mithyā'. That is, in the view of Advaita, the world is an illusory appearance, a mere product of avidyā or māyā, like a rope-snake or shell-silver.

It may be pointed out in this context that unless and until we show that the world is a mere appearance, the non-duality of Brahman cannot be established. In other words, the establishment of non-duality of Brahman presupposes the falsity of the dual world. This is why the concept of falsity (mithyātva) finds a very important place in the structure of Advaita.

Now, the question arises as to what exactly Advaitins mean by saying that the world is false? Is the world a fiction or a void (śūnya)? 'No' says Advaitin.¹ Advaitins never regard the world of experience to be absolute

non-existent (abhavato-ant) like a sky-flower or the hare's horn. Nor do they equate the appearance of the world with such illusions as the rope-snake, dream etc. To Advaitins the world-spectacle is something superior to these illusions.

The above idea will become much more clear on the analysis of the three-fold reality (sattā-traividhya) as recognised by Śaṅkara and his followers.²

(1) The absolute reality: (pāramārthika-sattā): That which is not sublatable in all the three divisions of time, in all the states and in all places is the absolute reality. Brahman alone, in this sense, can be the absolute reality. Because there is nothing which can sublate Brahman that transcends everything else including time and space.

(2) The empirical reality: (vyaśāhārika-sattā): The objects such as pot, cloth etc., which we come across in our day to day experience, have empirical reality. The silver, which we see in the market, is pragmatically real, for it fulfils our practical needs. We can make ornaments out of that silver. And this experience is not instantaneous. It continues till the dawn of the Brahman-realisation and hence does not suffer contradiction in the empirical plane. Only Brahman-realisation can sublate

what is empirically real.

(3) The phenomenal reality: (Prātibhāsika-gatā): That which appears to be real only so long as we perceive it, and which gets sublated afterwards is phenomenally real. We mistake, for instance, rope for snake or a piece of shell for silver. The rope-snake, shell-silver, etc. appear to be real so long as they are perceived and get sublated, following the right knowledge of their substratum i.e. rope, etc. And the sublation of those illusory things can be possible even in the range of our empirical life. The rope-snake, shell-silver, etc., unlike the empirical objects such as pot, cloth etc., are not capable of fulfilling our practical needs.

Now, if we consider the concept of the falsity of the world in the light of the doctrine of three-fold reality, the sense in which the falsity of the world is understood by the Advaitins becomes very clear. The world is not absolutely real as Brahman, for it suffers contradiction on the attainment of the Brahman-realisation. But whereas Brahman, the essential nature of which is reality, consciousness, and bliss, and which is unconditioned by time, space and all kinds of adjuncts, is never contradicted. From the standpoint of Brahman, therefore, the world is

not real. Nor can the world-appearance be characterised as absolutely unreal. For, in that case the world would not have been presented to any of our experience at all. Certainly, an absolutely non-existent entity like a sky-flower can never be experienced. But the worldly objects are universally experienced by one and all. Hence the world is something other than these two extreme categories viz., absolute reality and absolute unreality (sadāśa-vilakṣaṇa). In other words, the world cannot be determined either as absolutely real, which is never contradicted, or as absolutely unreal, which can never be experienced. In so far as the world is experienced and suffers contradiction, it is indeterminate (anirvacanīya). It is in this sense that Advaitins consider the world to be 'mithyā' (false). In this way, the falsity (mithyātva) of the world consists in the characteristic of its being indeterminate (anirvacanīyatva) and the characteristic of its being removable by the right knowledge (jñāna-nivartayatva). But not in its being either a fiction or a void. As the world is less real than Brahman, on which the former is superimposed, its sublation by the realisation of the latter is intelligible.

In fact, the objects both empirical (vyāvahārika) as well as phenomenal (prātibhāsika) are 'mithyā' (indeterminate),

from the stand-point of Brahman, the absolute reality. Advaitins, therefore, usually analogize the world-appearance with such illusions as the rope-snake, shell-silver, mirege, dream, etc. But this is only to emphasise the indeterminability and the sublatibility of the former. Just as the snake appearing in a rope is indeterminable, being different from both real and unreal and got sublated, subsequent to the right knowledge of its substratum i.e. the rope; even so, the world-appearance is indeterminable either as real or as unreal and is liable to sublation on the attainment of the realisation of Brahman, its substratum. Hence the above analogies used by the Advaitins in this regard are meant only to point out the phenomenal character of the world and not to equate the world-appearance with such illusions either as the rope-snake or the dream. The duration of the world-appearance is a prolonged one in comparison with the ordinary illusions such as rope-snake etc. While the former continues to be real till the dawn of the Brahman-realisation and is not liable to sublation in the empirical state (vyaavahāra-avasthā). The latter suffer sublation even at the empirical plane and thus persist only instantaneously. Hence the empirical world is something superior to such illusions as rope-snake, dream, etc. In this way, Advaitins clearly distinguish the empirical objects from the phenomenal ones.

As seen above, in the view of Advaita, the world of diversity is empirically real, as it is not contradicted in the state of bondage and thus is conducive to all our practical needs. But the 'Vijñānavāda Buddhists' deny even the empirical reality of the world.³ The Vijñānavādins altogether dismiss the externality and the objectivity of the worldly entities. They contend that the external objects, as such, do not exist, but the momentary internal ideas (~~kaṇṭhika~~-vijñāna) themselves, due to the variety of the past impressions, appear as if existing outside in the form of various objective entities. Apart from these mere subjective cognitions, no external things can possibly exist. In other words, according to this view, the external objective entities are nothing but the internal ideas. According to the Vijñānavādins, therefore, the existence of the external things is impossible. In this way, they treat the externality of the worldly objects as merely an illusion.

The above view, advocated by the Vijñānavādins, which is technically termed as the 'Subjective Idealism', is not acceptable to Advaita. Commenting upon the Brahma-sūtra II,11.28-30, Śaṅkara himself has refuted such an absurd position. Śaṅkara emphatically states that the non-existence of the external objects cannot be maintained as they are

actually found in our experience. For, we do perceive the external objective entities such as a pillar, a wall, a jar, etc., corresponding to each internal idea. Hence we cannot assuredly deny the very thing that is being actually perceived.⁴ To say that the external objects, which are being actually perceived through the sense-contact, are not perceived or that they do not exist is as absurd as the statement of a person, while he is enjoying his dinner, that he is neither eating anything nor experiencing any satisfaction out of it.⁵

Vijñānavādin may now argue that what he denies is the existence of the external objects as apart from the perception and not the perception of an object too. But Śaṅkara says that this is not a logical argument. He emphatically asserts that the existence of the external objects as apart from the perception should be admitted on the ground of the very fact of perception. In other words, the perception of the external things itself proves that they exist independent of perception. Because, nobody cognises the perception itself to be the pillar or the wall, but, on the contrary, every one cognises the external things such as the pillar, wall, etc. to be the 'objects' of perception.⁶

As it has been already noted, the Vijñānavādine argue

that the thing is internal, but appears as if it were external (outside). But Śaṅkara says that the very fact that Viśṇānavādin uses the word 'as if', when he says 'as if it were outside', to deny the existence of the external objects, proves that the Viśṇānavādin also believes in the existence of the external world. For, otherwise, if the external world were totally non-existent, then its perceptual experience cannot be possible and hence the expression 'as if it were external' cannot be possibly used. Verily, nobody would make use of the expression that Viṣṇumitra appears as if he were the son of a barren woman. The point to be noted is that a comparison between the things existing and the things non-existing can never be possible. Hence it is reasonable to hold that the perception refers to the object which is actually outside, and not that it appears 'as if it were outside'.⁷ The existence of the external things, therefore, should be admitted. Moreover, the ascertainment of the existence of an entity depends upon the means of valid knowledge. That which is not in the range of any known means of valid knowledge can be denied as non-existent. But in the present case all means of right knowledge point to the external objects. How can one deny their existence?⁸

Viśṇānavādin still tries to adduce reasons as to why

the external objects as apart from the internal ideas cannot possibly exist: The common feature of cognition is mere awareness. But it takes different formulations with regard to each and every different object, such as the cognition of a pillar, the cognition of a jar, etc. This particularisation cannot be reasonably sustainable unless there is some special peculiarity in each individual cognition itself. Therefore, it has to be necessarily assumed that our cognitions themselves take on the form of the different objects. In other words, the cognitions must have the same form as the objects of such cognitions (Viśaya-sārūpya). And when this is accepted that the cognition itself takes on the form of the alleged object, it is superfluous to assume the separate existence of the external things. Moreover, the cognition and its object are invariably found to occur together (asambalabha-viyama). One of them can never be found in the absence of the other. This would not be possible if both of them were really distinct from each other by nature. Verrily, there can be no such rule that the two distinct entities such as a cow and a horse are to be invariably found. In so far as the cognition and its object are invariably found to occur, both of them are one and the same. For this reason also the external objects do not separately exist as apart from the internal cognitions.

Śaṅkara refutes this contention by saying that merely due to the fact that the cognition is seen to take on the same form as its object, the object is not altogether destroyed; because if the object itself were not to exist at all, how could the cognition take on the same form as that particular object? And since the object is actually perceived as being outside, its existence cannot be denied.⁹ Therefore, the separate existence of the external objects as apart from the internal ideas should be admitted. And thus, when it is proved on the ground of the universal experience that the cognition and its object are distinct from each other, the fact of the cognition and its object occurring invariably together is to be understood to mean that they have a relation of cause (object) and the effect (cognition) between them, and not that they are one and the same, and have no distinction between them.¹⁰ Even two entities distinct from each other are invariably found to occur together. The colour, for instance, which is grasped only through the sense of sight, is found to be perceived only as associated with light. In the absence of light, however, the colour is not seen. But this invariable co-presence of the light and colour, as far as the perception of the colour is concerned, does not establish that the two i.e. the light and the colour are one and the same, for they are actually found in our experience to be distinct

from each other.¹¹ In the same way, the cognition and its object can be invariably found to occur together even though they are distinct. The existence, therefore, of the external things as apart from the internal ideas should not be denied.

Further, Vijñānavēdin argues that just as in the dream state there is the cognition even without the external objects, even so, in the waking state also the cognitions may as well occur even in the absence of any external objects, for the experience of the dream state and the experience of the waking state are similar to each other by nature, in as much as both of them are cognitions (pratyakṣatvāvisṛjāt).

Śaṅkara rejects this argument by pointing out that the analogy of the dream cannot be used in the case of the phenomenal world as there is dissimilarity (vaidharmya) between the dream state and the waking state. That is, the cognitions of the dream state cannot be equated with those of the waking state, because they are dissimilar in their nature. They are dissimilar because the cognitions of the dream state are sublated, whereas the cognitions of the waking state are not so sublated. For, it is a well known fact that when a person awakens from the dream, the objects

seen in that state become sublated, as a person on coming back to the waking state says that the wonderful objects, which he saw in his dream, are false. But, on the other hand, the objects perceived in the waking state are not so sublated in any other subsequent empirical state.¹²

The waking cognitions are not sublated because they arise from the valid means of knowledge (pramāṇa). The cognitions of the dream state are not caused by the valid means of knowledge, but are caused by such defects as sleep, etc., and hence are subsequently sublated.¹³ Moreover, the objects of the dream state are of the nature of recollection being caused by the residual impressions, while the experience of the waking state is direct, being caused by the sense-object contact, etc. The difference between the recollection and the direct perception is obvious in as much as the object recollected is remote, while the object directly perceived is immediate.¹⁴ Śaṅkara, therefore, comes to the conclusion that experience of the waking state cannot possibly be on par with experience of the dream state, in so far as the latter, as seen above, has less reality than the former.¹⁵

Vijñānavādin contends that even in the absence of the external objects, the variety in our cognitions (jñāna-vaicitrya) can very well be due to the variety of the

residual impressions (vāsanā-vaicitrya). But the question is, how could there be any residual impression if any external object does not possibly exist? For, it is only on the basis of the perceptual cognitions of the external objects that there arise various residual impressions in connection with various objects perceived.¹⁶ Therefore, in order to reasonably account for the variety in our cognitions, the external objects should be held to be perceived.

The above criticism of the Buddhist idealism clearly indicates that the empirical world, in the view of Advaita, does exist as apart from our internal ideas. And hence it has both objectivity and externality. Advaitins never deny the empirical reality of the world. According to Advaita, the world is empirically real because it does not suffer sublation in the empirical state and is conducive to all our practical needs. Only from the stand-point of the absolute reality the world is said to be false. Hence just as the objects in the dream are unsublated and appear to be real until the waking state arises, even so, the objects of the empirical state continue to be real until the Brahman-realisation is attained. Śaṅkara, therefore, aptly points out that prior to the realisation of Brahman, all our practical activities are real and valid for the

time being, just as the transactions in dreams are real enough for the time being before waking up. As long as one does not realise his identity with Brahman, so long the notion that the world is false does not arise in him, and on the other hand, he considers it to be real under the influence of avidyā; even as a man, while he is asleep and dreaming, has no notion that the objects of the dream are merely false appearance, and on the other hand, he definitely considers his experience as real as when it is directly perceived. Śaṅkara, in this way, arrives at the conclusion that all common human dealings and Vedic observances are logical and valid in the empirical state i.e. upto the state when the soul realises its identity with Brahman.¹⁷

Thus, it is only in the afore mentioned sense that the dream analogy has to be understood. Our experience of waking state should not be equated with that of dream state. No doubt Advaitins compare this life to a dream. Commenting upon the Āitareya Upaniṣad,¹⁸ Śaṅkara states that the world-spectacle is as illusory as the dream, the realisation of the Self (the ultimate reality) not having arisen.¹⁹ But this comparison is only to emphasise the relative and the phenomenal character of the worldly life. This does not imply that our life is literally

a dream. But on the other hand, this life is full of significance to man. For, it is here on this earth and not any where else that rebirth is possible. And the attainment of the moral and spiritual perfection, which is a necessary pre-requisite for the attainment of mokṣa, the supreme human goal, can be possible only on this earth.

In this way, the world, in the view of Advaita, is empirically real though it is false (mithyā) absolutely. It is false in the sense that it has no independent existence of its own as apart from its cause i.e. Brahman. Therefore, on the realisation of the latter the world of experience is transcended. According to Advaita, therefore, the world-spectacle is not as real as it is understood by the other realistic schools of Indian Philosophy, nor is it a nothingness, a void as it is understood by the nihilists. "No teacher of the Advaita holds that the world is absolutely unreal or illusory. It is real as a manifestation of being but unreal as a self-subsisting entity."²⁰ Advaita thus does not concede supreme reality to the world; nor does it reduce it to vacuum. According to Advaita, hence, the value of our worldly life should neither be overrated nor be underrated. Such a conception regarding the nature of the world of experience, in fact, is a unique contribution of Advaita to the Indian Philosophy. Now to sum up:

Advaita is a realism from the lower point of view as much as it is an absolutism from the higher point of view. In other words, Advaita is not a world-denying philosophy but it is the world-transcending philosophy.

b) Brahman: Material as well as the Efficient Cause of the world (abhinnā-nimitto-' pradhāna-kāraṇa)

According to Advaita, neither the insentient Pradhāna nor the indivisible atoms can be the cause of this world. But Brahman-Ātman of the nature of pure consciousness alone is the cause of this world. Taking their stand on the Śrutis, Advaitins declare that Brahman is both the material (upādāna) as well as the efficient (nimitta) cause of the world. Brahman, in the view of Advaita, is not the efficient cause only. Śaṅkara, in his commentary on the 'Prakṛtyadhikaraṇa',²¹ refutes the view of those who hold Brahman, to be only the efficient cause. According to him, the two-fold causality in respect of Brahman is to be admitted, as this view is not in conflict with the proposition (pratītiḥ) and the illustrative instances (dṛṣṭānta) quoted in the Śruti.²²

The Chāndogya text VI.1.2 declares that by knowing one thing i.e. Brahman all else, though it is unknown, becomes known.²³ Knowledge of all things can be possible

only through the knowledge of their material cause, because the effect is non-different from its material cause. The knowledge of the effect by knowing its material cause is intelligible, as the essential nature of the latter necessarily inheres in the former. But whereas the effect is not so non-different from its efficient cause, as an architect, in our ordinary experience, is seen to be different from the palace he builds. In this way, since the effect is wholly different from its efficient cause, the knowledge of the effect by knowing its efficient cause cannot be possible.²⁴ Now if we admit Brahman to be only the efficient cause of the world, the above proposition that by knowing one thing, i.e. Brahman, everything else, though it is unknown, becomes known would be conflicted. Therefore, Brahman is to be admitted as the material cause also. And the illustrative examples referred to in this context also relate to the material cause. For instance, it is declared that by knowing a lump of clay all things made of clay become known.²⁵ This is an illustration of Brahman. Such illustrative instances clearly indicate that Brahman is the material cause of the world, otherwise they would be meaningless. Such texts putting forth the proposition and illustrative instances which are to be found in all the Vedānta texts prove the material causality in respect of Brahman.²⁶ Moreover, the ablative case used in "that

from which - yatah" occurring in the text "that from which these beings emerge" is indicative of the material causality of Brahman. For, in accordance with the special rule of grammar "the basic substance (i.e. the material cause) of anything that is being born is used in the ablative case (i.e. with the pronoun 'from')".²⁷

And since there is no other guiding being than Brahman, it should be admitted that Brahman is the efficient cause also. The ordinary material causes such as clay and gold require other efficient causes such as the potter and the goldsmith for the origination of their respective effects. But in the case of Brahman, which is the material cause of the world, there is no such requirement of any other efficient cause, on which the material cause could depend, because the Śruti declares that prior to creation, Brahman was one only without a second.²⁸ Moreover, if the efficient cause of the world is admitted to be something different from its material cause, it is impossible to know everything else by knowing one thing i.e. Brahman. And in that case, the proposition that everything else becomes known by knowing one thing and the illustrative instances given in support of that proposition would be contradicted.²⁹ Hence, Śaṅkara arrives at the conclusion that Brahman is both the material as well as the efficient cause of the world.

Since there is no other guiding being, Brahman is the efficient cause (nimitta-kāraṇa) and since there is no other substance from which the world could emerge, Brahman is the material cause (upādāna-kāraṇa) as well.³⁰

The creational text which declares "It desired, may I become many, may I grow forth" (Tai. Op. II.vi.1)³¹ also establishes the two-fold causality in respect of Brahman. "It desired" indicates that Brahman is the efficient cause and "May I become many" indicates that Brahman is the material cause as well.

Now the question arises as to how can Brahman be the material cause of this world? For Brahman is essentially immutable (akṛtoṣṭha). That is, Brahman is not liable to change at any time (avikāri), whereas the world of experience is a changing phenomena (vikāri). The problem is, how the unchangeable Brahman can be the material cause of the changeable world? It is well known that the material causes such as clay and gold cannot produce their effects such as pot and ornament without themselves undergoing some change. That is, for the origination of the effects such as pot, etc., some kind of change in the original form of their material causes is indispensable. Now, if we admit Brahman to be the material cause of this composite world,

then Brahman also should be liable to change. And in that case the immutable nature of Brahman will be affected.

Advaitins rejoin to this by saying that Brahman is neither the originating cause like the atoms of the Vaiśeṣikas nor the transforming cause like the Pradhāna of the Sāṃkhyaas, in which case the immutable nature of Brahman would be affected. But Brahman, according to Advaita, illusorily appears as the world of name and form; just as the shell illusorily appears as the silver. Certainly, the shell does not suffer any change by the appearance of the silver in it. The true nature of the shell remains as it is even at the time when it is mistaken for the silver. Similarly, Brahman suffers nothing by the appearance of the world in it. Its essential nature remains unchanged, though it illusorily appears as the world. As noted already, the principle that is responsible for the illusory appearance of Brahman as the world is māyā or avidyā. This is known as the 'theory of transfiguration' (yivarta-vāda), according to which the cause appears as the effect without itself undergoing any change whatsoever. Advaitins establish this theory by refuting the other theories of causation as untenable. It is necessary at this stage to examine critically the views maintained by the Buddhists, Naiyyāyikas and Sāṃkhyaas on the problem of the causation.

in order to understand clearly the proper significance of the 'vivarta-vāda'.

c) Different Theories of Causation

(1) Asat-kārya-vāda of Buddhists : Buddhists declare that existence originates from non-existence.³² According to them, "nothing comes into being without annihilating its cause."³³ They argue that the cause perishes before the effect is produced. For it is from the decomposed seed only that the sprout arises, so also spoilt milk only turns into curds and the lump of clay ceases to be so, when it becomes pot.³⁴ Accordingly, in as much as it is from the causes such as seed, etc., which have been reduced to the condition of non-existence, that the effects such as sprout, etc., spring, they consider that existence comes out of non-existence.³⁵ According to this theory, the effect is real, but the cause is non-existent (asat).

But Advaitins deny the above view, as it goes contrary to all our experiences. For nowhere it is observed that existence comes out of non-existence as Buddhists think.³⁶ A cloth, for instance, is never found to be produced without threads nor the pot without clay. If existence comes out of non-existence, as if entity originates from non-entity, then it would mean that anything can come out

of anything, for non-existence is the same in all cases. And in that case, it would be futile to assume a specific cause to produce a specific effect.³⁷ Assuredly, there is no any difference whatsoever between the non-existence of the seed when it is destroyed and the non-existence of the hare's horn, because both of them are devoid of any characteristic.³⁸ Thus the assumption of specific cause to produce specific effect as when it is held that seeds alone produce sprouts and milk alone gives rise to curds would have no meaning. If the absolute non-existence, which is devoid of any characteristics, is held to be the cause, then the sprout may as well originate from even hare's horn. But this is not seen.³⁹ And if non-existence were the cause, then the effect also should be characterized by non-existence. But this contradicts our experience, for we notice the effects such as the cloth, etc., to be existent entities.⁴⁰ The contention of the Buddhists that existence should spring from the non-existence, since an entity, which is unchanging and eternal, cannot be the cause of any effect unless its own nature is destroyed, is wrong. Because we do observe that gold, etc., the nature of which is unchanged and which are recognised as being present in the ornaments etc., are the causes of the effects like the ornaments etc.,⁴¹ Even in the case of the seeds etc., where the

destruction of the form is seen, it is not the prior state (i.e. seed), which is being destroyed, that is regarded to be the cause of the later state (i.e. sprout), but it is the very component parts of the seed, which constitute the essential nature of the seed and which continue to inher in the effect (i.e. the sprout), that are regarded to be the cause of the sprout.⁴² The position, therefore, that something existent emerges out of what is non-existent or void is untenable and inadmissible, for, as seen above, it violates the very law of the existence of order in human life. To sum up: Existence cannot come out of non-existence. And the cause can never be non-existent (asat), changing and perishable as Buddhists contend, but on the other hand, it must be existent or real, unchanging, and imperishable or eternal.

(ii) Asat-kārya-vāda of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas: According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, the cause is real and it invariably precedes the effect.⁴³ But they maintain that the effect is non-existent (asat) in the cause prior to its actual production.⁴⁴ The effect, according to them, is altogether a new product and is totally absent in its cause. That is, the effect does not exist in any form in the cause prior to its production. For instance, when the threads are woven in a specific manner, a new entity, namely, the cloth

comes into being. In fact, in this theory, the cloth begins to exist only when it is produced. In this way, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, the effect is not pre-existent in the cause and it is produced de novo. Therefore, they consider the effect to be entirely different from the cause. Even though the effect is entirely different from the cause, yet it is connected with the latter by an inseparable relation known as samavāya (inherence).^{44a} This theory is also known as 'śrabbha-vāda'.

Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas argue that if the effect is pre-existent in the cause, then what is the necessity of causal operation (kāraṇa-vyāpāra)? If the pot already exists in the clay, there is no need of any exertion for making the pot. It may be argued that the causal operation is required for the modification of the cause into the form of an effect. But in that case it should be admitted that the effect possesses some novel characteristics which were absent in the cause. This means that the effect was not entirely there in the cause. And this is exactly what the asat-kārya-vādin wants.

But Advaitins refute this view, because it involves many difficulties. It is observed that specific causes such as clay, gold, and milk give rise to specific effects

such as pot, ornament, and curds. Any cause cannot produce any effect. If the effect were non-existent (asat) everywhere prior to its production, why should pot be produced from clay and not from milk?⁴⁵ But one who wants to obtain a pot invariably makes use of clay and not the milk. This shows that the effect does exist in the cause in some form prior to its production. Asat-kārya-vādin may now argue that the specific cause is used to get specific effect, not because the effect is pre-existent in the cause, but because the specific causal substance has some capacity (śakti) in it to regulate specific effect. That is why a man who wants to obtain a pot uses clay only and not anything else, because clay alone has the capacity to produce a pot. But in that case the whole edifice of the asat-kārya-vāda will collapse, for the assumption of some capacity in the cause to produce specific effect means that the effect potentially resides in the cause prior to its origination.⁴⁶ This is exactly what the asat-kārya-vādin wants to avoid, which he cannot on the above assumption.

As stated already, the Hyāya-Vaiśeṣikas hold the cause and effect to be totally different from each other. But this view does not hold good. Because as a matter of fact the effect is perceived only when the cause exists

there and not otherwise. For instance, a pot is perceived only when clay is there or a cloth is perceived only when threads are there. If the cause and effect are different just as the cow and horse are different, then the two i.e. the cause and effect need not be found invariably together. Verily, a horse which is totally distinct from a cow, is not invariably found only where a cow exists.⁴⁷ Therefore, it is necessary to admit an identity of essence (tādātmya) between the cause and the effect.

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas may try to consolidate their position by saying that though the cause and the effect are different, owing to the intimate relation of samavāya, the effect is invariably perceived only when the cause exists there. But Advaitins say that this is not a sound argument. Because the concept of samavāya itself is a pseudo one. It is not a logically viewed concept. For if it is accepted that the 'samavāya' relation requires another 'samavāya' to join itself with the cause and a third 'samavāya' to join the second 'samavāya' with the first samavāya and so on, then it will definitely lead to the fallacy of infinite regress (anavasthā). If, on the other hand, it is held that the samavāya is not connected to the cause by any relation, then the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas are forced to abandon their assumption of 'samavāya'.⁴⁸

In this way, the sat-kārya-vāda of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika is also untenable.

(iii) Sat-kārya-vāda of Sāṃkhya: The Sāṃkhya advocates the view of sat-kārya-vāda or parināma-vāda. According to this view, the effect is pre-existent in the cause in a latent state prior to its creation.⁴⁹ That is, the effect is potentially present in the cause before it is actually produced. In other words, the cause is nothing but a potent effect. The effect cannot be held to be non-existent prior to its creation, because what is non-existent (asat) can never be brought into existence by the operation of the cause. If the effect were really non-existent in the cause, then, when the effect is produced, it would mean that something comes out of nothing or non-existent, which, as seen already, is an absurdity. Therefore, it should be admitted that the effect is potentially present in the cause before it is produced. For instance, clay can be turned into a pot only because the pot potentially exists in it. Otherwise, if the pot were really non-existent in its cause, namely clay, then there is no hope of turning clay into pot even by the effort made by a thousand potters. Hence pot must be pre-existent in clay in a latent condition. So far as the effect is thus pre-existent in the cause, the two are not different, but essentially identical with each other.

According to the sat-kārya-vāda, the effect is not entirely a new creation as Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas maintain. But the cause itself modifies into the form of the effect when certain conditions are fulfilled. The pot, which exists unmanifest (avyakta) in its cause, namely clay, becomes manifest (vyakta) by the causal operation. The operation of the causal agencies thus only helps to determine the particular form, which the cause will take. Clay can take different forms such as pot, pitcher etc. But by merely appearing in a different form or aspect, a thing, as such, does not become altogether a different thing. For instance, a tortoise, when its limbs are withdrawn, does not become altogether a different thing at the time when its limbs are stretched outside. Similarly, the modification of the cause into the form of an effect does not bring about any distinction in the essential nature of the two. As far as the essential nature is concerned, there is absolutely no difference between the cause and the effect. In fact, the cause and effect are two aspects of one and the same entity. Therefore, even in the sat-kārya-vāda the causal operation (kāraṇa-vyāpāra) is meaningful as it is necessary to arrange the causal substance into the form of the effect. In this way, the sat-kārya-vāda of the Sāṃkhya is quite the opposite of the asat-kārya-vāda of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas.

The sat-kārya-vāda of the Sāṅkhyas comes nearer the Advaitic view of the Vivarta-vāda. Because Advaitins also, as for the Sāṅkhyas, accept that the effect is pre-existent in the cause in a latent condition before it is actually produced, and thus in the view of Advaita the cause and the effect are non-different. But the Sāṅkhyas philosophers maintain that the effect is a transformation of the cause and that this transformation (pariṇāma) is a real process. That is, according to the Sāṅkhyas, the cause is actually transformed into the effect on the fulfilment of certain conditions. Clay gets really changed into the pot, when the causal agencies work upon it. In this way, in the view of the Sāṅkhyas, effectuation is transformation and this transformation is a complete change of cause into the effect.

But Advaitins do not admit the above view of the Sāṅkhyas that there is a real transformation of the cause into the effect. For if in the transformation process the cause gets really changed into the effect, then the effect will be really different from the cause. If the effect really differs from the cause, then it is not intelligible to hold that the effect is pre-existent in the cause. And in that case the spirit of the sat-kārya-vāda will be lost. Advaitins, therefore, arrive at a

conclusion that the effect is merely an appearance (vivarta) of the cause. Just as the rope appears as the snake, so the cause appears as the effect. The rope-snake is only an illusory appearance, and hence is not ultimately real. Similarly, the effect is also ultimately false. The cause appearing as the effect does not imply a real change, but it only implies an apparent change of the cause into the effect. Therefore, in the process the cause remains unaffected. Just as the rope-snake has no existence of its own independently of its substratum i.e., the rope, so, the effect has no existence of its own apart from the cause. Really speaking, the cause alone has the real existence and the effect only 'appears' to exist. The effects such as pot, pitcher, etc. are merely appearances or manifestations of their cause, namely clay, and hence they are not real. Clay alone is real. This is known as the vivarta-vāda according to which the cause gives rise to the effect without itself undergoing any change. While the Sāṅkhya treat both the cause and the effect to be real, for, according to them, the effect is the real transformation of the cause, Advaitins assign reality to the cause alone and treat the effect to be unreal (mithyā). Therefore, the Advaitic view of causation can also be called 'sat-kāraṇa-vāda'.

This view has got its solid support in the Upanishads. The Chāndogya-Upanishad, for instance, after having declared the knowledge of every thing else i.e. the effects, by knowing one thing i.e. the cause, cites an illustration - "By knowing one lump of clay everything that is made of clay becomes known. Clay alone is real, and its modifications are names only; they exist through speech only."⁵⁰ This text suggests that the effects such as pot, etc. have no existence of their own as apart from clay, and hence they are not real and that clay alone is real.⁵¹ The above is an illustration used for Brahman. From this it follows that the entire mass of the created objects i.e. the world of names and forms has no existence of its own apart from Brahman.⁵² It is not real but is only illusory. It has no independent existence, but has only a borrowed existence derived from its cause i.e. Brahman. If the world had independent existence apart from Brahman, then, there arises the dualism, and in that case it is impossible to know everything else i.e. the world by knowing one thing i.e. Brahman.⁵³ Therefore, Advaitins conclude that Brahman alone exists independently, and the world only appears to exist. This is the final conclusion of Advaitins. And this is exactly what Śaṅkara seeks to establish in his commentary on the Ārādhana-sūtra.⁵⁴ Because on this view alone the absolute nature of Brahman i.e. the non-duality

and the immutability can be reasonably maintained. As seen already, even though the world is ultimately false, yet it is real till the dawn of the Brahman-realisation. Hence, it is also conducive to our day to day activities at the empirical plane.

It should be noted in this context that even though Advaitins establish the 'Vivarta-vāda' as their final view, yet they accept 'pariṇāma-vāda' from the empirical standpoint. 'Pariṇāma' implies that both the cause and the effect have the same amount of reality.⁵⁵ Curd is the transformation of the milk. Both of them are empirically real. But 'vivarta' means that the cause and the effect have different kinds of reality.⁵⁶ In the instance of rope-snake illusion, snake is the transfiguration of the rope. Both of them do not have the same kind of reality. For, the rope is empirically real, whereas the snake is phenomenally real. Now, Brahman and the world do not have the same kind of reality. Because Brahman is transcendently real (pāramārthika-satya), whereas the world is empirically real (vyāvahārika-satya). Therefore, the world is not the 'pariṇāma' of Brahman, but is the 'vivarta' of Brahman. The world, which is empirically real, can be the 'pariṇāma' of an empirical entity alone. Hence, the world is the 'pariṇāma' of empirical māyā or avidyā, which



is spoken of in the Upanigads as the primal cause of the world (prahṛti).⁵⁷ In this way, the world is said to be the transfiguration of Brahman and the transformation of māyā. Therefore, Advaitins say that Brahman is the transfigurative material cause (vivartopādāna) of the world and māyā is the transformative material cause (pariṇāmyopādāna) of the world. But, since māyā is dependent on Brahman, Brahman alone is to be regarded as the ultimate ground of this world. As Dharmarājadhvarīndra rightly points out, material causality in case of Brahman consists in being either the substrate of the superimposition of the world or the substrate of māyā which is transformed in the form of the world.⁵⁸ And it is in this sense of underlying reality that Brahman is called both the material as well as the efficient cause of the world. Being the support of māyā, which has transformed into the world-appearance, Brahman is called the material cause, and being the support of māyā in all its various modifications such as will, activity, etc., which are required for the creation, Brahman is at the same time regarded as the efficient cause.⁵⁹

d) Brahman with Māyā or Avidyā is the Material Cause

Brahman, the transcendental reality, is essentially non-dual and free from all kinds of attributes. Hence,

from the transcendental point of view, the category of cause cannot be applied to Brahman. Therefore, according to Advaita, Brahman in conjunction with māyā or avidyā alone and not the pure Brahman is the material cause of the world from the empirical viewpoint. Māyā or avidyā is the limiting adjunct (upādhi) of Brahman. It is only in conjunction with this upādhi of avidyā that Brahman is spoken of as the cause of origination, maintenance, and the dissolution of the world.^{59a} In its real aspect, however, Brahman remains beyond all phenomenal actions. Vācaspatiśāra, in his Bhāṣatī, says that just as the snake in the rope-snake illusion has for its material cause, the rope in conjunction with the ignorance of the rope; so, the world has for its material cause, Brahman in conjunction withnescience (avidyā). And just as the rope-snake exists if the rope exists and is absorbed in the rope itself, even so, the world exists in Brahman alone and is absorbed in that alone.⁶⁰ In this way, according to Advaita, Brahman is not alone the material cause (pradhāna-kāraṇa) of the world, but Brahman-with-avidyā is the material cause.

Even though all the Advaitins admit that Brahman in conjunction with avidyā is the source of the world, yet the various preceptors of the post-Śaṅkara Advaita hold

different views regarding the nature of the causality in the case of avidyā in bringing about the world-appearance. Thus, according to Surobhara⁶¹ and his disciple Sarvajñātmā,⁶² māyā or avidyā is only an intermediate cause (dyāva-kāraṇa). Avidyā is the medium, through which one Brahman appears as the manifold world. According to this tradition, Brahman alone is the real cause underlying all appearances. But no appearance can be possible without this avidyā. Therefore, avidyā is only an instrument in bringing about the world-appearance.

Vācaspatiśiṣya considers avidyā to be only a helping factor (sahakāri-chāraṇa) of Brahman in the creation of the world-appearance. That is, avidyā is co-existent with Brahman as an accessory. And it is through the operation of this avidyā that the creation of the world-appearance is possible. In the opening verse of Śrīmatī, Vācaspati says that the world is a false appearance of Brahman associated with indefinable two-fold avidyā.⁶³ Thus, in the view of Vācaspati, avidyā assists Brahman in bringing about the world-appearance.

Prakāśātman explains the joint causality of Brahman and māyā in three ways.⁶⁴ Just as two strands conjoined together constitute a rope, so Brahman and māyā are together

the joint cause of the world. Or Brahman with māyā as its power (śakti) is the cause of the world. Or Brahman being the support of māyā which is the material cause, is indirectly the cause of the world. It follows from this that Prakāśātman concedes equal primacy to both Brahman and māyā in bringing about the world-appearance.

In this way, we come across three divergent views in the post-Śaṅkara Advaita regarding the nature of causality in respect of avidyā. While according to the tradition of Surośvara-Sarvajñātman, avidyā is only intermediate cause (dvāra-kāraṇa), according to the Vācaspati's tradition, avidyā is a helping factor (sahakāri-kāraṇa) of Brahman. In these two traditions avidyā is subordinated to Brahman in causing the world-appearance. But in the Vivaraṇa tradition of Prakāśātman, Brahman and avidyā are given equal primacy. But all these traditions agree to the point that the ultimate causality belongs to Brahman alone, because avidyā is also dependent upon Brahman only. To sum up: According to Advaita, even though the category of cause cannot be applied to Brahman from the transcendental view-point, yet from the empirical view-point Brahman associated with avidyā is viewed as the source of this world. Avidyā, which is inert, cannot by itself be the cause of the world. Nor can Brahman of the nature of immutable pure consciousness

be said to be the cause single-handed. Thus neither Brahman alone nor avidyā alone can be the cause. But Brahman in conjunction with avidyā is the cause of this world-appearance.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. "For the present we merely note that the foregoing account shows how mistaken is the common belief that Śaṅkara views the objects of every-day experience to be false or unreal. So far from doing this, he claims some kind of reality even for objects of illusion. To be perceived^{is} for him 'to be', and his theory may therefore^{be} described as an inversion of the one associated in western philosophy with the name of Berkeley".

M. Hiriyama, Outlines of Indian Philosophy, p. 351.

2. यदा त्रिविधं सत्त्वं- पारमार्थिकं सत्त्वं ब्रह्मणः, व्यावहारिकं सत्त्वं आकाशादेः, प्रातिभासिकं सत्त्वं गुणितरजतादेः ।
VP. II. p. 60.

CE. तत्र कालमयावाच्यत्वं पारमार्थिकसत्त्वं, संसारदशायां उपाध्यत्वं व्यावहारिकसत्त्वं प्रतिमाकालावाच्यत्वं प्रातिभासिकसत्त्वम् ।
Anandāśā's Madhvasāhita on VP. II. p. 115.

3. Śaṅkara has summarised the arguments of the Viśiṣṭa-vāda-Buddhists in this regard in the pūrvopākṣa portion of the Abhāvādhikaraṇa under the Bṛ. Sū. II. 11. 28.
4. न स्वभावो बाह्यस्वार्थस्याध्यतस्तुं शक्यते । कस्मात् ? उपलब्धेः । उपलब्धेः हि प्रतिप्रत्ययं बाह्योऽर्थः - साम्मः, कुड्यं यदः पट इति । न चोपलब्धमानस्येवाभावो भवितुमर्हति ।
Bṛ. II. 11. 28 pp. 547-548.

5. यथा हि कश्चिद् भुञ्जानो भुजिताद्यायां तुष्टौ
स्वयमुपलभमानायां स्वं भुषाम्नाहं भुञ्जे न वा तुष्यामीति,
तददिनिद्रयतेनिकर्षेण स्वयमुपलभमान स्व बाह्यमर्थं
नाहमुपलभे न च तौऽस्तीति युक्तं कथमुपादेयवचनः स्यात् ।
Op. cit. II. 11. 28 p. 548.
6. यत् उपलब्धिव्यतिरेकोऽपि कलादर्थस्याभ्युपगन्तव्यः
उपलब्धेरेव । न हि कश्चिदुपलब्धिरप्येव स्तम्भः कुदर्थं
चैत्युपलभते । उपलब्धिविषयत्वेन तु त्ताम्भुडयादीन्
सर्वे लौकिका उपलभन्ते ।
Ibid.
7. उत्तरेष्वेव सर्वे लौकिका उपलभन्ते यत्प्रत्याचक्षणा अपि
बाह्यमर्थमवधारयते यवन्तर्ह्यस्यैव तद्वर्तिदवभासत इति ।
तेऽपि सर्वलोकप्रसिद्धां बहिरवभासमानां लक्षितं प्रतिलभमानाः
प्रत्याख्यातुमाशय बाह्यमर्थं । बहिर्यदिति वक्तारं कुर्वन्ति ।
इतरथा हि कस्माद् बहिर्यदिति ब्रूयुः । न हि विष्णुभिर्भो
बन्ध्यापुत्रदवभासत इति कश्चिदावधीत । तस्माद्व्यानुम्यं
तत्प्रामाण्यमुपगच्छदिभ्यहिरवभावमासत इति युक्तमभ्युपगन्तुं शक्नु
बहिर्यदवभासत इति ।
Ibid.
8. यदि प्रत्यायादीनामन्यतमेनापि प्रमाणेनोपलभ्यते
तत्संभवति । यत्तु न केनचिदपि प्रमाणेनोपलभ्यते तन्न संभवति ।
इह तु यथासर्वं सर्वेषु प्रमाणैः बाह्योऽर्थ उपलभ्यमानः कथं
व्यतिरेकाव्यतिरेकादिविज्ञेयैर्न संभवतीत्युच्येतीमतव्येरेव ।
Op. cit. II. 11. 28, p. 549.
9. न च ज्ञानस्य विषयतारूप्याद्विषयनाशो भवति, उतति
विषये विषयतारूप्यानुमपत्तेः, बहिरुपलब्धेरेव । विषयस्य ।
Ibid.

10. उत स्व तदोपलम्भनियमोऽपि प्रत्ययविषयोऽस्वागोपेय-
मापहेतुः नामेदहेतुः इत्यनुपगन्तव्यम् ।

Ibid.

11. यथा चापुष्पव्यत्यस्य आलोकोपलम्भनियमोऽपि
नालोकाभेदः, तथा अर्थस्य न ज्ञानाभेदः, भेदेऽपि
ग्राह्यग्राह्यभावेन नियमोपपत्तेः ।

Covindānanda's Ratnaprabhā on BIB II.11.28, p.552.

12. न स्वप्नादिप्रत्ययवजाग्रतप्रत्यया भवितुमर्हन्ति ।
कृणात् वैधर्म्यम् । वैधर्म्यं हि भवति स्वप्नजागरितयोः ।
किं पुनर्वैधर्म्यम् ? बाधाबाधाविति द्वयः । बाध्यते हि
स्वप्नोपलब्ध्यं वस्तु प्रतिषेद्धस्य मिथ्या ज्योपलब्ध्यो महाजनसमागम
कृति, न ह्यस्ति सम महाजनसमागमो निद्रातर्जनं तु ते मनो बभूव
तेनैवा भ्रान्तिस्त्वभ्येति । एवं गागादिष्वपि भवति यथायर्थं
बाधः । नैव जागरितोपलब्ध्यं वस्तु तन्मादिर्दृष्ट्या विदध्यस्थायं
बाध्यते ।

BIB II.11.29, p.553.

13. छिन्न प्रमाणोऽनुभव उपलब्धिः यथा, अप्रमाणं स्वप्नज्ञानं
दृष्टान्तं इति वैधर्म्यन्तरम् ।

Covindānanda's Ratnaprabhā on BIB II.11.29, p.555

14. अपि च स्मृतिरेषा परस्वप्नदर्शनम् । उपलब्ध्यस्तु जागरितदर्शनम् ।
स्मृत्युपलब्ध्योरप्यप्रत्ययमन्तरं स्वयमनुभूयते उर्थपिप्रयोगसंप्रयोगात्कमिष्टं
पुनं स्मरामि, नोपलब्धे, उपलब्ध्युपलब्धोतीति ।

Op-Stt II.11.29, pp.555-556.

15. तथैव तति न शक्यते वस्तु मिथ्या जागरितोपलब्धिः उपलब्धत्वात्
स्वप्नोपलब्ध्यस्य इति उभयोरन्तरं स्वयमनुभूयता । न च स्वादुभवापत्ताप
प्राप्त्यानिमिः युवतः कर्तुम् ।

Ibid.

16. न भावो वासनानामुपपद्यते त्वत्पक्षे अनुमलब्धेः बाह्यानामर्थानाम् ।
अर्थोपलब्धिनिमित्ता हि प्रत्यर्थं नानास्या वासना भवन्ति
अनुपलम्बमानेषु त्वर्थेषु किंनिमित्ताः विविक्ता वासना भवेयुः ।
BSS II. 11. 30, p. 556.
17. सर्वव्यवहाराणामेव प्राग्ग्रहमात्मताविधानास्तत्त्वत्वोपपत्तेः,
स्वप्नव्यवहारस्यैव प्राग्प्रबोधात् । यावद्वि न सत्यात्मेकात्मप्रतिपत्तिः
तावत्प्रमाणप्रमेयत्वेषु विकारेषु अकृतबुद्धिर्न कस्यचिदुपपद्यते ।
विकारानि त्वहं श्रोत्रविषया आत्मारम्भीयेन भावेन सर्वे बन्तुः
प्रतिपद्यते स्वामादिर्ही प्रहमात्मतां हित्वा । तस्यात्प्राग्ग्रहमात्मता-
प्रतिबोधादुपपन्नः सर्वो लौकिको वैदिकश्च व्यवहारः । यथा
सुप्तस्य प्राकृतस्य जनस्य स्वप्न उद्यातवान् भावान् पश्यतो निश्चित्यैव
प्रत्यक्षाभिप्रायं विधानं भवति प्राग्प्रबोधात्, न च प्रत्यक्षाभावाभिम्याय-
स्तात्काशे भवति, तद्वत् ।
Op.cit. II. 1. 14, p. 458.
18. ८२. तस्य नय अवस्थास्त्रयः स्वप्ना प्रकाशवत्त्वोऽप्यमावत्त्वोऽप्यमावत्त्व
इति ।
Alt. Up. III. 12.
19. ननु वागरितं प्रबोध्यतावान्न स्वप्नः । नैमम्, स्वप्न एव । कथम् ?
परमार्थत्वात्प्रबोधाभावात् स्वप्नवत्त्ववस्तुवर्गनात् ।
Saṅkara's commentary on the Alt. Up. III. 12.
20. Dr. S. Radhakrishnan, Foreword to Dr. S. M. S. Chari's
Advaita and Viśiṣṭādvaita, p. xii.
21. BSS. I. iv. 23-27.
22. प्रकृतिस्य उपादानकारणं च प्रहमाभ्युपगन्तव्यं निमित्तकारणं च ।
न हेतुर्न निमित्तकारणमेव । ... सर्वं प्रतिष्ठापुष्टान्तो जीतो नोपस्यते ।
BSS. I. iv. 23, p. 429.

23. "उत तन्मादेशमप्राप्त्यो येनाहर्तुं कुतः स्यात्तद्वत्
मात्रमविहारी विज्ञातम् ।"
Chā. Up. VI. 1. 2.

24. तत्र चैकेन विज्ञातेन सर्वमन्यद्विज्ञातमपि विज्ञातं भवतीति प्रतीयते ।
तद्योपादानकारणविज्ञाने सर्वविज्ञानं सम्भवति उपादानकारणाव्यतिरेक-
त्कार्यस्य । निमित्तकारणाव्यतिरेकस्तु कार्यस्य नास्ति, ततो तल्लः
प्राप्तादव्यतिरेकदर्शनात् ।

BSB. I. iv. 23, p. 425.

cf. Vasopacimibho remarks -

"प्रतिष्ठादुष्टान्तावाक्ययोस्त्यदेतपरत्वात् उपादानकारणात्मकत्वाद्योपादेयस्य
कार्यजातस्योपादानकारणानेन तज्ज्ञानोपपत्तौः । निमित्तकारणं तु वायदित्यन्त-
भिन्नमिति न तज्ज्ञाने कार्यज्ञानं भवति ।"

BSB. I. iv. 23, p. 426.

25. दुष्टान्तोऽपि - "यथा लोम्येकेन मृत्पिण्डेन सर्वं
मुन्मथं विहारी स्याद् वायारम्भेण विहारी नामधेयं
मृत्पिण्डेत्येव सत्यम्" [उ. 6. 1. 4] इत्युपादानकारणोपर
एव आम्नायते ।

BSB. I. iv. 23, p. 425.

26. सर्वं यथासर्वं प्रतिवेदान्तं प्रतिष्ठादुष्टान्तो
प्रकृतित्वसाधनो प्रत्येत्यधी ।

Ibid.

27. यतः प्रतीयं पञ्चमी "यतो वा इमानि भूतानि वायन्ते" इत्यत्र
"जनिर्गर्तुः प्रकृतिः" [पा. सू. 1. 4. 30.] इति विशेषस्मरणात्
प्रकृतित्वस्य स्वापादाने द्रष्टव्या ।

Ibid.

28. निमित्तस्य तु अधिष्ठात्रन्तरामावादधिगन्तव्यम् ।
यथा हि लोके मृत्पिण्डादिकं उपादानकारणं
कृताल्लुप्यकारादीनामधिष्ठातृन्येव प्रवर्तते न
ब्रह्मण उपादानकारणस्य सतोऽन्योऽधिष्ठातापेक्ष्योऽस्ति,
प्रागुत्पत्तिरेकमेवाद्वितीयमित्यवधारणात् ।

Op. cit. I. iv. 23, pp. 426-427.

29. अधिष्ठातरि ध्युपादानादन्यस्मिन्नभ्युपगम्यमाने
पुनरप्येकविधानेन तद्विधानस्यासंभवात् प्रतिष्ठादृष्टान्तोपरीय
स्य त्यागः ।
Op. cit. p. 427.
30. तस्मादधिष्ठातृन्तराभावादात्मनः कर्तृत्वं उपादानान्तराभावाच्च
प्रवृत्तित्वम् ।
Ibid.
31. तीक्ष्णमयत । बहु स्यात् प्रजायेयेति ।
Text Up. II. vi. 1. Cf. Chā. Up. VI. 11. 3.
32. Buddhists advocate the doctrine of momentariness,
according to which everything is destroyed in a
moment. Hence, they do not admit a cause, which
is stable and which continues to persist in its
effect. This definitely leads to the conclusion
that existence originates from non-existence.
33. दर्शयन्ति वामावाप् भावोत्पत्तिम्—“नानुपमृष्ट
प्रदुर्भावात्” इति ।
B3B. II. 11. 26, p. 539.
34. विनष्टादि किमधीषावह्युर उत्पद्यते, तथा विनष्टात्
धीरात् दधि, मुत्पिण्डाच्च घृतः ।
Ibid.
35. तस्मादभावगतोभ्यो तीक्षादिभ्योऽङ्कुरादीनामुत्पद्यमानत्वात्
उभावाद् भावोत्पत्तिरिति मन्यन्ते ।
Ibid.

36. *नाततोऽवृष्टत्वात् ।*
इ. ३५. ११. ११. २६.
37. यत्तत्त्वाद्भाव उत्पद्यते अभावत्वाविरोधात्
 कारणविरोधाभ्युपगमोऽनर्थकः स्यात् ।
ISS. 11. 11. 26, p. 539.
38. नहि बीजादीनामुपभूतानां योऽभावस्तस्याभावस्य
 श्लाघिषाण्दीनां च निःस्वभावत्वाविरोधादभावस्यै
 कश्चिद्विरोधोऽस्ति, येन बीजादेवाहुरो जायते
 बीजादेव दधीत्येवं जातीयकः कारणविरोधाभ्युपगमः
 अर्थवान् स्यात् ।
Ibid.
39. निर्विशेषस्य त्वभावस्य कारणत्वाभ्युपगमे श्लाघिषाणादिभ्योऽप्यहुरादयो
 जायेरन् । न धैर्यं दुष्यते ।
Ibid.
40. अभावाच्च भावोत्पत्तौ अभावान्वितमेव त्वं कार्यं स्यात् ।
 न धैर्यं दुष्यते । त्वस्य च वस्तुनः स्येन स्येन स्येन भावात्मन्युपपत्त्य-
 मानत्वात् ।
ISS. 11. 11. 26, p. 540.
41. त्विरस्यभावानामेव त्वणादीनां प्रत्यभिज्ञायमानानां
 स्वकादिकार्यकारणभाववर्जनात् ।
Ibid.
42. ऐश्वर्यं बीजादिषु स्वस्थोपमर्दं लभ्यते
 तैश्वर्यं नासादुमुपमाना पूर्वाविस्थोरतरायस्थायाः
 कारणभ्युपगमस्यते, अनुपमुपमानानामेवानुयायिनां
 बीजायवर्णनानामहुरादिकारण भावाभ्युपगमात् ।
Ibid.

43. कार्यनियतपूर्ववृत्ति कारणम् ।

Anantabhatta's Tarka-saṃgraha, Chapter I.

44. कार्यं प्रागभावप्रतियोगि ।

Ibid.

44 a. The doctrine of 'samavāya' is peculiar to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas. They regard samavāya to be an independent category. It is defined as nityasambandhaḥ samavāyah. And it is said to exist between the following five "avyakta-siddha" pairs -

"अयोर्दयोर्मध्य समविनयद्वयराश्रितमेवावतिष्ठते तावदुत्पत्तिः ।
यथावयवावयविनी गुणगुणिनी क्रियाक्रियावन्ती जातित्यज्योती
विशेषनिरवप्रज्ये धेति ।

45. दधिकृतत्वकार्थभिः प्रतिनियतानि कारणानि

धीरनृतिष्ठासुखमादीन्युपादीयमानानि तौळे दृश्यन्ते ।

नहि दध्यर्थभिः मूर्तिरूपोपादीयने न पदार्थभिः

धीरं तदसत्कार्यवादे नोपपद्यते । अविशिष्टे हि प्रागुत्पत्तेः

तत्रैव तत्त्वसत्त्वै कस्यासधीरादेव दध्युपपद्यते ? न मूर्तिरूपायाः ?

मूर्तिरूपाया स्व कृत् उत्पद्यते न धीरम् ।

Bṛh. II. 1. 18, p. 467.

46. अथाविशिष्टे हि प्रागसत्त्वै धीरे स्व दधनः कश्चिदतिशयो न

धीर इत्युच्येत, तद्व्यतिशयवत्तवात् प्रागवस्थायाः असत्कार्यवादद्वयानिः

सत्कार्यवादसिद्धिश्च ।

Ibid.

47. भाव एव कारणस्य कार्यमुपलभ्यते, नामाये ।
तद्यथा तस्यां मृदि घट उपलभ्यते तत्सु च
तन्तुसु घट उपलभ्यते । नच नियमेन अन्यभावे
अन्यस्योपलब्धिर्भूयता, न्ह्यस्यो गौरन्यः तत्र
गोमय एव उपलभ्यते ।

BSP. II.1.15. p.463

48. तन्वापकल्पनायामपि सम्भावस्य सम्भावयिभिः
तैबन्धे अन्वयमभ्यगाने तस्य तस्यान्योन्यः संबन्धः
कल्पयितव्यः कल्पनप्रत्याप्रसङ्गः अन्वयमभ्यगाने च
विरुद्धप्रसङ्गः ।

Op.cit. II.1.18, p.468.

49. Īśvarakṛpṇa, in his famous work Saṅkhyā-kārikā,
adduces five arguments in support of the 'sat-kārya-
vāda' in the following kārikā -

अव्यक्तात् उपादानादव्यक्तात्, सर्वतन्माभावात् ।

अव्यक्तस्य अव्यक्तात्, कारणभावाच्च, तत् कार्यम् ॥

Commenting upon this kārikā, Vācaspatiśiṣṛa, in his
Saṅkhyā-tattva-kauṇḍīyī, discusses at length the
Saṅkhyā-view, of 'sat-kārya-vāda'.

50. यथा तौम्यैकेन मृत्पिण्डेन सर्वं मृन्मयं विकृतं
स्यादायारम्भो विकारो नामैकं मृत्पिण्डेत्येव सत्यम् ।

Chā. Op. VI.1.1.

51. ननु वस्तुपूर्वत्वेन विकारो नाम कश्चिदस्ति, नागधीपयात्रं
इत्येतदनु मृत्पिण्डेत्येव सत्यमिति ।

BSP. II.1.14, p.454.

52. तत्र कृताद् वाचारम्भणाद्याद्दाष्टान्तिर्न ऽपि
ब्रह्मव्यतिरेकेण कार्यजातस्य उभाव इति गम्यते ।
Ibid.
53. न धान्यैकविज्ञानेन सर्वविज्ञानं रस्यते ।
Op.cit. p.455.
54. Cf. B39. II. 1. 14-20.
55. परिणामो नाम उपादानसप्तताकार्यापत्तिः ।
VP. I. p. 37.
56. विवर्तो नाम उपादानविष्मत्तत्ताकार्यापत्तिः ।
Ibid.
57. सायां तु प्रकृतिं विद्यान्मायिनं तु महेश्वरम् ।
Sya. Up. IV. 10.
58. उपादानत्वं य जगदध्यासाधिकान्तत्वं
जगदाकारेण परिणामान्मायायाधिकान्तत्वं वा ।
VP. VIII. p. 117.
59. सक्त्यैव अवियोगहितत्वेन उपादानत्वस्य अविनापरिणामे-
च्छादुत्पादाद्यत्वेन निमित्तत्वात्प्रापि संभवात् । AS. II. p. 789.
- 59 a. अ वावश्यामुपमन्तव्या । अर्थवती हि ता । नहि
तथा विना परमेश्वरस्य स्रष्टृत्वं तिष्ठति ।
शक्तिरहितास्य तस्य प्रसृत्यनुपपत्तेः ।
BSP. I. IV. 3, p. 377.

60. यथा रज्ज्विज्ञानादितरज्ज्भादाना धारा रज्ज्वां तस्यामस्ति,
रज्ज्वाश्वे च लीयते, एवमविद्यातद्विब्रह्मोपदानं जगत् प्रहस्यैव
अस्ति, तस्यैव च लीयते इति सिद्धम् ।

Bhā. 1.1.2, p.95.

61. अविज्ञातं परं तत्त्वं जन्माकारणं कुतो ।
आन्त्यात्कार्यात्तदेव स्यात्तत्त्वकार्यविशेषम् ॥

BUBV. 1.1v.15.

CE. Anandagiri's remarks on the above śloka -

"यद्यपि परिशुद्धं ब्रह्म जगतो मूलकारणं तथापि तत्र
अज्ञानं दारिभ्यति । अन्यथा कृत्यान्वयादयस्य
तत्त्वयोगादिति भावः ।"

CE. BUBV. 1. 1v.371.

62. तामात्मैतदुपजीव्य विद्वद्वितीया
संसारकारणमिति प्रवदन्ति धीराः ।
तामात्मैतदिति संसृतिकारणत्वे
द्वारं परं ममति कारणता दमास्तु ॥

Śū. 1.323. CE. Śū. 1.332.

63. अनिर्वाच्याविद्यादित्यतविवस्व प्रभवतो
विवर्तं यत्यैते विद्वदन्मिसेजोऽनवयः ।

Bhā. Introductory verso 1.

CE. "ब्रह्मैवेतिनाथनिर्वाच्याविद्यातविवर्तं
जगदुपादानम्"

Op.Cit. 1.1.5, p.167.

64. त्रैविध्यमत्र संभवति- रज्ज्वाः संयुक्तसूत्रद्वयवत्
मायाविशिष्टं ब्रह्म कारणमिति वा "देवात्मनाञ्जितं
स्तुष्टुर्निगूढा" इति कुतः मायाशक्तिमत् ब्रह्म
कारणमिति वा, जगदुपादानमायातयात्रा ब्रह्म
कारणमिति वेति ।

BEV. Var.V. p.652.

CHAPTER V

THE NATURE OF THE INDIVIDUAL SOUL AND GOD (JIVA AND ISVRA)

a) Preliminary remarks

Advaitins advocate the doctrine of the absolute non-difference between the individual soul and Brahman. That is, according to Advaita, the so called individual soul is essentially none other than Brahman, the absolute reality (Jīvo Brahmaiva nāparah). The true individual soul is Brahman itself. This view of Advaita regarding the nature of individual soul is based upon the Upaniṣadic texts such as, "Thou art that" (Chā. Up. VI.viii.7),¹ "I am Brahman" (Bṛh. Up. I.iv.10),² "This self is Brahman" (Bṛh. Up. II.v.19)³ etc., which are considered to be the great sentences (mahāvākyas).

Since Brahman is partless (niravayava), the individual soul cannot be a part (śāśa) of Brahman. And since Brahman is immutable (kūṭastha), the individual soul cannot be a modification (vikāra) of Brahman. If the individual soul be regarded as either a part or a modification of Brahman, then Brahman ceases to be an eternal and unchangeable entity, the view which goes against the Upaniṣadic import. Nor can it be really different from Brahman, because there is nothing that is different from Brahman, the ultimate

reality, which is one only without a second (ekavyāvṛtīya).⁴ Nor can the individual soul be a substance (dṛavya) in the Nyāya sense of the term, substance⁵ possessing the qualities such as cognition, happiness, pain, desire, etc., since these qualities, according to Advaita, really belong to the internal organ⁶ and not to the individual soul, which in its essence is attributeless. Moreover, it should be noted that according to Advaita, knowledge is not a special attribute (viśeṣa-guṇa) of the individual soul as Naiyāyikas think, but it constitutes the very nature of the individual soul. In other words, the individual soul is not the substratum of knowledge (jñānādhikaraṇa), but essentially knowledge itself (jñāna-svarūpa).

Vīśiṣṭādvaitins equate the individual soul (jīvaātman) with the I-sense (aḥamārtha). According to them, I-sense itself is the true individual soul. But the Advaitins do not admit this equation of the individual soul and the I-sense, because the latter does not persist in the states of deep sleep and liberation.⁷ To explain: In the view of Advaita, the I-sense itself is not the true self, because the true individual self is an eternal spiritual entity, and what is eternal should persist in all the three divisions of time - past, present, and future. That, which appears at some time and disappears at some other time,

is not eternal. If the I-sense itself were the true individual self, then it should persist even in the states of deep sleep and liberation. But this is not the case, for the I-sense disappears in those states. In the state of deep sleep, however, the I-sense is merged in its root cause, namely avidyā. But in the state of liberation, the I-sense totally disappears, because its root cause i.e. avidyā, is completely annihilated in that state. If the I-sense were present in the state of liberation, it would follow that even in the state of liberation there is avidyā which is an absurdity. Advaitins, therefore, conclude that the I-sense is not the true self, but a complex of self and not-self. That is, the I-sense (ahamārtha) consists of two elements, namely the witness-consciousness (sākṣi-caitanya) and the ego (ahaṁkāra), a modification of the internal organ. Of these two elements, the former i.e. the witness-consciousness, which is none other than Brahman, alone persists in all the states including liberation. Hence, it alone is the true individual soul.⁸ In this way, according to Advaita, the true individual soul is non-different from Brahman.

b) Śaṅkara on the Relation between the Individual Soul and Brahman

Śaṅkara, in his commentary on the Vākyaṇyavādīkaraṇa,⁹

discusses three different views regarding the relation between the individual soul and Brahman, put forward by the ancient preceptors such as Āmarathya, Audulomi, and Kāśakṛtsna, referred to by Śādarāyaṇa in the Brahma-sūtra.¹⁰

Āmarathya advocates the doctrine of the difference-cum-non-difference (bhedābheda-yāda). Taking his stand on the Upaniṣadic texts which compare the relation between the individual soul and Brahman to that of sparks and fire, he maintains that the individual soul is both different and non-different from Brahman. The sparks issuing from a fire are not absolutely different from the fire, since they are of the nature of fire. Nor can the sparks be absolutely non-different from the fire, since in that case the distinction (vyāvṛtti) of those sparks either from the fire or from each other would not have been possible. Similarly, the individual souls, which are the modifications of Brahman, are neither absolutely different from Brahman, for in that case they would not be of the nature of consciousness (cidrūpa); nor are they absolutely non-different from Brahman, since in that case they would not be distinguishable from each other. In this way, according to Āmarathya, the individual souls are both different and non-different from Brahman.¹¹

According to Auṅgulomī, the individual soul bound by the limiting adjuncts of body, senses, and mind, is absolutely different from Brahman. But, through knowledge and meditation, that individual soul, being freed from those limiting adjuncts, becomes absolutely identical with Brahman. Thus, in the view of Auṅgulomī, there are two stages of the relation between the individual soul and Brahman. In the stage of bondage, there is absolute difference between them, while in the stage of liberation, there is perfect identity between the two, i.e. the individual soul and Brahman. It is owing to the possibility of this identity, which is to be or to become, that they are spoken of as identical even in the stage of bondage. But, till the attainment of liberation, the individual soul remains absolutely distinct from Brahman.¹²

Ācārya Rāṣakṛtana, on the other hand, maintains the absolute non-difference between the individual soul and Brahman. Taking his stand on the Upaniṣadic text, which declares- "I shall enter into (the body) as the individual soul and evolve names and forms" (Chā. Up. VI.11.2),¹³ he says that the Supreme Self or Brahman presents itself as the individual soul. The individual soul is neither different from Brahman nor a modification of it. Because, the scriptures in their account of the creation of the

elements such as fire, etc. from the Supreme Self do not speak about any special creation of the individual soul. Thus, in the opinion of Kāśakṛtsna, the Supreme Self or Brahman, unmodified in any way, is itself the individual soul.¹⁴

Śaṅkara accepts the view of Kāśakṛtsna. The remaining two views are not acceptable to him, because they do not accord with the final Upaniṣadic import. In the opinion of Ācārathya, even though the individual soul is not entirely different from Brahman, yet the two are not absolutely non-different. For according to him, since the individual soul is a modification of Brahman, there does exist a certain relation of cause and effect between Brahman and the individual soul. Hence, in this view, the individual soul is somehow different and somehow non-different from Brahman. And in the opinion of Aṇḍalomi, the difference and the non-difference between the individual soul and Brahman depend respectively on the state of bondage and release of the individual soul. In both these views the difference of the individual soul from Brahman is something real (tātyāika). But, this view goes against the Upaniṣadic texts, which declare the right knowledge alone to be the ultimate means of liberation. Liberation is nothing but the removal of difference between the

individual soul and Brahman and the attainment of the absolute identity with Brahman. Now, if the difference were real, it can never be removed by the right knowledge. Because knowledge removes what is illusory (kalpita), and not what is real. Hence, only if the difference is illusory, the right knowledge of Brahman, which is spoken of in the Upaniṣads as the sole means of liberation, removes that difference between the individual soul and Brahman, and consequently brings about the absolute identity of the two. Otherwise, if the difference were real, it is impossible to remove it by the right knowledge, and consequently the individual soul would never attain the absolute non-difference of Brahman.¹⁵ But this is not the case, for the Upaniṣads declare both the removal of difference and the attainment of the absolute non-difference, on the dawn of the right knowledge of Brahman. Hence it should be admitted that the non-difference between the individual soul and Brahman alone is ultimately real and difference is only illusory. The above difficulty will not arise in the view of Kāśakṛtana, for (he assigns reality to non-difference alone and not to difference too.

Here it may be pointed out that while according to Āṅgārathya and Aṅgulomī, the individual soul attains absolute identity with Brahman only at the time of liberation,

according to Kāśakṛtana, even now the individual soul is the Supreme Self or Brahman itself. Thus, in the view of Kāśakṛtana, the identity between the two does not depend on any particular state; on the other hand, this identity between the individual soul and Brahman is essential even in the state of bondage. This is exactly what the Upanisadic texts such as "That thou art" (Chā. Up. VI.viii.7) etc., seek to establish. Śaṅkara, therefore, says that of the three views mentioned above, only the one held by Kāśakṛtana is in accordance with the Scripture, because it agrees with what all the Vedānta texts teach.¹⁶

The Upaniṣads assert that the knowledge of the non-difference between the individual self and the Supreme Self leads to immortality.¹⁷ This holds good only on the view of Kāśakṛtana, for, according to him, the individual soul is essentially non-different from the Supreme Self i.e. Brahman. On the other hand, if the individual soul were of the nature of a modification as Āśmarathya thinks, then, since a modification of a substance loses itself on merging into its material cause, the assertion of the attainment of immortality through the knowledge would not become logical.¹⁸ Even the Upaniṣadic text^{18a} that speaks of the individual soul to be the abode of name and form should be understood in a figurative sense, for the abiding of

the name and form in the individual soul cannot be possible in the true sense, but the name and form really abide in the limiting adjuncts, which bring about the 'Jīvanhood' of the true Self.¹⁹ Similarly, when the Upaniṣads sometimes somewhere speak of the origination of the individual soul, illustrating it by the instance of the issuing of the sparks from fire, the origination should be understood to abide in the limiting adjuncts only.²⁰ It is the limiting adjuncts that are liable to origination and destruction. But really, the individual soul is neither created nor destroyed, for it is essentially one with Brahman, the absolute reality, which is unborn (aja) and immortal (amara).

c) Absolute non-difference and the apparent difference between the individual soul and Brahman :

As seen above, Śaṅkara accepts the view of Kāśakṛtana regarding the relation between the individual soul and Brahman, because it alone is in complete harmony with the final Upaniṣadic import. Thus, according to Śaṅkara also, the individual soul is not essentially different from Brahman. The individual soul, while being essentially Brahman alone, is described as the agent and the enjoyer as conditioned by limiting adjuncts such as the intellect, etc.²¹ Hence, the apparent difference between the

individual soul and Brahman is thus due to the limiting adjuncts, which are only the products of avidyā. The difference, therefore, between the two is not real but illusory from the absolute view-point.²² If the individual soul were really different from Brahman, then its becoming identical with the latter would not be possible. As Śaṅkara so aptly points out, one thing can never attain identity with another altogether different. In as much as the Upanisads speak of the knower of the Supreme Self or Brahman becoming Brahman, the knower i.e. the individual soul must be Brahman alone.²³

Here it should be remembered that even though Śaṅkara admits the essential non-difference (pāramārthika-abheda) between the individual soul and Brahman from the absolute view-point, yet he does not deny the difference between the two caused by the limiting adjuncts (aupādhika-bheda). Thus, Śaṅkara, in his commentary on the Ānandamayādhikaraṇa,²⁴ states that just as the ether, unlimited by any conditioning factor, is different from the ether delimited by such conditioning factors as a pot, etc., even so, the Supreme God i.e. Brahman is indeed different from the one (i.e. the individual soul) imagined through nescience to be embodied, the agent, the experiencer and called the cognitional self (viśvānātmā).²⁵ In the Antarādhikaraṇa,²⁶

he says that the individual soul, though as a matter of fact is the same as the Supreme Self, still mortality and fear are superimposed on the former i.e. the individual soul through nascence, desire, and action; and hence immortality (amṛtatva) and fearlessnessness (abhayatva) do not fit in with it.²⁷ In the Sarvatraśāśidhādīkaraṇa,²⁸ he says that there is necessarily a difference between the embodied soul and the Supreme Self. The one (i.e. jīva) is an agent, an experiencer of happiness and sorrow, a source of merit and demerit etc., while the other (i.e. Brahman) is just the opposite, being possessed of such qualities as freedom from sin (apahata-pāpmatva) and so on.²⁹ In the same Adhikaraṇa, Śaṅkara elsewhere says that the Supreme Self itself as delimited by the limiting adjuncts (such as body, senses, mind, intellect, etc.), is figuratively spoken of as embodied soul (śarīra) by the ignorant. And taking into consideration this difference with reference to the limiting adjuncts, treating the one i.e. the Supreme Self or Brahman as the object and the other i.e. the individual soul as the subject, is not contradictory, before the attainment of the right knowledge of Brahman.³⁰ From what has been stated so far, it is clear that Śaṅkara does admit a difference between the individual soul and Brahman caused by the limiting adjuncts (upādhi), even though he holds the view of essential non-difference

between the two, from the absolute view-point. To sum up: according to Śaṅkara the individual soul is essentially non-different from Brahman. Yet owing to the limiting adjuncts such as body, mind, etc., it appears to be different from the latter.

In order to account for the essential non-difference and the apparent difference between the individual soul and Brahman, the Supreme Self, Śaṅkara occasionally employs certain analogies such as the pot-delimited ether, the reflection of the sun in the water and the illusory manifestation of snake in the rope.

Śaṅkara uses the analogy of the pot-delimited ether in many places.³¹ Thus in the Sarvatrapresiddhādhikaraṇa, he says that just as the ether, though it is undivided, appears as if divided owing to such limiting adjuncts as pot, etc., even so, the Supreme Self itself, as delimited by the limiting adjuncts such as body, senses, mind, intellect, etc., is figuratively spoken of as the embodied soul by the ignorant.³² Here Śaṅkara treats the individual soul as the delimitation (avaccheda) of the Supreme Self by the limiting adjuncts such as mind, etc.

The analogy of reflection is also employed. In the

Uphaveliṅgādhikaraṇa.³³ he says that just as the luminous sun, though one in itself, becomes multifarious owing to its entry into water divided by different pots, similarly the self-luminous Self, though one, seems to be diversified owing to its entry into the different bodies constituting its limiting adjuncts. Or just as the same moon appears as many being reflected in water, so the universal soul, though one, is seen as many being present in all beings.³⁴ Śaṅkara, here suggests that the individual soul is a reflection (pratibimba) of the Supreme Self. He uses this analogy in the commentary of the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad also.³⁵

In Āśādhikaraṇa,³⁶ Śaṅkara declares that the individual soul is only a semblance (ābhāsa) of the Supreme Self like the semblance of the sun in water. The individual soul is neither the Supreme Self itself nor is it something else.³⁷ Here Śaṅkara suggests that the individual soul is only a false appearance of Brahman.

Now, on the basis of these analogies, there have emerged, in the post-Śaṅkara Advaita, divergent views over the way in which the individual soul is to be regarded. These views are - avaccheda-vāda (delimitation-theory), pratibimba-vāda (reflection-theory), and ābhāsa-vāda

(semblance-theory), maintained and developed by Vācaspati-
miśra, Prakāśātman, and Sureśvara respectively. These
three views are successively elaborated in the following
section.

(1) Avaccheda-vāda (Delimitation-Theory):

Vācaspatimiśra, the chief exponent of the Dharmatī-
school, advocates the theory of delimitation. According
to this theory, the individual soul is neither a reflec-
tion nor a false semblance, but only a delimited entity.
That is, the individual soul is nothing but the apparent
delimitation of the unlimited (Absolute Reality i.e.
Brahman by avidyā and its products.

This theory is sought to be explained on the analogy
of the pot-defined ether: Ether is an unlimited and all-
pervading entity. But due to different limiting adjuncts
such as pot, room, etc., it comes to be perceived as
enclosed finite portions of the etheric space such as
'ghaṭākāśa', 'māṭhākāśa' etc. of various dimensions and
descriptions. Similarly Brahman, the Absolute Reality,
is unlimited and all-pervasive. But on account of different
limiting adjuncts i.e. avidyā and its products such as
mind, intellect, etc., it is misconceived as the finite
embodied souls of various kinds.³⁸ The Supreme Self is

essentially unconditioned and free from all kinds of attributes. But having attained to the state of *jīva*, being apparently conditioned by mind, body, etc., imagined by nescience, it appears to be different and finite and is spoken of as an agent and an enjoyer; just as the undivided ether appears as different and possessing diverse attributes, owing to different limiting adjuncts such as pot, etc.³⁹

The pot-defined ether is not different from the unlimited ether. But it appears to be different so long as the pot persists. Similarly, the individual soul imagined by inexplicable *avidyā*, is not really different from Brahman. Yet it appears to be different so long as the limiting adjuncts are not annihilated by the right knowledge. And just as the pot-defined ether appears to be originated and subjugated with the origination and the subjugation of the pot; so, the individual soul also appears as if originated and subjugated due to the origination and the subjugation of the limiting adjuncts.⁴⁰ But the individual soul is immortal and unchangeable, being essentially one with Brahman. When the pot, etc., which bring about limitations in the unlimited ether, are removed, the etheric space delimited by pot etc., become merged into the one cosmic ether. Even so, when the

limiting adjuncts i.e. avidyā and its products such as mind, etc. are removed, the individual souls become one with Brahman.⁴¹ Just as the dust and the vapour contained in a pot do not affect the essential nature of the ether, so, too, the individual pleasures and pains do not really affect the essential nature of Brahman. Brahman remains unaffected and untainted, even when it is conditioned by the limiting adjuncts, which are only imagined by the indeterminable avidyā. And, just as, dust and smoke associated with the etheric space delimited by one pot do not affect the other parts of the ether; even so, pleasure or pain of the individual soul do not affect the other individual souls. In this way, Vācaspatiniśra explains the individual soul in terms of the apparent delimitation of the unlimited Brahman by avidyā and its products, by comparing it to the etheric space delimited by pot. According to him, the inner self (pratyagātman), which is identical with Brahman, itself, as delimited by the internal organ, etc. is called the individual soul.⁴²

Vācaspatiniśra holds the theory that the individual soul is the locus of avidyā and that there exists a plurality of avidyā. According to him, avidyā rests on jīva and each jīva possesses its own particular avidyā. Hence, liberation, on this view, consists in the annihilation

of avidyā of that particular individual soul. Therefore, even when one individual soul is liberated, the others continue to be bound, because the avidyā located in them continue. In this way, according to this view, it is the plurality of avidyā that accounts for the distinction between the innumerable jīvas.

Vācaspatimīśra does not seem to favour the theory of reflection (pratibimba-vāda). In his commentary on the advēśa-bhāṣya, he points out that there cannot be any reflection of a colourless entity in a medium, which is also colourless. An entity possessing colour can be reflected in a medium also possessing colour. In the present case, however, both Brahman as well as the internal organ are colourless (nīrūpa). Therefore, the reflection of Brahman in the internal organ cannot be possible. How could there be any reflection of sound, smell, taste etc?⁴³ But such a difficulty does not arise on the avaccheda-vāda, for, according to it, the individual soul is only an apparent delimitation of Brahman by avidyā and its products, and not the reflection of Brahman in avidyā or the internal organ. This clearly indicates that Vācaspati does not favour the 'pratibimba-vāda'.

Nevertheless, it should be noted that there are some

instances in Śhāṇḍī, in which Vācaspatiāra seems to support the reflection-theory (pratibimba-vāda) as well.⁴⁴

But on the close examination of these statements, wherein Vācaspati has employed the analogy of reflection, it is very clear that he does not mean by the word 'pratibimba' that the individual soul is a very reflection of Brahman, but he only means that the individual soul may have the likeness of a reflection. The terms 'pratibimba-kalpan' and 'pratibimbamiva' are very much significant here. These clearly indicate that Vācaspati does not approve of the reflection-theory. He does not consider the individual soul as primarily a reflection of Brahman. If the reflection-theory were also agreeable to him, then, instead of saying 'tat-pratibimba-kalpan īva' he could have very well said 'tat-pratibimbah īva'.⁴⁵ But, since Vācaspatiāra repeatedly employs the analogy of the etheric space delimited by pot, jar, etc. to explain the nature of the individual soul, and since there could be only delimitation and not reflection of etheric space in pot, jar, etc., it should be concluded that Vācaspatiāra favours only the avaccheda-vāda and not the pratibimba-vāda.⁴⁶ Avaccheda-vāda, therefore, is the distinctive theory of the Śhāṇḍī-school as initiated by Vācaspatiāra.⁴⁷ Appayya Dīkṣita in his Parimala and Siddhānta-lakṣaṇa-saṅgraha further endorse this theory. To sum up:

Vacaspati's view: Brahman delimited by avidyā and its products is jīva, and Brahman not so delimited by avidyā and its products is Īvara.^{47a}

(ii) Pratibimba-vāda (Reflection-Theory)

Padmapāda, in his Pañcapādikā and his commentator Prakāśtman in his Vivaraṇa advocate the pratibimba-vāda.⁴⁸ According to this theory, the individual soul is nothing but the reflection of Brahman in avidyā.

Pratibimba-vāda can be explained more clearly with the help of the familiar instance of the reflection of a face in a mirror, which is a reflecting medium: A mirror receives the reflection of a face which is in its proximity. Similarly, avidyā, which is superimposed on Brahman, the pure consciousness, receives its reflection. The pure consciousness that is reflected in avidyā and its product mind, both in its latent and gross forms is the individual soul (jīva). And the same consciousness which serves as the prototype (bimba) is Īvara.⁴⁹ Just as the defects like impurity, etc. pertaining to the mirror are superimposed on the reflected face and not on the prototype face; even so, the defects pertaining to avidyā, the limiting adjunct, are presented only in the individual soul, which is the reflected consciousness (pratibimbika-

caitanya), and not in Īvara, who is the prototype consciousness (bība-caitanya). Thus, the individual soul, being a reflected image, is overpowered by its limiting adjuncts i.e. avidyā and mind. Hence, the real nature of Brahman is concealed from it. Identifying itself with body, senses, mind, etc., the individual soul undergoes the transmigratory pleasure and pain.

Īvara, on the other hand, is not overpowered by avidyā, but He is the Controller of it. Just as the impurities present in a mirror do not spoil the fairness of the original face; so, too, the defects pertaining to avidyā do not affect Īvara, who is nothing but the pure consciousness serving as the prototype. Therefore, the real nature of Brahman is not concealed from Him, but it is always revealed to Him.

According to this view, avidyā which is the primary limiting adjunct of the individual soul is entitatively single.⁵⁰ But as conditioned by various internal organs and the residual impressions thereof, it is plural. Hence, the pure consciousness reflected in it i.e. avidyā as conditioned by numerous internal organs and their residual impressions is also manifold; just as the single moon reflected in water contained in various pots is manifold.

Therefore, the individual souls are many. In this way, even on the view of single avidyā, the plurality of individual souls can be justified.⁵¹

According to the pratibimba-vēda, moreover, the reflected image is not different from the prototype; but, on the contrary, it is essentially one with it; and hence the reflected image is as real as the prototype.⁵² The reflected face in a mirror, for instance, is not different in essence from the original face, but is identical with it. Though the reflected face is not different from the original face, yet it appears to be different from and opposite to the latter due to the limiting adjunct i.e. mirror. The appearance of the reflected face as different from and as opposite to the original face is only superimposed on it (i.e. the reflected face), and hence is not ultimately real; because on the recognition of oneness in the form "This face is mine", the experienced difference between the face, which is present on one's shoulders, and the face, which is present in the mirror, gets sublated. In fact, if the reflected face and the original face were really different, the recognition in the form "This face is mine" itself would not have arisen. Therefore, the reflected face as such is not illusory, but only the elements such as the appearance of the reflected face and

the original face as different from each other and the appearance of contrariety i.e. the reflected face and the original face appearing opposite to each other are illusory. In this way, in the reflection-theory, the reflected image per se is real, being essentially identical with the original, but only the characteristic of being a reflected image (pratibhāṭva) and the difference, contrariety, etc., which bring about that characteristic, are illusory.⁵³ Since the reflected image is non-different from the original, the individual soul, being a reflected image of Brahman, is not different from the latter, but is essentially identical with it. Only the difference from Brahman and the characteristics such as agency, enjoyership, etc. are falsely superimposed on the true individual soul owing to the limiting adjuncts. And they get sublated on the attainment of the right knowledge of identity arising from the meditation on Upaniṣadic texts such as "That thou art," etc.

As to the objection that the reflection of the colourless, non-material Brahman is impossible, Prakāśānanda replies by saying that the reflection of even the non-material is possible; just as the non-material ether as qualified by the clouds, stars, etc. located in itself, is seen to be reflected in water.⁵⁴

The opponent may argue that it is only the ether inside the water and not the ether outside, that is the support of the reflections like that of clouds, stars, etc., which are being perceived by us. And hence, in the above instance, there is only the reflection of clouds, stars, etc., and not that of the non-material ether too.

But this is not a sound argument. Because, even in the water, which is only knee-deep, the distant and extensive ether is seen as reflected. If the ether inside the water alone be the support of the reflections of clouds, stars, etc., then the reflection of the distant ether in the water would not have been cognised. But as a matter of fact a person feels deepness equal to that of the distant ether, even in a knee-deep water, at first sight. Therefore, the reflection of even a colourless, non-material entity can be possible. The theory, therefore, that the individual soul is a reflection of Brahman is not untenable.⁵⁵

Prakāśātman quotes śruti, smṛti and the Vedānta-sūtra as an evidence for the individual soul being a reflection. Śruti declares, "It became the reflection of each form",⁵⁶ Smṛti proclaims, "It is seen as one and as many, like the moon in the water",⁵⁷ and in the Vedānta-sūtra it is said,

"For the same reason there is the comparison to the reflection of the sun, etc."⁵⁸

Prakāśātman, in his Vivaraṇa, incidentally criticises the avaccheda-yāda, according to which the individual soul is a delimited entity like the etheric space delimited by a pot, jar, etc. Prakāśātman points out that on the avaccheda view, since Brahman, which exists inside the cosmos (apda), is wholly delimited by numerous limiting adjuncts, in the form of the innumerable individual souls, the unlimited Brahman, that transcends all limiting adjuncts, should exist only outside the cosmos, the existence of the unlimited Brahman inside the universe being impossible. If the unlimited Brahman does not exist inside the universe, omnipresence, controllership of all, etc. in its case would not be possible.⁵⁹ But this goes against the teaching of the Antaryāmi-Brahmaṇa, a section of the Bṛhadaranyaka Upaniṣad (III.vii), according to which Brahman is immanent and the inner controller of all beings.⁶⁰ If, in order to overcome this difficulty, the avaccheda-yāda admits the existence of the unlimited Brahman inside the cosmos consisting of numerous limiting adjuncts, then it would mean that Brahman is duplicated inside the cosmos. But the duplicated existence in the limited spaces of what

is unlimited is not possible. The duplicated existence of ether inside the pot is not seen.⁶¹ In the pot there exists only the ether, which is delimited by it (i.e. pot), and not the unlimited ether which exists only outside. Similarly, inside the cosmos there exists only Brahman as delimited by limiting adjuncts and not the unlimited Brahman, which exists only outside the cosmos. In other words, just as there cannot be the duplication of ether inside the pot as the delimited ether and the unlimited ether; even so, there cannot be the duplication of Brahman inside the cosmos as delimited Brahman and the unlimited Brahman.

But on the Pratibimba view, however, the duplicated existence of what is unlimited in the same place can be properly accounted for. For, just as in the midst of knee-deep water there exists both the natural ether, that is of the volume of the water, and the reflected expansive ether; even so, in the limiting adjunct of the individual soul, there may intelligibly exist both the original as well as the reflected Brahman, the pure consciousness. Therefore, the view that the individual soul is a reflection alone is preferable.⁶² In this way, the Vivarupa-school upholds the pratibimba-vāda, the theory that the individual soul is a reflection of Brahman.

111) Ābhāsa-vāda (Semblance-Theory)

Sureśvara is an advocate of the ābhāsa-vāda. The individual soul, according to him, is an ābhāsa, a semblance of Brahman, the pure consciousness. Sureśvara seems to have derived inspiration for this theory from the works of his Master, Śaṅkara. The latter, in his commentaries as well as in the independent works, has several times characterised the individual soul as an ābhāsa. In the commentary of the Chāndogya Upaniṣad, for instance, Śaṅkara says that the individual soul is merely an ābhāsa of the Supreme God.⁶³ And in the Laghu-vākyavṛtti he says that the individual soul is an ābhāsa, a semblance of pure consciousness in the intellect.⁶⁴

According to Sureśvara, as for all Advaitins, Brahman-Ātman, the ultimate reality, is non-dual (advaitīya). Yet due to avidyā and its produce i.e. the intellect, the non-dual reality appears in the dual forms of Īśvara and jīva (the individual soul) respectively. Brahman, as associated with avidyā is called Īśvara and as associated with the intellect is called jīva.⁶⁵ When Brahman-Ātman, the pure consciousness, is associated with the limiting adjuncts namely avidyā and the intellect, the semblance of the pure consciousness is reflected in those limiting adjuncts; just as the semblance of the redness of the jagā flower is reflected in a crystal, when the latter i.e. a crystal is in association

with the japa-flower. In accordance with the ābhāsa-vāda, as propounded by Sureśvara, therefore, what is called īśvara is the semblance of consciousness present in avidyā,⁶⁶ and the semblance of consciousness present in the intellect is jīva.⁶⁷ In this way, in the view of Sureśvara, both īśvara and jīva are cidābhāsa.

It is necessary at this stage to focus our attention on the nature of ābhāsa.⁶⁸ In Advaita literature, the term 'ābhāsa' is employed to denote both reflection and illusory appearance.⁶⁹ But the nature of reflection as interpreted in the ābhāsa-vāda is not the same as that of the pratibimba-vāda. According to the latter view, i.e. the pratibimba-vāda, as already noted, in a reflection, the reflected image in essence is identical with the original; and hence real. But only the appearance of the reflected image as different from and as opposite to the original, which is caused by the limiting adjunct, is not real. In other words, according to the pratibimba-vāda the reflected image (pratibimba) is real but the characteristic of being a reflected image (pratibimbatva) is false. On the contrary, according to the ābhāsa-vāda, the reflected image is not identical with the original, but is different from it; and hence mithyā. It is indeterminable either as real or as unreal. The reflected image of the face,

for instance, is not real, for it is coterminous with the limiting adjunct i.e., the mirror. That is, the reflected face is unthinkable without the mirror, as it disappears on the removal of the latter. Nor is it unreal, since in that case it would not have been perceptually cognised. Hence it is indeterminable (mithyā).^{69a} The reflected image of the face is, therefore, neither the face itself, nor the mirror, but a third entity arising from a contact of the two i.e. the mirror and the face. In this way, in the view of ābhāsa-vādins the reflected image is different from the original; and hence totally false. It is false in the sense that it has no existence of its own but only appears temporarily like a mirage or a □ rope-snake owing to the juxtaposition of a limiting adjunct with the original. Though the reflected image is different from the original, it resembles the original. For instance, the reflected face in a mirror appears like the original face, though it is different from the latter. Thus, the nature of reflection as interpreted in the ābhāsa-vāda differs from that of the pratibimba-vāda. While in the latter view the reflected image is real, in the former view it is not real, but merely an illusory appearance.⁷⁰

It should be remembered that even though Advaitins use the term 'ābhāsa' in the sense of reflection (pratibimba)

also, the terms 'ābhāsa' and 'pratibimba;' however, should not be identified. For the word 'pratibimba' is confined to mean the specific form reflected; but whereas the expression 'ābhāsa' includes the indeterminable character (mithyātva) of the reflected image also. The term 'ābhāsa', therefore, is more comprehensive than the term 'pratibimba'.⁷¹ That is why the term 'ābhāsa' is usually translated as 'a semblance' and not as 'a reflection' which is adequate only with reference to the term 'pratibimba' and not with reference to the term 'ābhāsa' too.

From what has been stated so far it is very clear that according to the Vārttika-school, both jīva and Īvara, being the semblances of the pure consciousness, are different from the latter; and hence mithyā. Both of them are ontologically indeterminable as either real or unreal, as either jada (not-Self) or ajada (Self). Though both jīva and Īvara being the cīdābhāsas are different from the 'cit' i.e. the pure consciousness, which serves as the original, yet they resemble it; just as the semblance of the face reflected in the mirror resembles the original face, though it is different from it.

It has already been stated that, according to Sureśvara, the non-dual Brahman appears through its association with

avidyā and the intellect in the dual forms of jīva and Īvara respectively. The association of Brahman-Ātman, the pure consciousness, with the limiting adjuncts i.e. avidyā and the intellect leads to the false identification of the pure consciousness with these limiting adjuncts. Owing to this false identification there is non-discrimination between the pure consciousness and its semblance reflected in avidyā and the intellect. Consequently, there is a wrong identification between the pure consciousness and its semblance present in avidyā and the intellect also. In this way, according to the Ābhāsa-vāda, what is called Īvara is the semblance of pure consciousness in avidyā, wrongly identified with its original.⁷² And the semblance of pure consciousness in the intellect wrongly identified with its original is jīva.⁷³ It is on account of this wrong identification between the pure consciousness and the semblance thereof in avidyā or the intellect, as the case may be, that Īvara, though only a semblance and hence indeterminable (mithyā), is viewed as the cause, the inner controller, and the witness of the entire universe; similarly the jīva also, though only a semblance and therefore mithyā, is looked upon as an agent, an enjoyer, and a cognizer.^{73a}

Since the intellect is manifold, the semblance of

the pure consciousness in it is also manifold. Consequently the original consciousness, which is wrongly identified with its semblance present in the intellects, appears to be many.⁷⁴ Hence, the individual souls are many. In fact, the Supreme Self itself, through its association with different intellects containing the semblance of the pure consciousness, appears in the form of innumerable individual souls.⁷⁵ In this way, according to the ābhāsa-vāda, it is the plurality of the intellects that accounts for the plurality of the individual souls. On the other hand, since there is only one primal avidyā, the semblance of the pure consciousness in it is also one. Consequently, the original consciousness, which is wrongly identified with its semblance present in avidyā, is also one.⁷⁶ Therefore, there is only one Īvara.

It should be remembered that though according to the ābhāsa-vāda Īvara and jīva enjoy the same status, both being the semblances of pure consciousness, yet there is one important distinction between the two. As it has already been noted, avidyā, the primal principle that accounts for the appearance of every thing else other than Brahman, is characterised by two powers, namely, the power of concealment (āvarana-śakti), by which avidyā veils the true nature of Brahman, and the power of projection

(vikāśa-śakti), by which avidyā creates the world-spectacle. Of these two powers of avidyā, it is only the power of projection that is operative in case of Īśvara but not the power of concealment too. The latter is inactive in His case. Consequently, though Īśvara is associated with avidyā, the true nature of Brahman is not concealed from Him. If the power of concealment too were operative in case of Īśvara, He would be helpless as the jīva, and in that case Īśvara would not be possibly viewed as having the characteristics of being the omniscient and the omnipotent. Therefore, it should be admitted that Īśvara is not overwhelmed by the power of concealment. But however, He witnesses the world-process due to the power of projection of avidyā. From what has been said so far it is clear that there is no bondage for Īśvara. He is ever liberated and hence is free from the transitory pleasure and pain. Jīva, on the other hand, is overwhelmed by both the powers of avidyā. Consequently, the jīva does not know the true nature of Brahman. But identifying himself with the assemblage of mind, body, senses, etc. the jīva considers himself as an agent and an enjoyer, and hence undergoes pleasure and pain. So the jīva is in bondage.

Now, the Ābhāsa-Vēda may be objected to as follows:

What is bound according to the ābhāsa-vāda is the semblance of pure consciousness in the intellect, i.e. the individual soul characterised by the agency, enjoyership, etc. And as already seen, this semblance of pure consciousness is indeterminable (mithyā). While what is free from bondage is the pure consciousness i.e. the pure Self of the nature of supreme bliss and eternal, but not the semblance of pure consciousness. In other words, it is the semblance of pure consciousness (cidābhāsa) that is in bondage and it is the pure consciousness (kevala-caitanya) that is liberated. It means that the substratum of bondage and release is not one and the same but different. That being the case, the bound individual soul would not strive to attain liberation; for the individual soul being indeterminable will not persist at the time of liberation and hence the struggle on the part of the individual soul to attain liberation would go without any reward. Moreover, according to this view, the individual soul, being a semblance (ābhāsa), is also illusory like the bondage. Therefore, when the Brahman-realisation dawns, the individual soul would also be destroyed along with the bondage. But this goes contrary to our experience; for, nobody attempts to bring about one's own destruction.

This objection is unsound; because it is not the

semblance of pure consciousness (cidābhāsa) that is admitted to be bound, but it is the pure consciousness itself that is admitted to have been bound through its semblance.⁷⁷ Therefore, when the pure consciousness i.e. the Self has the semblance, it is the bondage; and when the semblance has ceased to exist, it is the liberation.⁷⁸ Hence, there is neither a difference of substratum nor the possibility of an attempt to bring about one's own destruction. In fact, the nature of having a semblance is not essential but adventitious to the Self, because it is only imagined on the latter due to the limiting adjuncts. And it is on account of this unessential nature that the true Self attains the status of the jīva and hence viewed as an agent, an enjoyer, etc. But the essential nature of the Self, however, is pure and free from such taints as agency, enjoyership, etc. that constitute the bondage. Therefore, there is no defect if one attempts to bring about the destruction of one's unessential nature, which causes suffering, in order to attain his essential nature, which is the supreme bliss.⁷⁹ Thus, the view that the jīva is merely an ābhāsa of the Self is not unintelligible.

Sureśvara's explanation of jīva as a cidābhāsa ultimately implies that the so called individual soul is merely an illusory appearance of the pure consciousness.

which is Brahman. In the view of Sureśvara, therefore, just as a rope appears as a snake through avidyā; even so, Brahman appears as the jīva and suffers as it were in that form.⁸⁰ Thus, like a rope-snake, the individual soul also is an indeterminable (mithyā) entity, being falsely superimposed on Brahman-Ātman due to avidyā and its products. And just as the superimposed snake is not different from its substratum, rope; similarly, the individual soul is not different from Brahman. In other words, the individual soul, like a rope-snake, has no status apart from Brahman wherein it is superimposed. Yet the individual soul appears to be different from Brahman so long as avidyā persists. But on the removal of avidyā, which is the root cause of illusion, the apparent difference between the individual soul and Brahman also gets sublated and consequently the individual soul attains its essential identity with Brahman. In this way, according to the Vārttika-school, even though the jīva-in-itself is an indeterminable entity, yet in the secondary sense it is no other than Brahman, the supreme reality.⁸¹

In his Bṛhadāraṇyaka-kośa-vārttika, Sureśvara refers to the story of a prince in order to explain how the unchangeable Brahman itself attains through avidyā the status of the jīva.⁸² A prince when he was in his

childhood, was somehow carried away by a hunter and was brought up by him in the forest. He considered himself to be a hunter, though (really he was a prince. All his actions, therefore, were like those of a hunter. After a lapse of time, he was made acquainted with his royal descent by some one. The moment he realised his high birth, he abandoned all his humble actions, went to his father and gained the sovereignty of his kingdom. In the same way, when the individual soul is made to recognise his real nature as Brahman by a compassionate and profound teacher, he gives up his illusory status of jīva and regains his native freedom.

d) Ābhāsa-vāda and Pratibimba-vāda

The basic differences between the ābhāsa-vāda and the pratibimba-vāda may now be pointed out as follows:

1. According to the pratibimba-vāda, the reflected image is not different from the original, but essentially identical with it; and hence real. While the ābhāsa-vāda maintains that the semblance is not identical with the original, but essentially different from it; and hence indeterminable either as real or as unreal.

2. In the pratibimba-vāda, the reflected image is

as real as the original being essentially one with it. But it is only the elements such as the state of being a reflection and the difference, contrariety, etc. which bring about that state, that are not real. In the ābhāsa-vāda, on the contrary, the semblance being not identical with the original is totally false, and it is real only in the secondary sense.

3. In the pratibimba-vāda, subsequent to the removal of the limiting adjunct, which brings about the difference as it were between the reflected image and the original, the reflected image becomes one with the original. But in the ābhāsa-vāda, the semblance also gets sublated along with the removal of the limiting adjunct.

4. According to both pratibimba-vāda and ābhāsa-vāda the pure consciousness serves as the original. But the two views differ in as much as the ābhāsa-vāda holds that the pure consciousness transcends its semblance reflected in avidyā and its products,⁸³ while in the pratibimba-vāda it cannot transcend the reflected image, which is essentially nothing but itself.

c) Critical remarks

From what has been discussed so far it is obvious

that even though all the three sub-schools of post-Śaṅkara Advaita subscribe to the central doctrine of Advaita, i.e. the absolute non-difference of the jīva from Brahman, yet they differ from each other over the way in which the jīva is to be regarded. The Dharmatī-school propounded by Vācaspatiniśra regards the jīva (individual soul) as the consciousness delimited by avidyā or the internal organ. According to the Vivarapa-school propounded by Padmapāda and Prakāśānand, the individual soul is regarded to be a reflection of Brahman in avidyā. And in the Vārttika-school propounded by Sureśvara, the individual soul is merely a semblance of Brahman in the intellect. In this way, we come across three prominent views in the post-Śaṅkara Advaita regarding the nature of the jīva, namely, the delimitation-theory (avaccheda-vāda), the reflection-theory (pratibimba-vāda), and the semblance-theory (ābhāsa-vāda). The upholders of these respective theories controvert the theory of each other and try to establish that their theory alone is preferable. But strictly speaking, none of the above views is unobjectionable. Objections can be raised against all these views. And the replies given by the adherents of these views are some times not wholly satisfactory. In Pañcadaśī, for instance, Vidyāranya has raised an objection against the avaccheda view, according to which the individual soul is nothing but the

consciousness delimited by the internal organ. He says that if the mere delimitation of the universal consciousness be the cause of jīvatva, then, even the consciousness delimited by pot, wall, etc. would become the jīva; and in that case there would be no distinction between the living and the non-living. It may be said that there is a difference between the internal organ and pot, etc. in as much as the former is pure and clear, whereas pot, etc. are not so. But in spite of this difference between them, their power to delimit is the same. And the concern of the avyaccheda-vādin is with the delimitation and not with what delimits. That is, when the avyaccheda-vādin seeks to account for jīvatva in terms of mere delimitation, then, the purity or the impurity of the limiting adjunct does not really matter. In measuring out rice and other grains, for instance, it makes no difference to their quantity whether the measure be made of wood or metal. Similarly, when the universal consciousness is delimited equally by the internal organ and by the adjuncts like pot, etc.; then, there is no difference whatever so far as the process of delimiting is concerned. That being the case, just as the consciousness delimited by the internal organ is regarded as the jīva, even so, the consciousness delimited by pot, etc. also would be regarded as the jīva. But that is not the case.

It may be further said by the avaccheda-vādin that in the instance of measuring out the rice and other grains, though the capacity of the two measures be the same, yet the two differ from each other in so far as the metal one can give a reflection, whereas the one made of wood has no capacity for reflection. But this is an acceptable contingency; for, while the internal organ, which is the limiting adjunct of the *jīva*, can reflect consciousness, the external adjuncts like pot, etc. do not have such capacity. In this way, even the avaccheda-vādin is forced to admit that it is the reflection and not the mere delimitation of the consciousness that is distinctive of *jīvatva*.⁸⁴ But as already noted, the avaccheda-vādin rejects outright the pratibimba view on the ground that there can be no reflection of a colourless entity; and hence Brahman-Ātman, the pure consciousness, being devoid of any colour, cannot be reflected. In order to corroborate his stand the pratibimba-vādin may advance one or the other instance. But even then the avaccheda-vādin points out some other difficulty.⁸⁵ In this way the controversy goes on, and it has no end.

There is yet another difficulty in the case of avaccheda view. The delimited consciousness, which according to the avaccheda-vādin is regarded to be the *jīva*, differs

at different places. That is, when one internal organ, the limiting adjunct of the jīva, goes to heaven through the potency of merit, the consciousness delimited by it in that place is different from that which was limited by it while it was on this earth. This will lead to two defects: (1) destruction of the rewards of actions that are done (kṛtāṇa), and (2) occurrence of fruits of actions that are not done (akṛtābhyaṅga).⁸⁶ To explain this idea more clearly: The consciousness delimited by the internal organ in heaven i.e., a jīva say a heavenly-god enjoys the fruits of actions that are performed by the consciousness delimited by the same internal organ on the earth i.e., another jīva say a Brāhmaṇa. It means that the jīva, who did meritorious actions on the earth, remained without reward; while the jīva, who did nothing, enjoyed the fruits of those actions. But it is an absurd position, for the fruits of the actions done by a particular jīva should belong to that jīva only and to none else. In order to overcome this difficulty it may be said that the delimited consciousness also goes wherever the internal organ, the limiting adjunct, goes. But it is impossible to assume any movement in case of what is all-pervading. For instance, even when the pot is carried away from one place to another place, the etheric space delimited by that pot is not seen to move.

The same difficulty arises even in the case of pratibimba-view. The reflected image, which one internal organ contains, must be due to the consciousness which is adjacent to that internal organ. Therefore, the reflected images in the same internal organ should differ at different places, the original consciousness, which casts reflection being different. Thus, the unity of the migrating soul cannot be reasonably maintained and the contingency of one jīva enjoying the fruits of actions done by some other jīva remains unavoided.⁸⁷ And it is needless to say that the above argument can be advanced against the ābhāsa-vāda also. It is, therefore, clear that none of the above theories is free from objections. And, as already pointed out, the controversy between the pratibimba-vāda and the ābhāsa-vāda is regarding the way in which the nature of reflection is to be interpreted. While the former view maintains that the reflection is real, the latter view holds that the reflection is indeterminate as either real or unreal. The adherents of both the views handle the issue from their own fundamental positions. Hence, it has naturally given rise to two divergent theories.

But as a matter of fact, in the view of Śaṅkara, avastheda, pratibimba, and ābhāsa are not at all theories

(vēdas) but just simple analogies (dṛṣṭānta). As seen already, Śaṅkara gives in his works certain analogies, slightly differing in matter of details, such as the etheric space delimited by pot, the sun and his reflection, etc. in order to account for the absolute non-difference and the apparent difference between the jīva and Brahman. The real purport of all these analogies is to prove that the so called jīvatva is only superimposed due to the limiting adjuncts and hence ultimately illusory. Nowhere does Śaṅkara refer to avacchēda, prātibhā, etc. as theories. Nor does he seem to prefer any one particular analogy to the other analogies. But his followers, however, favoured one or the other analogies and stretched them too far. And this resulted in the rise of distinct theories in the post-Śaṅkara Advaita, namely, delimitation-theory, reflection-theory, and semblance-theory. All these theories ultimately advocate the doctrine of the absolute non-difference of the jīva from Brahman. Yet they differ from each other in as much as they make use of different analogies, which differ from each other in matter of details. In this way, the above theories are mainly based on the analogies and hence unthinkable in the absence of the latter. But it should be remembered that analogies are always based on half-truths. In other words, analogies always convey similarity and not identity between the illustration and

the thing to be illustrated. The analogical reasoning, so to say, has its own limitations. Hence, the analogies should not be stretched too far. If we do so, the spirit of the analogies is lost.

In the Brahma-sūtra-bhāṣya, Śaṅkara himself points out the purpose of analogical reasoning. An objection is raised against the comparison with the reflection of the sun in water in the case of the Self. The opponent's contention is as follows: A material thing possessed of form, such as water, is seen to be clearly separate from and remotely placed from the sun, etc., which are also material entities with forms; and there i.e. in water, the occurrence of a reflection of the sun, etc. is feasible. But the Self is not such a material entity having form; and since it is all-pervasive and non-different from all, it can have no limiting adjuncts either separate or remote from it. Therefore, the illustration is not apt, the reflection of the Self being impossible. ^{97a}

In reply to the above objection, Śaṅkara states that the illustration of the reflection of the sun in water is quite apt, inasmuch as the point sought to be illustrated is pertinent. Because, it is impossible for anybody to show entire similarity between the illustration and the

thing illustrated, over and above some point of similarity in some way, which is sought to be presented. . If such an all-round similarity exists, the very relation between the illustration and the thing illustrated will fall through.

The intended point of similarity in the present case is this: The reflection of the sun in water increases as the water increases, diminishes as the water diminishes, moves when the water moves, and differs as the water differs. Thus, the sun conforms to the characteristics of the water; but in reality the sun never has these. Similarly, though the Highest Self i.e. Brahman is not liable to undergo any change and has a uniform nature from the absolute point of view, still owing to its entry into such limiting adjuncts as the body, etc., it conforms as it were to the characteristics such as increase and decrease of those limiting adjuncts. Thus, there is no contradiction, as the illustration and the thing illustrated are both compatible.⁸⁹

From the above remarks of Śaṅkara it is crystal-clear that the analogies are not to be interpreted literally and that the purpose of the analogical reasoning is to convey similarity between the illustration and the thing to be illustrated only in a particular respect and not in every

respect. But in spite of its limitations the analogical reasoning helps us to understand easily the basic philosophical doctrines. For instance, the absolute non-difference between the jīva and Brahman declared in the Upaniṣads is not easy to be understood. Śaṅkara, therefore, makes use of the analogies such as the pot-delimited ether, the sun and his reflection, etc., to explain the above doctrine convincingly. And it should be strictly noted, as Padmapāda points out, that all this aggregate of analogies is only for the purpose of removing the doubt that may arise regarding what has been established by the Śrutis, conformatory logic, and experience and also for mental concord; but not for directly establishing the thing itself i.e.

Ātman.⁹⁰

As already pointed out, the so called vēdas such as avaccheda, pratibimba, etc. are the outcome of stretching the analogies employed by Śaṅkara beyond their legitimate point. And, therefore, the controversy among the adherents of these theories is only artificial, for it is due to too much emphasis on the non-essential points of the analogies made use of by those theories. As Dr. R. D. Ranade aptly remarks, "The partisans in their enthusiasm forget that the analogies only indicate similarity and not identity and as such the non-essential points in the one case

need not have a parallel in the other. But for their insistence on unnecessary details they all agree with the principle of identity between the Self and God.⁹¹ All these theories strive to show that the difference between the jīva and Brahman is only apparent, it being caused by the limiting adjuncts such as avidyā, intellect, etc. and that it gets sublated on the removal of avidyā, the root cause of all difference, when the true nature of Brahman is realized.

Yet there is a particular motive behind each one of these theories. The avyakcheda view in particular conveys the unattached character (asaṃsāra) of the Self declared in the Śrutis.⁹² Just as the real nature of the unlimited ether remains unaffected even though it appears to be limited by adjuncts such as pot, etc., even so, the real nature of the Self remains untainted even though it is delimited as it were by avidyā, intellect, etc. The pratibimba view in particular emphasises the identity between the jīva and Brahman. Just as the reflected image of the face in the mirror is identical with its original, so the individual soul which is the reflected image of Brahman is identical with the latter. Ābhāsa-vāda, according to which the individual soul is an indeterminable entity, suggests that the agency, enjoyership, etc. are only superimposed on the

Self like the rope-snake or the redness in the crystal.^{92a}

In this way there is no real difference between the upholders of these theories, for all of them subscribe to the central theme of Advaita. But they only differ over the mode in which the central theme is to be explained. To sum up in the words of Dr. T. M. P. Mahadevan, "It does not really matter whether the example of the pot-defined other be given or the analogy of the reflection be cited, what the preceptors of Advaita aim at teaching is the non-difference of jiva from Brahman."⁹³

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. स आत्मा तत्त्वमसि ।
Chā. Up. VI. viii. 7
2. अहं ब्रह्मास्मि ।
Bṛh. Up. I. iv. 10.
3. उपमात्मा ब्रह्म ।
Bṛh. Up. II. v. 19.
4. तदेव तौम्यं ह्यमृतासीदिकोवादितीयम् ।
Chā. Up. VI. ii. 1.
5. According to the Naiyāyikas, Ātman is one of the nine substances -
 "अस्मिन् द्रव्याणि पृथिव्यप्तेष्वोष्णत्वाकाशकालदिगारणमर्माणि नव ।"
 Annambhaṭṭa's Tarka-saagarah, p. 8.
 And they regard the eight qualities viz., cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, action, merit, and demerit to be the special attributes of Ātman.-
 "अस्मद्व्यवसोऽष्टावार्त्तमात्रविशेषगुणाः ।"
 Annambhaṭṭa, Op. cit., p. 171.
6. "हामः संख्या विचिचिस्ता स्यात्स्रष्टा
 पुतिरपुतिर्द्वीधीर्भीरित्येतत्सर्वं मम एव ।"
Bṛh. Up. I. v. 3.
7. "अहमर्थः, नात्मा, लुप्तमोक्षोऽननुवर्तमानत्वात्,
 मोक्षे तदनुवर्ततावशत्वादित्यस्याप्य ।"
 MM. N. S. Anantakrishna Gatri's 'Śata-bhāṣanī',
 p. 102.

8. तथा च जीवात्मनः स्वविस्थानुगतविन्मात्रमेव
मुक्तावन्यतमानं पारमार्थिकं स्वस्यम् । तत्तदुपाद्युपहितं
तु तस्योपाधिर्न स्वस्यम् ।
Op.cit. p.111.
9. BSB. I.1v.19-22.
10. Cg. प्रतिष्ठा सिद्धेर्निष्प्रमात्रमर्थयः ।
उत्कृष्टमिष्यत स्वभावादित्योद्गोमिः ।
उपस्थितोरिति वाचस्पतिः ।
Bṛ. Sū. I.1v.20-22.
11. यथा हि ब्रह्मैविकारा व्युत्पन्नतो विष्णुनिष्ठाः
न ब्रह्मैवत्यन्तं भिद्यन्ते, तद्रूपनित्यत्वत्वात्, नापि
ततोऽत्यन्तमभिन्नाः, ब्रह्मैवैव परस्परव्यापृत्यभाव-
प्रसङ्गात् । तथा जीवात्मानोऽपि ब्रह्मविकारा न
ब्रह्मणोऽत्यन्तं भिद्यन्ते, विद्रूपत्वाभावप्रसङ्गात् ।
नाप्यत्यन्तं न भिद्यन्ते, परस्परं व्यापृत्यभावप्रसङ्गात् ।
तस्यात्कथञ्चित् भेदो जीवानामभेदश्च ।
Bṛh. I.1v.20. p.415.
12. जीवो हि परमात्मनो त्यन्तं भिन्न स्य सन्
देहेन्द्रियमनोबुद्ध्युपधानलैपठति त्वदा व क्लृप्तः,
तस्य च दान्तेषानादिबाधनानुष्ठानात् संप्रसन्नस्य
देहेन्द्रियादित्वातादुत्कृष्टमिष्यतः परमात्मनैवयोषत्तोः ।
सत्त्ववर्तं भवति - भविष्यन्तामिदमुपादाय भेदकालेऽप्यभेद उक्तः ।
यथाहुः पाञ्चरात्रिकाः - आमुषतेभ्यः स्व स्याद् जीवस्य च
परस्य च । मुक्तस्य तु न भेदोऽस्ति भेदेतोरगावतः ॥ इति ।
Op.cit. I.1v.21, p.416.
13. अनेन जीवेनात्मनानुविद्य नामस्य व्याकरवाणि ।
Chā. Up. VI.11.2.

14. न च तैवः प्रभृतीनां सुष्ठौ जीवस्य पुष्कं सुष्ठिः प्रुता येन
परत्यादाधनो न्यस्तदिकारी जीवः त्वात् ।
काश्कृत्स्नस्य आचार्यस्य अविदुतः परमेवरो जीवो नान्य
मिति मतम् ।
BSB. I. 1v. 22, p. 417.
15. आत्यन्तिके हि जीवपरगात्मनोरभेदे तात्त्विकेऽनादविदाकीप्यतो
भेदः ... विद्या शक्यः समुत्कार्य कश्चिद्, रज्ज्वावतिविग्रम
एव रज्ज्वावसाधात्कारेण, ... न तु सुष्ठिकारः गरावादिः
शक्तोऽपि मुन्मुदिति विन्त्यमानस्तज्जन्मना भूद्भावसाधारकारेण
शक्यो निवर्तयितुं, तत्कस्य हेतोः, तस्यापि गृहो भिन्नाभिन्नस्य
तात्त्विकत्वात्, वस्तुतस्तु ज्ञानेनोद्योत्तुमावयत्वात् ।
Bhā. I. 1v. 22, p. 417.
16. आश्चर्यस्य तु यद्यपि जीवस्य परत्यादनन्यत्वमभिहितम्, तथापि
प्रतिष्ठातिष्ठेरिति तापेक्षयाभिधानात्कार्यकारणभावः विद्वानप्यभिहित
मिति गम्यते । जीह्वानोमिपद्ये पुनः स्पष्टमेवावस्थान्तरापेक्षी भेदाभेदी
गम्यते । तत्र काश्कृत्स्नीयं मतं ब्रूत्यनुसारीति गम्यते,
प्रतिपिषादविधितार्थानुसारात् "तत्त्वमसि" इत्यादिब्रूतिभ्यः ।
BSB. I. 1v. 22, p. 417.
17. विद्या विन्दतेऽमृतम् ।
Kona. Up. 12.
विद्यामृतमनुते ।
Īśa. Up. 11.
18. एवं च सति तज्ज्ञानादमृतत्वमवच्छत्यते । विकारात्मकत्वे हि
जीवस्याभ्युपगम्यमाने विकारस्य प्रकृतितत्त्वमे प्रत्यप्रसङ्गान्न
तज्ज्ञानादमृतत्वमवच्छत्यते ।
BSB. I. 1v. 22, p. 417.
- 18 a. यथा तपः त्यन्दमानाः समुदेऽर्ता गच्छन्ति
नामज्ये विहाय ।
तथा विद्वान्नामस्यादिमुक्तः परात्परं
पुस्त्यमुपैति दिव्यम् ।
Bhā. Up. III. 11. 8.



19. अत्रय स्वाग्रयस्य नामस्यत्यागीयादुवाध्यायस्य
नामस्य जीव उपवर्धते ।
BGB. I. 1v. 22, p. 417.
20. अत्रयोत्पत्तिरपि जीवस्य यवविदग्निनविरक्तित्वा-
दाहरणेन साव्यमाणा उपाध्यायैव वेदितव्या ।
Ib14.
21. नहि जीवो नाम अत्यन्तमिन्नो ब्रह्मणः, "तत्त्वमसि"
"अहं ब्रह्मास्मि" इत्यादिवृत्तिभ्यः । बुद्ध्यादुपाधिपूर्तं
तु विशेषमात्रित्य ब्रह्मैव सत् जीवः कर्ता मोक्षता वेत्तुष्यते ।
BGB. I. 1. 31. p. 222.
22. विद्यानात्मापरमात्मनोः अविद्याप्रसूतस्यापितनामस्यरवितदेहात्मा-
धिनिमित्तो भेदो न पारमाथिकः ।
Op. cit. I. 1v. 22, pp. 418-420.
23. स एव तु स्यात्, तदभावस्य विवर्धितात्वात् ।
तद्वहनेन परमात्मगावो हि अत्र विवर्धिताः -
"ब्रह्मविद्याप्नोति परम्" इति । नहि ब्रह्मस्य
अन्यमावायतिरूपमप्यस्ति ।
Śā. on Tait. Op. II. viii. 9.
24. BGB. I. 1. 12-19.
25. परमेस्वरस्त्वविद्याहन्विताच्छरीरात् कर्तुर्भोक्तुविद्यानात्मात्वादन्यः ।...
यथावा घटाकाशादुपाधिरिच्छिन्नात् अनुपाधिरिच्छिन्न आवासोऽन्यः ।
Op. cit. I. 1. 17, p. 184.
26. Op. cit. I. 11. 13-17.
27. यद्यपि विद्यानात्मा परमात्मनोऽनन्य एव तथाप्यविद्याभामकर्मभूतं
तस्मिन् प्रवर्तत्वम्यारीषिर्मां वेत्तुमुत्तत्वाभ्यारब्धे नोपपद्ये ।
Op. cit. I. 11. 17, p. 251.

28. Op.cit. I. 11. 1-8.
29. विशेषो हि भवति शारीरपरयोगरणोः । एकः कर्ता शोयता
धर्माधर्मादिनायनः सुष्ठुःधादिमविद्य । स्वरुतद्विपरीतोऽ-
पहत्तमाप्पत्वादिगुणः ।
Op.cit. I. 11. 8, p. 236.
30. पर स्वात्मा देहेन्द्रियमनोबुद्धयुपाधिभिः परिच्छिद्यमानो वासैः
शारीर इत्युपपद्यते । यथा घटकरकादुपाधिसमादपरिच्छिन्नमपि नभः
परिच्छिन्नमवमालो, तद्वत् । तद्वेषणा च कर्मकर्तृत्वादिभेदव्यवहारो
न विवक्ष्यते प्राक् "तत्त्वमसि" इत्यात्मैकत्वोपदेशग्रहणात् ।
Op.cit. I. 11. 6, p. 239.
31. CE. BSB. I. 1. 5, 1. 11. 20, II. 1. 14, and II. 111. 17.
32. पर स्वात्मा देहेन्द्रियमनोबुद्धयुपाधिभिः परिच्छिद्यमानो वासैः
शारीर इत्युपपद्यते । यथा घटकरकादुपाधिसमादपरिच्छिन्नमपि
नभः परिच्छिन्नमवमालो, तद्वत् ।
Op.cit. I. 11. 6, p. 239.
33. Op.cit. III. 11. 11-21.
34. एत एव चायमात्मा धैतन्यस्थो निर्विकल्पो ब्राह्मणतातीतः
परप्रतिषेधोपदेशोऽत एव चास्योपाधिनिमित्तामवारमार्थिणी
विशेषततामभिलेख अनन्यकादिधदित्युपमोपादीयते मोक्षमात्रेण-
"यथा ह्ययं ज्योतिरात्मा विवस्वानयो भिन्ना बहुधाऽऽमुगच्छत् ।
उपाधिना क्रियते भेदस्यो देवः धैतन्येवाजोऽयमात्मा" इति ।
"एक एव हि भूतात्मा भूते भूते व्यवस्थितः । स्रुधा बहुधा चैव
व्यवृते जलपद्मवत् ॥ १५. विं. 12१" इत्येवमादिषु ।
Op.cit. III. 11. 18, p. 710.
35. CE. BSB. Bṛh. Up. II. 1v. 12.
36. BSB. II. 111. 43-53.

37. आमात एव वैश्व जीवः परत्यात्मनो जलसूर्यकादिवत्प्रतिपत्त्यः ।
न स एव साधात् । नापि वस्तुनन्तरम् ।
Op.cit. II.111.50, p.625.
38. स एव तु अविवोपधानभेदात् घटकरकावाकावाकायसद्
भेदेन प्रपञ्चे ।
Bhā. II.1.21, p.472.
39. तस्यै प्रत्यगात्मा त्वर्यपूकाशत्वादविषयोऽन्यत्र
तथाप्यनिर्वाच्यमायधियाकल्पितबुद्धिमनःसूक्ष्मस्थुशरीरेन्द्रियावच्छेदेन
अन्वच्छिन्नोऽपि वस्तुतोऽवच्छिन्न इव, अन्वच्छिन्नोऽपि
अमिन्नोऽपि भिन्न इव अकार्षि कर्तव्य, अभीष्टतापि भीक्षते,....
जीवभावगापन्नोऽवमासते, नम इव घटमणिकमालिकावच्छेदेन
भिन्नमिमानेकविधधर्मकमित्येति ।
Op.cit. I.1.1, p.38.
40. यथा घटाकामो नाम न परमाकाशादन्यः । अथ घाता इव
यावद्व्यक्तमनुवर्तते ।
स्वमनायनिर्वचनीयाविषयोपाधिरूपितो जीवो न वस्तुतः
परमात्मनो भिन्नो तदुपाद्युद्भवामिष्याम्यर्था च उद्भूता इव
अभिज्ञा इव प्रतीयते ।
Op.cit. III.11.9, p.705.
41. "जीवः उपाधिरहितेन रूपेण ब्रह्मस्वभावः"
Op.cit. I.111.7, p.276.
42. "अन्तःकरणाव्यच्छिन्नः प्रत्यगात्मा चेतनः
कर्ता भीक्ता जीवात्मा"
Op.cit. I.1.1, p.45.
43. स्ववद्वि द्रव्यमतिस्वच्छतया स्वयतो द्रव्यान्तरस्य तद्विषयेन
गुदयमाणस्यापि उपागं गुदणोपात्तु, विद्यात्मा त्वत्स्यो विषयो न
विषयव्यापामुदगादयितुमर्हति, यथाहुः - "शब्दजन्यरतानां च
कीदृशी प्रतिबिम्बता" इति ।
Op.cit. I.1.1, pp.7-8.

44. a) अविवोधधानं च यद्यपि विद्यास्वभावे परमात्मनि न
साधादस्ति, तथापि तत्प्रतिबिम्बकल्पबीजदारेण परात्मन्युच्यते ।
Op.Cit. I. iv. 22, p. 421.
- b) स्वप्रविधोपधानकल्पितावच्छेदो जीवः परमात्मप्रतिबिम्बकल्पः ।
Op.Cit. II. ii. 10, p. 502.
- c) यतः प्रतिबिम्बानामिव इयागतावदाततादिः
जीवानामिव नानावेदनाभिर्बन्धो ब्रह्मणस्तु बिम्बस्यैव न
तदभिर्बन्धः ।
Op.Cit. II. iii. 43, p. 623.
45. P. Srirama Sastri, Introduction to the edition of
Poṭṭapāṭikā with its commentaries, p. 126. (Govt.
Oriental Manuscripts Library, Madras, 1958).
46. Cf. "But Vācaspatiśāstra has definitely advocated
avaccheda-vēda as an independent line of argument,
where he has not followed Maṇḍanaśāstra, his model
of following, who in his Brahmasiddhi has supported
pratibhābo-vēda."
Dr. B. K. Son Gupta, A Critique on the Vivarana School,
p. 255.
Cf. "यो जीवो नियन्ता लोके हिः स परमात्मेवोपास्यवच्छेदकस्थित-
भेदस्तथा व्याख्यायत इत्यस्यैवावेदितम् ।
Bhā. I. ii. 19, p. 254.
47. Cf. Dr. V. N. Sheshagiri Rao, Vācaspati's Contribution
to Advaita, pp. 89-92.
- 47 a. तस्याह यदाकाशवदन्ताः करणावच्छिन्नं चैतन्यं जीवः
तदवच्छिन्नं ईश्वरः ।
SIS. I. p. 95.

48. तत्त्वमिति चिन्मस्थानीयब्रह्मस्यस्वता प्रतिचिन्मस्थानीयस्य जीवस्योपदिश्यते ।
PP. Var. I. p. 100.
 ननु कोऽयं जीवो नाम यस्य स्वस्यै त्वपदेन कल्पमाणं
 ब्रह्मैव वाच्यार्थः त्वपदो ? ब्रह्मैव अविद्याप्रतिविम्बितमिति उदाह्रियः ।
PPV. Var. IX. p. 760.
49. अतानोपहितं चिन्मयेतन्यमीश्वरः, अन्तःकरणतत्तत्कारावधिन्ना-
 छानप्रतिविम्बितं चैतन्यं जीवः इति निरूपकाराः ।
SP. p. 28.
50. For the theory of single avidya vide Chapter III.
51. अन्तःकरणानां तत्तत्काराणां घानैकत्वात् तादृशीपात्रिकेन
 एकस्याप्यछानस्य यदाकाशादिधन्नानात्वात् तात्प्रतिविम्बितस्य
 चैतन्यस्यापि नानात्वमित्येकापिधापथेऽपि नानाजीववादः
 समर्थितः ।
MM Vasudeva Shastri Alhyankar's Bindu-prapñca on
Siddhanta-bindu, p. 46 (BORZ, Poona, 1962).
52. अहङ्काररन्दिमो चिन्वादिष्व प्रतिविम्बे न ब्रह्मणो वस्तुवन्तरम्,
 किन्तु तदेव तत्, पुनस्तमानविपर्ययस्यस्वताभावे मिथ्या । इयं
 पुनस्तदेव तत् ? एकस्याप्यज्ञावगमात् ।
PP. Var. I. p. 104.
 ननु जीवस्याहङ्कारस्थप्रतिविम्बस्यै दर्पणस्यमुक्त्वा प्रतिविम्बवत्
 बिम्बादभेदः स्यात्, तत्र हि ग्रीवात्क्षरदर्पणस्थोऽन्योन्याभिमुखत्वेन
 भेदोऽनुस्यूते । मैवम्: "मदीयनिर्दं मुक्ता" इतीत्यप्रत्यक्षमिति
 भेदानुसृत्य वाचात् ।
VPS. Var. I. p. 80.

53. नहि पर्य प्रतिबिम्बत्वस्य भूतस्य चैतन्यस्य वा मिथ्यात्वं
 भूतः । किं तर्हि ? प्रतिबिम्बत्वस्य धर्मस्य स्थापनादकमेव विपर्ययादेशच
 मिथ्यात्वं भूतः । प्रतिबिम्बस्य प्रत्यभिधाया "तत्त्वप्रति" वाक्येन
 च तत्त्वबिम्बात्मताप्रवादिसम ।
VPV. Var. I, p. 85.
Cf. PPV. Var. I, pp. 294-295.
54. "अमूर्तस्य चक्राशस्य भाग्नयस्य ज्ञे प्रतिबिम्बत्वदमूर्तस्य
 प्रदम्नोऽपि प्रतिबिम्बत्वमभात् ।"
PPV. Var. I, p. 289.
Cf. "न व अमूर्तस्य प्रदम्नः प्रतिबिम्बत्वमभः अमूर्तस्याप्याकाशस्य
 स्वाश्रितामृतादिविशिष्टस्य ज्ञे प्रतिबिम्बभावदर्शनात् ।"
VPS. Var. I, p. 83.
55. "जानुमात्रप्रमाणेऽपि ज्ञे दूरविशालाकागदर्शनात्, क्लान्तराकाश
 स्य अभादिप्रतिबिम्बवृत्तौ दृश्यत इति वस्तुगम्यत्वात्"
PPV. Var. I, p. 289.
Cf. क्लान्तराकाश स्य अभादिप्रतिबिम्बाधारः, इति चेत्, न.
 जानुमात्रेऽपि ज्ञे दूरविशालाकागदर्शनात् ।
VPS. Var. I, pp. 83-84.
56. "स्यं स्यं प्रतिबिम्बो वसुधं"
Bgh. Up. II. v. 19, Katha. Up. V. ix. 10.
57. "सुधा वसुधा येन दृश्यते क्लान्द्रवम्"
Brahmabindu, 12
58. "अत एव योममा तर्कतादिवत् ।"
Br. Sū. III. 11. 18.
59. ननु घटाकाशप्रदुषाद्यवच्छिन्नो जीवः किं न स्यात् ? न-ज्ञानान्तरित्वाभावात्
 उपाधिभिः अण्डान्तर्गतिप्रदम्नः स्वस्मिन् जीवमात्रेण अवच्छिन्नतात्
 अन्तर्गच्छन्नस्य प्रदम्नः अण्डाद् बहिरेव तदभावप्रसङ्गात् तत्र सर्वगतत्वनिमित्त-
 त्वादि प्रदम्नः न स्यात् ।
PPV. Var. I, pp. 289-290.

60. यो विज्ञाने तिष्ठन् विज्ञानादन्तरः, यं विज्ञानं न वेद,
यस्य विज्ञानं शरीरम्, यो विज्ञानान्तरो यमयति, स्य
त आत्मान्तर्याम्यमृतः ।
Bṛh. Up. XII. vii. 22.
61. अयच्छिन्नप्रदेशैकव्यच्छिन्नस्य द्विगुणीकृत्य वृत्त्ययीनात् ।
PFV. Var. I. p. 290.
तथा सति जीवोपाधिमध्ये ब्रह्मणोऽपि सत्त्वे चैतन्यं
तत्र द्विगुणं स्यात्, न वैवर्माकाशस्य एते द्वेगुण्यं दृष्टम् ।
VBS. Var. I. p. 84.
62. प्रतितित्वपथे तु जगत्तत्त्वाभाविताकारो तत्त्वेय प्रतितित्वाकाशदर्शनात्
स्कन्ध द्विगुणीकृत्य वृत्त्ययपरतः जीवावच्छेदेऽपि ब्रह्मणोऽपि
नियन्तृत्वादित्येण अवस्थानमुपपद्यते इति प्रतितित्वपथ एव ज्ञेयमिति ।
PFV. Var. I. pp. 290-291.
63. जीवो हि नाम देवताया आभासमात्रम् ।
Śā. on Chā. Up. VI. iii. 2.
64. बोधामात्रो बुद्धिगतः कर्ता स्यात्पुण्यपापयोः ।
Lakṣhu-vākya-vṛtti, v. 2.
65. बुद्धितत्कारणोपाधी तैजोऽवरसंज्ञो ।
BUBV. I. iv. 614.
According to Suresvara, Brahman essentially is neither
the cause, nor the inner controller, nor the witness
of the universe. But through its association with
avidyā, Brahman itself attains the status of Īvara
and becomes the cause, the inner controller, and the
witness, of the universe. Similarly, Brahman in its
essence is neither a cognizer, nor an agent, nor an
enjoyer. But through its association with the
intellect, Brahman itself attains the status of Jīva
and becomes a cognizer, an agent, and an enjoyer.
Cf. अविवर्माकाशोपायेतद् ब्रह्म कारणमुच्यते ।
तदेव ज्ञातृतामेति बुद्ध्युपाधित्माख्यात् ॥
- BUBV. II. iii. 7.
Cf. also BUBV. II. iii. 10 and IV. iii. 303.

66. अवास्ताविदातज्जत्वावस्थानादुचितगोचरः ।
 स्वामासाविद्योपाधिः सन् साध्यन्तर्गमितां कृजेत् ।
BUBV. I. iv. 151.
 Cf. also BUBV. II. 111. 10 and IV. 111. 303.
 Cf. Anandagiri's commentary on the above Vārttika-
 "विदाभासविशिष्टाविद्योपाधेः साधित्वं तस्यैव
 मायातत्कार्यन्यन्तत्वेन अन्तर्गमित्वमिति हेतुः ।"
67. अविद्याकार्यवृद्धित्वात्प्रत्यगाभासस्य च ।
 बोधेत्यादिसमुत्थानं मयते परमात्मनः ।
BUBV. II. iv. 472.
68. For a detailed account of the nature of the ābhāsa,
 vide Dr. Satya Deva Mishra, 'The Theory of Appearance
 in Śaṅkara Vedānta', Indian Philosophical Annual,
 Vol. V. 1969, University of Madras, pp. 272-290.
69. Cf. US. XVIII. vv. 31-50.
- 69 a) तच्च न तर्कं, मयविद्युत्तादर्थं तिर्यङ्निरीयमाणं वा
 तस्मिन्निर्दिष्टात् । नाप्यस्य अपरोक्षप्रतिभासात् ।
 तस्मादनिर्वचनीयं स्य आभासस्तस्माच्च अन्यन्मुचमिति भावः ।
Rāmācīrṇa's Padārthasāra on US. XVIII. 32.
70. तस्य च प्रतिबिम्बस्य तस्यत्वमेवेति प्रतिबिम्बवादिनः ।
 मिथ्यात्वमेवेत्याभासवादिनः ।
SB. P. 16.

71. Cf. "Abhāsa is both reflection and illusion: Pratibimba is only reflection. So Abhāsa is a larger category."
R.D. Ranade, Vedanta, The Culmination of Indian Thought, p.135.
72. "अज्ञानोपहित आत्मा अज्ञानतादात्म्यापन्नः
स्वविदाभासाविवेकादन्तर्यामी साधी जगत्कारणमिति च कथ्यते ।
SB, pp.26-27.
73. "बुद्ध्युपहितस्य तत्तादात्म्यापन्नः स्वविदाभासाविवेकाज्जीवः
वर्तमानोऽयं प्रमातेति च कथ्यते इति धार्मिककारणादाः ।
Op.cit. p.27.
- 73 मिथ्यात्वपक्षेऽपि तस्याधिष्ठानीभूताविरतादात्म्याभावात्
वैतनत्वमिति भावः ।
Brahmananda's Ishya-ratnavali on SB, p.160.
74. प्रतिदेहं बुद्धीनां च भिन्नत्वात् तद्वगतविदाभासमेवेन
तद्विषयवर्तमानं चैतन्यमपि भिन्नमिव प्रतीयते । SB, p.27.
75. स्वाभावैर्बुद्धतामेति मनोबुद्ध्यादुपाधिभिः । BUAV, II.1v.425.
76. अज्ञानस्य तु सर्वत्राभिन्नत्वात् तद्वगतविदाभासमेवेदमाभावात्
तद्विविक्तताधिहितन्यस्य न कदापिदपि भेदमानम् ।
SB, p.27.
77. न च आभासस्यैव ब्रह्मत्वात् केवलवैतन्यस्य च गुरुतत्वात्
अन्यमोक्षोर्वेयविकरणं स्वभावार्थं प्रवृत्त्यनुपपत्तिरिति वाच्यम्,
केवलवैतन्यस्यैव आगारात् ब्रह्मत्वानुपपत्त्यात्, तद्वर्त
धार्मिककारणादेः -
अथमेव हि नोऽन्यो यत्संतायतिः प्रमाणम् ।
[SB. 3. भा. वा. 2. 4. 137] इति.
Ibid.

Cf. अकार्यकरणोऽप्यारमा बुद्धिप्राणादिहेतुः ।
अपिधया चिदाभासः संहारीवाजमातते ॥ -
BUBV. IV. 111. 406.

Cf. also Anandagiri's gloss thereon -

"आत्मा वस्तुतोऽप्योऽपि स्वाविधया बुद्ध्यादौ संहारहेतो
स्थितः स्वाभासद्वारा संहारित्वाभासमनुभवति इत्यर्थः ।"

78. तेन शुद्धैतन्यस्य आभास एव बन्धः तन्निवृत्तिरस्य मोक्षः
इति न किञ्चिदप्यन्वयम् ।"
SB. p. 28.

79. तथा च स्वीयवास्तवमुपयस्वरूपप्राप्तये स्वस्य बद्धत्वा नागार्थमपि
प्रवृत्तिः न दोषायः ।
Brahmananda's Nyāya-ratnōvatī on SB. p. 223.

80. अपिधयास्तद्वर्णोऽपि रज्जुः स्पर्शमतागिव ।
कोशमन्वक्तारं यातस्तमकुशोऽस्तीति हि ॥
TUBV. 11. 259.

अपिधया तदोदस्य रज्ज्वा रज्जुमिव स्वयम् ।
अहित्वेनाद्याद् बोधात्कुरो कर्तृभोषतुभिः ॥
Op.cit. 11. 463.

81. Cf. लोकागदवाच्यस्य मिध्यात्वेऽपि तत्सत्त्वस्य
सन्मात्रस्य सत्यत्वमिति व्यवस्था ।
Anandagiri's Chāndogya-bhāṣya-tīkā, VI. iv. 3.
Cf. also SLB. I. p. 77.

82. Cf. BUBV. II. 1. 506-521.

83. आरमाभासोऽपि योऽज्ञाने तत्कार्यं याजमातते ।
कार्यकारणतास्यस्तमप्येवोऽतिवर्तते ॥
Op.cit. IV. 111. 1320.

84. ED. VII. 27-31.
85. CS. 313. I. pp. 94-95.
86. हे परमं च जीवमावेन अवच्छेदयैतन्न्यप्रदेशस्य मेदेन
कृताहानाकृताभ्यागमप्रसङ्गात् ।
Op. cit. I. p. 71.
87. प्रतिबिम्बपक्षेऽपि त्वानन्तर्गतस्य स्वतन्निहितस्य
यैतन्न्यप्रदेशस्य अन्तःकरणे प्रतिबिम्बस्य वपतव्यतया
तत्र तत्र अन्तःकरणस्य गमने विम्बमेवात् तत्प्रतिबिम्बस्यापि
मेषावश्यमावेन दीयतां स्यात् ।
Op. cit. I. p. 98.
87. * न जलसूर्यादितुल्यत्वमिष्टोपपद्यते तद्वदगृहणात्
सूर्यादिभ्यो हि मूर्तेभ्यः पृथग्भूतं विप्रकृष्टदेशं मूर्तं ज्ञेयं
गृह्यते तत्र युक्तः सूर्यादिप्रतिबिम्बोदयः । न
त्वात्मा न चात्मात्पृथग्भूताः विप्रकृष्टदेशाश्च उपाध्यः
सर्वगतत्वात्सर्वान्वयत्वाच्च । तस्मादयुक्तोऽयं दृष्टान्त उच्यते ।
BSP. XII. 11. 19, p. 710.
88. युक्त एव स्वयं दृष्टान्तो विवक्षितार्थमात् । नहि
दृष्टान्तदाहर्तान्तिष्ठयोः कश्चित्कश्चिद्विवक्षितार्थं भवत्वा
सर्वसारूप्यं तेनपिदुर्दर्शयितुं शक्यते, सर्वसारूप्ये हि दृष्टान्तदाहर्त-
ान्तिकगावोच्येद एव स्यात् ।
Op. cit. XII. 11. 20, p. 710.
89. जलगतं हि सूर्यप्रतिबिम्बं जलपृष्ठी पश्यते जलदृष्टे इत्यतः जलचक्षणे
पश्यति जलमेवेति मियते इत्येवं जलधर्मानुपायि भवति न तु परमार्थतः
सूर्यस्य तथात्वमस्ति ।
Ibid.

90. एतच्च सर्वमुदाहरणभारं बुधितान्त्र्यायानुसृतित्वा
तद्वर्तभावनापरिहाराय बुधिसाम्यार्थं च, न वस्तुन
एव साधयितव्ये ।
PE. Var. I, p. 113.
91. R.D. Ranade, Vedanta, The Culmination of Indian
Thought, pp. 135-136.
92. अतद्वर्गो ह्ययं पुरुषः ।
Brah. 32. IV. 111. 13.
- 92 a. स्फटिकलोहितपट्टद्वयान्तेन आरम्भनि कर्तृत्वादेरारोपितत्वम्,
प्रतिबिम्बद्वयान्तेन बीजब्रह्मेण्यम्, पटाकायद्वयान्तेन
अव्यक्तादारेण विगुह्यार्थतीयप्रत्यगतरमता ।
VPS. Var. V. p. 273.
93. Dr. T. N. S. Mahadevan, The Philosophy of Advaita, p. 226.

CHAPTER VI

THE NATURE OF MOKṢA AND THE MEANS THEREFOR

a) The Nature of Mokṣa:

According to Advaita, as for all systems of Indian Philosophy, both orthodox as well as heterodox, except Cārvāka, liberation (mokṣa) alone is considered to be the supreme human goal (parama-puruṣārtha). Its supremacy consists in its being eternal, as compared with three other human goals, i.e., dharma, artha, and kāma, which are non-eternal. The eternality of mokṣa is ascertained from such Śruti texts as 'He does not return again' (Chā. Up. VIII.15.1).¹ This text declares that one, who attains liberation, will not be subject to transmigration again.

Liberation, according to Advaita, consists in the individual soul (jīva) realising directly its own essential nature as Brahman, the Absolute, which is of the nature of reality, consciousness, and bliss (satcīdananda). It, in other words, is the state of jīva's identity with Brahman-Ātman. Śaṅkara describes liberation as "that incorporeal entity, which is real in the absolute sense, immutably eternal, all-pervasive like ether, free from

all modifications, ever content, partless, self effluent by nature, in which neither good, nor evil, nor effect, nor past, nor present, nor future has any place."² Undoubtedly, this entity is nothing but Brahman itself. Thus, in the view of Śaṅkara, the state of liberation is identical with Brahman.³ For liberation, according to him, is merely the realisation of one's identity with Brahman and nothing else.⁴

The state of liberation, thus being identical with Brahman, the Supreme Truth, cannot be logically explained in any precise terms, because it transcends all empirical categories, in terms of which the logical explanation of it could be possible. It is really a matter for realisation but not for explanation. And so long as it is not realised, it is to be grasped through negative descriptions in terms of what it is not and with the help of some superlatives. That is all. But it should also be strictly noted that because the Advaita concept of liberation defies all logical expression, it is not an empty concept signifying nothing. It, on the contrary, signifies the highest spiritual truth, which cannot be explained in words, but is to be experienced in the deepest meditative trance (samādhi). Thus, the state of liberation, in the absolute sense, is anirvacanīya, the realm of "Silence."

The Advaita concept of liberation as the state of identity with Brahman is integrally connected with the basic Advaita view that the so called jīva, the individual soul, in essence, is the same as Brahman, which is infinite, ever-liberated, and non-dual. The jīva, as stated earlier, is Brahman-Ātman itself appearing through the limiting adjuncts - mind, senses, and body, which are the products of avidyā. The difference, therefore, between jīva and Brahman is only apparent and not ultimately real. But the jīva, though essentially identical with infinite Brahman, forgets, as it were, its innate identity with it due to the influence of beginningless avidyā, which conceals the true nature of Brahman, and consequently undergoes transmigration, associating wrongly itself with the finite mind-body complex. Further, owing to the wrong association of jīva with the mind-body complex, the attributes of the latter are superimposed on the former. And on account of this superimposition, the jīva is wrongly viewed as involved in action and enjoyment and as subjected to birth and death. This is the state of bondage. In this state arises the sense of individuality in the form of 'I' and 'mine' owing to which the individual soul fails to know its own essential nature as the eternal bliss, strives after temporal and transitory objects, and, in consequence, experiences

miserly and suffering. In this way, the jīva, though in reality ever free and eternally pure, appears as bound in the transmigratory existence, due to avidyā and its products. Bondage, according to Advaita, thus consists in the erroneous association of the Self with the mind-body complex through the influence of avidyā. The foregoing account makes it clear that the root cause of bondage and of all subsequent evils is avidyā. The only means, therefore, to overcome all sorts of evils is to uproot avidyā. This can be possible only by the right knowledge (paramārthajñāna) of Brahman.⁵ The moment this right knowledge arises, avidyā and the products thereof are totally removed; and simultaneously the jīva shines forth in its true nature as the Self-luminous Brahman-Ātman. And this is liberation.

Śaṅkara, in his commentary on the Brahma-sūtra, gives the following account: The Supreme Brahman, which is ever free from all evils, is the real nature (paramārthika-svarūpa) of jīva, the individual soul, as shown in such Upaniṣadic texts as "That thou art." But the nature of jīva as an agent, an enjoyer etc. is not so real; it being only imagined due to the limiting adjuncts.⁶ The characteristics of being an agent, an enjoyer, etc. constitute the individuality, the jīvahood, of the

individual soul. This individuality (jīvatva) of the individual soul persists only so long as the latter does not get rid of its nescience (avidyā) in the form of duality, and does not realize its own Self as Brahman, which is immutably eternal and a witness by nature.⁷

The nescience of the individual soul may be compared to the false idea of a person, who, in a twilight, mistakes a post for a man, a rope for a serpent. But when the individual is roused from the assemblage of body, senses, mind, and intellect by the Upaniṣad, which makes him understand, "You are not the assemblage of body, etc., nor are you a transmigratory being, but you are that Truth - the Brahman-Ātman of the nature of pure consciousness only," then, that every individual soul, having realized the Brahman-Ātman, and having risen above its identity with body, mind, etc., becomes Brahman-Ātman itself.⁸ This is declared in such Upaniṣadic texts as, "Anyone, who knows that Supreme Brahman, becomes Brahman indeed" (Īṣa. Up. III.11.9). That alone is the real nature of the individual soul in the truest sense wherein it manifests in its own nature after rising above the body.⁹

Prior to the rise of discriminating knowledge, however, the real nature of the individual soul as pure consciousness remains mixed up, as it were, with the

limiting adjuncts such as body, mind, senses, etc. The real nature of a crystal, viz., its purity and whiteness, for instance, remains indistinguishably mixed up, as it were, with the limiting adjuncts such as redness and blueness, prior to its being understood with proper discrimination.¹⁰ But when it is understood with proper discrimination arising from a valid means of knowledge, the crystal is said to attain its true nature of purity and whiteness, even though it was exactly so even before. Similarly, in the case of the individual soul, remaining indistinguishably mixed up with such limiting adjuncts as body, etc., when there arises the proper discriminatory knowledge from the Upanishads, it gives up its false identity with body, etc., and attains its real nature as the absolute Brahman-Ātman.¹¹ Thus it is only due to the fact of discrimination or want of discrimination respectively that there is unembodied condition (anāṁ) or embodied condition (bandha) for the Self. In reality, however, there is no any such distinction as embodiedness or unembodiedness, as declared in the Āruti text, "Bodiless in the midst of bodies" (Ka. Up. I. 11. 22), and in the Śaṅkṛti text, "The Supreme Self, Oh son of Kuntī, neither acts, nor is affected though existing in the body" (BG. XIII. 31).¹² Therefore, the individual soul, continuing in the state of unmanifested nature, owing to lack of discrimination, is said to have its real nature manifested,

when the discriminatory knowledge dawns.¹³

From what has been stated so far it is clear that, according to Śaṅkara, liberation is nothing but the realization of one's own essential nature as the absolute Brahman-Ātman, by giving up one's adventitious nature of finitude, agency, etc. The absolute Brahman-Ātman, being the essential nature of the jīva, is ever-attained and ever existent. But it is concealed from the view of jīva due to the influence of beginningless avidyā and hence appears as what is to be attained. So the only obstacle in the way of attaining liberation is avidyā. The moment this obstacle is dispelled by the right knowledge, the jīva realizes its absolute identity with Brahman-Ātman, which constitutes the attainment of liberation. The attainment of liberation, in the view of Advaita, therefore, does not mean the creation of anything new, but only realization of something, which was already there without our knowing it. In other words, the attainment of liberation is merely ascertainment or awareness of one's real nature, which is ever existent, and not acquisition or accomplishment of a new state of existence. For instance, a prince brought up as a hunter since his childhood and later on discovering that he belongs to a royal family, does not really attain any new status, but simply realizes his real status. Similarly a person, who attains liberation,

does not gain anything afresh and anew, but simply regains his real nature (avarūḍhvatī). That is why the Chāṇḍogya Upaniṣad speaks of liberation as the manifestation of the soul in its own real nature.¹⁴ If liberation consists in attaining anything new, the above Upaniṣadic view will not hold good. Therefore, in the state of liberation, the jīva manifests in its own real nature, but not as possessed of any adventitious nature.¹⁵ In this way, according to Advaita, liberation is an ever-accomplished fact (śiddha-yaṁ). And it is not something to be achieved newly (anābhava). If it were so, it would become impermanent. But all who believe in liberation admit it to be eternal.^{15a}

Further, according to Advaita, liberation is not conditioned by any particular place, time, etc. Since liberation is merely the discovery of one's essential nature, which is achieved through the right knowledge arising from the Upaniṣads, it can be attained here and now and not hereafter anywhere in the imagined regions like svarga or pātāla. For, the nature of right knowledge is such that it does not presuppose any interval after its rise to yield fruit. As soon as the right knowledge dawns, liberation is attained. Hence, one need not wait till his death for attaining it. On the dawn of Brahman-knowledge, one attains liberation even while living in this body. In this way,

liberation is not an unseen fruit (~~adṛṣṭa-phaḥa~~), which is to be gained after death, but a seen fruit (~~drṣṭa-phaḥa~~), which can be experienced even in the present life. The Brhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad, therefore, proclaims: "One attains Brahman here (in this very body)" (Bṛh. Up. IV. iv. 7).¹⁶ Such a conception regarding the nature of mokṣa, in fact, is one of the unique features of Advaita philosophy.

The attainment of liberation, moreover, does not involve the process of going. A person attaining liberation does not go anywhere, because, as already stated, liberation is nothing but the ascertainment of one's own inherent nature as Brahman-Ātman. Brahman-Ātman, being all-pervading, immanent in all, and the Self of all, is ever-reached; and hence can never be the goal of the process of going. Because, what has already been reached cannot again be sought to be reached. The well known fact in the ordinary world is that it is one thing that goes towards some other thing.¹⁷ That is, the process of going always involves two different things. For instance, a person goes towards a certain village, which is something different from him. But since the jīva and Brahman are absolutely non-different, it is not reasonable to hold that the former goes towards the latter. Even when the Upaniṣads sometimes mention the process of going towards Brahman, the goal of such a

process should be understood to be the conditioned Brahman (saguna-Brahman) and not the absolute Brahman (para-Brahman) which is omnipresent and the innermost Self of one who goes.¹⁸ The Upanisadic text, "His organs do not depart. Being but Brahman he is merged in Brahman" (Aph.Up. IV. iv. 6) denies any going towards Supreme Brahman.¹⁹ On the other hand, if Brahman is supposed to be the goal of the process of going, the individual soul, which travels towards It, must be either a part, or a transformation of It (Brahman), or something different from It; for travelling is impossible in a case of absolute identity.²⁰ But since Brahman is ascertained to be partless, immutable, and non-dual, the individual soul can neither be a part, nor a transformation of Brahman, nor something different from It.

Another distinguishing feature of Advaita is that, according to it, liberation is the state of supreme bliss and hence it is something positive in nature. Since, according to Advaita, Brahman-Ātman is the supreme bliss, liberation, which consists in realising one's own essential nature as Brahman-Ātman, is of the nature of absolute bliss.²¹ It is, therefore, quite inadequate to describe it negatively in terms of mere absence of misery. Liberation is not simply a state of cessation of sorrow and suffering, but is one of supreme happiness. The worldly

happiness, which is obtained through external means and bodily accomplishments, is limited and surpassable (sāṭīśaya). But the happiness attained by a liberated soul is infinite and unsurpassable (anīśaya),²² because it does not depend upon any other factors such as sense-object contact, etc. No means is required for its existence or for experiencing it, because it i.e., Brahman-bliss is our own essential nature and hence ever existent and eternally attained. What is required is merely the removal of avidyā, which obstructs the manifestation of the real nature of Brahman-Ātman; and the moment this is accomplished, the self-luminous Brahman-Ātman of the nature of supreme bliss shines of its own accord. But it should be strictly noted that the absolute Brahman-bliss attained by a liberated soul does not involve any such distinctions as happiness and the experiencer thereof; because, on the consequence of the removal of avidyā, the soul becomes Brahman-bliss itself. Such distinctions as the happiness and one who experiences it would be meaningful only if there is any sort of difference in Brahman. But Brahman is essentially non-dual. Śrutis proclaim that there is no duality whatever in Brahman.²³ Brahman transcends all sorts of differences. Since, avidyā, the root cause of all distinctions, is totally annihilated by the right knowledge, such distinctions as happiness and the experiencer thereof will

not remain in the state of liberation. In fact, liberation is the state of one's absolute identity with the supreme bliss, which is Brahman.

b) Knowledge: The Sole Means to Liberation:

According to Advaita, liberation, which is the supreme human goal (parama-purushārtha), can be achieved by knowledge alone. As it has already been noted, the root cause of bondage and of all subsequent evils of the individual soul is avidyā or ajñāna, nescience. For, it is on account of nescience that the individual soul imagines itself to be finite, to be transmigrating from one life to another, to be different from Brahman, the absolute reality, and hence undergoes all sorts of suffering. The nature of avidyā is such that it not only conceals the truth but also creates something false in its place. Since avidyā can be removed only by its contrary vidyā or jñāna, knowledge, Advaitins maintain that knowledge is the sole means to liberation.²⁴ That avidyā or ignorance is removable solely by knowledge is a matter of common experience. For when a person is ignorant of a particular object, say pot, he desires to remove that ignorance by gaining the true knowledge of that pot. Apart from knowledge, there is absolutely no other means to remove that ignorance. Hence, avidyā or ignorance of the real nature of Brahman-Ātman, which is

the cause of bondage, can be removed by the true knowledge of Brahman-Ātman only. That the knowledge of Brahman-Ātman alone is the means of attaining liberation, is ascertained from such Śruti texts as "Knowing that alone, one passes beyond death; no other path exists to go by" (Śve. Up. III.8).²⁵ The knowledge here means the final, immediate intuition of the identity of the jīva and Brahman arising from the Upaniṣadic texts like "That thou art."²⁶ And this saving knowledge is immediate (aparokṣa) in character, because, if it were mediate (parokṣa), it would not be capable of removing the jīva's delusion, which is immediate.²⁷

Liberation cannot be achieved through any action (karma). For what is achieved through action is bound to perish. But liberation is imperishable. The result obtained through action is one of four kinds: origination (utpatti), attainment (prāpti), modification (vikṛti), and purification (śuddhi). Liberation is different from these.²⁸ Since Brahman-Ātman, the realisation of which constitutes liberation, is ever existent, ever attained, immutably eternal, and ever pure, none of the above kinds of result obtained through action is applicable to liberation. Liberation is not something to be produced (utpādyā); nor is it something to be modified (vikāryā). For, in the ordinary world, things like curds, etc., which are modified,

and things like pot, etc., which are produced, are not observed to be permanent.²⁹ But liberation is everlasting. Nor liberation is a thing to be acquired (prāpya); for it being the essential nature of one's very Self, there can be no acquisition of it. Even if Brahman be different from oneself, there can be no acquisition; for, Brahman, being all-pervasive like ether, is ever attained by every body.³⁰ Liberation cannot also be something to be purified (śodhakārya). Purification is achieved either through the addition of some quality or removal of some defect. But since liberation is of the very nature of Brahman, on which no excellence can be effected, purification is not possible here through the addition of any quality. Nor is that possible through the removal of any defect, for liberation is of the very nature of Brahman that is ever pure (nitya-śuddha).³¹ A thing, which is to be either produced, or modified, or acquired or purified, is dependant on action. But liberation, as already noted, is neither of these. Action can, therefore, play no part in attaining it. Only ignorance (avidyā) concerning Brahman-Ātman has to be set aside, which is accomplishable solely by knowledge.

Since Brahman, which is no other than the inward Self of the individual soul, is ever liberated (nitya-mukta)

and ever existent, liberation is always attained. Though it is ever attained, it seems to be unattained as it were, due to the influence of avidyā. And therefore, one desires to attain it. When the right knowledge dawns, liberation is attained as it were. It is the attainment of what is already attained (prāpta-prāpti). This idea finds support in the Bhagadārāyaṇa text which says: "Being (already) Brahman, he attains Brahman."²² Similarly, the condition of bondage, which is conjured up by avidyā and its products, is not real, and hence it is always removed in the case of the ever free Self. At the dawn of right knowledge, it is removed as it were. It is the removal of what is already removed (nivṛttāya nivṛtti). This idea is supported by the Kāṭha text: "And being (already) free, one is liberated."³³ For the attainment of what is not already attained and for the removal of what is not already removed, action is necessary. For instance, in reaching a village not already attained, and in removing a rope entangling one's feet, there is required some sort of action in the form of movement, etc. But in the case of the attainment of what is already attained and the removal of what is already removed, action is not necessary.³⁴ For instance, in attaining a gold necklace, which a person wrongly thinks to have been lost, though in truth it is there around his very neck already; and in removing the serpent, which is imagined

to be there in the rope, though in reality it is not there, any amount of action will not do. Because in both these cases avidyā or ignorance is operative and thus what is already there is obscured, and what is not there already is fancied to be there, and hence it is an illusion. So what is required is the removal of avidyā, which is achievable only through knowledge and not through any action. For attaining a gold necklace, which is wrongly thought to have been lost, mere knowledge of the fact that it (gold necklace) is on one's very body is sufficient; and in removing a rope-serpent, the knowledge of the fact that the object in front is only a rope and not the serpent alone is sufficient. Similarly, in the attainment of the eternally attained liberation and in the removal of eternally removed bondage, what is required is the right knowledge of Brahman-Ātman. Advaitins, therefore, conclude that apart from knowledge and knowledge alone, there cannot be the slightest touch of action in attaining liberation.³⁵

c) Refutation of Jñāna-karma-samuccaya-vāda - The Theory of the Combination of Knowledge and Action:

The supremacy of knowledge in attaining the final emancipation has been discussed so far. However, all the Vedāntins do not admit knowledge to be the sole means to liberation. They, in fact, agree that knowledge (jñāna)

is the indispensable means; but they further maintain that it should be combined with action (karma) for bringing about liberation (mokṣa). According to these Vedāntic thinkers, thus, it is not knowledge alone, but the combination (saṃyoga) of both knowledge and action, that is the direct means to liberation. But Śaṅkara's tradition of Vedānta does not accept this view. Sureśvara, in his Naishanagya-siddhi and Vārttika refers to three different schools of 'Jñāna-karma-saṃyoga-vāda', and vehemently refutes them.

The first two views are ascribed respectively to Brahmadatta and Maṇḍana.³⁶ According to these views, the mere comprehension of the import of statements such as 'I am Brahman' is not capable of directly bringing about the final emancipation. An aspirant after liberation has to first comprehend from the Upaniṣads the truth that the jīva is essentially Brahman itself. But the knowledge of absolute identity between the jīva and Brahman, derived from the Upaniṣadic texts, is only mediated; and hence it cannot dispel the root negligence. Therefore, one has to repeatedly meditate upon that Upaniṣadic knowledge with a full concentration of mind, until it is transformed and refined into an immediate intuition of Brahman, which puts an end to the binding negligence. In this way, it is

this prolonged and intense meditation - variously termed prasaṅkhyāna, bhāvanā, or upāsana, that leads to the final liberating knowledge, which the Upaniṣadic texts fail to give. And thus, according to these views, there is an interval between the acquisition of the Upaniṣadic knowledge and the final liberating experience accruing from meditation. Since, during this interval, the initiate is still in the realm of avidyā, the performance of all obligatory rites is both possible and necessary.³⁷ If, during this stage, one gives up these rites, it would lead to sin (durita), which binds him again in the cycle of birth and death. One should, therefore, carry on all the Scripture-ordained duties along with meditation, which is itself a form of inward and mental karma, till the attainment of Brahman-realisation. In this way, according to Brahmaṇḍa and Maṇḍana, though knowledge is indispensable, it is not sufficient, and for the achievement of liberation, knowledge should be combined with action (karma).

Sureśvara and Śaṅkara's tradition of Vedānta in general reject the above views, by showing the untenability of the dominance of meditation (prasaṅkhyāna) over the Upaniṣadic knowledge in directly effectuating the final liberation. Upaniṣads are independent means of valid knowledge (pramāṇa). Now, the distinctive feature of a pramāṇa is that it does

not require any direct assistance of other factors in revealing pramāṇa. When the conditions become favourable, it directly reveals pramāṇa by its own inherent power. Otherwise, if a pramāṇa depends upon other factors in doing so, it loses its intrinsic validity (svataḥ prāmāṇya).³⁸ Therefore, it should be admitted that the Upaniṣads also, being a pramāṇa, directly reveal the true nature of Brahman, without any direct assistance whatsoever from meditation. And the question whether the verbal statements give mediate knowledge or immediate knowledge depends entirely on the nature of pramāṇa. Verbal statements can give only mediate knowledge of a mediate object but an immediate one of an immediate object. Since Brahman, which is essentially non-different from the inward self of the jīva, is ascertained to be direct and immediate, the mahāvākyas like 'I am Brahman' also can give rise to the immediate knowledge of Brahman.³⁹ In this way, since the knowledge arising from the mahāvākyas is itself immediate in nature, there is no need of any assistance from pramāṇa, which, according to the opponent, is necessary to convert the mediate knowledge into immediate. And if the knowledge derived from the Upaniṣads is invariably mediate in nature, then, there is absolutely no chance of transforming it into immediate. For instance, the mediate knowledge of fire, arrived at through inference, can never be converted into

immediate through repeated meditation.⁴⁰ Prasādhyaṇa, therefore, has no direct bearing upon the final liberating knowledge. But it does not mean that Śaṅkara's followers altogether dismiss the scope for meditation. They do provide scope for meditation in the preliminary stages of spiritual life.⁴¹ For, the practice of repeated meditation brings about concentration of mind (cittaikāntya) and also removes the factors such as the improbabilities, contrary notions, etc., which obstruct the rise of immediate knowledge from the Upanisadic statements. Prasādhyaṇa is thus only an indirect aid to the right understanding of the mahāvākyas like 'I am Brahman' and that is the final liberating knowledge. Therefore, there is no any interval between the acquisition of the Upanisadic knowledge and the actual liberation, during which interval the performance of all obligatory duties would be both possible and necessary. The Upanisadic knowledge, when it is perfect, at once destroys the basic ignorance that bears the forms of action and the factors involved therein; and it does not stand in need of any further meditation. Therefore, the combination of knowledge and action is neither possible, nor is it necessary.⁴²

The third kind of 'Jñāna-karma-samuccaya-vāda' is attributed to Bhartṛhari. Bhartṛhari's doctrine

of śaṃkara is directly connected with the theory of Ultimate Reality held by him. He maintained the theory of 'identity in difference', also described as bheda-bheda-vāda or dvaitādvaita-vāda.⁴³ According to this theory, Brahman is, at once, one and many. Brahman, considered as Brahman, is one, but as the universe it is many; just as a tree or an ocean as such is one, but as roots, branches, leaves, or waves, foam, etc., it is many. Hence, according to Bhakti-prapāṇa, duality and non-duality are equally real, both being the essential aspects of the same reality. And since duality is as real as non-duality, the performance of obligatory duties remains always indispensable in one's life, because karma is binding upon all who believe that duality is valid. "But a mere adherence to karma means the recognition of only diversity and not also the unity underlying it. For realising the latter, which is what the common man misses, jñāna is essential; so that mokṣa is attained only by a combination of both."⁴⁴

Sureśvara rejects this view by showing the untenability of the theory of ultimate Reality maintained by Bhakti-prapāṇa. The latter, as stated already, maintains that Brahman is, at once, one and dual. But according to Sureśvara, as for all Advaitins, two attributes, duality and non-duality, which are so opposed to each other as darkness and light, cannot

both be true of the same entity.⁴⁵ Therefore, Brahman, which is the Ultimate Reality, cannot be both dual and non-dual. But, on the contrary, Brahman should be admitted to be one only, non-dual, as shown in the Upaniṣads. Further, what is Reality in the true sense of the term does not require and cannot be dependant on anything else, different from itself, and such a Reality is Brahman alone. The world of duality, on the other hand, is not self-dependant, but is solely dependant on Brahman for its existence; and hence it is not ultimately real but only a seeming appearance through avidyā. The disputed combination of jñāna and karma would have been plausible, if both duality and non-duality were ultimately true. But as noted already, non-dual Brahman alone is the ultimate Reality and the so-called duality is not ultimately valid, as it is only an appearance through avidyā and hence sublatable by the right knowledge of Brahman. Therefore, the performance of karma, which necessarily presupposes the belief in the validity of duality, does not remain indispensable throughout in the process of Brahman-realisation.

In all the above theories, it is not the knowledge alone, but knowledge combined with action, that constitutes the direct means of liberation. As already pointed out, even though the exponents of these theories admit knowledge

(jñāna) to be indispensable, still they attempt to accommodate karma also along with jñāna in spiritual life. Karmas here mean the scripture-ordained actions relative to particular varṇaśāstra, etc. But according to Śaṅkara's followers, since the removal of avidyā, the only obstacle in the way of attaining the ever-attained liberation, is achieved only through its contrary vidyā (knowledge), karma, which is itself a product of avidyā and hence not opposed to it, has no direct bearing upon liberation. The combination, therefore, of jñāna and karma as the direct means of liberation can never be possible.⁴⁶

Further, knowledge and action are diametrically opposed to each other in respect of their source (hetu), nature (svabhāva), and effect (kārya). The source of knowledge is a pramāṇa, a valid means of knowledge, but the sources of action are ignorance and desire. The nature of knowledge is to reveal reality, but action, which involves duality in the form of means and end, doer and deed, conceals the real. The removal of avidyā or ignorance is the effect of knowledge, but production, or attainment, or transformation, or purification is the effect of action. Two factors, which are so thoroughly opposed to each other, cannot be joined together, as light and darkness cannot be.⁴⁷ It is, therefore, futile to make any attempt to combine together

knowledge and action for the purpose of attaining liberation.

The Śrutis also lend support to the view that mokṣa is attainable only through knowledge and not through any action. The Śvetāśvatara text declares, "Knowing that alone one passes beyond death, no other path exists to go by" (III.8).⁴⁸ In the Mundakopaniṣad it is stated, "Nothing that is eternal can be gained by karma" (I.ii.12).⁴⁹ And the Mahānārāyaṇopaniṣad proclaims, "Not by rites, not by offspring, not by wealth, they have attained immortality" (XII.14).⁵⁰ These texts directly deny the instrumentality of karma to liberation, the supreme human goal.

d) Karma - The Remote Means to Liberation:

Even though Advaitins consider jñāna to be the sole means to liberation, they do not reject the utility of karma altogether in the Advaitic scheme of spiritual discipline. This is because the performance of obligatory (nitya) and occasional (niṣkāṅkṣika) rites leads to the purification of the mind, and it is only in a pure mind that the intuitive knowledge of Brahman is manifested. Hence, the aspirants after liberation (mumukṣu) seeking the knowledge of the Self must regularly and sincerely perform obligatory and occasional rites, for purposes of self-purification.⁵¹ Even

the optional rites (kānya-karma), when performed without any attachment to their fruits, lead to mental purification and lasting detachment from all transitory pleasures.⁵²

The Scripture-ordained karmas, when performed with a selfish attitude, may lead to several fruits in this world as well as in the heaven, but when performed in a spirit of dedication to God without seeking any immediate fruit, will certainly lead to mental purification. And without achieving the latter, as indicated already, one is not fit to receive the final Brahman intuition.⁵³ Karma is thus an indirect aid to the attainment of liberation. That the performance of karma is conducive to the attainment of Brahman-knowledge is declared in the Upanisadic text: "The Brāhmanas seek to know that Self through the study of the Vedas, sacrifices, charity, austerity, and fasting."^{53a}

From what has been stated so far it is clear that though Advaitins deny the utility of karma in the final stages of spiritual life, yet they consider karmas to be indispensable in the preliminary stages, as they prepare the ground for the Brahman-realisation through the mental purification and spiritual fitness. "Their value, as a means of self-realisation may not be the highest; but it is the next best and that is what is meant when they are described as 'ārādupakāra' or 'distantly conducive to

mokṣa.⁵⁴ In other words, the value of karma, in Advaita, is not overrated as karmas are not directly conducive to mokṣa; nor is it underrated as karmas are useful as preparatory for any seeker.

According to Advaita, a successive order of all the consecutive stages of the spiritual path, beginning with the performance of karma and ending with the attainment of Brahman-realisation is generally arranged in the following manner:⁵⁵

1. Performance of Scripture-ordained duties (nitya-naimittika-karmāṇuṣṭhāna);
2. Consequent accumulation of merit (dharmopāde);
3. Removal of the sin (durita-kṣaya);
4. Purification and equipment of the mind (sattva-buddhi);
5. Knowledge of the impermanence, impurity and misery of the world and empirical life (samsāra-sāratā-jñāna);
6. Utter detachment to the world and empirical life (samsāra-virakti);
7. Desire for the abandonment of worldly life (samsāra-parihīṇsā);
8. Seeking the means to that abandonment (hānopāya-paryojana);

9. An ardent desire for self-realisation (ijñāṣā);
10. Resort to positive means, leading to the desired Brahman-realisation, namely, śravaṇa, manana and nididhyāsana; and
11. Attainment of Brahman-realisation (Brahma-sākṣātkāra).

In accordance with the above arrangement, the performance of karmas enjoined by the Scriptures is the first task to be fulfilled by every seeker after liberation. But it should also be remembered that these karmas have to be performed only prior to the origination of Brahman-knowledge. Because when the knowledge of Brahman arises, liberation, which is the supreme end sought after by the spiritual aspirant, is achieved; and hence there is no need for karma after the rise of Brahman-knowledge.⁵⁶ Nor the performance of karma is possible after the rise of Brahman-knowledge. For the performance of karmas relating to one's stage and class of life necessarily involves the false identification of the pure Self with body, etc. But when the Brahman-knowledge dawns, such false identifications are totally destroyed; and, then, one realises one's absolute identity with Brahman-Ātman. How can the performance of karma, which involves the identification of the pure Self with body, etc., be possible after the rise of Brahman-knowledge, which

destroys such false identifications?⁵⁷

c) Different Views about the Utility of Karma:

It has already been noted that, according to Advaita, karmas indirectly render service to the rise of Brahman-knowledge by purifying the mind of the spiritual aspirant. But there is a difference of opinion among the post-Śaṅkara Advaitins regarding the utility of karmas in the scheme of Advaitic sādhana. The question is whether the performance of Scripture-ordained karmas i.e., sacrifices, etc. subserves the desire for knowledge or knowledge itself?

Vācaspatiśiṣya, in his Bhāṣya, maintains that karmas subserve the desire for knowledge. That is, according to Vācaspati, the performance of sacrifices, etc. enjoined by the Scriptures generates the desire of knowing Brahman (vividiṣṇ), which is requisite for knowledge.⁵⁸ Thus, in the view of Vācaspati, karma is a means of the means to knowledge (jñāna).

Vācaspati takes his stand on the Bṛhadāraṇyaka text 'tometaḥ vedaṇuvacaṇena brāhmaṇāḥ vividiṣanti yaḥkṣena dānena tapasā anāśakena',⁵⁹ which means that 'Brahmanas desire to know Him (Brahman) through the study of the Veda, through sacrifice, through charity, and through austerity and

fasting, in order to establish his view that karmas are useful only to create in man the desire to know Brahman. According to him, the above text clearly says that sacrifice, etc., are enjoined as subsidiaries to the desire to know Brahman (yividiṣā) and not as subsidiaries to the knowledge (vedang) itself; for this text is very particular in stating that Brāhmaṇas 'desire to know' (yividiṣanti) and not that they 'actually do know' (vidantī).⁶⁰

Now to explain this idea more clearly: In the text 'yividiṣanti yajña', the word 'yividiṣanti' consists of the root 'vid', which means knowledge (vedang), and the desiderative suffix 'ṣan', which is used in the sense of desire (icchā).⁶¹ Now there is a general rule that the sense of the suffix (pratyaya) is more prominent than that of the root (prakṛti).⁶² In accordance with this rule, though in fact knowledge is primary as compared with the desire therefor, yet in the word 'yividiṣanti - yaditva icchanti' it is subsidiary, it being the sense of the root, while desire, being the sense of the suffix, is primary. And it is quite obvious that activity relates to what is primary.⁶³ In the statement "Bring the king's man", for instance, the act of bringing is related not to the king but to the man. For, when one says, "Bring the king's man", one does not, verily, bring the king but brings the

man himself, because, though in fact the king is primary as compared with his man, yet in the word 'the king's man' (gāin-purusa), he is subsidiary as the qualification of 'man', while the latter i.e. man is primary.⁶⁴ Similarly, in the text 'vividisanti yajñāna', the karmas i.e. sacrifice, etc. are related not to the knowledge of Brahman, which, being the sense of the root, is not primary, but to the desire therefor, which, being the sense of the suffix, is primary. In this way, according to Vācaspatiśāstra, the study of the Veda (vedānuyoga), sacrifice (yajña), etc. are prescribed as the means not to the knowledge of Brahman but to the desire therefor.⁶⁵

While endorsing Vācaspati's view, Appayya Dīkṣita, in his Parimala, points out that Śaṅkara also is of the same view.⁶⁶ The latter, in his commentary on the Sarvālokaśādhikāraṇa states "Hence sacrifices etc. and self-control etc., which are the duties of the respective stages of life, are all but means for the emergence of knowledge. And yet among these, such means as Self-control etc., which are connected with knowledge by clause, "He who knows it as such" (Bṛh.Up. IV.iv.23),⁶⁷ are proximate to knowledge, while the other means viz., sacrifices etc., are external (i.e. remote), they being connected with the "seeking to know" (Bṛh.Up. IV.iv.22). This is how these are to be distinguished".⁶⁸

This passage clearly shows that according to Āṅkara also the karmas i.e. sacrifices, etc. are prescribed as the means to the desire of knowing Brahman. It may be added here that sureśvara in his Dhādāraṇyaka-bhāṣya-vārttika and Sarvajñān in his Saṁkṣepa-śarīraka uphold the same view.⁶⁹

sureśvara clearly says that the study of the Veda, sacrifices, etc. are enjoined as the means merely to the desire of knowing Brahman (pūrvurā), and therefore, these do not subserve the knowledge of Brahman. That is why the Śrutis lay down self-control, etc. alone as the means of attaining the right knowledge of Brahman-Ātman.⁷⁰ And sureśvara emphatically asserts that when the mind is purified by the performance of karmas dedicated to God, it (i.e. the mind) spontaneously inclines towards the inner Self. When this spontaneous inclination towards the inner Self is thus generated in the mind, the purpose of karmas is fulfilled, and then they disappear like the clouds after the rainy season.⁷¹ In this way, according to sureśvara also the karmas are helpful only to create in man the desire of knowing Brahman-Ātman.

It should be noted in this regard that even prior to the performance of sacrifices, etc. one may have a mild desire of knowing Brahman. But the ardent desire of knowing Brahman, which is considered here as the fruit of the

performance of sacrifices, etc., arises after the fulfilment of the latter. Unless such a keen desire is generated, one does not, verily, proceed to practice bravara, manana, and nididhyāsana, which are directly helpful to the rise of Brahman-knowledge. Thus, though through the purity of mind achieved by the performance of Scripture-ordained duties in past births, a man feels confidence that knowledge is the means of attaining Brahman-Ātman of the nature of unsurpassable bliss, and is anxious to attain the latter through knowledge, yet, owing to the sin accumulated in the beginningless past, he inclines towards the enjoyment of worldly pleasures. This attachment to worldly things is a great obstacle in the way of the rise of the ardent wish of knowing Brahman, subsequent to which alone one advances to resort to bravara, etc. The performance of sacrifices, etc. removes this obstacle, and, in consequence, accomplishes the required 'desire to know Brahman-Ātman' (vividisā).⁷²

Prakāśātman in his Pañcapādikā-vivaraṇa, on the other hand, maintains that the text 'vividisanti yajñāna' enjoines sacrifice, etc. as subservient to knowledge (yajñāna) itself and not merely to the desire therefor. That is, the performance of sacrifices, etc., according to him, is helpful, not to generate the desire to have the knowledge

of Brahman, but to generate the knowledge of Brahman itself.⁷³
 He asserts that the Scripture-ordained rites, when conjoined with śravaṇa, manana, etc. generate the knowledge of Brahman-Ātman.⁷⁴

Unlike Vācaspati, Prakāśātman is of the view that the prominence should always be given to the object of desire (īśyamāṇa) and not to the desire (īcchā) itself. The object of desire, in the present case, is knowledge i.e. the immediate experience of the true nature of Brahman-Ātman. And being the object of desire, Brahman-knowledge is something to be accomplished by some means, in the same way as heaven, etc., since it is a human goal (puruṣārtha). The sacrifice, etc., which are understood as means in the text 'vividhiṣanti yajñena', relate only to the desirable thing to be accomplished. And, as already stated, that desirable thing to be accomplished is the knowledge of Brahman itself. The mere desire on the other hand, is not what is to be accomplished like heaven, etc., because the desire arises spontaneously from the knowledge that something is achievable by effort, and that when achieved it will lead to desirable results. Sacrifice, etc., therefore, have no relation with the mere desire. In this way, in the view of Prakāśātman, the performance of sacrifice, etc., are proscribed as the means, not merely to the 'desire to know', but to the knowledge itself.⁷⁵

From what has been stated so far it is clear that Brakāśātman lays more stress on 'knowledge', which is the sense of the root 'vid' in the Aṅhadāraṇyaka text referred to above than on the 'desire to know', which is the sense of the suffix 'gan'. The rule that the sense of the suffix is more prominent than that of the root is a general one. But when the desire and its object are mentioned together, the prominence should be given to the object of desire alone and not to the mere desire. As for instance in the Vedic text 'avyaya-kāṃ ivotiṣṭomana yaleta' (i.e., he who is desirous of heaven should perform the Ivotiṣṭoma sacrifice), the performance of sacrifice has for its effect heaven, which is the object of desire, and not the desire itself. Or let us take an instance, namely, the worldly usage- "He desires to go on a horse". In this the means, namely, horse is understood to relate only to the object of desire i.e. going and not to desire itself. In like manner, in the text referred to above i.e. yividiṣanti yaṣṣṇa, the means, namely, the performance of sacrifice etc. relates only to knowledge, which is the object of desire, and not to the desire itself.⁷⁶

Now an objection may be raised against the view of Brakāśātman: If sacrifice etc. be the means to knowledge itself, they have to be performed upto the rise of knowledge.

In that case, the Vedic text that enjoins renunciation (śaṁnyāsa), which consists in the abandonment of actions, as the means of attaining Brahman knowledge would be meaningless.

But this objection is unsound, for, according to Prakāśātman also actions should be performed until perfect purity of mind and the consequent keen desire of knowing Brahman are generated, and afterwards they are to be abandoned. Thus the performance of actions as well as the abandonment thereof are helpful to the rise of Brahman-knowledge.⁷⁷ This idea finds solid support in Bhagavadgītā and Naishkarmya-siddhi. In the Bhagavadgītā, it is said "For one who wants to ascend to yoga (i.e. perfect mental purity and the consequent inclination towards the inner Self), action is said to be the means. To the same person, when he has ascended to yoga, hama (i.e. renunciation of action) is said to be the means" (BG.VI.3).⁷⁸ And in the Naishkarmya-siddhi it is stated "The actions having generated in the mind through its purification the inclination towards the Self, and having fulfilled their purpose thus, disappear, like the clouds after the rainy season" (NS.I.49).⁷⁹

Here a question arises: If according to both Vācaspati's view and Prakāśātman's view the performance of karmas is

sanctioned only up to the rise of the keen desire of knowing Brahman, what is the material difference between the two?

Appayya Dīkṣita, in his Siddhānta-lakṣaṇa-sāra, answers this question as follows: According to Prakāśānanda, although karmas are given up after the rise of the ardent desire of knowing Brahman, the merit (śreyas) generated through the performance of those karmas persists till the dawn of Brahman-knowledge and helps one to acquire the positive means of knowing Brahman such as unimpeded śravaṇa, manana, etc. Thus, through the said channel, karmas subserve the rise of Brahman-knowledge itself. But according to Vācaspati, the merit generated through the performance of karmas altogether vanishes after the rise of the ardent wish of knowing Brahman. Therefore, in this view, karmas are not subservient to the rise of Brahman-knowledge.²⁰

In this way, we come across two divergent views in the post-Śaṅkara Advaita regarding the role of karma in the scheme of Advaitic discipline. While according to Bhāmatī-school and Vārttika-school, the performance of the Scripture-ordained duties is helpful to create in man the desire to know Brahman (vividiṣā), according to Vivaraṇa-school, the performance of one's duties helps

to the rise of Brahman-knowledge (vidyā) itself. All these sub-schools, however, agree to the point that karmas are to be abandoned after the rise of the ardent desire of knowing Brahman.

The difference of opinion among the post-Śaṅkara Advaitins regarding the utility of karma in the scheme of Advaitic discipline has arisen mainly because they interpret differently the Uṇhādāraṇyaka text 'yividiṣanti yajñaṃ', which declares that the performance of sacrifice, etc. also has a role to play in the path of attaining the spiritual perfection. While Vācaspati, Sureśvara, and Sarvaśāstrman maintain that sacrifice, etc. relate merely to the desire (icchā) of knowing Brahman, which is the sense of the desiderative suffix 'saṃ', Prakāśāstrman holds that they relate to knowledge (vedanā) itself, which is the sense of the root 'vid'. Prakāśāstrman's interpretation, as indicated already, seems to be more satisfactory than that of Vācaspati and others. For, the latter take the general rule that the sense of the suffix is more prominent than that of the root for granted, and interpret the above text accordingly; and, thus, they overlook the well-known fact that when desire and its object are mentioned together, the object of desire alone should be given prominence as seen in the Vedic texts such as 'avayakāṃ ivatistomaṃ

yaigra' and in the worldly usages such as 'nāyena jigamīati'. Prākāśātman, on the other hand, rightly notices this fact and hence considers the object of desire alone i.e. knowledge, though it is the sense of the root, as primary.

However, it should be remembered that although the post-Śaṅkara Advaitins hold different views about the exact role of karma, they unanimously admit the basic Advaita stand-point that karma is only indirectly conducive to the rise of the final liberating knowledge.

It has already been noted that the performance of Scripture-enjoined duties in a spirit of dedication to God purifies the mind of the aspirant by removing the sin (durita) present therein. When the perfect mental purity is thus achieved, there arises in the mind the firm belief that Brahman-Ātman alone is eternal, and the objects in the world are not real. This is known as 'nityā'nitya-vastu-viveka'. This gives rise to the utter detachment towards enjoyment of fruits here and hereafter, which is termed 'ahamutārtha-bhoga-virāga'. This in turn, leads to what is called śamādamāi-gōṣṭhāna-saṁpat i.e. the possession in abundance of means such as śama, dama, uparati, tittikṣā, śamādhāna, and śradhā. śama is the control of the mind; dama is the control of the external senses; renunciation

of all prescribed duties is uparati; endurance of opposites like pleasure and pain or heat and cold is titikāṣā; samādhi is deep concentration of the mind; and śraddhā is faith in the words of the preceptor and of the Upaniṣads.⁸¹ These virtues when pursued arouse in the aspirant the ardent desire for liberation from the bondage of transmigration (saṁsāra-bandhana). This is termed mukṣutva.⁸² The aspirant, who has heard that the knowledge of Brahman-Ātman, which is eternally pure, intelligent, and free, is the means of liberation, seeks to attain that knowledge. For him, the Aṅgīrasyaka text "The Self is to be seen, to be heard, to be reflected, and to be contemplated" (IV.v.6)⁸³ lays down hearing (śravaṇa), reflection (manana), and contemplation (nididhyāsana) as the means that are directly helpful (anantara'bhakāra) for attaining the knowledge, i.e. the direct experience, of Brahman-Ātman.

All Advaitins recognise śravaṇa, manana, and nididhyāsana to be the direct means for attaining the Brahman-knowledge. But the various sub-schools of post-Śaṅkara Advaita differ as regards the exact nature of śravaṇa, etc. and their mutual relation. And there is also a difference of opinion as to whether or not any kind of injunction (vidhi) about śravaṇa, etc. is to be accepted. In the following sections, these topics are considered one by one.

2) The Nature of Śravaṇa, Manana, and Nididhyāsana:

Vācaspatiśāstri, in his Bhāṣya, holds all of them i.e. śravaṇa, etc. to be of cognitive nature and defines them accordingly. In Sarvāpakaśādhikāraṇa, he states that there are four cognitions with regard to Brahman-Ātman. The first cognition, which arises merely from the study of the Vedāntic texts, is called 'śravaṇa'. The second one also arises from the Vedāntic texts, but it is accompanied by inquiry or deep reflection (mīmāṃsā). This is known as 'manana'. The third cognition, which is of the form of constant meditation upon the knowledge derived from the Vedāntic texts, is termed 'nididhyāsana'. The fourth one is of the form of intuitive experience (sākṣātkāra), which is nothing but a kind of mental modification (antahkaraṇa-vṛtti). And the moment this intuitive experience dawns, there is the final emancipation (kaivalya).⁸⁴ It follows from this that in the view of Vācaspati, śravaṇa, manana and nididhyāsana are of the nature of cognition (pratiṣatti).

Pañcapādī, on the other hand, considers śravaṇa, etc. to be of the forms of mental operation or activity. In his Pañcapādīkā, he explains the exact significance of the terms śravaṇa, etc. as follows:⁸⁵ 'śravaṇa' means the inquiry into the import of the Vedāntic texts for the comprehension (avagati) of Brahman-Ātman and also the inquiry into the

true nature of the embodied Self (śarīraka). By 'manana' is meant concentrated thought on the illustration of the 'great drum, etc.', the eulogistic passages relating to the origination, maintenance, and dissolution of the world, and the reasoning that a modification has speech as its origin and exists only in a name, which are adduced in support of the final Upaniṣadic import, namely, the non-duality of Brahman-Ātman, the Supreme Reality.⁵⁶ Manana also means the consideration of the syllogistic arguments (anumāna) that are not inconsistent with the ultimate import of the Upaniṣads. And by 'nididhyāsana' is meant the strengthening of the conviction regarding the Upaniṣadic import, which has been firmly grasped by 'manana'. Thus, according to Padmapāda, śravaṇa, etc. are the forms of mental operation, and not of cognitive nature as understood by Vācaspati.

Sureśvara, in his Bṛhadāraṇyaka-vārttika, defines śravaṇa as the effort of ascertaining the ultimate import of the Upaniṣadic passages with the help of various principles of interpretation such as śruti, liṅga, etc. 'Manana' is the subsequent process of further deliberation by the aid of confirmatory arguments on the Upaniṣadic import ascertained through the process of śravaṇa. The aim of this process is to comprehend the true nature of the Supreme Reality.⁵⁷ Sureśvara further asserts that these

acts of śravaṇa and manana are to be performed by the aspirant with every effort, till the knowledge of the identity of jīva and Brahman dawns.⁸⁸ It follows from this that, according to Sureśvara, both śravaṇa and manana are mental activities.

But Sureśvara does not consider 'nididhyāsana' also to be a form of mental activity as accepted by Padmapāda. He explains the term 'nididhyāsana' variously as 'śaśvats-ijñāna', 'aparāvatta-bodha', 'aikātmya-sambodha' and 'pratyakṣa-vāthātmya-sambodha'.⁸⁹ It means that 'nididhyāsana', in the view of Sureśvara, is of the nature of the true knowledge of Brahman-Ātman. Nevertheless, it should be remembered that 'nididhyāsana', which is here explained by Sureśvara as 'śaśvats-ijñāna', etc., does not mean the very intuitive experience that occasions the final liberation; because, as already noted, nididhyāsana also like śravaṇa and manana is accepted to be only a means for attaining that Supreme experience. Nididhyāsana may be described as the preliminary stage of the intuitive experience of Brahman-Ātman (Brahma-sākṣātkāra), springing up spontaneously as the not result of the continuous practice of the two preceding stages, namely, śravaṇa and manana. Through the process of śravaṇa, as stated earlier, the true import of the Vedāntic texts is ascertained, and by manana the said import

is further justified. But the same import, says Sureśvara, when perfectly accomplished through the continued process of śravaṇa and manana is called nididhyāsana.⁹⁰ In other words, nididhyāsana is the decisive knowledge in the form 'I am Brahman' emerging as the necessary outcome of the two i.e. śravaṇa and manana. Though this knowledge is decisive, it is indirect in nature. And it is this decisive but indirect knowledge (i.e. nididhyāsana) that gives rise to the direct experience of Brahman-Ātman immediately.

It is clear from the above that, according to Sureśvara, nididhyāsana is a form of decisive knowledge and not a form of mental activity. He proves this on the strength of śruti itself. The Bṛhadāraṇyaka text 'ātmaṁ vā agra darśayeh śrutavā mantavā nididhyāsitavah' lays down śravaṇa, manana and nididhyāsana as the direct means for attaining 'ātma-darśana' (Self-realisation). And the very next sentence 'Maitreyi ātmāno vā agra darśanena śravaṇena, matvā vijñānena idam sarvaṁ viditam'⁹¹ refers to darśana, śravaṇa, etc., which are already mentioned in the preceding sentence 'ātmaṁ vā agra' etc. In this sentence, 'Maitreyi ātmāno vā agra' etc., 'nididhyāsana' is referred to by the term 'vijñāna', which means the decisive knowledge (nirṇaya-jñāna). This text, says Sureśvara, clearly shows that nididhyāsana is only a knowledge and not a meditation (dhyāna), which consists in the resting of the mind in an

intense manner on Brahman-Ātman.⁹² Sarvajñātman, in his 'Geetopadeśa-Śarīraka', has recorded this view of Surośvara regarding the nature of nididhyāsana.⁹³

In this way, various post-Śaṅkara Advaitins have explained differently the nature of śravaṇa, manana, and nididhyāsana. While Vācaspatimīśra considers śravaṇa, etc. to be of the nature of cognition, according to Pañnapāda these are only mental activities. Surośvara, on the other hand, holds that only the first two, i.e. śravaṇa and manana are mental activities, while nididhyāsana signifies a decisive knowledge and not a meditation as it is generally understood.

g) The Relation of Śravaṇa, Manana, and Nididhyāsana:

The post-Śaṅkara Advaitins again differ as to what is the principal means among śravaṇa, manana, and nididhyāsana, which are recognised to be directly helpful to the rise of the intuitive experience of Brahman-Ātman (Brahma-ākāśa-ekātā). According to Vācaspatimīśra, nididhyāsana is the principal one, whereas śravaṇa and manana are secondary. Though in his Bhāṣya, Vācaspati admits the internal organ (antah-karāṇa) to be the instrumental cause (karāṇa) for the attainment of the intuitive experience of Brahman-Ātman, he emphasises the need of the assistance of the impressions produced by nididhyāsana for the internal organ in giving

rise to that experience. And nididhyāsana in its turn is assisted by the two preceding stages, śravaṇa and manana. Thus in the Samantveyādhikaraṇa he says that the intuitive experience of Brahman-Ātman arises from the internal organ aided by the impressions produced by upāśanā or nididhyāsana i.e. contemplation preceded by hearing (śravaṇa) and reflection (manana). Just as the impressions of the contemplation on the meaning of the science of music have the capacity to produce the intuitive experience of the notes śodhā, etc., even so the impressions of the contemplation of the true import of the Vedāntic passages have the capacity to produce the intuitive experience of the identity of jīva and Brahman.⁹⁴

In the Sarvāpoksādhikaraṇa, while explaining the nature of śravaṇa, manana, and nididhyāsana, Vācaspati analyses their consecutive order in contributing to the rise of the intuitive experience of Brahman-Ātman as follows: śravaṇa is the knowledge arising merely from the study of the Vedāntic texts. And manana is the knowledge also arising from the Vedāntic texts but as accompanied by inquiry. These two, śravaṇa and manana, are produced in him, who knows the connection of words and their senses and the various principles of determining the true import of the Vedāntic texts. These śravaṇa and manana alone give rise

to the next stage, i.e. nididhyāsana, which is the knowledge of the form of constant thinking on the Vedāntic import. And nididhyāsana when incessantly pursued for a long time leads to the intuitive experience of Brahman-Ātman. And the final emancipation immediately follows as the necessary result of this intuitive experience achieved through nididhyāsana.⁹⁵ From what has been said so far it follows that, in the view of Vācaspati, it is nididhyāsana that is directly connected with the rise of the intuitive experience of Brahman-Ātman, and hence it is to be regarded as its principal means. But śravaṇa and manana, which give rise to nididhyāsana, are related to the intuitive experience of Brahman-Ātman only through nididhyāsana and not directly, and hence these are to be regarded as only subsidiaries to nididhyāsana.

In the Bṛhadāraṇyaka-vārttika, Sureśvara also seems to support the above view. For, according to Sureśvara, as it has already been noticed while explaining his view as regards the nature of śravaṇa, etc., the constant practice of śravaṇa and manana results into nididhyāsana, which is an indirect but decisive knowledge about the identity of jīva and Brahman. And this nididhyāsana immediately leads to the rise of the intuitive experience of Brahman-Ātman. So, it means that, in the view of Sureśvara, as for Vācaspati, the stage of nididhyāsana is directly antecedent to Brahma-

sāṃpātkāre, whereas śravaṇa and manana are related to the latter through nididhyāsana. Thus, according to Suresvara also, nididhyāsana constitutes the principal means to the rise of Brahma-sāṃpātkāre, while śravaṇa and manana, being the cause of nididhyāsana, are only subsidiaries to the latter. One point is very clear from the above that both Vācaspati and Suresvara recognise śravaṇa, manana and nididhyāsana to be contributory to the rise of the intuitive experience of Brahman-Ātman in their natural consecutive order as shown in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka text 'ātma vā aro draṣṭavyaḥ śrotavyo mantavyo nididhyāsitavyaḥ' (II. iv. 5).

Prakāśātman in his Pañcapādikā-vivaraṇa, however, maintains that śravaṇa is the principal contributory (ahat) to the rise of the intuitive experience of Brahman-Ātman, while manana and nididhyāsana, although they are subsequent to śravaṇa, merely serve as subsidiaries to the latter.⁹⁶ The subsidiness of manana and nididhyāsana consists not in their being the very parts of śravaṇa, but in their being only helpful to śravaṇa in achieving its fruit, i. e., the intuitive experience of Brahman-Ātman (pholo-lakṣyaṇa). Just as the lump of clay is the principal cause and wheel, etc. are auxiliary ones with reference to one and the same effect such as pot; similarly śravaṇa is the principal means and manana and nididhyāsana are subsidiary ones in

respect of the intuitive experience of Brahman-Ātman.⁹⁷

Now to explain the above view more clearly: Prakāśān holds that śābda, i.e., the major texts of the Upaniṣads, is the instrumental cause (karana) of the intuitive experience of Brahman-Ātman (Brahma-gāhāpātaka). And śravaṇa, which consists in the determination of the real significance and purport of the Upaniṣadic texts, is the cause of excellence in the Upaniṣadic texts, which are the instrumental cause. Since the instrumental cause is proximate in respect of its intended fruit, śravaṇa, which brings about excellence in the instrumental cause, namely, the major Upaniṣadic texts, is also proximate with reference to the fruit, i.e., the intuitive experience of Brahman-Ātman. Manana and nididhyāsana, however, are related to the intuitive experience of Brahman-Ātman indirectly, that is, through the channel of producing a concentrated state of the mind, which is required for achieving that experience. In this way, since śravaṇa is proximately connected with the intuitive experience of Brahman-Ātman, it is to be regarded as its principal means, while manana and nididhyāsana, which are indirectly connected with that experience through the channel of producing the mental concentration, are to be admitted as subsidiaries to śravaṇa in bringing about its intended fruit, i.e. the intuitive experience of Brahman-Ātman.⁹⁸

b) Injunction about Āravapa, etc.

The views of various post-Śaṅkhara Advaitins in connection with the question whether or not any injunction (vidhi) is plausible regarding Āravapa, etc. may now be considered. Before taking up this question, it is necessary to discuss briefly the nature of vidhi, its varieties and the implications. Mīmāṃsakas define vidhi or injunction as that portion of the Veda, which makes known or enjoins a matter not known before by any other means of knowledge. Such a matter should further be conducive to a specific result. Thus, the nature of a Vedic injunction is such that it conveys to us a matter that ~~was~~ was not known before and that is helpful to achieve a specific fruit.⁹⁹ The Vedic injunction is of three kinds:

- (1) Original injunction (apūrvā-vidhi);
- (2) Restrictive injunction (niyama-vidhi); and
- (3) Exclusive injunction (pariśeṣhva-vidhi).

The injunction, which lays down a matter, which is absolutely non-established by any other means of proof, is an original injunction (apūrvā-vidhi).¹⁰⁰ The sentence 'ya ieta svaṛgokāmaḥ', for example, lays down a sacrifice for the purpose of attaining heaven. Now, that the performance of a sacrifice leads to the attainment of heaven (svaṛgārtthane yāna) is a matter, which is utterly unknown from any other source. For, neither perception, nor



inference, nor any other means of proof can give us any information about it. It is known only from this sentence of the Veda. 'Yajeta svergakāmap', which lays down such a matter, is, therefore, an example of an original injunction. Such injunction is called original injunction (apūrva-vidhi), because the information it gives was not known before.

The injunction, which restricts us to a particular means of accomplishing a thing, when we are likely to resort to some other, in a case where the thing can be accomplished by more than one means, is a restrictive injunction (niyama-vidhi).¹⁰¹ The sentence 'He pounds or threshes the rice-grains' (vr̥h̥iṇ avahanti) is an example of a restrictive injunction. Here the result to be accomplished by pounding is 'vaitsusya', i.e. the unhusking of the rice grains, which are used for the preparation of the sacrificial oblation (puroḍāśa). The above sentence, however, is not meant to teach that one has to pound the rice-grains for the purpose of unhusking them; because the fact that pounding leads to unhusking is a matter of common experience and thus it is already established. But it lays down restriction. To explain: The unhusking of the rice-grains can be effected in two ways, viz., by removing the husk from each single grain by means of our nails (nakha-vidalana) and by pounding or threshing the rice-grains (avahāta). Vaitsusya or the

unhusking of the rice-grains is thus a matter, which can be accomplished by more than one means. This being the case, we seem to favour one of these means for accomplishing the unhusking. But niyama-vidhi restricts us to a particular means. That is, when we think of effecting the unhusking by means of our nails, the sentence "He pounds the rice-grains" steps in and asks us to accomplish unhusking by means of pounding. And therefore, in the restrictive injunction, the import of the sentence is restriction (niyama), which consists in restricting the means to one possible alternative.

Now a question naturally arises as to why we should adopt avagāṭa or pounding in preference to the other methods such as nakhavidalana or separating the husks from the grains by means of our nails for effecting 'vaṭusya' i.e. the unhusking of the rice-grains? Because, both nakhavidalana and avagāṭa are equally the means of accomplishing vaṭusya. That is, whether we adopt nakhavidalana or avagāṭa, the final result, i.e., vaṭusya is the same. And in that case, the restriction as regards avagāṭa would be meaningless, it being not conducive to any special result.

The Mīmāṃsakas answer this by saying that since the

restriction regarding avagāṭa as the means of vaituṣya is not conducive to any visible result, it must be supposed that it has an invisible result. This means that if we unhusk the rice-grains by means of avagāṭa, then only there arises some adrṣṭa or apūrvā, technically called nivamādrṣṭa or nivamāpūrvā.¹⁰² Otherwise, if we were to unhusk the grains by nekha-vidalana or such other methods, this nivamādrṣṭa would not arise. Therefore, avagāṭa alone is to be adopted and the other means such as nekha-vidalana should be given up. Thus, the adoption of avagāṭa, in this particular instance, brings about two-fold result, namely, vaituṣya and nivamādrṣṭa. While the former is a seen result (drṣṭa-phala), the latter is an unseen result (adrṣṭa-phala).

When two alternatives become simultaneously available, the injunction, which aims at excluding one of them, is an exclusive injunction (pariśeṣkhyā-viधि).¹⁰³ 'Five five-fold animals should be eaten' (pañca pañcanakṣā bhakṣyaṇ) is the standard example of exclusive injunction. Here the five five-nailed animals that are allowed are hare, porcupine, alligator, rhinoceros, and tortoise.¹⁰⁴ The purpose of eating these five five-nailed animals is to satisfy our hunger. But, when we feel hungry, we can satisfy our hunger by eating the flesh of any of these five five-nailed animals

as well as the flesh of any other animals i.e., of five-nailed animals other than the five allowed and also of animals which are not five-nailed. That is, it is possible to include in our food bits of the flesh of different kinds of animals to satisfy our hunger. Thus, the two alternatives, i.e., the eating of the five five-nailed animals (pañca-pañcāṅgā-bhक्षणं) and the eating of the animals other than the five five-nailed (apañca-pañca-pañcāṅgā-bhक्षणं) can be simultaneously adopted (yugāt-prāpta). This being the case, what the sentence 'Five five-nailed animals should be eaten' does is to exclude the eating of the animals other than the five five-nailed. Since the eating of the five five-nailed animals is established by man's natural inclination, the above sentence cannot be an instance of an original injunction, which consists in laying down a matter that is absolutely non-established. Nor can it be an instance of a restrictive injunction, since, as noted already, the eating of the five five-nailed animals and the eating of the animals other than the five five-nailed are simultaneously established, and so there is no optionally non-established element (pañcā aprāpta) here to constitute what is called restrictive injunction. It is, therefore, an exclusive injunction, the purpose of which is to forbid the eating of animals that are not five-nailed and of all five-nailed animals other than the

five allowed. This means that if at all we want to eat flesh to satisfy our hunger, we must choose the flesh of these five five-nailed animals only. As far as the eating of flesh is concerned, exclusive injunction is only permissive and not positive.

Here it may be pointed out that, though in both restrictive injunction and exclusive injunction there is an element of exclusion, in the former it is secondary, while in the latter it is primary. In other words, the restrictive injunction has got primarily a positive significance in the sense that it purports to restrict us to a particular means of accomplishing a thing out of several alternative means. And the exclusion of the other alternative means follows by implication. But the exclusive injunction has got primarily a negative significance in the sense that it purports to prohibit one of the two alternatives, which become simultaneously available.

Now to sum up the discussions: The original injunction (apūrva-vichī) lays down something, which is not known from any other source. The restrictive injunction (niyama-vichī) restricts us to one of the two or more alternative means. And the exclusive injunction (parisaṅkhyā-vichī) excludes one of the two alternatives, which obtain simultaneously. 105

Appayya Dīkṣita, in his Siddhānta-lāṭā-saṅgraha, has recorded the views of various preceptors of post-Śaṅkara Advaita about the nature of injunction (vidhi) in respect of śravaṇa.¹⁰⁶ Anubhūtiśeṣarūpācārya, the author of Prakāśārtha-vivaraṇa, maintains that there is an original injunction (apūrvya-vidhi) with regard to śravaṇa, because, one has no previous knowledge of any means for the attainment of Brahman-knowledge, which is beyond the range of any ordinary means of proof. Thus, the Upaniṣadic precept 'Ātmā vā are drastavyaḥ śrotavyo,' etc., lays down śravaṇa for the purpose of attaining the knowledge (darśana) of Brahman-Ātman. The matter that śravaṇa leads to Brahman-knowledge could not be known from any other source, hence it falls under what is called an original injunction.¹⁰⁷

On the other hand, the followers of the Vivaraṇa-school, propounded by Prakāśātman, say that it is not an original injunction; because, even in the absence of any injunction it is a well-known fact that śravaṇa, which consists in the inquiry into the true import of the Upaniṣadic texts, which aim at teaching the non-dual Brahman-Ātman, leads to the knowledge of the latter. It is a matter of common experience that an inquiry into a particular object is the means of ascertaining the true nature of that object. And in the present case, the object of inquiry (śravaṇa-viśaya)

is the non-dual Brahman-Ātman. Therefore, the above Upaniṣadic text is meant not to teach that śravaṇa is the means of attaining Brahman-knowledge, but to restrict us to śravaṇa for achieving Brahman-knowledge, to the exclusion of all other possible alternatives such as the inquiry into the dualistic Scriptures, the inquiry into the Upaniṣadic texts independently of the preceptor, etc., which we may adopt through ignorance. It is, therefore, a restrictive injunction (nivama-yichī).¹⁰³

Now, it may be objected that if we accept a restrictive injunction about śravaṇa as the means of Brahman-knowledge, then it should be admitted that the adoption of śravaṇa generates some adṛṣṭa or apūrya (an unseen result). Because, as already indicated, without reference to some adṛṣṭa-phala, technically called nivamaṇḍṛṣṭa, a restrictive injunction, which consists in restricting us to one particular means of accomplishing a thing out of several alternative means, loses all its injunctive force. But in the matter of Brahman-knowledge, any amount of adṛṣṭa-phala is of no use. For, only the known means like śravaṇa are sufficient for attaining Brahman-knowledge.

Prakāśātman replied to this by saying that even in the matter of Brahman-knowledge there is immense scope for

adṛṣṭa-śhala, for Brahman-knowledge is to be achieved through the adṛṣṭa of all acts enjoined in the Scripture.¹⁰⁹ These adṛṣṭas are conducive to the removal of the evils that are antagonistic to the rise of Brahman-knowledge. Vidyāranya, in his Vivareṇa-eramaṇya-saṅgraha, points out that the word akṣhila (entirety) over and above the word sarva (all) in the Bhagavad-gītā passage 'sarvaṁ karma akṣhilaṁ pārtha iḥāno karisaṁśyate' (IV.33) is employed only in order to include acts like śravaṇa, etc. over and above sacrifice, etc. Otherwise, it would be mere repetition.¹¹⁰ Therefore, it should be admitted that all Scripture-ordained acts including śravaṇa are helpful to the rise of Brahman-knowledge through their respective adṛṣṭa. In this way, since the adṛṣṭa-śhala is useful in the rise of Brahman-knowledge, it is quite intelligible to accept a restrictive injunction about śravaṇa.

Again it may be said that to recognise such an injunction about śravaṇa would conflict with Śaṅkara's commentary on the Ananyavādhikaraṇa, wherein Śaṅkara himself has refuted with great effort the presence of any injunction in respect of śravaṇa, etc.¹¹¹

Prakāśānjan rejoins to this by stating that there is no conflict with the commentary of Śaṅkara, because, on

that occasion, Śaṅkara has refuted the presence of any injunction only in respect of ijñā or darśana, i.e., knowledge, and not in respect of āraṇya, etc.¹¹² If we admit the presence of any injunction in respect of knowledge (darśana), then in accordance with the rule that the sense of the suffix is primary to that of the root, the injunction, which is the sense of the suffix 'avya' in the text 'drashtavya', would alone be primary, while 'darśana', which is the sense of the root 'dr̥ś', would be secondary; and Brahman-Ātman, which is the adjunct of 'darśana', would also be still more secondary. In that case, Brahman-Ātman would not be established by the Upaniṣads, their primary significance being injunction itself.¹¹³ But if we recognise the injunction about āraṇya for the sake of Brahman-knowledge, which is primary as the fruit, then Brahman-Ātman, which is the adjunct of that knowledge (darśana), stands as the most Primary Principle and not secondary. In this way, since Brahman-Ātman is the Primary Principle established by the Upaniṣads, there is no defect whatever in admitting a restrictive injunction about āraṇya as the means of attaining Brahman-knowledge (Brahma-darśana).¹¹⁴ Prakāśātman admits injunction in respect of manana and nididhyāsana also. But, according to him, as noted already, these merely serve as subsidiaries to āraṇya, the principal means, in bringing

about its intended result, i.e. Brahman-knowledge.¹¹⁵

Sureśvara also, in his Bṛhadāraṇyaka-vārttika, clearly accepts an injunction with regard to śravaṇa and manana. Sureśvara, as it has already been noticed, considers śravaṇa and manana to be the mental activities. And these being the activities as such, are dependent on the human effort (puruṣa-tantra) for their emergence. And whatever that is dependent on the human effort falls within the scope of an injunction (vidhi).^{115a} According to Sureśvara, therefore, śravaṇa, manana, and the six disciplines like śama, dama, etc. are enjoined as the means of attaining Brahman-knowledge.¹¹⁶

Then what kind of injunction does Sureśvara accept about śravaṇa and manana? Appayya Dīkṣita, in his Siddhānta-lakṣaṇa-śāstra, has recorded the view of exclusive injunction (pariśankhyā-vidhi) about śravaṇa and has attributed it to the followers of the Vārttika-school. And, as already noted, the main purpose of an exclusive injunction is to exclude or prohibit one of the two alternatives, which become simultaneously available. In the present case, a spiritual aspirant engaged in śravaṇa, i.e. the inquiry into the Upaniṣadic texts, for the purpose of attaining Brahman-knowledge may, at intervals, take to some other courses through natural inclinations. But these extraneous courses cause, now and then, interruption to carry on Vedānta-śravaṇa

for achieving the final goal. Hence, the injunctive precept 'śrotavyaḥ' purports to prohibit all other courses than śravaṇa for the attainment of Brahman-knowledge.¹¹⁷ Appayya Dīkṣita quotes one of the verses from Suresvara's Naishkarmya-siddhi¹¹⁸ and comments upon it with a stress of imagination to arrive at this interpretation of exclusive injunction about śravaṇa according to the Vārttika-school.

But it may be noted that, even though Suresvara does not explain in so many words as to what kind of injunction is plausible with regard to śravaṇa and manana, he is agreeable to the idea that it can be only an exclusive injunction. For, according to Suresvara, it is more the abandonment of the worldly attachments that is to be accomplished for the attainment of Brahman-knowledge.¹¹⁹ And it is exactly at the stage when the spiritual aspirant abandons all worldly actions and things, for the purpose of knowing Brahman-Ātman that he is introduced to śravaṇa, manana, and the six virtues like śama, dama, etc., which are directly helpful to the rise of Brahman-knowledge. Suresvara clearly says that the spiritual aspirant, who has renounced all worldly actions, and who desires to be free from transmigration, and, also, to understand the unity of the Self, alone is eligible to undertake the inquiry into the nature of Brahman-Ātman by means of śravaṇa and

manana.¹²⁰ It means that, in the view of Suresvara, the other courses, in which one may be engaged through natural propensities, are to be excluded during the process of śravaṇa and manana. It is, therefore, reasonable to consider that he prefers the exclusive injunction in this matter.

Although Suresvara accepts injunction about śravaṇa and manana, yet, in his view, no injunction can be acceptable with regard to nididhyāṇa itself, which is of cognitive significance as explained by him. As it has already been noted, Suresvara considers nididhyāṇa to be a decisive knowledge in the form 'I am Brahman' arising spontaneously out of the continued practice of śravaṇa and manana. In respect of such a nididhyāṇa, any kind of injunction is neither possible nor is it necessary. For, unlike activity (kriyā), knowledge (jñāna) is not dependent on the human effort, but is dependent on the valid means of knowledge (pramāṇa) and the object to be known (prameya).¹²¹ The knowledge arises as soon as the required conditions become favourable, and it does not stand in need of any human effort for its rise. And, as indicated earlier, that, which is not dependent on the human effort, does not fall within the scope of any injunction. Hence there can be no question of any kind of injunction with regard to nididhyāṇa as elucidated by Suresvara.

But Vācaspatiśra is totally against supporting any kind of injunction with regard to any of these śravaṇa, manana, and nididhyāsana. For, according to him, these śravaṇa, etc. are considered as the forms of knowledge. And as already pointed out, knowledge, being not dependent on the human effort, is beyond the scope of any kind of injunction.¹²²

In the Samanvayādhikaraṇa, Vācaspati explains his idea as follows: An injunction is that, the content of which is what is to be rejected or accepted. And that alone is what is to be rejected or accepted, which a person can effect or not effect or effect in a different way. And it is he, who is capable in respect of that, that becomes the agent, the eligible person, the person enjoined. But śravaṇa, manana, etc., are not of this nature; because these are of the forms of knowledge of Brahman-Ātman, which is neither rejectable nor acceptable. Thus, the content and the person who observes, which are invariably concomitant of an injunction, are absent in the present case. Hence there is no injunction in the matter of Brahman-knowledge. Although the imperatives etc., are found used in the Upaniṣads, yet they are not capable of impelling to activity and become non-authoritative, as the edge of a razor applied to a stone becomes blunt.¹²³ Therefore, the Upaniṣadic statements such as 'ātmā vā agraṇyā vā śravaṇa śrotavyo' etc. are not of

injunctive character.

Now the question arises: If there is no injunction in the context of Brahman-knowledge, then, for what purpose are these statements like 'ātmā vā aro draṣṭavyaḥ' etc., which have a semblance of injunction?

The reply is: If the spiritual aspirant undertakes śravaṇa, manana, and nididhyāsana, he attains Brahman-knowledge, and not otherwise. Thus śravaṇa, etc. are established by co-presence and co-absence (anvaya-vyatiraka) to be the means of Brahman-knowledge.^{123a} These śravaṇa, etc. that are thus established from some other source to have the fruit of Brahman-knowledge are merely re-stated by texts like 'ātmā vā aro draṣṭavyaḥ' etc., which have the appearance of injunctions (vidhi-rūpa). And a re-statement (anuśāda) is not fruitless, as it generates in man excellence of activity.¹²⁴ Now to explain: A man, whose heart is distracted by the desire to obtain what is pleasant or to avoid what is unpleasant, and who is thus engaged in outward objects through natural inclination, fails to concentrate his mind on the Inner Self (pratyakṣātman). But the Upaniṣadic texts like 'ātmā vā aro draṣṭavyaḥ śrotavyo' etc., which have the appearance of injunctions, turn him back from the outward objects naturally attracting his body and senses

towards them and produce in his mind a current of thoughts directed towards the Indwelling Self.¹²⁵

From the above it is clear that, in the view of Vācaspati, the Upanisadic statements, which appear to have the sense of injunction, are not real injunctions, but mere re-statements of what has already been established from some other source. And though re-statements, they are not futile, as they conduce to generate in man a strong inclination towards the Inner Self, by weaning him back from the external objects, towards which he is naturally attracted. In holding this view, Vācaspati has the solid support of Sankara, who has rejected outright the presence of any injunction in the context of Brahman-knowledge.¹²⁶

In some places, however, Vācaspatimibha seems to admit injunction with regard to śreyasa etc. In the 'Sahakārya-ntaravidhyedhikarana', for instance, he says that 'acurvatyā vidhirāstheva ītyarthah'.¹²⁷ Thus, Vācaspati seems to contradict his own view as explained above. But Amalananda and Appayya Dīkṣita, in their commentaries, defend Vācaspati's view by reconciling this apparent contradictory position. Amalananda points out that it is only an eulogical statement (artha-vāda), which is meant for inducing the aspirant to the knowledge of Brahman-Ātman by praising it, that is here

called as 'vidhi' by Vācaspati.¹²⁸ Appayya Dīkṣita is also of the same opinion. It may here be noted that, those, who admit some kind of injunction with regard to śrāvana, etc., usually quote in support of their view the Brahma-sūtra III.iv.47,¹²⁹ and Śaṅkara's commentary thereupon.¹³⁰ But Appayya Dīkṣita says that the purport of this Brahma-sūtra and Śaṅkara's remarks thereupon is not to establish any injunction about śrāvana, etc., but to show that the Upaniṣadic statements having the injunctive appearance are only eulogies, being meant to inspire the man to meditate upon Brahman-Ātman, towards which he was not previously inclined owing to intimate attachment to the dual world.¹³¹

Anaṅgana further shows that none of the three kinds of injunction can be possible with regard to śrāvana, etc. Since śrāvana, manana, and nididhyāsana are established by co-presence and co-absence to be the means of Brahman-knowledge, the originative injunction (apūrva-vidhi), which conveys something that is absolutely not established from any other source, cannot be possible as regards śrāvana, etc. A restrictive injunction (niyama-vidhi) and an exclusive injunction (pariśeṣkhyā-vidhi) operate only when there are many alternative means of accomplishing a thing. But in the present case, Brahman-knowledge can be accomplished only by śrāvana, manana, and nididhyāsana, and no

other alternative means is here available either optionally or simultaneously, in which case either a restrictive injunction or an exclusive injunction would have been possible about śravaṇa etc. ¹³²

1) The Instrumental Cause (Karaṇa) of the Intuitive Experience of Brahman-Ātman (Brahma-sākṣātkāra):

In siddhānta-lakṣaṇa-sūtra, Apureya Dikṣita records three prominent views advanced by Advaitins in solution of the problem as to what is the instrumental cause of the intuitive experience of Brahman-Ātman. ¹³³

Some earlier Advaitic thinkers like Brahmaṇḍa and Maṇḍana ¹³⁴ maintain that 'prasaṅgyāna', i.e. the prolonged and intense meditation on the true import of the Upaniṣadic texts like 'That thou art', is the required instrumental cause. According to these exponents, the knowledge of the absolute identity between the individual soul and Brahman derived from the Upaniṣadic texts like 'That thou art' is an indirect one (parokṣa). So one has to repeatedly meditate on such indirect knowledge before it could be refined into the pure intuitive experience of Brahman-Ātman (Brahma-sākṣātkāra), which alone is capable of bringing about the final emancipation (mokṣa). Thus, it is the intense meditation or prasaṅgyāna, also called as dhāraṇā or

upāśanā, that is the instrumental cause in attaining the Brahma-sākeśhāra.

The above view that meditation or prasaṅkhyāna is the required instrumental cause, is supported by the Muṇḍaka text which says: 'Then in meditation, one realizes Him, the Absolute',¹³⁵ There is yet another evidence adduced by Prasaṅkhyāna-vādins in support of this view: In a somewhat similar intuitive experience of his beloved by a lover in her actual absence, constant meditation on the beloved alone is admitted to be the instrumental cause.¹³⁶ Because, in the absence of the object, the external senses cannot operate; and the internal organ or mind, also, does not go outside the body. Hence, in case of the intuitive experience of Brahman-Ātman too, it is reasonable to admit meditation to be the instrumental cause.

Now the opponent asks: As prasaṅkhyāna is not regarded to be a means of right knowledge (pramāṇa), how can the intuitive experience of Brahman-Ātman produced therefrom be the right experience (pramā)?

The Prasaṅkhyāna-vādins answer to this by saying that, since Prasaṅkhyāna or meditation is based upon the true import of the Upaniadic texts like 'That thou art',

which are admitted to be the means of right knowledge, the intuitive experience of Brahman-Ātman arising from it is the result of the operation of the means of right knowledge and consequently it is a right experience.¹³⁷

The above view as regards the relation between prasaṅkhyāna and Brahma-sākṣātkāra was later on adopted by Vācaspatiśāra. The latter, in his Bhāṣatī, says that Brahma-sākṣātkāra or the intuitive experience of Brahman-Ātman is the result of intense meditation on the true import of the texts like 'That thou art'.¹³⁸

But some Advaitic thinkers severely criticise Vācaspati for having adopted this view, on the ground that it conflicts with the Brahma-sūtra 'Āstrotpratyā tu upadeśo vānsdevavyet' (I,1,30). Because, in this sūtra, the word 'Āstrotpratyā' denotes the intuitive experience in the form 'I am Brahman' (āstī) arising from texts like 'That thou art' (āstī). This expression 'Āstrotpratyā' would not hold good, if Brahma-sākṣātkāra is admitted to be the result of prasaṅkhyāna.

However, Amalananda, his commentator, comes to the rescue of Vācaspati¹³⁹ and remarks that Vācaspati understands the expression 'Āstrotpratyā', as used in the above

Brahma-sūtra, to mean the true knowledge springing from meditation on the true import of the mahāvākyas (śāstrārtha-dhyāna or pramā), and that this view is supported by Bādarāyaṇa in the Brahma-sūtra 'api ca saṁrādhaṇaḥ pratyakṣa-numānābhyām' (III.ii.24). The latter sūtra declares that the Yogins realize Brahman-Atman during saṁrādhaṇa, which means the act of devotion, contemplation, deep meditation, and such other practices e.g., japa, etc. Thus, according to Amalānanda, the expression 'śāstra-dṛṣṭi' should be interpreted not to mean the right knowledge arising from mahāvākyas but to mean the right knowledge arising from meditation based on mahāvākyas. In other words, śāstra-dṛṣṭi means 'śāstra-praveśyā dṛṣṭi' and not 'śāstrīyā dṛṣṭi' in accordance with this interpretation. Hence, Vācaspati's view is not in conflict with the Brahma-sūtra about śāstra-dṛṣṭi.

No doubt, Vācaspati adopts the view as regards the relation between prasaṅkhyāna and Brahma-sākṣātkāra, and hence regards the latter to be the result of the former. Nevertheless, it should be strictly remembered that prasaṅkhyāna, in the view of Vācaspati, is not directly the instrument but only a subsidiary to the internal organ or mind in accomplishing the desired fruit, i.e., Brahma-sākṣātkāra. Therefore, he says that the internal organ,

matured by the constant meditation on the indubitable
 import of the mahāvākyas, manifests the essential nature
 of the immediately experienced individual soul (tyag-
 vedārtha) as Brahman-Ātman (tat-vedārtha), through negating
 the various conditioned forms of the former.¹⁴⁰ Just as
 one experiences directly the different notes, śaḍja, etc.,
 in their different cadences, through the sense of hearing
 (śrotrāṅgīya), aided by the impressions brought about by
 the contemplation of the knowledge gained from the science
 of music; even so the jīva or individual soul experiences
 its own nature as Brahman-Ātman, through the internal
 organ (antahkarana), aided by the impressions brought about
 by the constant meditation on the true import of the mahā-
 vākyas like 'That thou art'.¹⁴¹ From this it follows that
 Vācaspati holds prasaṅghyāna to be only an intermediary
 operation of the internal organ in bringing about the
 intuitive experience of Brahman-Ātman. Prasaṅghyāna by
 itself cannot be the instrumental cause, since it is not
 recognised to be a means of true knowledge (jñāna-karana).¹⁴²
 Mere internal organ, too, is not the instrument, for
 unless it is matured by constant meditation on the true
 import of mahāvākyas, it is incompetent to produce the
 desired result. Thus, according to Vācaspati, it is the
 internal organ, accompanied by constant meditation or
prasaṅghyāna, that is the required instrumental cause.

Even in the analogous instance of the presentation of an absent woman, the internal organ associated with meditation and not the latter alone is the instrumental cause.¹⁴³

Moreover, according to Vācaspati, mahāvākyas - the principle texts of the Upaniṣads like 'That thou art', are not directly the cause of Brahma-sākṣātkāra, which is of the nature of an immediate experience (aparokṣānubhava); because, like Maṇḍana, he, too, maintains that a valid verbal testimony (śabda) can generate only a mediate knowledge (parokṣa-jñāna). But the mediate knowledge, derived from the Upaniṣads is not capable of occasioning the final emancipation. For, the two-fold ignorance (avidyādvaya), which is immediately experienced, and due to which the jīva undergoes all sorts of suffering, can be removed only by the experience, which is also immediate in nature. The erroneous cognition like shell-silver, for instance, is removed only by the immediate cognition of the true nature of the shell.¹⁴⁴ For, unless a person immediately cognises the true nature of the shell, he continues to experience the shell-silver illusion, even when he is informed by a trustworthy person that it is not a silver but only a shell. Hence, in the present case, what is required is the immediate experience of the absolute identity of jīva and Brahman, on the attainment of which alone there can be a complete

cessation of the immediately experienced suffering, grief, etc. of jiva. Now, the immediate experience can arise only from the functioning of a sense-organ (indriya), the instrumental cause of valid immediate experience (aparokṣa-pramāṇa). Since no other sense-organ can be operative in the process of the immediate experience of Brahman-Ātman by contemplation of the true import of mahāvākyas, the internal organ or mind must be admitted to be a sense-organ - the organ of internal senses. But, as indicated earlier, mere internal organ is not qualified for producing the desired Brahma-sākṣātkāra. The internal organ should be made perfect by prasaṅkhyāna, the deep meditation on the mahāvākyas like 'That thou art', before it could be able to give rise to the desired result. For instance, a defective sense of sight cannot generate a valid perceptual cognition of the object in front, but on the removal of the defects, the same sense of sight produces a valid perception of that object. Similarly, an impure internal organ is not capable of generating the desired result, but when purified by the said prasaṅkhyāna, the same internal organ immediately manifests the true nature of Brahman-Ātman.

What has been explained above is exactly what Vācaspati intends to assert, in his Bhāṣatī, as follows: Brahma-sākṣātkāra does not, verily, result from verbal testimony (śabda-pramāṇa) - the Upaniṣadic mahāvākyas, though accompanied by inquiry. But it results from perception -

a means of valid immediate experience (pratyakṣa-graṇā), i.e. a sense-organ; because, that ākṣātkāra, being of the nature of an immediate experience, is the invariable result of a sense-organ alone. Just as a banyan shoot cannot grow from a kutaja-seed; even so Brahma-ākṣātkāra cannot result from verbal testimony, the innate nature of which is to give rise only to mediated knowledge. Hence, it stands to reason that the internal organ, perfected by constant meditation on the indubitable import of mahāvākyas, manifests the absolute identity between jīva and Brahman, by negating the various adventitious forms of the former.¹⁴⁵ In this way, according to Vācaspati, neither verbal testimony nor meditation is the required instrumental cause, but it is only the internal, ^{organ,} which, in his view, is a sense-organ, that intuites Brahman-Ātman, as associated with the knowledge obtained through verbal testimony, meditation thereon and so on.¹⁴⁶ Anaṇanda, in his Vedānta-kalpataru, further endorses Vācaspati's view.¹⁴⁷ The Upaniṣadic texts like "This subtle Self is to be known by means of mind"¹⁴⁸ and "But by the seers of subtle things, He (Ātman) is seen through a pointed and fine intellect",¹⁴⁹ also corroborate the above view.

As against Vācaspati's view, Prakāśātman, in his Pañcādikā-vivaraṇa, holds that the principal texts of

the Upaniṣads such as 'That thou art' are themselves directly the cause of the intuitive experience of Brahman-Ātman. Prakāśātman elucidates his view as follows: Even prior to śravaṇa, manana, etc., the Upaniṣadic mahāvākyas give rise to the immediate knowledge of Brahman-Ātman. Yet the latter i.e. Brahman-Ātman falsely appears to be mediated one, being obstructed by certain defects like non-concentration of the mind, contrary notion i.e., the self-hood of the body, organs, and mind, etc.¹⁵⁰ And because of such defects, created in the mind by the prior sins, one does not attain the unshakable immediate experience of Brahman-Ātman by mere mahāvākyas. Scriptures, therefore, prescribe sacrifice, etc., śama, dama, etc., and śravaṇa, manana, etc., which, when pursued, remove these defects present in the mind. By the performance of Scripture-ordained duties such as sacrifice, etc., there is the removal of sin. By the acquisition of śama, dama, etc., contrary activities of the mind are annihilated. śravaṇa and manana, respectively, refute the doubt as regards the validity of the Upaniṣadic passages (pramāṇasādhyaṇā) and the impossibility of the import of the Upaniṣadic texts (prameyāsādhyaṇā). And nīdīdhyāṇa removes the contrary notions (vivarita-bhāvaṇā) and brings about, in consequence, the concentrated state of the mind, which is quite essential for ascertaining Brahman-Ātman that is a very subtle object. The mind, thus

qualified, assists verbal testimony, i.e. the Upanisadic mahāvākyas, in generating directly the unshakable immediate experience of Brahman-Ātman, by removing the obstacles, which cause the illusion of mediateness in respect of Brahman-Ātman.¹⁵¹

And that the Upanisadic testimony is the cause of the immediate experience of Brahman-Ātman is shown by the tadāhita suffix in the text 'I ask you about the upanisado-vyūha (the person i.e. Brahman-Ātman), propounded in the Upanisads'.¹⁵² Here the meaning of the tadāhita suffix is, 'that person, who is properly known through the Upanisads alone'.¹⁵³

It should not be argued that the tadāhita suffix in the above text holds good even if we accept that the Upanisadic texts give only a mediate cognition of Brahman-Ātman; for, in respect of what is essentially immediate, mediate cognition is mere illusion and not a right cognition. In case of an essentially immediate object, immediate cognition alone is the right cognition (anyāya-jñāna). Therefore, if the Upanisadic texts are admitted to give only mediate knowledge of Brahman-Ātman, which is immediate by nature, the validity of the Upanisads would be lost.¹⁵⁴ In order to overcome this difficulty, we have to accept that the Upanisadic statements themselves directly give rise to the immediate knowledge of Brahman-Ātman. And, as noticed

already, what is required is the removal of defects present in the mind. Once this is achieved, the required immediate experience springs spontaneously from the Upaniṣadic mahāvākyas like 'That thou art'.

From the above, it is clear that, according to Prakāśātman, the Upaniṣadic mahāvākyas like 'That thou art' alone are the instrumental cause of the intuitive experience of Brahman-Ātman, while the mind, purified by nididhyāsana, etc., is only a subsidiary cause thereof. And thus, unlike Maṇḍana and Vācaspati, Prakāśātman maintains the view that, in certain special cases, even the verbal statements are capable of imparting an immediate knowledge. This view is based on the theory that the immediacy of knowledge depends not on the origination through a particular instrument, but entirely on the particular object of knowledge (grameya).¹³⁵ Accordingly, a verbal statement gives rise to the mediate knowledge of an object if the object is mediate, and it gives rise to the immediate knowledge of an object if the object is immediate. Since the absolute Brahman is non-different from our immediate inner self, the knowledge in respect of the non-difference between the individual self and Brahman, though arising from the verbal statements like 'That thou art', is immediate.¹⁵⁰

The above view that knowledge through verbal testimony may of itself be immediate, was earlier advocated by Suresvara also. He, in his Naishkarmya-siddhi and Vārttikas, refers to the well-known instance, 'Thou art the tenth', in order to establish this view. The story runs as follows: Once, a party of ten persons happened to cross a river. After crossing the river, each one of them started counting the members of the party, in order to know whether all of them were quite safe. But unfortunately, each person counted only nine, leaving out himself from the counting. All of them thought that they had lost one of their friends, and so they began to lament. Then there came an outsider, and seeing their sorrow-stricken condition born of stupidity told each one that he himself was the missing tenth man. Then they rejoiced the recovery of the lost friend.

In the above case, says Suresvara, the statement of the wise stranger, i.e., "You are yourself the tenth man" causes the immediate ascertainment of one's being the tenth man. Even so, the Upanisadic statements like 'Thou art that' bring about the immediate experience of jīva's being non-different from the Absolute Brahman.¹⁵⁷ The knowledge arising from the statement "You are the tenth man" is not stultified. At no time, in the beginning, middle, and end, is there any doubt that there are nine persons already.

Similarly, in one, who has perfectly understood already the import of 'Thou' (tvanamātha), unshakable knowledge about the inmost Self positively arises from the proposition 'That thou art', which dispels all duality.¹⁵⁸ It may be noted here that though Prakāśānandan and Sureśvara slightly differ from each other as to the conception of and relation between ānyāsa, etc. as well as the process of the emergence of Brahma-sākṣātkāra, yet, both of them commonly hold the view that the latter emanates directly from the Upaniṣadic mahāvākyas through the process of ānyāsa, manana, etc. And both of them do not accept the view of some Advaitins that śabda-prasaṅga can yield only mediate knowledge. Sureśvara in particular has severely criticised this view.¹⁵⁹

So far, the prominent views, advanced by Advaitins in solution of the problem as to what is the instrumental cause of the intuitive experience of Brahman-Ātman, have been discussed. From this discussion, it is clear that there is a kind of unity among these divergent views. Because all these views are at one that the Upaniṣadic mahāvākyas, the mind, and meditation assist one another in giving rise to the desired result. But the dispute is only as regards the primacy of one or the other.

Among the three prominent views referred to so far, the view that meditation (pratyakhyāna) is the required instrumental cause, which was held by some earlier Advaitins like Brahmadatta and Harṣana, is not supported by a majority of post-Śaṅkara Advaitins, on the ground that meditation is not recognised to be a means of true knowledge. The remaining views represent two dominant currents of thought in post-Śaṅkara Advaita. As already seen, Shāmatī-school holds that the Upaniṣadic statements can generate only mediate knowledge. And since immediate knowledge can be produced only from the functioning of a sense-organ; the mind, which is the organ of the internal sense, must be admitted to be the required instrumental cause. While according to Vivarapa-school and Vārttika-school, the immediacy of knowledge entirely depends on the particular object of knowledge and not on the origination through a particular instrument. Here since Brahman-Ātman is ever immediate, the Upaniṣadic texts can give rise to the immediate knowledge or the intuitive experience of Brahman-Ātman. Thus, according to this view, the Upaniṣadic mahāvākyas are admitted to be the required instrumental cause. And it may be added here that a good majority of Advaitins accepts this view.¹⁶⁰

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. न च पुनरावर्तते ।
Chā. Up. VIII. 13. 1.
2. इदं तु पारमार्थिकं, कूटस्थनित्यं, व्योमवत्तत्त्वव्यापि
सर्वविद्रियारहितं, नित्यतुल्यं, निरवयवं, स्वयंज्योतिःसम्भावम् ।
यत्र धर्मधर्मो तदकारेण बालवत् नोपावर्तते । तदेतदगरीरात्वं
मोघाद्यम् ।
BSE. I. 1. 4. pp. 117-121.
3. ब्रह्मैव हि मुक्त्यवस्था ।
Op. cit. III. 14. 32. p. 926.
4. ब्रह्ममावृत्य मोघः ।
Op. cit. I. 1. 4. p. 128.
5. मिथ्याज्ञाननिमित्तत्वाच्च बन्धो न सम्यग्ज्ञानादुक्तो
विमूर्तितुमर्हति ।
Op. cit. IV. 11. 8. p. 974.
6. यत्तत्परं ज्योतिरसंप्रतप्तं तत्तत्परं ब्रह्म ।
तच्च अप्रतप्तप्राप्तादिवर्त्मकं, तदेव च जीवस्य
पारमार्थिकं स्वस्वं "तत्त्वमसि" इत्यादिशास्त्रेभ्यः,
नेतरदुपाधिकोत्पत्तम् ।
Op. cit. I. 111. 19. p. 303.
7. यावदेव हि स्वाणादिव पुरुषस्यैव देहाध्यामादिव
निवर्तयत् कूटस्थनित्यदुःखस्यमात्मानं अहं ब्रह्मात्मोति
न प्रतिपद्यते, तावज्जीवस्य जीवत्वम् ।
Ibid.

8. यदा तु देहेन्द्रियमनोबुद्धिर्नपातात् व्युत्थाप्य ब्रूया
प्रतिष्ठीयते, नास्ति त्वं देहेन्द्रियादिसंघातः, नास्ति
संभारी, किं तर्हि तत्परमं स आत्मा तत्परमतीति,
तदा कूटस्थमित्यद्वयस्वस्यमात्मानं प्रतिष्ठय
अत्माच्छरीराभिमानात्तस्मिन्नुत्तिष्ठन् स एव
कूटस्थमित्यद्वयस्वस्य आत्मा भवति, "स यो ह वै
तत्परमं ब्रह्म वेद ब्रह्मैव भवति" [मुण्ड. 3.2.9]
इत्यादिभूतिभ्यः ।
Ibid.
9. तदेव चास्य पारमार्थिकं त्वत्वं येन शरीरात्
समुत्थाय स्येन स्येन अभिनिवृत्तते ।
Ibid.
10. प्राग्विवेकविज्ञानोत्पत्तेः शरीरेन्द्रियमनोबुद्धिष्वपेक्षानोपाधिभिः
अविविक्तमिव जीवस्य दृढतयादिज्योतिःत्वत्वं भवति । यथा
शुद्धस्य स्फटिकस्य स्वाच्छयं शौक्यं च त्वत्वं प्राग्विवेकग्रहणात्
रवतनीलाऽऽपाधिनिरविविक्तमिव भवति ।
Op. cit. I. 111. 19, p. 304.
11. प्रमाणजनितविवेकग्रहणास्तु पराचीनः स्फटिकः स्वाच्छयेन
शौक्येन च स्येन स्येन अभिनिवृत्तत इत्युच्यते । तथा
देहाध्याययिविविक्तस्यैव सतो जीवस्य अतिष्ठतं विवेकविज्ञानं
शरीरात्समुत्थानं, विवेकविज्ञानस्य त्वत्वेनाभिनिवृत्तिरितः
देवतात्मस्वस्यावगतिः ।
Ibid.
12. तथा विवेकाविवेकमात्रेण आत्मनोऽशरीरत्वं शरीरत्वं च,
गन्त्रवर्णात् "अशरीरं शरीरेषु" [उप. 1.2.22] इति ।
"शरीरस्थोऽपि कौन्तेय न कश्चित् न तिष्ठति" [गी. 13.31]
इति च शरीरत्वाशरीरत्वविशेषाभावस्मरणात् ।
Op. cit. I. 111. 19, pp. 304-305.

13. तत्माद् विवेकविज्ञानाभावाद्भावविर्मितत्वस्यः
तन् विवेकविज्ञानादाविर्मितत्वस्य हत्युच्यते ।
Ibid.
14. स्वमेवैष तृतादोऽत्माच्छरीरात्समुत्थाय परं ज्योतिष्यति
त्वेन ज्येण अभिनिष्पद्यते ।
Chē. U. VIII. xii. 3.
15. CE. देवोन्मात्मनाऽऽविर्मवति न धमन्तिरेति । कुतः ?
त्वेन ज्येण अभिनिष्पद्यत इति स्वशब्दात् । अन्यथा
हि स्वशब्देनेति विशेषणमनवतुष्टं स्यात् ।
DS. IV. iv. 1, p. 1003.
- 15 a. माध्यमेन्मोक्षोऽभ्युपगम्येत, अनित्य एव स्यात् ।
नित्यस्य मोक्षः सर्वमोक्षादिभिरभ्युपगम्यते ।
Op. cit. I. 1. 4, p. 121.
16. अत्र ब्रह्म तत्त्वज्ञो ।
Bh. U. IV. iv. 7.
A person, who is liberated even while living in
the body, is called a jīvanmukta. Vidyāranya, in
his Jīvanmukti-vivoka, explains jīvanmukti (embodied
liberation) as follows:
“जीवतः पुरुषस्य कर्तृत्वभोगतृत्वसुखदुःखादित्यग्निरिच्छतार्थाः
बलेन ह्यपत्त्याद् दन्धो भवति, तस्य निवारणं जीवन्मुक्तिः ।”
I. p. 7.
17. यत्सर्वगतं सर्वान्तरं त्वरिभक्तं च परं ब्रह्म, तस्य गन्तव्यता न
कदापिदुपपद्यते । नहि गतमेव गम्यते । अन्यो ह्यन्वद्
गच्छतीति प्रसिद्धं लोके ।
UG. IV. iii. 14. p. 990.

18. अस्या हि कार्यब्रह्मणः गन्तव्यत्वमुपपद्यते प्रदेगगत्वात् ।
न तु परस्मिन् ब्रह्मणि गन्तुत्वं गन्तव्यत्वं गतिर्वाऽव्यक्त्यतो ।
तर्जगतत्वात्प्रत्यगात्मत्वाच्च नन्तुणाम् ।
Op. cit. IV. 111. 7. p. 994.
19. "न तस्य प्राणा उत्क्रामन्ति ब्रह्मेव सन् ब्रह्माप्येति"
[Bṛ. 4. 4. 6] इति च परस्मिन् ब्रह्मणि गतिं निवारयति ।
Op. cit. IV. 111. 14, p. 999.
20. गतिरूपनाशो च गन्ता जीवो गन्तव्यस्य ब्रह्मणः
उपपद्यते विकारो वाच्यो वा ततः स्यात् ।
अत्यन्ततादात्म्ये गमनानुपपत्तिः ।
Ibid.
21. Cf. आनन्द्यात्मकब्रह्मावाप्तिश्च गीतः ।
VP. IX. p. 153.
22. In order to convey the infinite and unsurpassable nature of Brahman-bliss, the Taittiriya Upaniṣad, speaking in terms of the calculus of pleasure, says that Brahman-bliss is the culmination of the ever-increasing happiness arranged in a graduated scale from the lower to the higher.
Cf. Tait. Up. II. viii.
23. नेह नानास्ति किञ्चन ।
Bṛh. Up. IV. iv. 19.
24. स च शक्तिमायः । अकाननित्वेन किञ्चिदायत्तनियमाच्च ।
VP. IX. p. 153.
Cf. रोगार्तस्यैव रोगनिवृत्तौ स्वस्थता, तथा दुःखात्मकस्य आरमनो दैतप्रपञ्चोपशान्ते स्वस्थता, उद्वेगनावः प्रयोजनम् ।
दैतप्रपञ्चस्य वायिवाक्यत्वात् विद्या तदुपशान्तिः स्यात् ।
Śaṅkara's preface to the Commentary of Māṇḍūkya-kārikā.

25. तमेव विदित्वाऽतिमृत्युमेति
नान्यः पन्था विद्यतेऽयनाय ॥
Svs. Up. III. 8.
26. तस्य ज्ञानं ब्रह्मात्मैवयोगोवरम्, "अभयं वै जनकं प्राप्तोऽपि"
"तदात्मानमेवावेदं ब्रह्मास्मि" इति श्रुतेऽपि, "तत्त्वमस्यादि-
वाक्योऽयं ज्ञानं मोक्षस्य साधनम्" इति नारदीयवचनाच्च ।
VP. IX. p. 155.
27. तस्य ज्ञानं अद्वैतस्यम्, परोक्षत्वे अद्वैतस्य निवृत्तिरित्याप्ततेः ।
Op. Cit. IX. p. 156.
28. उत्पादमाप्यं संस्कार्यं विकार्यं च त्रिधा तत् ।
नैव सुवितर्क्यतास्तत्कार्त्तम् तस्या न साधनम् ॥
IB. I. 53.
29. तयोः पक्षयोर्गोष्ठस्य धूमनिवृत्त्यम् । नहि दद्यादिकार्यं
उत्पाद्यं वा घटादि नित्यं दृढं लोहे ।
BSB. I. 1. 4. p. 126.
30. नवाप्यत्वेनापि दायपिधा, स्वात्मस्वत्वे सत्यनाप्यत्वात् ।
स्वस्वप्यतिरिक्तत्वे पि ब्रह्मणो नाप्यत्वं, सर्वगतत्वेन
वित्याप्तत्वस्यत्वात् सर्वेण ब्रह्मणः, आकाशस्येव ।
Ibid.
31. नापि संस्कार्यं मोक्षः, येन व्यापारमपेक्षे । संस्कारो हि नाम
संस्कार्यस्य गुणाधानेन वा स्याद्दोषापनयनेन वा, न तापद्
गुणाधानेन संभवति, अनापेक्षातिशयब्रह्मत्वस्यत्वान्मोक्षस्य ।
नापि दोषापनयनेन, नित्यब्रह्मत्वस्यत्वान्मोक्षस्य ।
Ibid.
32. ब्रह्मैव तन् ब्रह्माप्येति ।
BSB. Up. IV. 1v. 6.

33. विमुक्तश्च विमुच्यते ।
Katha. Up. II. 11. 1.
34. परिहृतावाप्तयोर्बोधादानप्राप्ती न कर्मणा ।
मोहमात्रान्तरागतत्वात्क्रियया ते न तिर्यक्तः ॥
MS. I. 34.
35. तस्माज्ज्ञानेनैव मुक्त्वा क्रियाया गन्धमात्रस्याप्यनुपयोगो
ब्रह्म नोपपद्यते ।
MS. I. 1. 4, p. 126.
36. For the details of these views Cf. M. Hiriyanna's
introduction to the edition of Naishkarmya-siddhi,
pp. xiii-xvii.
37. Cf. वायव्यजन्मज्ञानोत्तरकालीनभावनोत्कर्षात्
भावनाजन्मना प्राकारतत्त्वज्ञानान्तरेणैव ज्ञानस्य निवृत्तेः
ज्ञानाभ्यासदशायां ज्ञानस्य कर्मणा व्युत्पद्यमानपत्तेः ।
Jñānottama's Commentary on MS. I. 67, p. 38.
(M. Hiriyanna's edition).
38. स्वमहिम्ना प्रमाणानि कुर्वन्त्यवविबोधनम् ।
इतरेतरताचिद्व्ये प्रामाण्यं नेह्यते स्वतः ॥
MS. III. 86.
39. ब्रह्मात्मवस्तु निरवधिचिदेकत्वं
बहन्मुक्तावदपरोक्षेषुः स्वभावात् ।
निर्दोषोदशिरतो ब्रह्मादतोऽस्मिन्
ब्रह्मात्मवस्तुनि भेदपरोक्षद्विः ॥
MS. I. 341.

Cf. also Madhusūdana Sarasvatī's remarks thereon-

"प्रत्यगभिन्नं ब्रह्म चापरोक्षविन्मात्रत्वात् यत्नाभादपरोक्षादिति
श्रुतेष्वनित्यापरोक्षेति तत्र वेदान्ताज्ज्वलं ध्यानं शब्दप्रवृत्तमपि
विषयमहिम्नाऽपरोक्षेयं भवेत् "

40. युक्तिशब्दो पुराण्यस्य न वेदकुत्सां प्रभाम् ।
साक्षादापत्तमानास्ताभ्यां हिमपूर्वं कतिपयति ॥
RS. II.1.124.

Cf. Jñānottama's commentary thereon -

"युक्तिशब्दो यदि पूर्वमपरोक्षप्रमां न कुर्वति परोक्षप्रमामेव
कुत्साः परयात्कथमप्यतास्तां कुर्वीयातां, परोक्षतया
अनुमानादिगतवदन्यद्वी अभ्यासादापरोक्ष्यादर्शनादित्यर्थः ।"

41. प्रतीक्ष्याने ज्ञातवस्य न्यायोऽस्तथाग्नेहनात्मकः ।
ईयच्छतं तामिहृत्तं सम्यक्कृत्वावगच्छति ॥
RS. II.1.125.

42. स्मृत्प्रपूरत्या मृदनाति क्रियाकारकस्यम् ।
ब्रह्मन्मागमज्ञानं साक्षात्प नारूपतोऽनयोः ॥
RS. II.1.126.

Cf. "भावनायाः विरतीकानुपदेष्टुतया ज्ञेयभावनाविपरीत-
भावनात्मकविशेषलक्षणप्रतिषेधनिरासेन ज्ञानोरपत्तायेव
उपधीणत्वात् उत्पन्नमात्रं आगमिकं ध्यानं स्वार्थमज्ञानं तदेव
निवर्तयतीति न ज्ञानकर्मणोः समुच्चयावतर इति भावः ।"
Jñānottama's commentary on the above verses.

43. Śaṅkara himself, in his commentary on the Prheṭāganyake
Upaniṣad (V.1), briefly describes dvaitādvaita-vāda
and refutes it. Cf. also RSB. II.1.14, pp.456-458.

44. M.Hiriyanna, Introduction to Suresvara's
Naishkarmya-siddhi, 14. xviii-xxix.
45. परस्परविरोधाच्च नैकैककर्तृत्वम् ।
द्वयोरवस्थयोर्ध्वत्प्रकाशतमसोरिव ॥
BUBV. V. 1. 69.
cf. also BUBV. I. vi. 76 and IV. iii. 1812.
46. सर्वथा नैव पठते ज्ञानकर्मसमुच्चयः ।
विद्यैव तमोक्षानादकार्यं कर्म किंप्रसम् ॥
न मानं किञ्चिदप्यस्ति ज्ञानकर्मसमुच्चयः ।
प्रत्यक्षैव तमोक्षो ज्ञानादेव तमोक्षतेः ।
BUBV. III. iii. 72-73.
47. हेतुत्वस्यकार्याणि प्रकाशतमसोरिव ।
विरोधीनि ततो नास्ति सादृश्यं ज्ञानकर्मणोः ॥
NS. I. 66.
cf. ज्ञानस्य हेतुः प्रमाणम् । त्वत्त्वं च परमार्थप्रकाशकत्वम् ।
कार्यमविधानिरूपितः । कर्मणो हेतुरविधाराणादिः ।
त्वत्त्वमप्रकाशतमसोरिव । कार्यमुत्पत्त्यादीति
परस्परविरोधीनि ।
Jñānottama's commentary on the above verse.
48. तमेव विदित्वाऽतिगूढमेति नान्यः पन्था विदितेऽप्यनाय ।
Upe. Upe. III. 8.
49. नास्त्यकृतः कृतेन ।
Mupā. Upe. I. 11. 12.
50. न कर्मणा न प्रजया धनेन त्यागेनैव अतृप्तत्वमानुः ।
Mahānār. xii. 14.

51. तस्मान्मुमुक्षुभिः कार्यमात्मज्ञानाभिलाषिभिः ।
नित्यं नैमित्तिकं कर्तुं सदैवात्मविमुक्षये ॥
IS. I. 50.
52. Cf. "विना क्ताभिलाषमनुष्ठितं विप्रायपि ज्ञानहेतुः"
Anandagiri's remark on SV. 328.
53. Cf. कर्मभिः संस्तुता हि विमुक्षात्मानः शश्वन्ति आत्मानं
उपनिषत्प्रकाशं अप्रतिबन्धेन वेदितुम् । तथा ह्यार्थमे-
"विमुक्षस्त्वत्तत्तत्तु तं पश्यते निष्कलं व्यापमानः" [मु. 3. 1. 8]
इति । स्मृतिवचनानुसङ्गते पुनरप्यात्मात्मस्य कर्मणः उत्पादिः ।
Śaṅkara's commentary on Bṛh. Up. IV. iv. 22.
- 53 a. तमेतं वेदानुसङ्गेन ब्रह्मणा विविदिषन्ति यथेन
दानेन तपसाऽनागमेन ।
Bṛh. Up. IV. iv. 22.
54. M. Hiriyanna, Introduction to Naiṣkarmya-sūtrāḥ,
p. xxii.
55. Cf. नित्यकर्मविमुक्तानामुद्दिष्टाभिः पुमान् ।
निःशेषकर्मैतत्पक्षनावच्छीस्ततः ॥

विरक्तं ज्ञानात्सोऽयं तत्सावदन्तीभवात् ।
तत्सावदुःखसंस्कारसमुत्तिभिः प्रेरमाण्मीः ॥

उद्भूताजिज्ञासः तत्तद्दाने साधनस्युहः ।
त्यगताभेक्षणाः सोऽयं प्रत्यग्गाथात्म्यनिश्चयः ॥
वस्तुवृत्तात्मतपोधनस्तत्संसारकारणः ।
व्याविदाशेषांसारो विमुक्तो ना विमुच्यते ।
BUV. II. 1v. 2-3.
Cf. also BUV. I. 111. 98-99. Sambandhoḥti to IS. I. 52.
and Bṛh. I. 1. 1. pp. 62-63.

56. आत्मज्ञानोदयादूर्ध्वं पुरुषार्थवितानतः ।
स्वतःसिद्धेश्च मोक्षस्य कर्मकाण्डमनर्थकम् ॥
TUUV. I. 163.
57. विदेहो वीतस्त्रिहो नेतिनेत्यवशेषिताः ।
देहावनात्मदूष् तद्वत् तत्किंयां तीक्ष्णो वि न ॥
SB. I. 58.
58. उत्पत्तौ ध्यानस्य कमपिधा विधौ विविदिषीत्पादद्वारा
विविदिषन्ति यमेनेति श्रुतेः ।
Bhā. III. iv. 26. p. 898.
यज्ञादीनि विविदिषायां विनियु ज्ञानो विधिः ।
Op. cit. III. iv. 34, p. 906.
59. Bṛh. Up. IV. iv. 22.
60. तथाहि - तमेतमात्मानं वेदानुसन्धनेन नित्यस्वस्थयायेन
प्राप्स्यन् विविदिषन्ति वेदितुमिच्छन्ति, नतु विदन्ति ॥
Bhā. I. i. 1, p. 61.
61. CE. भातोः उर्मणः तमान्कर्तृकादिच्छायां या ।
Bṛ. Sū. III. 1. 7.
62. प्रधानप्रत्ययवचनार्थस्य अन्यग्रमाणत्वात् ।
Op. cit. I. 11. 56.
CE: प्रकृतिप्रत्ययो प्रत्ययार्थं सह हतः प्राधान्येन ।
63. वस्तुतः प्रधानस्यापि वेदनस्य प्रकृत्यर्थतया शब्दतो
गुणत्वात्, इच्छायाश्च प्रत्ययार्थतया प्राधान्यात्,
प्रधानेन च कार्यक्षेत्रत्वात् ।
Bhā. I. i. 1, p. 61.

64. नहि राज्यस्यमानयेत्पुष्टे वस्तुतः प्रधानो हि राजा
पुल्लविशेष्यतया शब्दतः उपसर्जनः आनीयते
अपितु पुल्ल्य स्य, शब्दतस्तस्य प्राधान्यात् ।
IbId.
65. सर्वं वेदानुचनस्येव यदस्यापीच्छासाधकतया निधानम् ।
IbId.
66. VSP. p. 63.
67. तस्यादेर्विच्छान्तो दान्ता उपरतास्तितुः समाहितो
मृत्वाऽऽत्मनुवेवात्मानं पश्यति ।
Brh. Up. IV. 1v. 23.
68. तत्साध्यादीनि श्रद्धादीनि च यथाश्रमं स्वर्णियेव
आश्रममणि विधीत्यस्तथावपेक्षितप्यानि । तत्राप्येवंविदिति
विशारतयोगारप्रत्यासन्नानि विद्यासाधनानि श्रद्धादीनि,
विविधविशारयोगास्तु बाह्यतराणि वशादीनीति विवेकाख्यम् ।
SSA. III. 1v. 27, p. 900.
69. CE. SV. 14, BUBV. IV. 1v. 1024-1026, and SS. III. 332-330.
70. धुम्रतामात्र स्वामी वेदानुचनद्वयः ।
विनियुक्ता यतस्तत्मान्नैतो तज्ज्ञानविद्ये ॥
अत एव वृत्तिर्यत्नाच्छ्रमादीनेव वक्ष्यति ।
उपायानात्मसाधारम्यविज्ञानाय यमात्मकान् ॥
BUBV. IV. 1v. 1024-1025.
71. प्रत्यक्षप्रवृत्तां बुद्धेः समर्ण्युत्पाद्य बुद्धितः ।
कृतार्थान्मस्तमायास्ति प्रायुहन्ते फा एव ॥
NE. I. 49.
72. CE, SLS. III. p. 303.

73. "अवान्तरवाक्यमेवेन ऽविधिदिवन्ति" इति यज्ञादीनां
ज्ञानसंयोगविधानस्य
PPV. Var. I. p. 37.
74. नित्यनैमिरितकर्मनिष्ठानिः तत्कृतस्य आत्मनो यदि
सर्वजननध्यानाभ्यासादीनि ज्ञानसाधनानि तैपद्यन्ते तदा
तत्कारकमणि त्वहारिणोभ्याम् आत्मज्ञानव्यतारयन्ति ।
Op. cit. Var. III. p. 540.
75. Cf. आत्मतत्त्वापरोक्षानुभवस्तावद्विषयमाणाया
त्वर्गादिवद् भवनासाध्यो अवगम्यते, पुरुषार्थत्वात् ।....
.....। तत्र यज्ञादीनामिच्छोपसर्जनतया आख्याताभिहित-
भावनाकरणाया अवगतानां साध्यैश्च अन्यथा,
यज्ञादीनि ब्रह्मानुभवसाधनान्यवगतानि । तत्र च
"आत्मानुभवतानो यज्ञादीन्यानुतिष्ठेत्" इति विधिः
परिणम्यते । न च दृष्टामात्रेण संयोगः । तस्या
असाध्यमानतापगमात् ।
Op. cit. Var. III. p. 543.
76. तेन ज्ञप्तेन किमिच्छोत्पन्न अवस्य गमनकरणत्ववत्
यज्ञादीनां द्वयमाणज्ञानकरणत्वं प्रतीयत इत्यर्थः ॥
VII. Var. III. p. 543.
Cf. SLG. III. pp. 305-306 and Acyutakṛaṇānanda-Tīrtha's
commentary thereon.
77. येषां गुणविविदिनादिस्वप्नप्रत्यक्षावगम्योदयपर्यन्तं
कर्मनिष्ठानि ततः सन्न्यातः इति कर्मतत्सन्न्यासाभ्यां
विद्यानिष्पारपभ्युपगमात् ।
SLG. III. p. 307.
78. आत्मस्थो मुनयोर्म कर्म कारणमुच्यते ।
योगास्तस्य तत्त्वैव शमः कारणमुच्यते ॥
BG. VI. 3.

79. प्रत्यग्रवृण्णां हृदेः कर्माण्युत्पाद शुद्धितः ।
कृतार्थान्यस्तमायास्तं प्राप्नुवन्ते यथा ह्य ॥
MS. I. 49.
80. कर्मणां विद्यार्थत्वपक्षे द्वारभूतविविदिषातिद्वयनन्तारं
उपरतावपि फलपर्यन्तानि विशिष्टगुणस्वामिनिर्दिष्ट-
व्यवस्थानादिसाधकानि नियुक्तिप्रमुखाणि तस्यापि
विधौत्पादकत्वनियमोऽस्ति । विविदिषार्थत्वपक्षे
तु कृष्णादिप्रवृत्तिजननसमर्थोत्प्रेक्षातम्यादनमात्रेण
कृताकृतिति नावश्यं विधौत्पादकत्वनियमः ।
SLS. III. p. 307.
81. Cf. तौलिकव्यापारात् मनस उपरमः शमः
बाह्यकरणानामुपरमो ह्यनः । शान्त्यर्थं विहितनित्यादिकर्मसंन्यास
उपरतिः । शीतोष्णादिद्वन्द्वजनैः तितिषा । निद्राजस्यप्रमाद-
त्यागैश्च मनःस्थितिः समाधानम् । सर्वत्रास्तित्वा श्रुतः ।
Govindānanda's Sāṃkhya-sūtra on BSB. I. I. 1, pp. 36-37.
82. Śaṅkara, in his commentary on the Jijñāṣāsūtrikarāṇa,
says that the aspirant, who is fully qualified by
possessing this four-fold requisite (sādhana-saṁstaya),
namely, nityā'nitya-vastu-viveka, ihānūtrārtha-bhoga-
virāga, śamaśamādi-sādhana-saṁyat, and mumukṣutva,
alone is eligible for taking up the inquiry into the
nature of Brahman-Ātman.
Cf. BSB. I. I. 1, pp. 71-73.
83. आत्मा वा अरे द्रष्टव्यः श्रोतव्यो मन्तव्यो
निदिष्ट्यास्तव्यः ।
Bṛh. Up. IV. v. 6.

84. अपि च यत्तुः प्रतिपत्तयो ब्रह्मणि । प्रथमा तावत्
उपनिष्ठाव्यवस्थायाः भवति यां किं आचक्षते
ब्रह्ममिति । द्वितीया श्रीमत्तात्पर्येण तस्मादेवोपनिष्ठाव्या-
त् यामाचक्षते मननमिति । तृतीया चिन्ता तत्तमयी
यामाचक्षते निदिध्यासनमिति । चतुर्थी साक्षात्कारवती
वृत्तिरस्या, नान्तरीयकं हि तस्याः कैवल्यमिति । -
Bhā. III. iv. 26. p. 599
85. तथा च ब्रह्म नाम आत्माद्यगतये वेदान्तवाक्यविचारः
शारीरकब्रह्मणं च । मननं वस्तुनिष्ठवाक्यापेक्षित-
दुन्दुभ्यादिदुष्टान्तजन्मस्थितियथावारम्भत्वादियुक्तवर्थादानुत्थानं
वाक्यार्थाविरोधवन्मानानुत्थानं च । निदिध्यासनं
मननोपबृंहितवाक्यार्थविषये स्थिरीभावः ।
Pr. Var. IX. pp. 352-353.
86. The illustration of the drum given in the
Bṛhadāraṇyaka text :-
"त यथा दुन्दुभेऽन्वमानस्य न बाह्यान् शब्दान् शक्नुवाद्गृह्णाप
दुन्दुमेस्तु गृह्णेन दुन्दुभ्यावाप्तस्य शब्दो गृहीतः §2.4.7§", is
intended to show that nothing exists apart
from Brahman-Ātman. cf. Śaṅkara's commentary
on this text.
The Taittirīyopaniṣad text:-
"यतो वा इमानि भूतानि जायन्ते । येन वातानि बीजन्ति ।
यत्प्रपन्त्यमिमीदृशन्ति । §3.1.1§", declares that Brahman
is the cause of the origination, maintenance and
dissolution of the world. This is meant for
propounding the fact that everything has Brahman
as its Self (Brahmātmabhāva).
Cf. Bṛ. II. 1. 33. p. 481.
And the Chāndogya text:- "वावारम्भं पिकारो
नामधेयं वृत्तिरस्यैव सत्यम् । §6.1.4§",
points to the falsity of the manifested world of
senses. Cf. Śaṅkara's commentary on this Upaniṣadic
text.

87. वृत्तिनिष्णादिषो न्यायः शब्दगणितविषेष्टकृत् ।
आगमार्थविनिर्दिष्टस्य मन्तव्य इति मन्यते ॥
BUBV. IX. iv. 214.

CE. वृत्त्यादिभिः शब्दगणितपर्यायविषयायैः न्यायैः
ब्रह्मात्मनि वेदान्ततात्पर्यनिष्पत्तिं श्रवणमित्यर्थः ।
वृत्त्यादिना ज्ञातस्य तत्त्वस्य अस्मादनादिविरासेन
निवृत्तार्थं देवमिदयात्स्यसाधको यत्तर्कः तदनुत्थानं
मन्तव्य इत्युच्यते इत्यर्थः ।
Anandagiri's Īśāstra-prakāśikā on the above
vārttika.

88. श्रवणादिभिः तावत्तत्त्वैकं प्रयत्नतः ।
यावद्व्योक्तं विज्ञानमापिस्मृति भास्वरम् ॥
Op. Cit. IX. iv. 218.

89. निदिध्यासनशब्देन सम्यग्ज्ञानं विवक्षितम् ॥
BUBV. I. iv. 899.
अपरापत्तबोध्योऽत्र निदिध्यासनमुच्यते ॥
Op. Cit. IX. iv. 217.
ईदृशकारम्यत्वबोध्यो निदिध्यासनमुच्यते ॥
Op. Cit. IX. v. 16.
प्रत्यग्याथात्म्यत्वबोध्यमाप्तत्वादेव हेतुतः ॥
Op. Cit. IX. v. 17.

90. वृत्त आगमतो योऽर्थस्तर्केणापि तयर्थितः ।
त एवार्थः सुनिष्णातः निदिध्यासनमुच्यते ॥
Op. Cit. IX. v. 18.

CE. "श्रवणादिभिः तावत्तत्त्वैकं प्रयत्नतः ।
यावद्व्योक्तं विज्ञानमापिस्मृति भास्वरम् ॥"
Anandagiri's remark on the above verse.

91. Bṛh. Up. IX. iv. 5.

92. निदिध्यासनाद्येन सम्यग्ज्ञानं विवक्षितम् ।
उक्तानुवचने तस्य विज्ञानेनेति निर्णयात् ॥
BUBV. I. 1v. 699.

ध्यानाशङ्कानिवृत्त्यर्थं विज्ञानेनेति भ्रम्यते ।
निदिध्यासनाद्येन ध्यानमाशङ्क्यते यतः ॥
Op. Cit. II. 1v. 233.

93. CE. अणमननस्य योजितयोर्गत्फलं तत्
नियुज्यतिमित्यर्थोऽप्युच्यते दर्शनाय ।
अनुमननविहीना येनमेवेति बुद्धिः
ह्यनननमाप्ता तन्निदिध्यासने हि ॥
ibid. III. 346.

CE. उच्यते तस्या अनुमननसमाप्ता तदुत्कर्षं सति
अनुमानयित्रीणां ब्रह्मात्मत्वापरोक्षपरहिता
अर्हं ब्रह्मैव हत्येवमाकारनिर्विविक्तिता या
बुद्धिः सा तत्फलं तन्निदिध्यासनमित्यर्थः ॥

Madhusūdana Sarasvatī's 'Sāra-saṅgraha' on the above verse.

94. तस्यापि विधौदयस्यापि अणमननपूर्वकोपासनाजनितसंस्कारतश्चिदादेव
येततो भावात् ।
गान्धर्वाशास्त्रोपासनावासनाया इव अपूर्वान्येधायाः
व्यादिताधारकारे, वेदान्तार्थोपासनावासनाया जीवब्रह्मभावसाधारकारे
अन्येधाया इव सामर्थ्यात् ।
ibid. I. 1. 4. p. 114.

95. तत्राद्ये तावत्प्रतिपत्तिः अणमननरूपे विदितपदतदर्थस्य
विदितवाक्यगतिगोचरन्यायस्य च पुंसः उपपद्यते । ते
एव च चिन्तामयी तृतीया प्रतिपत्तिः निदिध्यासनरूपा
प्रसूयते । सा च आदरनैरन्तर्यदीर्घकालमेतिता
साधारणवर्ती आद्यते एव प्रतिपत्तिं वतुर्थात् ।
तन्नान्तरीयं कैवल्यम् ।
Op. Cit. III. 1v. 26, p. 898.

96. CE. उभूतत्वसाधने आत्मदर्शने "प्रकटव्यः" इत्यनुप तादर्थ्येन मनननिदिष्टात्मनाम्नां फलोपकार्यज्ञानम्नां सह ब्रह्म नाम अङ्गि विधीयते ।
BBV. Var. I. pp. 29-30.
 मनननिदिष्टात्मनोऽपि ब्रह्मणाज्ञात्वं उत्तरत्र वक्ष्यामः ।
Op. cit. Var. I. p. 33.
 तर्था सावत् मनननिदिष्टात्मनाम्नां अज्ञाभूताम्नां सह ब्रह्मविधाम् अस्त्येव ।
Op. cit. Var. I. p. 38.
97. CE. यथा फटादिकार्यं घृतिपण्डादीनां प्रधानकारणता चक्रादीनां सत्कारिकारणतां प्राधान्याप्राधान्यव्यवदेशः, तथा ब्रह्मज्ञाननिदिष्टात्मनामागतीति भन्तव्यम् ।
VP. IX. p. 165.
98. विशिष्टवाक्यावधारणं प्रमेयावगमं प्रति अव्यवधानेन कारणं भवति, प्रमाणस्य प्रमेयावगमं प्रत्यव्यवधानात् ।
 मनननिदिष्टात्मने तु विस्तृत्य प्रत्यगात्मप्रवणतारिस्कार-परिनिष्पन्नतदेकाग्रवृत्तिकार्यद्वारेण ब्रह्मानुमाहेतुतां प्रतिपद्यते इति फलं प्रत्यव्यवहितस्य कृष्णस्य विशिष्टवाक्यावधारणस्य व्यवहिते मनननिदिष्टात्मने तद्वदमे अङ्गीक्रियेते ।
BBV. Var. I. pp. 411-412.
99. तत्र उदात्तार्थज्ञापको वेदनागो विधिः । स च तादृशस्योपलवध-विधानेन अर्थवान् ।
Leubhankar Bhāskara's Artha-samgraha, p. 8.
100. प्रमाणान्तरेण अप्राप्तस्य प्रापको विधिरपूर्यविधिः यथा "यत्नेन स्वर्गकामः" इत्यादिः ।
Op. cit. p. 43.
101. एवै प्राप्तस्य प्रापको विधिर्निवगविधिः यथा "प्रीहोनवहन्ति" इत्यादिः ।
Ibid.

102. CE. न च वैतुष्यस्य नखविदलनेनापि तस्माद् अवहनननियमो व्यर्थः
प्रयोजनाभावादिति वाच्यम् । अवधातेनैव वैतुष्यकरणे किञ्चिद्
अदृष्टं जन्यते इति नियमादुद्धाङ्गीकारात् । नियमेन
दृष्टकार्यमात्रेऽपि अदृष्टस्योत्पत्तेः । तद्व्यापुर्वं यागोत्पत्त्य-
पूर्वद्वारा कलापूर्वं उपसृज्यते, तेन नियमापूर्वमित्ये कलापूर्वमित्य
नोत्पत्ते इति कल्पनात् नियमापूर्वस्य न वैयर्थ्यम् ।
Kṛpṇa Yajvan's Śāntiśāstra-paribhāṣā, p. 21.
103. उभयोश्च पुनस्तप्राप्ताौ क्षतव्यावृत्तिवर्तो विधिः परितोष्याविधिः ।
यथा - "पञ्च पञ्चनखा भक्ष्याः" इति ।
Lakṣyaśāstra Śāntiśāstra, 92. 94. p. 44.
104. CE. पञ्च पञ्चनखा भक्ष्या प्रथममेव राक्ष्य ।
शल्पकः उवाचिषो गीषा श्लाः कूर्मश्च प वगः ॥
Śāntiśāstra, Śāntiśāstra-kāṇḍa, XVII, 37.
105. CE. विधिरत्यन्तमुप्राप्ताौ नियमः पादिषे सति ।
तत्र चान्यत्र च प्राप्ताौ परितोष्येति गीयते ॥
Kumārila's Tantrasamuccaya, I. 11. 42.
106. CE. GLS, I. pp. 8-20.
107. CE. तत्रोपायापरिधानादतीदिकसमोक्षे ।
प्रकटार्थकृतः प्राप्तरपूर्वः अथैव विधिः ॥
Yajñ, I. 4.
108. CE. विचारस्य विवागर्थनिर्णयं प्रति हेतुता ।
अपरोक्षप्रमाणस्य तत्साक्षात्कारहेतुता ॥
प्राप्तौ च विन्तवनियमता भ्रान्तिप्राप्तान्यसाधनैः ।
ततो नियम इत्याहुः सर्वे विवरणानुताः ॥
92. 94. I. 5-6.

109. आत्मतत्त्वापरोक्षस्य स्वादिष्टताव्यवस्थस्य वक्ष्यमाणत्वात्
अवधारणादिवत् अ उभयार्थकता विधानोपपत्तेः ।
PPV. Var. I. p. 34.
110. अत्र हि प्रसिद्ध्याभावात्तमेव ज्ञेयस्य सर्वगृहणमिति श्रुतं व्युत्पद्य
श्रवणादेरपि संग्रहायैव अस्ति गित्युक्तम्, अन्यथा यौनस्वत्वात् ।
VPS. Var. I. p. 4.
111. CE. तद्विषये सिद्धादयः वक्ष्यमाणा अपि अनियोज्यविषयत्वात्
कृण्वन्तीभवन्ति, उपमादिषु प्रयुक्तपुरतीक्ष्णयादिवत्,
अधेयान्वादेयवस्तुविषयत्वात् ।
BSP. I. 1. 4, p. 129.
112. ज्ञानविधिस्तत्र निराकृतः न श्रवणादिविधिः ।
PPV. Var. I. p. 36.
113. दर्शनविधाने हि ब्रह्म कर्मतया गुणभूतं प्रकल्प्यते ।
UP. Cat. Var. I. p. 37.
- CE. दर्शनविधाने हि 'प्रकृतिप्रत्ययौ प्रत्ययार्थ' इति ब्रूतः
प्राधान्येन 'इतिन्यायेन प्रत्ययार्थस्य नियोगस्यैव
प्राधान्यात् दर्शनस्य गुणभूतावेन तद्विषयस्य ब्रह्मणोऽपि
तत्तत्तां गुणभावः स्यात्, ततो न वेदान्तैर्ब्रह्म सिध्येत् ।
VPS. Var. I. p. 5.
114. ब्रह्मदर्शनमुद्दिष्टाय विचारविधाने तु स्वप्रधानकर्मभूतदर्शनविषयकत्वात्
ब्रह्मापि स्वप्रधानं भवति न तु गुणभूतं इति वेदान्तैः ब्रह्मण्यपि
स्वप्रधाने प्रतिपाद्यमाने तददर्शनाय श्रवणादिविधानं नैव विन्ययते ।
PPV. Var. I. p. 37.
115. CE. सर्वथा तावत् मनसिनिदिष्टासनाभ्यां उद्भूताभ्यां
श्रवणविधानं उत्तराय ।

UP. Cat. Var. I. p. 38. For an elaborate discussion on
the nature of injunction about śravaṇa, etc., accord-
ing to the Vivaraṇa-school, vide Dr. B. K. Gangupta's
A Critique on the Vivaraṇa School, pp. 3-15.

For an elaborate discussion on the nature of injunction about bravana etc., according to the Vivarana-school, vide Dr.B.K.Sengupta's 'A Critique on the Vivarana School', pp.3-15.

- 115 a. Cf. त्यासन्नर्थं यत्र कर्तुः स्यात् तत्र कर्ता निपुज्यते ।

BVBV. II. iv. 107.

116. Cf. प्रवर्णं मननं तद्वत् तथा शमदमादि यत् ।

पुमान् शनोति तत्कर्तुं तत्मादेतद्विधीयते ॥

Op.cit. II. iv. 122.

दर्शनस्याविद्येयत्वात्तदुपायो विधीयते ।

वेदान्तश्रवणं यत्नादुपायस्तर्कं स्य च ॥

Op.cit. II. iv. 213.

Here 'tarka' means 'manasana'.

117. Cf. चिकित्साशास्त्रवत्प्राप्तव्यापारान्तरवारिणी ।

श्रवणे परितोषेयमिति चार्तिरूपवेदिनः ॥

VSSM. I. 12.

"ब्रह्मज्ञानार्थं वेदान्तश्रवणे प्रवृत्तस्य चिकित्साज्ञानार्थं
परकगुणतादिक्रवणे प्रवृत्तस्यैव मध्ये व्यापारान्तरेऽपि
प्रवृत्तिः प्रकथ्येत इति तन्निष्कृतिफलकः "श्रोतव्यः"
इति परितोषाविधिः ।"

SLS. I. pp. 26-27.

118. नियमः परितोषा वा विध्यर्थोऽत्र स्नेहतः ।

अनात्मादर्शनैव परात्मान्मुपात्महे ॥

IS. I. 88.

119. CE. तथा एव हि सर्वेषां मौयसाधनमुत्तमम् ।
तयज्ज्ञेयं हि तज्ज्ञेयं तयज्ज्ञेयः प्रत्यक्षपरम्पदम् ॥
तयज धर्मधर्मं च तथा तयजानुते अपि ।
न्यासो प्रहमेति च प्राह तैरितरीयवृत्तिस्तथा ॥
PUGV. II. 10-11.
120. तयज्ज्ञेयधर्मधर्मं सैतारं प्रविष्टास्तः ।
किञ्चातोरेव वैकार्म्यं ऋष्यनोऽवधिकारता ।
SV. 12.
121. CE. तयज्ज्ञेयधर्मं या बुद्धिः ता प्रमेयमत्ताद मये ।
BUDV. II. 1v. 120.
आतोऽप्युत्तमत्वात्तान्नात्मज्ञाने विधिर्मेत ।
Op. Git. II. 1v. 121.
122. CE. अपि च यतः प्रतिपरतयो प्रहमणि ।
Bhū. III. 1v. 26, p. 898.
CE. प्रवर्णं द्यागमावर्णवादयर्षं ज्ञानमिदमेत ।
अयोऽप्येव विधिर्मेत वाचस्पतिमत्तानुताः ।
VS34. I. 13.
123. ऐयोणादेयविद्वानो हि विधिः । त एव च ऐय उपादेयो वा, यं
गुरुः कर्तृमकर्तृमन्यथा या कर्तुं शक्नोति । तमेव च समर्थः
कर्ताऽपि कर्तुं नियोज्यो भवति । नवेर्षुक्तान्यात्मत्वमननोपात्त-
दर्शनानीति विधिमत्तदनुष्ठातोः विधिध्यायकपोरभावाद् विधेरभाव
इति प्रयुक्ता अपि सिद्धादयः प्रवर्तनायामतगर्थाः उपलब्धं भवतीत्यर्थ
कुण्ठमप्रमाणीभवन्तीति ।
Bhū. I. 1. 1, p. 129.
- 123a. CE. अन्वयध्यातिरेकाभ्यां च श्रवणमननसिद्धिध्यायनाभ्यासस्यैव
स्वगोचरतावातकारकतत्वेन लोकोत्थितत्वात् ।
Op. Git. IV. 1. 1, p. 829.

124. अन्यतः ग्राप्ता एव हि श्रवणादयः विधिसत्त्वैर्विधेरनुवन्ते ।
न च अनुवादोऽप्यप्रयोजनः, प्रवृत्तिविशेषकरणात् ।
Op. cit. I.1.1, p. 130.

125. तत्तदिष्टानिष्टविषयेष्वाभिज्ञाभाषद्वयस्य बहिर्मुखो
न प्रत्यगात्मनि समाधातुमर्हति । आत्मश्रवणादिविधिसत्त्वैस्तु
वचनैर्जनको विषयज्ञोः किञ्चिद्व्यप्रत्यगात्मज्ञोः उदाहृत
इति प्रवृत्तिविशेषकरणा अनुवादानामस्तीति ।
Ibid.

CE. मननविधिसत्त्वयोरपि न विधिः, तयोः
अन्वयव्यतिरेकलिङ्गाधारकारणयोः विधिसत्त्वैः वचनैः
अनुवादात् ।
Op. cit. 2.1.4, p. 153.

CE. न च चिन्तासाधारकास्योर्विधिरिति तत्त्वसमीक्षायां
अस्माभिः श्रवणादितम् । विस्तरेण च उपमर्शस्तत्रैव
प्रपञ्चितः । तस्मात् "जर्त्तयिष्याम्यां ब्रह्मणा" इतिदद
विधिसत्त्वा एते "आत्मा वा अरे द्रष्टव्य" इत्यादयो
न तु विध्य इति । तदिदमुक्तम् - द्रष्टव्यादिगद्य ।
अपि तत्त्वसाभिमुखीकरणप्रधाना न तत्त्ववाचकोपविधिप्रधान इति ।
Op. cit. III.11.21, p. 713.

126. त
CE. विषये लिङ्गादयः ब्रह्मणा अपि अनियोज्यविषयत्वात्
कुण्ठीभवन्ति, उपलब्धिषु प्रत्युक्तपुरतः श्रवणादितम्,
अहेयानुपादेयवस्तुविषयत्वात् । किमर्थानि तर्हि
"आत्मा वा अरे द्रष्टव्यः श्रोतव्यः" इत्यादीनि
विधिच्छायाणि वचनानि ? तत्त्वसाभिमुखीकरणविषयविशेषकरणादीनि
इति श्रुमः ।
Op. cit. I.1.1, pp. 129-130.

127. CE. Op. cit. III, iv.47, p. 929.

128. विधिर्यं च अर्थवादस्यैव ततो वाक्यस्य प्रतीतिद्वारेण
प्रवृत्त्यतिशयकारणम् ।
VK. p. 919.
129. सकार्यन्तरविधिः षष्ठेण सूतीयं तदतो विध्यादिवत् ।
Ex. 99. III. 1v. 47.
130. स्वमविधिप्रधानेऽपि अस्मिन् विधावाक्ये मौनविधिरित्यर्थः ।
BSB. XII. 1v. 47. p. 821.
131. मौनपदतदभाष्ययोः भेददर्शय्यात्तद्भावात् व्याप्तेऽनुसृतमानस्य
उत्ताहजननार्थं विधिसम्बन्धोऽप्यमर्थवाद इत्यत्रेव तत्पर्यमिति भावः ।
VK. p. 919.
cf. विधिच्छायावर्धनादस्यैव प्रतीतिद्वारा प्रवृत्त्यतिशयकारणत्वादेव
तत्र विधित्वव्यवहारात् ।
SLB. I. p. 36.
132. नात्रापूर्वविधिः प्राप्तेरनन्योपायतो न च ।
नियमः परितोषा वा क्वणादिषु लभ्येत ॥
न तु क्वणादितादर्थे ब्रह्मसाधात्कारे उत्पत्त्यापान्तरत्वेनो यतः
क्वणादेर्नियमः परितोषा वा स्यात् ।
VK. p. 920.
133. cf. SLB. III. pp. 336-340.
134. cf. शब्दादेव तस्य [तत्त्वज्ञानस्य] उत्पत्तेः किमर्थं उपासनादि ?
उच्यते - परीक्षार्थं शाब्दज्ञानम्, प्रत्यक्षः प्रपञ्चावभासः,
तेन तयोरेकित्वेन प्रपञ्चावभासो नास्मात्संस्पृष्टः । उपासनादिना
साक्षात्कृतात्मतत्त्वस्य तु विरोधात् सन्नपि प्रपञ्चावभासो
नास्मात्संस्पृष्टः ।
BS. III. p. 134, see also pp. 515. I. p. 35.
135. ततस्तु तं पश्यते निष्कर्षं व्याख्यानः ।
Mund. Up. XII. 1. 8.

136. कामातुरस्य व्यपहितकामिनीसाक्षात्कारे प्रसंख्यानस्य
करणत्वकृत्येऽप्येव ।
SIS. III, p. 336.

137. Cf. वैदान्तवाक्यज्ञानमावनावापरोक्षीः ।
मूलप्रमाणदाटर्पेन न स्मर्त्तुं प्रपद्यते ॥
VK, p. 94, Cf. SIS. III. 337.

138. ध्यानस्य हि साक्षात्कारः क्लृप्तः । साक्षात्कारस्य
उत्कर्षितस्वरूपविषयः ।
Bhā. I. 111. 13, p. 287.

ध्यानाभ्यासपरिपाकेन साक्षात्कारी विज्ञानम् ।
Op. Cit. I. 111. 14, p. 290.

आगमाचार्योपदेशमूर्ध्वमनननिदिध्यासनप्रवर्धपर्यन्तजोऽस्य
ब्रह्मरूपसाक्षात्कारः उपावसति ।
Op. Cit. I. 1v. 19, p. 414.

"तत्त्वमसि" इति वाक्यश्रवणमननध्यानाभ्यासपरिपाकप्रवर्ध-
पर्यन्तजोऽस्य साक्षात्कारः उपजायते ।
Op. Cit. II, 11. 10, p. 502.

श्रवणमनननिदिध्यासनाभ्यासस्यैव त्वमोवरसाक्षात्कारपक्षत्वेन
लीकस्मिन्नुपपद्यते ।
Op. Cit. IV. 1. 1, p. 929.

139. ध्यानजसाक्षात्काराभ्युपगमो वाचस्पतेरेतत्सुत्रार्थमीयात् इति
हेमिचन्द्रयुक्तमुक्तम् । यतः -

अपि त्वंराधने सुखाच्छास्त्रार्थध्यानजा प्रमा ।
मास्त्रदृष्टिर्दृष्टा तां तु वेत्ति वाचस्पतिः परः ॥
VK, p. 21B.

140. तस्मान्निर्विचिकित्स्वावधार्यमावनापरिपाकतद्विषयमन्तःकरणं त्विषयस्य
अपरोक्षस्य तत्तदुपाध्याहारनिर्भयेन तत्पदार्थतामनुमावयतीति युवतम् ।
Bhā. I. 1. 1, p. 57.
141. तस्मादथा गान्धर्वास्त्रार्थानाम्वाताहितसंस्कारसचिद्व्योत्रेन्द्रियेण
क्षणादित्वरन्नागमूर्धना मेदमध्ययं अनुभवति, एवं वेदान्तार्थानाम्वाताहित-
संस्कारी जीवः स्वस्य प्रदमभावमन्तःकरणेन ।
Op. cit. I. 1. 1, p. 50.
CE. तस्यापि § विद्योदयस्यापि § प्रवृत्त्यनन्तर्गतापातनाजितसंस्कारसचिदादेव
वेतनः भावात् ।
Op. cit. I. 1. 4.
142. न तु प्रतीक्षानं स्वयं करणम् । तस्य क्वचिदपि
ज्ञानकरणत्वावसृप्तेः ।
SL3. III. p. 335.
143. कामातुरकाग्निनीसाधारस्कारादावपि प्रतीक्षानतद्वृत्तस्य जगत एव
करणावोपपत्त्या अवसृप्तज्ञानकरणान्तरकल्पनायोगात् ।
Ibid.
Here it should be strictly noted that the presenta-
tion of one's beloved in her actual absence is only
imaginary, as the object is actually absent; whereas
the direct experience of Brahman-Ātman is real one;
because its object is present everywhere, and because
meditation, aided by which the internal organ
produces that experience, is based on the solid
foundation of the Upanishadic texts.
144. CE. साधारस्कारस्यो हि विपर्ययः साधारस्कारस्यैव
तत्त्वज्ञानेन उच्छिद्यते, न तु परोक्षज्ञानेन ।
Bhā. I. 1. 1, p. 55.

145. नवैष साधारकारो मीनासासहितस्यापि शब्दस्य प्रमाणस्य फलं,
अपि तु प्रत्यक्षस्य, तस्यैव तत्फलस्यनियमात् । अन्यथा कुलज्जीवादिषु
वैद्यान्तरोत्पत्तिरसङ्गात् । तस्मान्निर्विनिमित्तत्वाव्याप्यभावात्-
परिपाकसहितमन्तःकरणं त्वयदार्थस्यापरोक्षस्य तत्तदुपाध्याकारनिर्देशेन
तत्पदार्थतामनुमावयतीति युक्तम् ।

Op. Cit. I. 1. 1, pp. 55-57.

146. तस्यैव न प्रथमसाधारकारः साधादागमयुक्तिरस्ति, अपि तु
पुनरागमस्यैवानाहितसंस्कारस्यैव चिरत्नेन प्रथमणि
साधारकारत्वती बुद्धिरिति समाधत्ते ।

Op. Cit. IV. 1. 2, p. 232.

147. The following remarks of Śaṅkarācārya, in this regard,
are noteworthy:-

*अप्रमथितः- स्वतोऽपरोक्षस्यापि प्रथमः परोक्षः प्रमथितम् ।
तत्र अपरोक्षमाकर्णणेन तत्साधारकारः । अन्तःकरणं यत्तद्विषये
आत्मनि जनयत्यर्थवृत्तिमिति सिद्धमस्यात्मन्यपरोक्षधीदेवत्वम् । तत्तु
शब्दजनितप्रथमात्मैक्यधीर्तत्तत्तिवागितं तत्पदलक्षणप्रथमात्मतां जीवस्य
साधारकार्यति, अत्रापि तु पूर्वानुमर्तस्कारवातितां ततोऽन्तोपनिमित्त-
विषयप्रत्यभिज्ञाहेतुः, शब्दस्तु नापरोक्षमाहेतुः स्तुप्तः, प्रमेयापरोक्ष-
योग्यत्वेन प्रमायाः साधारकारत्वे देहात्मैक्यविषयानुमितेरपि व्यापारितः,
दशमस्त्यमसीत्यत्रापि तत्तद्विवादधादेव साधारकारः, अथादेस्तु
परोक्षोरेव ।

साधादपरोधावित्येषमाकारेण धीः शब्दादुदेति, ननु परोक्षं प्रथमेति,
ता तु करणत्वमावात् परोधाऽवतिष्ठते न गुण इति त्वयदार्थम् ।

Vg. pp. 55-56.

148. एषोऽणुरात्मा वेतसा वेदितव्यः ।

Mund. Up. XII. 1. 9.

149. दुश्चरो रवग्रथया बुद्ध्या सुमया सुगदशिभिः ।

Ratha. Up. XII. 12.



150. तत्र ब्रह्मण एव सर्वतर्कविमुपादानत्वात् ब्रह्माकारशब्दप्रमाणजन्यविदनेऽपि तदभिन्नतया तज्जनकतया वा ब्रह्मापि प्रथममेव अपरोक्षतया अवभासते । तच्च चित्तस्य अतिसूक्ष्मे अनेकाग्रतादोषाद् विपर्ययतत्कारदोषाच्च प्रतिबद्धं भ्रान्त्या परोक्षदवभासते ।

HPV. Var. I. pp. 406-407.

151. तत्र अपरोक्षानुविद्यस्य यदादीनां गमादीनां निदिध्यासनादीनां च विद्यानामवर्थात्, यदादिनिर्वाहिकत्वमभ्युपगम्यते गमादिनिर्वाहविपरीत-प्रवृत्तिदोषं मननसंदर्भितप्रमेयादितर्मावनागुण्यदीषोज्ज्वलितं अतिसूक्ष्मतर-ब्रह्मविषयनिदिध्यासनप्रचयपरिनिर्मितलक्षणाग्रवृत्तिगुणं चित्तेन्द्रियं पारोक्ष्यविश्रुतिनिमित्तप्रतिबन्धनिरासेन शब्दादेव अपरोक्षविषयनिमित्तं भवतीति गम्यते । तौटे च अतिसूक्ष्मत्वान्निर्धारणे चित्तैकाग्र्यविशेषा-या दर्शनात् ।

Op. cit. Var. I. pp. 407-408.

152. तं त्वोपनिषद् पुरुषं वृत्तामि ।

Brh. Up. III. ix. 26.

GA. एवं च "तं त्वोपनिषद्गु" इति तद्विप्रत्ययेन ब्रह्मात्मगतिहेतुत्वं शब्दस्य दर्शितमुपपन्नं भवति ।

HPV. Var. I. p. 408.

153. उपनिषदस्यैव सम्यगवगतः पुरुष इति तद्विप्रत्ययार्थः ।

YPS. Var. I. p. 128.

The lokaṭhita suffixes are added to those words, which are already complete in sense (parmartha or pariniṣṭhita). Pāṇini's sūtra Ṣaṣ. 4.2.12 teaches the suffixes 'on' etc., which have senses other than those already taught in the previous sūtras. One of these senses is that in which the 'on' suffix is used in the word 'upaniṣad' - 'propounded in the Upaniṣads'. The sense, which the suffix has here, is 'that of being known' (avagatyaṭha).

154. अरौघस्यमावे वस्तुनि परोक्षज्ञानस्य विभ्रमत्वात्
तज्जनकत्वे शब्दस्य अग्रामाण्यं स्वादित्वर्थः ।
UTD. Var. I, p. 409.
155. CE. सैषिदापरोक्षं न करणविशेषोत्पत्तिनिवन्धनम्,
किन्तु प्रमेयविशेषनिवन्धनम् ।
UP. IX, p. 156.
156. CE. तथा च ब्रह्मणः प्रभातुजीवाभिन्नतया तद्गोचरं
शब्दजन्यं ज्ञानमप्यपरोक्षम् ।
101A.
157. दृष्टान्तोच्छेदिनी वात्य तदन्तोत्थादिना दुष्टम् ।
प्रतीतिं प्रतिष्ठातिः स्यान्नामी मानान्तराद् भेदः ॥

विज्ञातोद्देशं यदन्वयातिष्ठम्य ताम्यतः ।
तथमेव दशमोऽसीति दुष्यतिर्धं प्रमां वचः ॥
NA, III. 67-68.
158. दशमोऽसीति वाक्योत्था न धीरस्य पिहन्वतो ।
आदिमध्यावशात् न नवत्वस्य शेषः ॥

एवं तत्त्वमसीत्यस्माद् द्वैतनुत्पत्त्यगारमनि ।
तन्मध्यस्थातत्त्वमर्थस्य जायेतैव प्रमा दुष्टा ॥
NS, III. 69-70.
159. CE. BUDV. IV, 17, 799-821.
160. CE. UP. XVIII. 190-192, 225, 1. 341, and TP. IXX, p. 342.

CONCLUSIONS

Some fundamental doctrines of the sublime philosophy of Advaita as taught by Śaṅkara have been discussed in the preceding sections. Śaṅkara's disciples and followers successfully tried to elaborate further his teachings in a very convincing and marvellous manner and defend them from the attacks of the rival schools. One of the most vital and fundamental points of deep philosophical significance, on which the great Advaitic thinkers that followed Śaṅkara focus more attention, is the concept of avidyā. As avidyā is the basic concept through which the Advaita metaphysics, epistemology and ethical discipline are worked out, the critics of Advaita naturally attack this concept. So the later Advaitins had to give much importance to the defence of avidyā.

While discussing the nature of avidyā, an attempt has been made to clarify some essential points concerning the problem of avidyā with special reference to three illustrious Advaita preceptors, namely, Suresvara, Vācaspatiśāstra and Prakāśānanda. There is no difference of opinion among these preceptors regarding the positivity, indeterminability and beginninglessness of avidyā. Yet they differ among themselves as to the details pertaining to avidyā such as the

locus of avidyā, the relation of avidyā to Brahman, the question whether avidyā is one or many, and the nature of causality in respect of avidyā in bringing about the world-appearance.

Although all the above preceptors subscribe to the fundamental doctrine of non-difference between the jīva and Brahman, they hold different views over the mode in which the non-difference is to be explained. These views are - avyākhyāta-vāda, pratibhāta-vāda and ābhāsa-vāda, maintained and developed respectively by Vācaspatiśiṣṛa, Prakāśānanda and Śaṅkara. In his Śiṣyabodha-lakṣaṇa, Appaya Dīkṣita has recorded various such doctrinal differences upheld by the teachers of Advaita after Śaṅkara. But all these differences, which have appeared on the doctrinal side of Advaita, are merely the outcome of the strong application of logic. They are not extra additions contrary to the original principle of Advaita. Because all of them are intent on establishing the same Advaitic truth, and ultimately reach the same goal, as streams to the ocean. They never depart from the central thesis of Advaita that Brahman is real, the world of plurality is illusory and the jīva in its essential nature is non-different from Brahman, the Absolute.

The preceptors of post-śaṅkara Advaita adopt different modes of explaining the fundamental doctrines of their system in order to suit different tastes and temperaments. One mode of explanation, which is appealing and intelligible to one person, may not appear to be so to another. It is, therefore, quite open to any person to choose any particular mode of explanation that is appealing and intelligible to him in accordance with his taste and temperament. For attaining the firm knowledge of the non-difference between the jīva and Brahman, for example, one person may prefer avaccheda-vāda, another person may prefer pratibimba-vāda and some other may prefer ābhāsa-vāda. But every mode of explanation is equally valid in a particular context in the structure of Advaita insofar as it serves the purpose for which it is intended in that particular context.¹ Therefore, the adoption of various methods of explaining the central teaching of Advaita is in no way a defect but an ornament to the system.²

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1. CE. यथा यथा क्षेत्रे पुंता व्युत्पत्तिः प्रत्यगात्मनि ।
ता त्वे प्रक्रियेह स्यात् साध्या ता वान्यस्थिता ॥
BUSV I. 1v. 402.
2. CE. विवक्षितवस्तुप्रतिपत्त्युपायतया विद्वन्नानाप्रकारप्रदर्शने
आवायिणी न दोषाय भवति । किं तु उल्लेखाराधेय
भवति । प्रतिमातृणां प्रभावेयिष्येभ्य उच्यते प्रतिपत्तुः
केनपि प्रकारेण मुक्तितावन्तद्व्याप्त्येवञ्जानामात् ।
Myatkeśananda-Piṭha's Commentary on SLB
pp. 3-4.

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